Sunday, February 5, 2017

Book Review: Motivation in War by Ilya Berkovich

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Cover Art for Motivation in War

Dear Readers,

Today, we are going to look at the first major book of a younger historian of eighteenth-century conflict: Dr. Ilya Berkovich. Berkovich has impeccable academic credentials. He worked closely with Dr. Timothy Blanning at Cambridge and received advice from Dr. Christopher Duffy in the course of his studies.  Motivation in War examines the rationale for enlistment, reasons for continued service, and motivation in combat of eighteenth-century soldiers. In this framework, Berkovich uses the model of historian John Lynn's older but standard work, Bayonets of the Republic. Berkovich argues that soldiers, "embraced a unique corporate identity based on military professionalism, forceful masculinity, and hostility towards civilians." In the following review, I will evaluate the book on two levels. First, how successful is Berkovich at proving the main argument of his work? Second, how approachable is this book as a work of historical scholarship? In essence, does Berkovich show his due diligence as a scholar, and is his work readable for a general audience? 

In the first category, Berkovich succeeds admirably. He marshalls close to 250 primary sources from common soldiers of the eighteenth century, some of them previously unknown to historians such as Christopher Duffy. Although utilizing new material, Berkovich also efficiently examines known published accounts, gleaning new details from the older source material.

Motivation in War also demonstrates an intimate familiarity with the secondary literature on combat motivation, citing both eighteenth-century specialists such as Duffy, Lynn, and Nosworthy, in addition to more modern ways of thinking such as Marshall, Stouffer, Shils and Jannowitz's contributions to thinking about the primary group. Particularly, Berkovich follows in the footsteps of Sascha Möbius, Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind?, an important 2007 study which turns the famous quote of Frederick the Great, that men should be more afraid of their officers than the enemy, on its head. Surprisingly, Marcus von Salisch's recent Treue Deserteure: Das kursächsische Militär und der Siebenjährige Krieg is not cited.

Berkovich successfully shows that desertion was not an insurmountable obstacle for eighteenth-century armies. He also demonstrates the nuanced nature of military punishment and its effects on soldiers. However, Dr. Berkovich briefly overstates his case when arguing that soldiers created an identity for themselves in opposition to civilian life, and more importantly, that this resulted in violent actions towards civilians. Certainly, this occurred in the eighteenth century, but it was not necessarily the norm. Gemeine Hoppe, a Fusilier in the Alt-Kretzyen regiment, had this to say about his feelings towards civilians during the 1758 Zorndorf campaign: 

“We were all smoldering with anger over the destruction of Küstrin and the sufferings of the poor country people. The enemy had wasted and destroyed everything, and even broken into churches and robbed them. The poor farmers were scattered over the woods and fields like sheep with their wives and children. The children were crying for bread, so we gave them most of our rations, for which they brought us water in return.”

Hoppe's relation demonstrates a familiarity and reciprocal understanding of the suffering of civilians during wartime. In Hoppe's view, both Prussian civilians and soldiers worked together against a common enemy. His relation is all the more telling because Hoppe was not a native Prussian, he was a foreign-born ethnic German serving in the Prussian army. Other frequently cited common soldiers, such as Roger Lamb, also recorded their experience with civilians in mixed terms. It is undeniable that officers encouraged their men to stand apart from the norms of civilian life, but eighteenth-century soldiers rarely embraced an open hostility towards the civilians of their own nations.

Aside from this minor quibbling, Berkovich contributes an outstanding volume to the growing literature on eighteenth-century common soldiers. His work is quite successful as a scholarly monograph.  

In this second area of evaluation, approachability Motivation in War falls slightly short of the mark. Although doubtless interesting for specialists in the field, Berkovich uses a large amount of academic jargon in this work. For example, on page 10: 

"The claim for novelty of the current model is that it considers these two theories within a single matrix which defines the components of motivation. Although the subdivision of such a complex subject is artificial, it allows for the formation of distinct analytic categories which can be applied systematically, helping to counterbalance the anecdotal nature of the narrative sources and their authors' choice of incident and choice of language."

Although fascinating for an academic and interested reader, this type of writing may push away a more general audience. Berkovich's use of precise and exacting terminology is admirable, especially as English is not his first language, but this is still a potential drawback of the work, which often reads more like a dissertation. Finally, although Berkovich draws on an astounding number of narrative sources, the reader rarely becomes familiar with them as individuals, and their writing is rarely reproduced at length. All of these criticisms fall away when the book is evaluated as an academic monograph, and not a work of history intended for a wide audience. 

For anyone interested in the soldiers of the eighteenth century, this book is required reading. Historians, soldiers, reenactors, and wargamers could all learn from Berkovich's powerfully argued work. The eighteenth-century myth of a cowed group of hapless conscripts being driven into combat by cane-wielding officers is no longer tenable: Motivation in War has destroyed it.

If you are interested, you can find it available for purchase here.


Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns 

Tuesday, September 13, 2016

Sampson Staniforth at the Battle of Fontenoy

A Romantic Imagining of Fontenoy
Sampson Staniforth, a twenty-five year old British soldier fought at the Battle of Fontenoy on May 11th, 1745. This battle was a key French victory in the War of Austrian Succession. AlThough he did not specify his regiment, circumstantial evidence suggests that Staniforth may have served in the 20th Regiment of Foot (Bligh's). He later worked as a Methodist preacher, and his recollections of life in the British army were recorded with his experiences of the War of Austrian Succession. The following is his description of Fontenoy:

"And in the mean time, the French batteries playing upon us, did us much hurt. We wheeled off, in order to get into the plains of Fontenoy. I had not marched far before we met a horse without his rider, and the lower part of his head taken off by a cannon-ball. A little after, I saw one of the guards lie dead ; and soon after, many more. We still advanced, and drew up in line of battle, in the plain of Fontenoy. The French before us were intrenched up to the neck, and many batteries of cannon were playing upon us. I was in the front rank, and the left-hand man joining the Dutch. We stood there, till the Dutch turned their backs and marched away. I was then left exposed to a battery on the left, and the batteries and small arms in the front. Soon after our regiment, with some others, were ordered to advance and attack the French in their trenches. We marched up boldly; but when we came close to the town of Fountenoy, we observed a large battery ready to be opened on us. And the cannon were loaded with small bullets, nails, and pieces of old iron. We had orders to lie down on the ground; but for all that, many were wounded, and some killed. Presently after the discharge we rose up, and -marched to the first trench, still keeping up our fire. They gave way ; but when we entered, batteries in the flanks were opened, which tore our regiment so, that we were obliged to fall back into the rear. Yet we rallied, and renewed the attack. But it was to no purpose. All the day I was in great spirits, and as composed in my mind, as if I had been hearing a sermon. I neither desired life nor death, but was entirely happy in God. Night coming on, the retreat was beaten, and the whole army marched away, leaving our cannon, and sick, and wounded behind us."

Staniforth's recollection is useful in two ways related ways. First, it shows the difference between the drill square and battlefield reality. In order to avoid fire, even here in the 1740s, British soldiers were ordered to lie down. This matches descriptions from Scottish units also at Fontenoy, who would through themselves to the ground to avoid incoming fire. As helpful as understanding drill square evolution and complicated firings are, soldiers' accounts of the battlefield must be our first source for any understanding of what combat was like in the eighteenth century.

Second,  it gives a glimpse into the reality of combat as experienced by private soldiers. In comparison to fanciful accounts of officers yelling invitations for the other side to fire first, Staniforth shows the gritty nature of war in the eighteenth century. While eighteenth-century fighting men may well have worn a good deal of lace, private soldiers' experience of combat was not rarefied or gentlemanly.

Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns

Thursday, August 11, 2016

Generallandschulreglement, August 12, 1763



A Landschule in the early nineteenth century 



Dear Reader,


Usually, Kabinettskriege focuses on the military history of the its namesake era. Today, however, we are going to examine a bit of Prussian administrative history, which had important consequences for the western tradition. On this day, in 1763, Prussia circulated the Generallandschulreglement, or the General Rural School Regulations. According to this regulation, authored by Prussian civil servant Johann Julius Hecker:

"We desire that all of our subjects, whether parents or guardians... to send there children to school, from age five, and continue until age thirteen or fourteen. They are to receive the basic elements of Christianity, reading and writing, and should also be able to read and answer for whatever is contained in our approved textbooks."

While public education had been growing in German speaking lands since the 1600s, education lacked vital necessary resources. Schools, particularly rural schools, lacked both the monetary resources to provide for their students, and the ability to compel parents, who used their children as a labor source, to send their children to school. The Generallandschulreglement did not solve these problems completely: but was an important step on the road to compulsory public education. Although rural Prussian teachers continued to struggle with cash flow problems, the Prussian government did marginally increase its investment in education after 1763. The regulation was perhaps most important in that it gave encouragement to a number of private individuals, who continued to make steady improvements to the educational system.

Frederick inspecting a harvest after the Seven Year War 

As a minor figure of the Enlightenment in his own right, Frederick II of Prussia supported this initiative, and as his father had done before him, used it to employ former soldiers in public service. For Frederick, a more educated population meant a more prosperous Prussian state, which was his primary goal after the Seven Years' War. This regulation was one of the many reforms which Frederick took on after the Seven Years' War, in order to promote the growth and prosperity of the Prussian state and economy.

Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns




Friday, August 5, 2016

Battle of Bushy Run, August 5-6th, 1763

Battle of Bushy Run, by Don Troiani


Dear Reader,

As the great conflict between the French and British for control of eastern North America drew to a close, another war was brewing. Two ambitious Native American leaders, Ottawa leader Obwandiyag, and Delaware prophet, Neolin, prepared to resist British occupation of eastern North America.  Together, these two men managed to convince a wide confederation of Native peoples to attack the British outposts along the Pays d'en Haut.  Pontiac's War, as the later historians called the conflict, encompassed much of the modern Midwestern United States, and portions of Canada.

Map of Pontiac's War 
The war broke out with lightning attacks on most British frontier posts, from Michilimackinac in present day Michigan, to Ft. Ouiatenon in present day Indiana, to Ft. Presque Isle, at present day Erie PA. On the whole, these Native attacks were highly successful, carried out via surprise, though at some places, like Presque Isle, the British garrisons held out for some days before succumbing to Native numbers and ingenuity. Between May 16th and June 2nd, 1763, Native warriors captured 5 of the British outposts in the Pays d'en Haut.

Despite the widespread Native success, some larger fortresses, such as Ft. Detroit, Ft. Pitt, and Ft. Niagara, remained in British hands, though they were surrounded by Native warriors. As a result of this development, British commander in chief Jeffrey Amherst tasked Colonel Henry Bouquet of the 60th Regiment with organizing a response. On July 19th, Bouquet had arrived at Carlisle Pennsylvania with a force of around 500 men, 300 men drawn from the 42nd Highland Regiment of Foot, a party of about 50 Virginians, and the remainder from the Royal American Regiment. There were also a number of men from the 77th Highland regiment, but their exact composition is unclear.

Accounts differ as to the number of Indians sent to meet this force, latter testimony acquired by Sir William Johnson indicates that the number may have been as low as 110. When the British met this force, they felt as though they were fighting a party of equal strength (around 500), and causality estimates on both sides bear out this idea.

On the evening of August 5th, about 25 miles east of Pittsburgh, Bouquet's force made contact with, "a considerable body of Indians composed of the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Mingoes[.]" (Henry Bouquet Papers, Series 21649, 16) Bouquet's mission was to break through the Indian blockade of Ft. Pitt, and relieve the British soldiers there.

Robert Kirk, an enlisted man in the Royal Highland Regiment, recounted the scene: "On August the 5th, we came within [sight] of the enemy's fires, and could, by the tracks we fell into, be certain of their approach. (Kirk, The Memoirs and Adventures of Robert Kirk, Late of the Royal Highland Regiment, 76)

Bouquet, hoping to avoid an ambush on an approach to Fort Pitt called Turtle Creek, prepared to make a night march in order to gain the safety of the Fort. The Swiss Colonel knew that to be ambushed in the open with an extensive wagon train would put the British forces at a severe disadvantage. After marching 17 miles, on August 5th, Bouquet and his men stalled when the British advance guard met a party Native warriors.
The Situation on August 5th, 1763, at 1:00pm
British forces are in red, Convoy and forces protecting it are in dark red, Natives in blue
Apparently acting on their own initiative, both light infantry companies of the 42nd Regiment moved in and supported the advanced guard. These forces succeeding in dislodging the Native warriors from their hidden positions.

Afternoon Situation, Aug. 5th, 1763
Bouquet, realizing that the force in front of him was substantial, brought the rest of his corps on line. "The savages returned to the attack, and the fire became obstinate on our front and extending along our Flanks, we made a general Charge with the whole Line to dislodge the savages from the Heights, in which attempt we succeeded..." (Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. VI, 339) Private Kirk records a slightly different version of the combat, in which the column appears to have been approaching the battlefield in a square formation, and is attacked to the front and the flanks of that formation. The flanks move off, leaving Kirk and his comrades in the rear guarding the supply convoy. It is therefore possible that Kirk missed the "general Charge of the whole Line" which Bouquet references, since he and his mates were not in that line. This is further supported by his description of his activities in the afternoon battle when his unit, "we faced about, and... made a breastwork of flour bags." (Kirk, 77) This defensive structure allowed the wounded men of the British army to be sheltered during the subsequent engagement.

The British return to the Convoy, late afternoon, Aug. 5th, 1763

However, both Kirk and Bouquet note that Native warriors attacked the convoy, Kirk saying that he and the other highlanders guarding the convoy, "waiting [the Indians'] approach; when they were close up, we gave them our whole fire, and rushed upon them with fixt bayonets."(Kirk, 77) Bouquet also notes this action, saying that Native Warriors, "attacked the Convoy lefft in our Rear: This obliged us to march back to protect it." ( Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. VI, 339) Both Kirk and Bouquet note that the action drew to a close around nightfall, and had been a rather intense back and for battle for control of the high ground on which the convoy rested. (Edge Hill).

At this point, the two forces drew apart, the British having suffered 60 men killed and wounded, while loses on the Native side are less clear. Both Bouquet and Kirk stress a lack of water as being detrimental to the British fighting ability, and Kirk relates that he was a member of a party sent to look for water. "accordingly a party was sent out to find water, of which we could find none but what was very muddy; however we made use of it, and were glad to get it any way, we lay upon our arms all night." (Kirk, 78)  Bouquet indicated the situation of the wounded, without water, was "truly deplorable." John Peebles, who would later keep a detailed diary of the American War of Independence, was one of the wounded on the first day on Bushy Run.


Situation for much of the day, August 6th, 1763
The next morning opened with the British virtually surrounded, in a situation that Bouquet described as quite, "perplexing." Bouquet noted that attacks with the bayonet dislodged native warriors, but that the warriors would speedily return to the attack when the British ceased pursuit. Perhaps tellingly, Bouquet notes the volume, rather than the accuracy of native firepower, indicating that fatigue and lack of water were the most dangerous enemies for the British soldier. However, both Kirk and Bouquet note that by noon of this second day of battle, the situation for the British was becoming critical. Kirk goes as far as to say that, "the loss we sustained broke the square entirely." (Kirk, 78)
Just after noon, August 6th, 1763

About this time, Bouquet feigned a retreat back towards Bushy Run Station, on the road east towards Ligonier. Bouquet withdrew two companies of light infantry towards the center of the formation, and moved two more companies to support this group.  According to Bouquet, the troops left in this part of their line, "on their right and lefft opened their Files and filled up the Space." (Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. VI, 343)The Native American warriors mistook this movement for a general retreat, and began to move forward in order to take the British camp. At this moment, Kirk informs us that he heard the order that the 42nd should, "strip to their waistcoats and from the rear, give the Indians a warm fire." (Kirk, 78)


Bouquet described the situation at this moment, the crisis point of the Battle of Bushy Run:

 "Major Campell, at the head of the first two companies, Sallied out, from a part of the Hill they could not observe, and fell upon their right Flank. They resolutely returned the Fire, but could not Stand the irresistible Shock of our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them, and put the rest to Flight. The Orders Sent to the other two Companies were delivered So timely by Captain Basset, & exexuted with such celerity and Spirit that the routed Savages, who happened to run that moment before their Front, received their full Fire, when uncovered by the Trees. The four Companies did not give them time to load a Second time, nor even tolook behind them, put pursued them till they were totally dispersed." (Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. VI, 343)

Kirk also recalled this phase of the battle, indicating that the Native warriors:
"came upon us in the greatest disorder; but they soon found their mistake, for we met them with our fire first, and then made terrible havok among with with our fixt bayonets, and continuing to push them everywhere, they set to their heels and were never able to rally again; (Kirk, 79)

Having routed the Native warriors on the southern part of their army, the remains of the British army fixed the Indian left wing in position during the heavy fighting on the right, and Bouquet indicates that they were prevented from supporting or intervening in that part of the battle. According to Bouquet, the Indian left wing was capable of, "being witness to [the right wing's] defeat, followed their example and fled." (Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. VI, 343) 


Broadswords of the Black Watch, by Don Troiani
  At least one historian has called Bushy Run the most significant defeat of a Native American force by European powers, and should perhaps be studied in tandem with Arthur St. Claire's defeat in 1791, arguably the greatest victory ever achieved by Native forces over European powers. Bouquet and St. Claire (and their respective Native opponents, whose names are not recorded) faced similar threats with similar amounts of manpower. 

The defeat at Bushy Run led to the relief of Fort Pitt, and in the following year, Bouquet would travel into the Illinois Country and negotiate a settlement with Indian leaders there. It could be argued that the defeat at Bushy Run prevented the success of Pontiac and Neolin. The failure of Pontiac and Neolin to achieve Native goals would lead to more Anglo-American settlement in the modern midwest. Though other issues were also in play, the efforts put forth by Native warriors would factor into the British decision to issue the Proclamation of 1763, and as a result, attempt to limit west-ward expansion. Pontiac's war, and Bushy Run, laid the foundation for the both future Indian-Anglo conflicts, and European-American conflicts. 

Though over 253 years old, the effects of Bushy Run can still be felt today. 

Monday, July 18, 2016

Book Review of For God and Kaiser: The Imperial Austrian Army

Cover Art
Dear Reader,

Today we are going to examine a new work covering the Austrian military from 1618 to 1918. Richard Bassett, a British journalist, has set out to rectify a problem. He argues the idea of Austrian writer Hermann Bahr, that "Austria has not been lucky with its biographers," also hangs true for the Austrian Imperial and Royal Army. It seems a bid odd to be making this case in 2015, when both Christopher Duffy and Franz Szabo have done so much to show that Austria had an effective military in the Seven Years' War. Indeed, Duffy is referenced in the acknowledgements as the first among equals of Seven Years' War historians, yet Bassett makes no reference to Duffy's magisterial two volume work on the Austrian army in the Seven Years' War.

As general work on the Austrian Army over the the three centuries, the work is successful, and may well (sadly, as will be shown) become a standard reference work and textbook. However, in the Kabinettkreige era, Bassett makes several glaring mistakes, which are exacerbated by the painfully few number of footnotes provided. Bassett gives an insightful overview of the Theresian military reforms of the 1750s, but comes into more trouble when describing the course of the Seven Years' War itself. As with some previous historians, Bassett sees Frederick II of Prussia more as a mustachio twirling villain than an actual historical figure. Like Szabo, (indeed, Bassett cites Szabo frequently, and for the following quote) Bassett seems to revel in ambassador Mitchell's description Frederick II (at 46) as, "an old man lacking half his teeth, with greying hair, without gaiety or spark or imagination." Once again, Frederick's slovenly habits are brought to the fore, as Bassett notes his predilection for wearing uniforms past the point of no return, and the many stains on his clothing. All of this makes for good reading, and poetic catharsis from the Austrian viewpoint, but does it help advance the narrative forward?

As in Szabo, Frederick becomes the scapegoat in a flimsy morality play, where Prussian defeats are Frederick's sole responsibility. Bassett relates manifold Prussophobic anecdotes, usually without footnotes. Frederick's practice of detaching independent commands is blamed for the defeat at Maxen, and Bassett clearly fails to note that such practices were often devastatingly successful, as when Frederick used a detachment to force the Russian army to retreat from positions surrounding Bunzelwitz. Bassett continuously suggests that Frederick is responsible for failures.

For God and Kaiser becomes almost unreadable when Bassett suggests that at Torgau, the Prussians took 24,000 causalities a to the Austrian 2,000. To put it mildly, such figures are historically irresponsible. Estimates for Prussia losses at Torgau range from around 17,000 to 25,000, and a figure of 20,000 might be plausible, considering the nature of the Prussian attack against massed artillery. However, Austrian losses were comparable,  considering the all-day of the battle, which ended in the Austrian army abandoning the field, (through no work of Frederick's, it has to be said: Hans Joachim von Ziethen's corps, and Johann Dietrich von Huelsen's heroic attack won the battle.)  Duffy's most recent total places the Austrian causality figures around 15,000, which though still a heavy loss on the Prussian side was not the one-sided massacre which For God and Kaiser suggests. This might be compared to the totals at Kunersdorf, where the Prussians lost 18,000 men to the allied total of 16,500. Were these losses which Prussia could ill afford, brought on by Frederick's unwillingness to abandon his preferred method of war? definitely. Did the Prussian king recognize this after Torgau? certainly.

1761 is glossed over as a year of rebuilding, Frederick's achievement at Bunzelwitz does not even warrant a reference, and the text quickly moves to a description of the death of the Tsarina, Elizabeth Petrovna, who was replaced by her nephew, Peter III, who admired Frederick. This led to Russia switching sides in the conflict, but only briefly. Indeed- like Szabo before him, and doubtless others afterwards, Bassett is confronted by the problem of the events of 1762. For those who say that Frederick had no skill and imagination in the Seven Years' War, that the Prussian army was a broken force, 1762 becomes a severe problem. The Prussian army was certainly rescued from destruction by Elizabeth's death, but as Christopher Duffy has suggested, this only brought the Seven Years' War back into the balance. The Prussians won the Seven Years' War in 1762. Frederick's victories at Burkersdorf and Reichenbach, and Prinz Henri's victories at Doeblen and Freiberg won the Seven Years' War. Bassett spends most of this year on the Austria defense of Schwiednitz- admittedly, a heroic endeavor.

Bassett closes out his description of the Seven Years' War arguing that by 1762, the Austrian army was the most widely admired and emulated army in Europe. Clearly, then, Bassett has not heard of Prussomania. It should also be noted, Bassett spends a great deal of time discussing the Austrian success in the War of Bavarian Succession. Clearly, this would be a surprise for Charles IV Theodore of Bavaria, whose was placed on the throne of Bavaria as a result of Prussian military intervention (and perhaps more tellingly, Russian threats.) The Austrian army achieved spectacular feats in the Seven Years' War. They were well- led professional soldiers, who were able to score an impressive number of victories in their contest with Prussia. Kolin, Hochkirch, Maxen, and Landeshut all deserve to be remembered by Austrian soldiers with pride. But by making Frederick into a skin and bones scarecrow leading an army of ill-trained misfits, Bassett does a disservice to the past.

It may seem that I am nitpicking a rather small portion of Bassett's book, or that I have an ax to grind regarding Frederick II of Prussia. I would say that both of those observations are correct. Bassett's overly partisan account of the Seven Years' War takes his "history" into the realm of a morality play. If his book cannot be trusted to give an impartial (or even factual) account of eighteenth century Austrian military history, why should it be trusted to do so for the twentieth century? Indeed, the book resorts to blaming Prussia (and in turn Germany) for many of Austrians military failings, including when the German forces were allied with the k.u.k. army in the First World War. Bassett attempts to turn Holger Herwig's suggestions that the Austrian army dragged down German military capabilities on its head, suggesting that Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf was prevented from winning World War One by telegrams from Berlin.

In attempting to promote Austrian military success, For God and Kaiser follows an excellent revisionist scholarly trend. In attempting to create a wildly successful Austrian Royal Army which outshone, and was impeded by failures in Prussian and German military professionalism, he falls for a mirage. Bassett creates an excellent overview of Austrian military history, suitable for those who have a passing interest in the Habsburg past, and no serious interest in reading more in depth works on particular periods. For individuals who are interested in a more detailed picture of the past, eschew this work in favor of more focuses studies.


Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

Tuesday, July 12, 2016

Journal Entry: John Marshall Deane at Ramillies

Map of Ramillies


The following is Private Sentinel John Marshall Deane's account of the Battle of Ramillies, fought between the Duke of Marlborough and the Duc de Villroi. In contrast to my previous entry from Deane, I have kept his spelling and grammar, for you to enjoy, and perhaps, hear a bit of his accent.



...The enemy had posted a brigade of fott nex tot the Mehion and filled the space between that and Ramilies wth. upwards of a hundred sqaudrons of Horse, amongst wch. ware the troops of the French Kings household. And at Ramilies they had above 20 batallions of Foott wth. a battery of 12 pieces of trebble cannon, and from thence to Autreglise they had formed a line of Foott along the Gheete wth a line of Horse at some distance behind them. His Grace the Duke of Marlborough, judging by the situation of the ground that the stress of the action would be on the lefte, ordered that beside the number of Horse belonging to thatt wing, the Danish sqaudrongs, they being twenty in number, should be posted there.

It was about 2 in he afternoone before our could be formed in order of battle and then begann to attacque of our left with. 4 battallions wch. forced the brigade of Foot before mentiond from there post on the Mahion. My Lord Overquirque about the same time charged wth. the horse on that wing. The success was doubtfull for about half an houre which the Dule of Morlborough perceiving, he order the rest of the Horse of the right wing to support those on the left, the English excepted and left still on the right to sustaine the Foote if occation should serve.

Whilst his Grace was rallying some and giving his orders to others to charge, he was in very greate danger, being singled out by severall of the most resolute of the enemy. And his Grace falling from his horse att the same time had eyther been killed or taken prisoner if some of our Ffoote that was neare at hand had not come verry seasonably to his Graces assistance and oblidged the enemy to retire. And after this my Lord Duke had still a great escape, for my Lord Duke just as he was remounting of his horse again and Major Brinfeilde attending of him, he being my Lords Gentleman of the Horse, the ball came so near that it took of Major Bringfeilds head just by my Lord Dukes side.

The village of Ramilies was attacqued by detachments of 12 battalions of Foot commanded by Lt. Genll Schultz who entered at once with great bravery and resolution. And his Grace hasted our line of Foote thither to support them wch., though it was att a great distance, yet came up time enough to beete the enemy quite out of the village and at the same time charged the rest of their Foot that was posted behind the Gheet. And my Lord Duke ordered the English horse to sustaine them.

By this time the enemyes right wing of Horse being intirely defeted, the Horse on our left fell upon there Foote, on there right, of which they slew greate numbers, cutting about 20 battalions to peices whose couler we took and likewise there cannon. The rest of the enemies Foot was intirely broake. The Horse on there left wing seemed to make a stand to gayne time for there Foort to retire, but our folks charged them soe quick and with soe much bravery yt. the enemyes Horse clearly abandoned there Foott, and our Dragoons pushing into the village of Auterglisse made a trebble slaughter of the enemy.

The Ffrench Kings own regiment of Foott called the Regiment du Roy begged for a quarter and delivered up there arms and delivered up there coulers to my Lord John Haynes Draggoones.

We persued the enemy all night by the way of the Judigne as farr as Meldree, being 5 leagues from the place where the action happened. Thus we gayned an intire and compleate victory over the enemy...


Ramillies was a great British victory, and one of the crowing achievements of Marlborough's career.

Thanks for Reading



Alex

Monday, July 11, 2016

Greatest Kabinettskriege Commanders: Ranks 5th-1st



Dear Readers,

As you may or may not have heard, I am undertaking to rank the greatest army commanders of the Kabinettskriege age. You can find a full list of the potential candidates here.  These are the following categories upon which these generals are being judged:

A) Battle win-loss record, reckoned against total number of battles fought as commander.
B) Achievement and Sustainment of strategic/political aims
C) Charisma/inspiration of soldiers under their command
D) Scale of operations under their personal command
E) Display of originality/flexibility in thinking

This post will list the highest scoring members from the pool in the previous post, ranked from lowest (5th) to highest (1st). Without further adieu, here are the winners:



5. Nadir Sah Afsar, Shah of Persia
A) 5/5 B) 1/5 C) 3.75/5 D) 4/5 E) 5/5                                                   Total: 18.75/25

An unsung great commander of the Kabinettskriege age, Nadir Shah was truly an exceptional commander. Nadir won the vast majority of the battles which he commanded, as a result of unorthodox tactical system he employed. Starting from a local commander with a few hundred warriors, he built a army of men who employed linear tactics and firepower, rather than missile cavalry, to achieve its goals. In every way the heart of the force were Nadir's Jazareychi, who used heavy muskets weighing close to 40 pounds, and firing a 94 caliber ball, much more on the order of European wall guns. Nadir's use of firepower, mixed with cavalry on the wings of his formations allowed him to conquer an impressive empire, stretching from an Armenia to Pakistan. At the time of his death in 1747, Nadir led the largest army in the world, numbering 375,000 men. His murder by his officers led the the swift collapse of his empire, leading to a number of historians to compare him with Alexander the Great. This swift collapse accounts for his score in criteria B), his assassination by ambitious officers and brutality in later years account for C). In most other aspects, Nadir Shah was one of the most respected commanders of the age, and was  admired by philosphes and military theorists throughout Europe and the world, 


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4. Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France
A) 5/5 B) 3/5 C) 3/5 D) 4/5 E) 4/5                                                              Total: 19/25
The greatest French military mind between Turenne, Villars, and Napoleon, Maurice de Saxe showed incredible military in his repeated defeats of British and Allied forces in the War of Austrian Succession. The victor of Fontenoy, Lauffeldt, and Roucoux, A lifelong soldier, he served under Prinz Eugene of Savoy, as well as Peter I of Russia in the late stages of the Great Northern War. Maurice came to the attention of Europe when he commanded the successful surprise attack against the city of Prague in September of 1741.In addition to the successful field battles named above, de Saxe assisted in the capture of Brussels, Bergen-op-Zoom, and Maastricht. Among eighteenth century generals, de Saxe stands out for his ability to capitalize on his successes in the field with consequent gains in terms of territory and fortresses. Dying early, at the age of 54, one wonders that the outcome of the Seven Years' War in Europe might have been different if he had lived another ten years. Despite the passage of two hundred and fifty years, his memoirs remain a fascinating piece of military theory. De Saxe will forever be one of the more romantic figures of eighteenth century warfare, his legacy untainted by the mistakes of later years.    




3. John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough
A) 5/5 B) 3/5 C) 3.5/5 D) 4/5 E) 4/5                                                          Total 19.5/25

Perhaps the greatest praise of Marlborough comes from another of the British "great captains," the Duke of Wellington. In 1836, he commented, "I always used to say that the presence of Napoleon at a battle was worth a reinforcement of 40,000 men. But I can conceive nothing greater than Marlborough at the head of an English army." (Stanhope, Miscellanies, 81.)  Marlborough's achievements are manifold. Coming to prominence in the reign of James, he was able to adroitly transfer his loyalties to William and Mary during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The greatest test of his career was the grueling War of Spanish Succession, where Marlborough was the commander-in-chief of the effort against Louis XIV's France. While Marlborough's great battlefield victories are familiar to many: Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, the war was less successful in the strategic realm, Philip, Duke of Anjou, would still become King of Spain. Although the allies secured the assurance that Spain and France would not be unified into one Bourbon kingdom, the allied kingdoms of France and Spain would go on to injure England in the course of the eighteenth century, during the American War of Independence. Marlborough's repeated victories and confident planning won him the respect of his men, this is clear the letters and journals of soldiers who served with him, such as John Marshall Deane. Marlborough advanced the art of war tactically, and his predilection for firepower would do much to influence later armies of the Kabinettskriege age.


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2. Alexander Suvorov
A) 5/5 B) 3/5 C) 4/5 D) 4/5 E) 5/5                                                              Total: 21/25

Alexander Suvorov was, without question, the greatest Russian military mind to grace the eighteenth century. A sickly child, Suvorov spent his early years reading military history intensively, and at age 18, enlisted in the Semyonovsky Guard Regiment. Cutting his teeth in the campaigns against Frederick of Prussia in the Seven Years' War, Suvorov obtained a colonelcy at the age of 32, at the end of the Seven Years' War. His first independent commands saw victories over Polish rebels and the Ottoman Empire. Despite being outnumbered against the Ottomans, Suvorov led his men to victory time and again. Suvorov became famous for his initiative, which occasionally earned him censure. He led campaigns in Eastern Europe until his exile by Paul I of Russia in 1796. Suvorov, who was admired by Catherine, disagreed with Paul about military doctrine, particularly an infectious strain of Prusso-mania which had damaged the Russian fighitng ability. After three years of retirement, Suvorov returned to lead a lightening campaign in Italy in 1799. Though he never fought against Napoleon, Suvorov's victories in this campaign show that the armies of the Ancien Regime, when led by an able commander, were not impotent against the forces of Revolutionary France. Suvorov also gives modern readers a number of exceptionally pithy quotes, such as:

"What is hard in training will be easy in battle."
"Win with ability, not with numbers."
"Perish yourself, but rescue your comrade."

A great leader of men, Suvorov deserves to be considered as one of the foremost military minds in world history.



1.  Frederick II Hohenzollern, "the Great"
A) 3/5 B) 4.5/5 C) 5/5 D) 5/5 E) 4.5/5                                                          Total: 22

Frederick's expression above no doubt mimic's the readers surprise to find him at the top of the list. In all seriousness, it has recently become very fashionable academically, and even in popular history, to look down on Frederick the Great's achievements. I cannot say that I agree with this trend, and while Frederick certainly should not be regarded as a starry-eyed Uebermensch, who single-handedly gave won the wars in which he took part, he is, in my opinion, the greatest captain of the Kabinettskriege age. Now for the justification: how did I arrive at the numbers above. You will note, Frederick scores rather low in the win/loss category. He won around half the battles which he commanded in the Seven Years' War, and all of the battles in the War of Austrian Succession. With this in mind, and with his impressive total number of battles as a commander, he receives an above average, but not exceptional A) criteria score. Frederick generally achieved his goals for the Prussian state- he seized and held Silesia for the duration of his reign, and also added West Prussia to Hohenzollern domains. He failed to acquire the province of Saxony, which might have been one of his goals in the Seven Years' War. Thus, he scores quite will in the B) criteria. The letters of Frederick's officers and men, with the exception of some of his personal aides during the later Seven Years' War, show devotion which exceeds most eighteenth century commanders. This grants Frederick a perfect score in the C) category. In terms of forces under his command, Frederick's role as roi-conntenable allowed him to wage war on multiple fronts, leaving defensive armies in secondary theaters, and bringing his royal army to bare on whatever enemy looked the most pressing. Finally, Frederick's system of flank attacks proved highly successful in the War of Austrian Succession and early Seven Years' War. Though Frederick's enemies adapted to meet this challenge, the king recognized this adaptation, and showed that he was as adept at defensive warfare as his foes. Though not as able on the battlefield as some of his contemporaries, Frederick's system of war allowed Prussia to survive and grow in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War. This achievement places him, in my opinion, at the pinnacle of Kabinettskriege era commanders.