Is the Military History of Frederick the Great and George Washington still relevant in the 21st Century?

The excellent reenactors of Prussian IR12, Erbprinz Hessen-Darmstadt

Dear Reader,

In the course of completing my Ph.D, I have the distinct pleasure of teaching the Modern Military History course at West Virginia University. Students always sign up for the class in large numbers, expecting to hear primarily about the Second World War, or even the Vietnam War. They are almost always disappointed to hear that to historians, "Modern" Military History includes much of Military History after 1500.

As I believe that students learn better when their instructor is passionate about the subject under study, I spend approximately two and a half weeks (of a sixteen week course) covering the Kabinettskriege era, with particular reference to the era between the War of Austrian Succession to the American War of Independence. Every semester, I ask students to write a paper, comparing two of the great military leaders of the eighteenth century. (It's not Frederick II and Washington every semester, in fact, I prefer reading essays about Charles XII and Maurice de Saxe). However, students are always surprised that I spend so much time on an era of limited war, where (at least in their mind) tactics and technology were relatively static. As a result, I am writing this post, attempting to defend what I see as an incredibly relevant period in military history for our own time. So, why is the era of Frederick II and George Washington still relevant in the 21st Century?

Washington by Peale, 1779

1. The conflicts of Frederick II and Washington form part of the "canon" of modern military thought, and the Military-Civil relationship in our own time. In order to understand that, we need to understand them. 

If you read On War, you will be astonished by the easy familiarity which Clausewitz possesses with the campaigns of Frederick II. To understand the mind which produced On War, we need to understand the conflicts of Frederick II as he did. The debates about the relationship between armies and societies which continue into our own time were happening albeit in a slightly different form, during the eighteenth century. In my observation, there is a gulf today in the United States between many soldiers and many civilians, and neither seem to understand the other, or even have a desire to do so. A reading of Charles Royster's A Revolutionary People at War, will reveal that the exact same debates were occurring in the fledgling United States during the American War of Independence. The army and the society became disconnected from one another during the course of the conflict, and began to actively dislike each other in cases.  In essence, an understanding of eighteenth-century warfare allows for a greater understanding of our own world.

2. Studying Eighteenth-Century Warfare demonstrates that while technology is important, adaptability is more important. 

There were a number of military technological improvements during the Kabinettskriege era,  including the French development of cooper-bottomed pontoon-bridges in the 1670s, the refinement of mortars, the artillery systems of Shuvalov and Gribeauval, the rifles of Isaac de la Chaumette and Patrick Ferguson, to name but a few. However, with the possible exception of the pontoon bridges, none of these technological inventions fundamentally changed the shape of warfare.

In the Seven Years War, Frederick II was faced by enemies with vastly superior artillery systems. The British, not the Americans, experimented with breechloading rifles under Ferguson. Indeed, technological experimentation does not always lead to decisive results. In the 1749, John Muller wrote to the Duke of Cumberland, arguing that

"The French, who are continually aiming at improvements [in their small arms] have succeeded no better than others; One should be surprised to find in their last establishments several things changed which were better before, and Mr. Belidor who takes great pains in making experiments has been very much mistaken in his account of the Chambers in Mortars[.]"[1]

Napoleonic Prussian Generals made much the same observation, after seeing the results of tests which showed that the older Frederician musket was more accurate than their modern replacement.

Though Frederick II was in many ways technologically inferior to his opponents, his willingness to adapt and learn from them proved one of his strengths, as the result of the Battle of Burkersdorf shows. Technology is not always the silver bullet, especially in an era of limited warfare. As the development of light troops shows us during this era, innovation was often more important than invention.

Frederick II, later 18th century, by J.H.C. Franke

3. In both the case of Frederick II and George Washington, greater material and manpower did not necessarily equate victory. 

Both the allies arrayed against Frederick II in the Seven Years War, and the British forces confronting George Washington the early American War of Independence put many more soldiers into the field, and had greater supporting and logistical forces at their disposal. This did not prevent both Frederick and Washington from achieving their political goals in the final outcome of the conflict (though Frederick's success is much more qualified than Washington's.) Both generals marched quickly, unexpectedly took the offensive and initiative from their opponents, knew when to dig in, and when to retreat, and learned from their many mistakes.

This is not a lesson that the American Civil War, or the First and Second World Wars teach particularly well. In these wars, powers with more resources had time to learn from their mistakes and eventually crush their opposition. Obviously, none of this was achieved superior resources alone. Russian operational maneuvering on the Eastern Front was quite good, particularly in the later stages of the Second World War, while the victories achieve by the Union army in the middle-western theater of the American Civil War were fairly consistent throughout the conflict.

Superior resources mattered in the eighteenth century as well, of course, but the successes of George Washington and other American leaders brought powerful allies (the French, Spanish, and Dutch), into the war, not the other way around. Likewise, successes which Frederick II achieved early in the Seven Years War allowed him breathing space to continue the fight as long as he did, until eventually, as a result of chance, the enemy alliance collapsed.

4. Studying an era where the "rules of engagement" were limited compared to the 20th Century encourages thought about the nature of warfare. 

We live in an age where compared with the mid-twentieth century, violence against civilians by regular forces is frowned upon, and at least officially discouraged. Civilians still suffer in war today, obviously, as they did in the eighteenth century, but compared with the mass blood letting of World Wars 1 and 2, and even Vietnam, modern standing armies attempt to cause less civilian casualties, or at the very least, claim that they attempt to cause less casualties. In that way, the eighteenth century may offer a window into our own time.

This point always causes controversy when brought up in the classroom, as many students prefer the thinking of William Tecumseh Sherman ("You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it") and Bomber Harris to the more seemingly more gentle nature of eighteenth-century war. Indeed, compare Sherman's statement above to Austrian Marshall Daun's: "The purpose of war is to push back the unrighteous enemy, not to exterminate the human race."

Frederick II of Prussia, a truly prickly and acidic man at times, delighted in the ransacking of Saxon noblemen's homes during the Seven Years War. Wars with British could turn particularly ugly when rebellion was involved, whether that rebellion was in Scotland in 1745 or in North America in 1775. However, none of the atrocities of the eighteenth century approach the sustained scale and magnitude of the Thirty Years War or the Napoleonic Wars, to say nothing of the industrialized death of the twentieth century.

 In recent years, as a result of the excellent work of historians such as John Childs, John Lynn, Erica Charters, Hannah Smith, Eva Rosenhaft, and others, there has been a vigorous debate about the exact nature of this "limitation" (if it can even be called that), but I would argue that the numbers tell a clear story. Fewer civilians died from conflict related causes during the 150 odd years of the Kabinettskriege era than died in the 50 odd years of the Thirty Years War and Napoleonic Wars. I don't think that we necessarily have a specific answer as to why that was the case. 

Reenactors portray British Forces in the American War of Independence

5. Studying the Eighteenth-Century Warfare is relevant, because, in a popular sense, it is still very badly understood. 

The misinformation abounds. You see false ideas everywhere regarding this era of history. People believe that uniforms were dangerous and impractical, that soldiers were only the dregs of society, that they were incredibly short, that soldiers did not aim, that firefights only occurred at 50 yards or less, that hand-to-hand combat was frequent,  that soldiers were unable to take cover, or fight independently outside linear formations. 

 6. In many ways, the conflicts of the Kabinettskriege era decisively shaped the course of modern history, the history of the era in which we live. 

It is impossible to understand the course of nineteenth and twentieth-century European History without understanding the wars of the eighteenth century. The Kabinettskriege era saw the beginning of so many stories which continued into our own time, or at the very least, continued into the twentieth century. It is impossible to understand the power of Napoleon's Empire without the stories of Vauban and Louis XVI, and the foreign policy disasters which caused the French Revolution.  It is impossible to understand the creation of the nineteenth-century nations of Germany and Italy without the success which Prussia and Savoy enjoyed in the eighteenth century. It is impossible to understand the rise of the British Empire as a global phenomenon without understanding the Seven Years War. It is impossible to understand the modern United States as a global power without the American War of Independence, and equally impossible to understand the story of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation without the reforms of Peter the Great, to say nothing of the generalship of Suvorov. It is impossible to understand the tragic history of Poland and the Polish people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without understanding the partitions of the late-eighteenth century. All of these are only reasons related to military history, to say nothing of the enlightenment and industrial revolution.

To some extent, this is true of every era. It is impossible to fully understand the eighteenth century without understanding the seventeenth century, etc. But, I must say, I am prejudiced and conceited enough towards my own field of study to argue that the eighteenth century deserves more of a share of attention than it currently enjoys in the public consciousness as we move into the third decade of the 21st century.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

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[1] Letter from John Muller at Woolrich to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, June 28th 1749.

Austrian and Prussian Items at Burg Forchtenstein

Officers Austrian Infantry Regiment 33 (Note the chaplain in the upper left)

Dear Reader,

Over the weekend, I had the distinct pleasure of being able to visit Burg Forchtenstein, just south of Vienna, near the border with Hungary. While there, I took the standard tour, and then as a result of the kindness of my guide, Zoltán Kacsmarik, was able to return to the eighteenth-century rooms for some additional photos.

Burg Forchtenstein from the Southwest

Prussian Enlisted Tent, with officers of Austrian Hussar Regiment Nr. 24 (Esterhazy)

Prussian Officer's Tent, captured 1758, front

Prussian Officer's Tent, captured 1758, interior

Plug Bayonet, late-17th/early 18th Century

More officers of Regiment 33, Austrian (Grenadier) Cartridge Pouches

Sword Belts, Late 18th Century/Napoleonic

Drum, Austrian, mid-to-late 18th Century

Sabertaches, Hussar Regiment 24 (?) Austrian, 18th Century

Artillery Train Wagon, late 18th century, likely Austrian

Various Prussian items, captured at Hochkirch, 1758

Austrian camp kettles and cartridge pouches, 1797 (?)

Like my recent post regarding the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, this is very much the highlight reel of my visit, I took over 260 photographs of mainly eighteenth-century items. I'll attempt to give a more full accounting when I return from Europe at the end of the summer.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

In the Service of Two Kings: Polish and Prussian Common Soldiers in the 18th Century (Part 1)

Painting of Polish soldiers by J. Ch. Mock,
"Kampament wojsk polskich i saskich pod Wilanowem w 1732 r.",
Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie.

Today, we have a post from Dr. Tomasz Karpinski, on Prussian and Polish common soldiers.[1] Few stories of common soldiers and their lives serving in either the Polish or Prussian Armies are passed down to us from written sources. It is not easy to follow someone's life. It is even harder if this person lived 250 years ago, especially when they failed to write anything down or leave behind a diary, a letter, or other writings. In these cases, still another way we can learn something more about common soldiers. This source is the Krixrecht or Kriegs-recht, or in simpler terms court martial records. 

Some time ago I discovered a very interesting article about former African-American slaves in Hessian service during war of American Revolutionary War. This brought me to learn about a very big database of soldiers served in "Hessian" units during that war. By curiosity I found out that also a few Poles served in the Hessian Landgrave’s Subsidientruppen army. It was strange to me that such men would choose hard service so far from home. But was the distance and their life choices really that exceptional? 

Over the next few weeks, I would like to describe the stories of 4 men that served in army of both Prussian and Polish armed forces. Their lives were simple and in many aspects still stand unknown to us, but understanding such lives is frequently the job of historians. The central basis for these stories are of course manuscripts of so called inquisitions - questioning and describing the criminal activities of those men, which have been in archives. Only a small fraction of these records survived the fires of the Second World War. Digging up these stories exposing them to the light of day allows us to understand a topic rarely examined by English-language historians, because of language barrier, etc. In today's post, we will examine the first of these four men: Michael Schultz.

Elbing in the 18th Century

Michał Szulc was of rather medium height, 73 1/2 inches (about 176,4 cm). Unfortunately we do not know how old he was. He joined the Polish Army, and had been recruited on the 24th December 1737 to the Prinz Foot Regiment, which stationed at this time in Elbing (Elbląg, PL). He served in company commanded by Lieutenant Baltazar Bystram, who was promoted to captain in 1740. As a younger inexperienced soldier, he was assigned to a musketeer company.

 In his court martial records, we read:

"... when he was at furloughed in Danzig (Gdańsk, PL), he secretly married a woman, and upon his return, he kept that secret until it was revealed. He then deserted to the King of Prussia on 21 April 1744 and joined Möllendorfs' Dragoons [DR6] o. He served (in this Prussian unit) for two years, and during “the grassing” (and eighteenth-century term for pasturing) he deserted [from that unit] and asked for a pardon (from the Polish Army), which he received and was returned to his previous company with another deserter named Both, and once again swore loyalty to articles of war by the flag. He received Tractament [XVIII Century "pay" name] and uniform regularly with the others, and after 4 months with together with musketeer Both and one more musketeer ran away during the night from the regiment. He crossed the wall and ditches and cost his company loss of his weapon and uniform. On 17th this month when one of the NCO's was returning from furlough from Danzig, [Schultz] has been seen in Elbling in a suburb by others soldiers of the Garrison, and was identified, captured and taken under arrest. By the inquisition he could bring nothing llogical for his defense, whereupon for his malicious desertion by the laws of war and 8th article accordingly he was sentenced to death by hanging."[2]

In the eighteenth-century, furlough was not something that everyone could acquire, and it was often denied to common soldiers for fear of their deserting. We do not know what had happened in Danzig, and what was the name of woman who Michael decided to marry. Michael likely chose to keep that fact a secret for financial reasons, since soldiers marriage usually required the permission of the Regimental Chef who needed to be paid off for such agreements (Ger. Frau-schein).Clearly Michael fell in love or was being reckless, not taking into consideration those obvious obstacles and made a promise he could not have kept. The girl lived quite a distance from city where Schultz served in the garrison. When the whole affair (if we can use this word?) finally came to light (maybe the girl came to search for her husband?) and Michael was afraid of punishment and fled to Prussia, also changing his branch of service from infantrymen to cavalrymen. Maybe Michael was born into military service or really enjoyed this way of living. It is unknown when Schultz joined Möllendorfs' Dragoon Regiment, nor if it was in 1744 soon after he deserted from Prinz Regiment and took part in War of Austrian Succession or he wandered some time before joined the army again. 

Schultz was likely born in Prussia (Not the kingdom, but the region in 18th century Poland),and he chose to join a regiment which had its quarters nearby at Königsberg (Królewiec, today Kaliningrad, RU). Soon after, he deserted from Prussian service as well, and was willing to rejoin the [Polish] Crown Army. The reasons might be lighter duty or less rigor - we cannot say for certain. He did not flee alone, but took with himself a friend named Both. Serving his Polish Majesty August III wasn’t exactly the stuff of dreams, and after 4 months three soldiers (Schultz, Both and one more musketeer) deserted again. For Schultz it was probably last time. Michael decided that military life had nothing more to offer, and he laid low as a civilian until he was caught in April 1751, 7 year after his first desertion. The treacherous musketeer who had sworn his loyalty twice (three times including Prussian service) was punished with the highest vigor, although it turns out Michael was not killed.

A portrait of General Goltz, Chef of Schultz's Regiment

The court martial had not yet finished with Michael, however Two months after being captured and convicted he was sent deep into territory to Poland to Częstochowa (PL):

"As regards to convicted Michael Schullza, although for double desertion the holy Krixrechts recommends the gibbet, which is a just punishment for this crime, I will give him his life, but for the first 3 Fridays he shall run the gauntlet of 200 men 10 times, and after that pro comendo caput general major de Goltz has ordered for this Schultz to be sent to Fortress Częstochowa under secure guard, so he is unable to desert again. After running the gauntlet he will serve in this prison [working with a barrow] 1 year and 6 weeks after which He can rejoin his regiment or not."[3] 

This is the last trace of Michael Schultz in the documentary record. Over the next few weeks, we will examine of the lives of three more such common soldiers from court martial records. If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,


Dr. Tomasz Karpinksi

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[1] Dr. Tomasz Karpinksi works as an archivist in Poznań. He has published on the Prussian and Polish armies of the eighteenth-century, and works to promote knowledge regarding military cultures in the ancien régime. 

[2]Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Branickich z Rosi, Militaria,  Pudło 7, plik 3;

[3]Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Branickich z Rosi, Militaria,  Pudło 9, plik 7;       

Young Historian Spotlight: Ben Olex

Ben Olex, giving a presentation to visitors at the Stony Point Battlefield and Lighthouse

Today, we are continuing with the second of a series of interviews with a number of young historians. By the time this series concludes in early November, we will have heard from Jack Weaver, Andrew Warren, Ben Olex, Casey Hill, Samantha Sproviero, and Davis Tierney. All of these individuals are broadly interested in the Kabinettskriege era, and have been selected as a result of recent promotion, impending graduate school applications, or work recently begun in graduate school or at a historic site. Today's young historian Ben Olex, a gifted young historian interested in naval affairs. Ben has worked as an historic interpreter at Stony Point, is currently in the process of applying to graduate programs, and has a forthcoming article on the American War of Independence in coastal areas.  

Alexander Burns : What drew you to study the history in this era? In 2018, much of popular memory of military history in the United States is focused on World War 1, World War 2, and the Vietnam War. What about the history of the 1688-1815 era do you find so compelling?

Ben Olex[1]: I have always had a fascination with ships.  When I was younger it was more challenging to understand the maritime world of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, since it is so different from our own, so I stuck to landborn military topics for a while.  When I reached the age that I could begin really comprehending naval history, I found it totally engrossing. With regards to why 20^th century conflicts are so interesting,  I believe that modern wars are more easily understood by modern people.  Many people alive today grew up with grandparents or great grandparents that fought in a world war.  For those who did not, photographs and videos are available, which makes it easier to connect with the experiences of those wars. As for the eighteenth-century, it is hard to say why I am so drawn to this period.  Something about it just fascinates me.  

AB: Is there a particular person, conflict, event, or geographical setting which draws you to this era?

BO:  I am really torn between the American War for Independence and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (if I’m allowed to lump them all together).  Since I work at a Revolutionary War battlefield it really brings home that connection for me.  When it comes to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars I am much more interested in the naval aspects of the war.  These wars represented over twenty years of almost incessant fighting around the world and it was the navy that brought that war to the Cape of Good Hope or the Caribbean, for example.  It is also arguably the golden age of the Royal Navy.  The Royal Navy was one of the largest institutions in Britain, if you take into account the dockyards etc.  I think the effect that the Navy had upon the war and Britain itself is very intriguing.

AB: How do you plan to continue your research into this era? Many of you have been employed in public history settings, or are currently applying to graduate programs. Why have you chosen your particular path?

Ben as a historical interpreter at Stony Point

BO:  I am currently in the process of applying to graduate school.  At the same time I’m trying to  research a little into some of the events on the Hudson River surrounding the Battle of Stony Point, where I currently work as a public historian.  I originally went to college to be a highschool-level history teacher.  After completing my  my student teaching,  I realized that I would prefer to teach at a higher level, so I am returning to my education, in order to hopefully teach at the university level.

AB: Ben, you have a forthcoming article about floating batteries, tell us a bit about more about your interest in the conflict along the Hudson during the American War of Independence. How did the combatants try to control the river?

BO:  Absolutely!  So one of the main interests I’ve had while working at Stony Point concerns sa type  of gunboat that guarded the left flank of the fort.  If you look up a map of the battle you can see that Stony Point is a sort of peninsula that juts out into the Hudson River.  The American plan for the battle consisted of two columns attacking both flanks of the fort with bayonets only at night.  So the American right column would have come into contact with this gunboat, and presumably the ensuing fight would have alerted the fort sooner to the American attack or at the very least have slowed the American attack.  The problem was that the gunboat just wasn’t there.  We know that it was absent from its post very often, but no one knows why or where it went. So the more I looked into this as an interpreter at Stony Point, the more I realized that there wasn’t really a satisfactory answer for it.  Therefore, the goal of my article is to try to bring as much information as is available about this gunboat and put it in one place and use it to try to answer as many questions as possible.  For example, I try to look at other examples of gunboats during the war, most notably on Lake Champlain in 1776 and try to see if they might have been similar to the vessel at Stony Point.  My other goal is to dispel the idea that the gunboat was actually the British row-galley Cornwallis.  I’ve just about finished the article now. This is only an article length treatment, and there is much work left to do, but hopefully it can clear up some of the confusion around this critical part of the battle.  With regard to your second question, I would say yes.  In researching this topic I was able to see a lot of how the relationship between land and naval forces works, (or sometimes doesn’t work!)

AB: What have you been reading, recently? Could you recommend one book on your topic of interest, or any recent work on the era?

BO:  At this moment I am reading a biography of King George III, appropriately titled King George III by John Brooke.  I always wanted to read more about him since he is frequently portrayed as the enemy of the Revolution.  I’m very interested to see to what extent he was involved in the war and the lead up to it.  Before that I was reading a book exploring warfare from the 1600’s to 1815 called The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo by Russell F. Weigley.  If I had to recommend a book about naval history I think I would recommend Jack Tar: Life in Nelson’s Navy by Roy and Lesley Adkins.  It explores the life of regular sailors in the Royal Navy, a topic which can be hard to find information on.  To understand the how the navy functions I think it is imperative to understand the common sailors.

AB: What do you think of Russ Weigley’s book? It is an older work, but an ambitious attempt to synthesize a wide period of European military history. Have you ever looked at N.A.M. Rodger’s The Wooden World?

BO:   I would definitely agree Weigley’s book is rather ambitious.  I found the premise rather interesting, and he makes some interesting points.  I think at some times he jumps to conclusions with certain leaders or battles.  Nonetheless I thought it was a good book, one that takes a wide look at this era of military history.  I am currently in possession of a copy of The Wooden World.  I was planning on reading it this summer, but unfortunately time got away from me.

AB: That sounds good! Thanks so much for taking the time for this interview! I look forward to talking with you more in the future.

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[1] Ben Olex is a recent graduate of Ramapo College of New Jersey where he received a bachelor's degree in history and a secondary education certification. He is currently an interpreter at Stony Point Battlefield and Lighthouse in Stony Point, New York. Ben is currently in the process of applying for graduate school, and eventually plans to earn his Ph.D in History. His current research interests include the experience of war in coastal areas, British naval history in the 18th and 19th centuries, the American Revolution and Civil War.      

How Impractical were Eighteenth-Century Soldiers' Uniforms?

Were eighteenth-century uniforms laughably impractical?

Dear Reader,

 When discussing the aesthetics of the eighteenth century, people often comment on the garish nature of military clothing. On the surface, it may seem that the wars of the eighteenth century were "wars in lace," and the period was "a decorative interval."[1] Uniforms are often used as a piece of evidence to assert that eighteenth-century warfare was inefficient, formalized, and foppish. According to some historians: "In general, an ancien regime [eighteenth-century] army was a slow and unwieldy mass of disgruntled and terrorized soldiers led by untrained and unimaginative officers."[2]  Were these conflicts "wars in lace," with all of the baggage that term implies?

Once again, as I write this post, I am greatly indebted to other historians and researchers who have examined this subject. Individuals such as Mark Canady, Henry Cooke, Daniel Hohrath, Neal Hurst, Phillip Katcher, Tomasz Karpinksi, Matt Keagle, William Koker, Tim Logue, Joseph Malit, Steve Rayner,  Hew Strachan, and Rob Welch, have spent much of their time researching and reconstructing eighteenth-century military garments. Though I have researched uniforms in a cursory way, I will never understand eighteenth-century military clothing in the painstaking way these individuals have.

So, how ostentatious and formal was eighteenth-century military clothing? Did soldiers truly fight bewigged in scarlet splendor?   Did uniforms hamper the ability of European soldiers to effectively wage war? Did brightly colored uniforms make men targets? Did these uniforms restrict the range of motion enjoyed by the soldiers? Was the available clothing bad for soldier's health, freezing or overheating them? Finally, did armies adapt their clothing to local needs and conditions?

The blue faced-red coats of the Continentals were inspired by European fashion

It is often said, particularly by Americans, that the bright red uniforms of the British regular infantry made them easy targets, to be individually picked out by American riflemen. Although this may true in very specific cases, by and large, the American War of Independence was not fought by drab colored riflemen. Rather, it was a war fought by men wearing brightly colored coats with (aim-able) smoothbore weapons. While the British were wearing their trademark red, the American medley of colors in the early war was increasingly replaced by blue uniforms or white/grey hunting shirts after 1780. Very few of the American uniforms were intentionally designed to camouflage the individual wearer.

Soldier's carried small field guides in order to identify
enemy units based on uniform details

Why would this be the case? Generals favored highly visible and identifiable uniforms because they allowed troops to be recognized, controlled, and moved. Units wore brightly colored coats, and different colored lapels and turnbacks (coat tails or skirts) allowed for officers and men to distinguish between different units of the same army.  Soldiers and officers effectively utilized their clothing and equipment in order to fight as efficiently as possible. Ironically enough, it is only after the Seven Years' War that some European armies became so infatuated with their perception of the external trappings of the Prussian army. Thus, in the late eighteenth century, produced some officers who argued for formality without function. They would have been rather out of place in the Europe of 1757, or the North America of 1777.

Come on, guys

What about the powdered wigs, you ask?? Can we truly respect any army that fought in powdered wigs? Although hair powder was very popular, and worn by soldiers, by the middle of the eighteenth-century, soldiers preferred to wair their own hair, not wigs.[3] This preference can be seen in the writings of Thomas Hughes of the 53rd Regiment, in September of 1778:

"I am recovering very fast and make no doubt shall be perfectly well... the only disagreeable consequence attending his sickness is the loss of my hair, which comes out by hand-fulls. I hope it will not all fall out-- what a horrid old-fashioned figure shall I make in a wig. I shall be taken for the resurrection of one of Queen Anne's soldiers."[4]

In addition to wearing their own hair, British soldiers in North American cut their hair short a number of times in the eighteenth-century, notably in the mid-French and Indian War, and early American War of Independence. If soldiers wore their own hair, were their brightly colored uniforms restrictive?

A German Jaeger in the American War

Clothing in various eighteenth-century militaries was undoubtedly more restrictive of movement than military clothing after the mid-nineteenth century. Having worn replica British and Germanic clothing of this era, as well as British and German military clothing from the 1980s-1990s, there is definitely a difference in range of motion. The improvement in the design, construction, material, and increase in efficiency is indeed noticeable.  With all that said, I would argue that the clothing of eighteenth-century soldiers did not greatly hamper their efficiency in combat. Though still an intensely physical experience, eighteenth-century combat was on average less physically demanding than combat today. In an example of this logic, Christopher Duffy asserts that loads in the eighteenth-century averaged about 60 pounds, while modern soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan carry around 120+ pounds.[5]  Despite this, eighteenth-century warfare could still be incredibly physically demanding, as the 12 mile run of the 45th Grenadiers from Philadelphia to Germantown shows us. Likewise, Prinz Henri and his army marched almost 100 miles during three days in August of 1760.

Officers and soldiers were concerned with the functionality and durability of the garments fighting men wore. After the Seven Years' War, the Prussian Army completed the transition to woolen gaiters as a result of their functionality. General Schmettau reported:

"The Gaiters: They had formerly been made out of twill, but it is better that they be made out of cloth, experience has taught us that these are warmer and lay better, so that the soldier looks more orderly, therefore, they have been almost universally adopted. Although they cost twice as much as the others, they only need to be issued once a year, because they are much more durable than the others, and the company proprietors prefer to issue something that looks better."[6]

British troops buttoning their coats in cold weather

In addition, officers and soldiers often made common-sense decisions regarding clothing with regards to weather and terrain. Soldiers' buttoned their coats over while in cold or rainy weather, and regimental tailors were instructed to make sure this was possible.[7] The Russian and Swedish armies discarded their regimental coats in summer, fighting in sleeved waistcoats. Furthermore, during particularly hot summers, troops would remove yet more clothing. Pvt. Hoppe of Fusilier Regiment Alt-Kreytzen reported:

On August 20th, we set up camp at the town of Reppen, where we were allowed to take off our clothes.This we did, but our repose did not last long, since the enemy concentrated at Zorndorf, two hours beyond Kustrin on the other side of the Oder. So the order came in the night that we should break up quickly and put our gaiters into our haversacks.[8] 

The summer heat in 1758 caused numerous problems

If soldiers changed what garments they wore as a result of local conditions, it should not surprise us that they also modified the garments themselves. Again, the British Army adapted to local conditions in this way, cutting down hats and coats during the 1758 campaign in North America, and also merged local native legwear with the European gaiter. Gaitered Trowzers, or overalls, were largely born out of North American experience.

British Infantry wearing gaitered trowzers

Finally, it is indisputable that soldiers cared a great deal about their uniforms, even the minor details. Period treatises such as Cuthbertson make it clear that officers cared a great deal about the uniforms of their men. Uniform details often became wrapped up in matters of honor, and as a result, ordinary soldiers also cared about them a great deal. In 1787, when the second Battalion of the Royal Highland Regiment was to be designated the 73rd Regiment, the men complained that they would lose their royal facings (a deep blue color.) Norman Macleod reported:

"I embrace this opportunity of sending you a Return of it, and of giving you a full account of its present state...I shall now speak of the clothing. As the Reg’t we had the honour to have Royal Facings from the beginning and have done nothing to forfeit that honour, but on the contrary has been distinguished by brave behaviour, and severe sufferings, it hopes that tho separated from the Fourty Second, it will still be a Royal Highland Regt. It is not easy for me to express the anxiety felt on this account by the whole corps. The officers certainly fell is as a point of honour, and on a mischievous report being raised that the facings were to be changed, the men loudly expressed their grief and rage. I must therefore earnestly recommend this point to your most serious consideration."[9]

We should be careful not to conflate the honor and pride felt as a result uniform distinctions with an idea that eighteenth-century conflicts were somehow more garish, and less serious, than later wars. These "wars in lace" were deadly serious for the men who took part.  To some extent, the tactics and ideas of eighteenth-century soldiers should look antiquated, that is not surprising.  Let us see how our own military is judged two hundred years in the future.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


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[1] Alexander Martin, "The Last “War in Lace” or the First “Total War”?" Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, vol. 15 no. 2, 2014, pp. 293-301. Christopher Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 3.
[2] Andrew R. Wilson, "Master's of War: History's Great Strategic Thinkers" (lecture, The Great Courses, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island).
[3] Soldiers would occasionally protest if not provided money for hair-powder. See Bill Potter, Redcoats on the Frontier, MA Thesis, Murray State University.
[4] Thomas Hughes, A Journal by Thomas Hughes, 41.
[5] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 168.; https://protonex.com/blog/what-do-soldiers-carry-and-whats-its-weight/.
[6] Fredrich Wilhelm von Schemttau, Einrichtung des Krieges-Wesens für die Preussische Infanterie zu Friedens-Zetien, 209. (Page number is from 2016 reprinting)
[7] Reglement für die Königl. Preussische Infanterie, 498. (Fawcitt, Regulations for the Prussian Infantry, 409.)
[8] Anon., Offizier-Lesebuch, Historisch-militärischen Inhalts, Mit Untermischten Interessanten Anekdoten, Von Einer Gesellschafts Militärischer Freunde (Berlin: C. Matzdorff's Buchhandlung, 1793), 180-1.
[9]MacLeod, Norman. “Letter From Col McLeod to the Col of the 73rd. 1787.” Dunvegan Castle: NRAS 2950, Section 4, #752.

How Effective was Artillery in the Kabinettskriege Era?

Reenactors portray Royal Artillerymen at Brandywine

Dear Reader,

Today we are going to examine the effectiveness of an important branch of service in eighteenth-century armies: the artillery. There is a seeming contrast of information regarding the accuracy of cannons in the eighteenth century. Just how effective was artillery on the battlefield during this period of history? Allow me open with two anecdotes to illustrate this point. In the first anecdote, Frederick II "the Great", took a careful interest in the disposition of one of his guns, aiming it and hitting the target.

"'There you are,' said the king, 'you don't bother to aim properly, otherwise you would have hit it.

'You can't always rely on it,' said a veteran gunner.

'Just let me show you!', riposted the king, and he aimed the cannon once again. They fired the gun, and this time the ball followed a totally different path."[1] 

Here, we see the random and unpredictable nature of eighteenth-century artillery and the micro-managing aspects of Frederick's personality.  In the second anecdote, a trained professional, Bombardier Kretschmer, is a bit more consistent:

"General Saldern, seeing the damage caused by the enemy battery, rode up to our gunners. 'Bombardiers' he said, 'if you can knock out those guns, I'll give you 10 Thalers.' [5 months wages for an enlisted man] Our bombardier, named Kretschmer...replied, "General, it won't take long." His first howitzer shell landed in front of the battery, forcing the Austrian gunners to fall back for a moment, giving us time for another shot. With this second shot, Kretschmer hit the Imperial ammunition caisson... now the enemy left their battery. The general immediately reached into his pocket and gave Kretschmer [his reward], saying, "that was a good hit."[2] 

In the first example, cannon fire seems almost random, even if the artillery is being carefully aimed. In the second, skilled gunners conduct accurate and devastating counter-battery fire. Which is more representative of Kabinettskriege artillery?

Reenactors fire a Prussian 12-pound cannon

In answering this question, we turn to a number of well-respected authorities. Christopher Duffy, as always, provides a great mass of material on European armies of the mid-eighteenth century. For those interested in the technical aspects of cannon during the Seven Years' War, there is no better source than Christian Rogge's blog on the subject. In English during this period, it was common to refer to artillery as "guns," and I do so several times in this post. So: how accurate and effective was eighteenth-century artillery?

In brief, artillery was quite effective, even out to 800 yards, if firing at large bodies of men.  When targeting single individuals, or troops using cover and concealment, artillery was somewhat less effective, particularly during the American War of Independence.  In addition, throughout the period, as a result of Austrian and French artillery reforms, artillery became more effective.

Although perhaps comparatively less effective than rifled artillery in the mid-nineteenth century, cannons still played a dominant role on Kabinettskriege battlefields, particularly in the latter portion of the period. The Swedish Army of Charles XII did not value artillery, perhaps as much as it should have. Relying on swift-movement and aggressive tactics to win the day, Charles and his army took four cannons with them to the battlefield at Poltava, compared with the Russian eighty-six. Charles should not suffer to much blame, as many military theorists undervalued artillery, particularly in the early and mid-Kabinettskriege era.

Prussian Artillerymen from the Von Schmalen studies

Eighteenth-century military observers often undervalued the role of their cannon, leading to statements such as Mauvillon's comment, "cannon fire does no great damage during a battle, and that it is a proverb among our military men that you have to be specifically foredoomed if you are to die of a cannon shot...".[3] Such statements by military intellectuals ignore the power of cannon on the battlefield, even before 1750.  Sampson Staniforth, a common soldier in the British Army, recalled his experience at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745:

"And in the mean time, the French batteries playing upon us, did us much hurt. We wheeled off, in order to get into the plains of Fontenoy. I had not marched far before we met a horse without his rider, and the lower part of his head taken off by a cannon-ball. A little after, I saw one of the guards lie dead ; and soon after, many more. We still advanced, and drew up in line of battle, in the plain of Fontenoy. The French before us were intrenched up to the neck, and many batteries of cannon were playing upon us. I was in the front rank, and the left-hand man joining the Dutch. We stood there, till the Dutch turned their backs and marched away. I was then left exposed to a battery on the left, and the batteries and small arms in the front. Soon after our regiment, with some others, were ordered to advance and attack the French in their trenches. We marched up boldly; but when we came close to the town of Fountenoy, we observed a large battery ready to be opened on us. And the cannon were loaded with small bullets, nails, and pieces of old iron. We had orders to lie down on the ground; but for all that, many were wounded, and some killed."[4]

 How can we account for this discrepancy between theory and practice? To a large, Mauvillon is correct that very few infantry were killed by solid-shot (non-explosive "cannon-balls") while advancing in line. These balls could be effective out to 900 yards, as they were at the Battle of Torgau. Howitzers sometimes fired explosive shells which could affect a large area. Artillery fire killed a much larger number of men when the gunners began to use canister: large numbers of smaller balls which turned the cannon into a giant shotgun. This type of ammunition became increasingly effective at under 300 yards, still outside the optimum range of musket-fire. Christopher Duffy asserts that " Canister was the tactical equivalent of machine gun fire, and in the Seven Years War it probably inflicted more casualties on the Prussian infantry than any other weapon."[5]

 Canister fire sometimes was able to repel large bodies of enemy infantry, even when the artillerymen in question were unsupported by friendly infantry. Captain Georg Pausch found himself in this rather unenviable position during the second battle at Saratoga in 1777: the Battle of Bemis Heights.  Pausch's two cannons kept up a heavy fire on the enemy, even as his infantry support collapsed:

"Now I and my cannons... held the respect of the enemy, who was before me, with cartridges for some time. How long the infantry left me alone, I cannot say with certainty.... [we] began firing alternately with canister and balls, whatever the piece would take...[the enemy] pushed forward vigorously towards my cannons, in the hope of silencing them. This effort failed twice, and was prevented by firing canister. Two cart-loads of ammunition were fired by my cannons, and I had started on the third. My cannons were so hot that no one could place a hand thereon."[6]

Pausch and his gunners were eventually overrun in the process of trying to move the guns to a safer position. Canister, then, even if only fired by two six-pound cannons, was capable of delaying enemy infantry.

Even firing round shot at longer ranges could have a devastating effect if enough cannons were present. The only example of a great infantry assault knocked back primarily by artillery, à la Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, comes at the Battle of Torgau in 1760. 10 battalions of Prussian grenadiers emerged from the woods in front of the Austrian Army and were quickly devastated by the firepower of massed Austrian guns. As a result of their reforms from the 1750s, the Austrian artillery system was probably the best of the eighteenth century. Frederick the Great agreed with this assessment, saying that the Austrian artillery was, 'as fine as it can possibly be."[7] Although it is possible that the Prussians took 24,000 casualties in the whole of this battle, 5,000 men were cut down in the first half-hour of this initial infantry assault.[8] This figure is astounding because the Austrians were firing round shot at over 800 paces rather than canister at close range. The exact number of cannons involved in the bombardment is unclear, but the Austrian army as a whole had 275 guns at this battle.

Temporary Matrosses on loan from the King's Regiment

When massed, or firing canister, cannons could knock back infantry assaults. They were also especially deadly when the enemy was formed in marching columns or the guns managed to fire on the flanks opposing troops. At St. Lucia in 1778, British Lt. Colonel Francis Downman had an ideal target for his guns:

"We are well in formed that the French did not lose less than 2,000 men during their stay on shore, and a very great number of them by cannon shot. The battery I had the honour to command on the attack of the 18th, did great execution. I received the thanks of Generals Grant and Medows, the latter called me his best ally. I had a fine situation for galling the French army as they marched to the attack in columns, I had them then charmingly, and while forming, and after being formed, and also in their retreat. I kept up as heavy a fire as I could on their flank which was presented to me the greatest part of the action. My shot in this situation swept them off by the dozens at a time, and Frenchmen's heads and legs were as plenty and much cheaper than sheep's heads and trotters in Scotland. Three of my guns were cracked during the action, one of them is rendered totally inservicable, the others will do at a pinch."[9]

Cannons did indeed suffer malfunction if used heavily, as both Pausch and Downman indicate. Despite this, artillery could be safely be fired twice a minute. Christopher Duffy asserts that the Austrians could safely fire four rounds a minute: as fast if not faster than a musket. [10] Eighteenth-century gunners were aware of the need to fire quickly: at Bemis Heights, Georg Pausch noted that his guns were not overrun because he guns made three shots for every one fired by British twelve pounders nearby.[11]

A Sargeant of the King's Regiment aims a gun at Fort Niagara

Gunners were often, as we saw with Bombardier Kretschmer above, called upon to duel with their opposite numbers. Various military authorities have strong opinions on counter-battery fire. Frederick the Great appears to have encouraged it in the 1750s, but wrote against it in the 1780s.[12] The American guns at the Battle of Brandywine appear to have engaged in extensive counter-battery fire, particularly while covering the retreat of troops late in the day.[13]

So- having shown that guns could be effective in some circumstances: let us move to moments when they were not: against individual targets, or against dispersed groups of soldiers in concealed positions. Sometimes, cannons could be used against individuals. Famously, King William III of England was slightly wounded by a cannon shot just before the Battle of the Boyne. However, I can think of nothing comparable to the veritable assassination of Leonidas Polk by rifled artillery in the American Civil War. Against troops in concealment or rifle-armed troops, gunners could swiftly run into trouble. In the Battle of Freeman's Farm, Lt. James Hadden lost 19 of his 22 gunners to enemy fire. When enemy troops were not on the advance, or in open terrain, artillerists struggled to destroy the enemy, or even drive them from concealment.

Reenactors portray Royal Artillerymen

Infantrymen knew that gunners were perhaps their greatest foe on the battlefield, and often took steps to preserve themselves. Throughout the eighteenth century, British troops frequently laid down under artillery fire, a practice which may have been adopted by the Russian Corps of Observation at Kunersdorf in 1759. It is possible that the Prussians used a different method to avoid artillery fire: continuous movement. During a rearguard action at Hochkirch in 1758, General Saldern,

"caused the regiments to move to the right or left whenever he saw cannon shot falling among them. In this advantageous manner, he made the retreat in a sort of zig-zag motion and lost barely 130 men in the retreat, notwithstanding the overpowering enemy and hail of bullets... Saldern's eyes were always moving between the enemy, the regiments, the surrounding terrain, and a place of safety and order."[14] 

Despite these measures, artillery remained a decisive force on eighteenth-century battlefields, possibly causing more casualties than any other branch of service during the Seven Years' War. Kabinettskriege artillery, far from adding dignity to an ugly brawl, added to the violence and chaos of already indescribable battlefields.

Thanks for Reading,




Alex Burns



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[1] Anonymous, Beträge zu dem Anecdoten, 17. (Translation is Christopher Duffy's.)
[2] Ernst von Barsewisch, Meine Kriegs-Erliebnisse, 115-6.
[3] Mauvillon, Histoire de la derniere guerre de Boheme, Vol II, 101. (Translation is Duffy's.)
[4] Thomas Jackson, Lives of the Early Methodist Preachers,  Vol IV,  125.
[5] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 217.
[6] Georg Pausch, Georg Pausch's Journal and Reports of the Campaign in North America, 87-89.
[7] Duffy, Instrument of War, 290.
[8] Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 303.
[9] Downman, The Services of Lieut.-Colonel Francis Downman, 105.
[10] Duffy, Instrument of War, 290.
[11] Pausch, Journal, 87.
[12] Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 184.
[13] Downman, Services, 33.
[14] Carl Daniel Küster, Characterzüge des Preussichen General-Lieutenants von Saldern, 12-13.