Urban Warfare in the Eighteenth Century

Two members of HM 40th Foot / 2nd Battalion LI - "Bloodhounds" take cover
in Cliveden, photo credit Suzanne Shaw

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to examine an understudied topic in eighteenth-century military history: urban warfare. Although the eighteenth century was an age where generals preferred to fight large field battles and conduct formal sieges, the century did indeed see its share of urban warfare, that is to say, troops fighting house to house in built-up areas. Troops would occasionally find themselves fighting in village houses during large field battles, but addressing that is not the main goal of my post today. Rather, I seek to understand what happened when armies clashed in actual urban environments, towns or cities as they would have been identified in the eighteenth century.

Encounters of this sort are rare, but not unheard of. Principally, in writing this post, I examined the fight at Preston in 1715, the Austrian attack on Velletri in 1744, and the American assault on Quebec in 1775. At Preston, the Hanoverians attacked a unfortified town that a small Jacobite army had hastily attempted to barricade. At Velletri, an Austrian army attempted to capture the entourage of the future King Charles III of Spain. At Quebec, an initially successful assault on a fortified city bogged down in heavy street fighting. These experiences will be supplements by descriptions of village fighting in larger field battles. With these sources of experience in mind, what common experiences can we identify between these actions?

When fighting in an urban environment, soldiers quickly sought out cover, usually by barricading themselves in houses. At Preston in 1715, when the Jacobite commander William  MacIntosh was asked why he chose to defend Preston rather than a nearby ridge, explained, "the body of the town was the security of the army."[1] At Velletri in 1744, civilians, seeing the fire that Austrian troops were spreading in the town, began firing at the troops in the street from barricaded houses. The Austrians soon followed suite, taking cover in whatever houses they could force open.[2] Events followed the same pattern at Quebec in 1775, when French civilians, loyal to the crown, opened fire on rebel troops marching through the lower town. In the words of a junior British officer observing the scene, "some of the French who took to the houses... ke[pt] gauling them so as obliged the rebels also to take to the houses... where they remained and returned our fire."[3] Larger buildings were valued as observation points and firing platforms.[4] At confused fighting at Leuthen and Hochkirch in the Seven Years War, Austrian and Prussian soldiers sought any cover they could find, and used a high churchyard walls in these villages as miniature fortresses.[5] At the Battle of Blenheim/Höchstadt in 1704, the French attempted to use the village of Blenheim (Blindheim) itself as a strongpoint.[6]

Schlacht bei Hochkirch, Carl Röchling

In addition to houses, soldiers constructed street barricades and fighting positions. Searching for cover, soldiers used whatever they could find in order to provide cover for themselves. John Deane helpfully lists the materials used for the construction of street barricades at Blenheim: "trees, planks, coffers, chests, wagons, carts and palisades[.]"[7] At Leuthen in 1757, Austrians troops were told off, in the midst of battle, to construct fighting positions in the village.[8] At Preston in 1715, the Jacobites constructed numerous barricades across the streets, encompassing multiple lines of defense. In a running battle that lasted for days, the Hanoverians followed suit by building trenches and barricades of their own.[9] At Preston, some of these barricades were large enough for hundreds of men to take shelter behind.

In the course of the natural use of houses as cover by soldiers, structures were almost always burned. Fire had important tactical uses in the eighteenth century. Obviously, only immobile and suicidal men would remain in a burning structure during a fight, and many wounded men burned to death in these horrible encounters.[10] Soldiers set buildings on fire intentionally, in order to drive out defenders, at Preston and Velletri.[11] Fire, of course, spread unintentionally from there. Soldiers also believed that the smoke that fires generated could be employed as cover, essentially as a smoke screen. At Blenheim in 1704, and Preston in 1715, fires were intentionally set to give concealment to friendly forces. At Blenheim, John Deane relates that, "The village was sett on fire before we came to it by the enemy whereby they though to have blinded our gunners[.]"[12] At Preston, both the Hanoverians and the Jacobites used the smoke of burning buildings as cover, and may have set fire intentionally for that purpose.[13]

The Battle of Quebec, F. H. Wellington

In this urban setting, artillery played the role of supporting weapons, clearing streets, and demolishing enemy strongpoints.  Thomas Ainslee, a British officer at Quebec in 1775, described the process of taking a large house on a city street with American rebel troops inside:

Capt. Nairn...had by this time run up a ladder and entered a window at the end of the corner house where the enemy were posted, there they killed one and took another prisoner and my detachment in the other street having by my direction enlarged the post of one of the guns... brought it to bear on the house where most of them were. I ordered it to be fired and as it was loaded with canister and grape shott, it killed Capt. Hendrick of the Rifllers, wounded Capt. Lamb... and several others in the room all of these circumstances together... obliged them to lay down their arms and surrender.[14]

At Trenton in 1776, the American continental army used artillery to stop enemy movement on village streets, this tactic was also used by the Austrians at Hochkirch in 1758.[15] At Preston in 1715, cannons were used extensively to sweep streets of enemy forces, as well as fire on and demolish enemy strong points.[16] Henry Knox's suggestion to use artillery on the Cliveden at Germantown in 1777 may fit into this type of tactical thinking.

Heavy fighting in an urban setting usually led to a high number of enemy troops surrendering, when cover and dense terrain meant that flight was impossible. At Preston in 1715, the battle ended when after four days of resistance, the entirety of the Jacobite Army surrendered.[17] At Velletri, the fighting in the town netted the Austrians almost 600 prisoners. [18] At Quebec in 1775, more than one third of Montgomery's initial force, over 400 men, were captured by the British and their Canadian allies.[19]

Finally, the consequences for the urban environment involved in the fighting were usually severe. At Velletri in 1744, civilians were accidentally shot on one occasion, and looting by Austrian Grenzer was widespread.[20] In Preston, the prolonged nature of the fighting caused widespread destruction, and a commission for civilian relief set up after the end of hostilities received 226 requests from the inhabitants of Preston for relief, totalling sums of approximately £6,500, or approximately $850,000 today.[21]

Fighting in an urban environment was provided eighteenth-century soldiers with an odd mix of contradictions. In dense terrain, soldiers were more likely to have an abundance of cover, and use that cover effectively. Fire was used both offensively and defensively, to provide cover from the enemy, and drive the enemy from buildings. Artillery was employed with an impressive degree of tactical flexibility,  to control enemy movement and reduce enemy strong points. Finally, despite the greater cover afforded by urban environments, soldiers were much more likely to be captured by the enemy in large numbers if they lost the engagement. Fighting in urban environments also had the possibility of causing great damage to civilian property.  By and large, eighteenth-century warfare in an urban environment possess more than a passing continuity to the experiences of urban warfare in the modern world.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 224.
[2] Christopher Duffy, The Wild Goose and the Eagle, (2019 edition), 85-6.
[3] MSS L2019F60, Society of the Cincinnati Library, (Thomas Ainslee's account of the Siege of Quebec)
[4]Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 225-6.
[5] Christopher Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, (1996 edition) 272, 284.
[6] John Deane, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaigns, 11.
[7] Ibid.
[8]Christopher Duffy, Prussia's Glory, 158.
[9] Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 224-228.
[10] John Deane, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaigns, 11.
[11]Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 229; Duffy, The Wild Goose and the Eagle, 85.
[12] John Deane, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaigns, 11.
[13]Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 229
[14]MSS L2019F60, Society of the Cincinnati Library, (Thomas Ainslee's account of the Siege of Quebec)
[15]Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 225, 227
[16] David Hackett Fisher, Washington's Crossing, 244; Christopher Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, (1996 edition), 284.
[17] Ibid, 233.
[18]Christopher Duffy, The Wild Goose and the Eagle, (2019 edition), 87.
[19]MSS L2019F60, Society of the Cincinnati Library, (Thomas Ainslee's account of the Siege of Quebec)
[20] Christopher Duffy, The Wild Goose and the Eagle, (2019 edition), 86.
[21]Charles Hardwick, History of the Borough of Preston and Its Environs, 240

How Effective was Artillery in the Kabinettskriege Era?

Reenactors portray Royal Artillerymen at Brandywine

Dear Reader,

Today we are going to examine the effectiveness of an important branch of service in eighteenth-century armies: the artillery. There is a seeming contrast of information regarding the accuracy of cannons in the eighteenth century. Just how effective was artillery on the battlefield during this period of history? Allow me open with two anecdotes to illustrate this point. In the first anecdote, Frederick II "the Great", took a careful interest in the disposition of one of his guns, aiming it and hitting the target.

"'There you are,' said the king, 'you don't bother to aim properly, otherwise you would have hit it.

'You can't always rely on it,' said a veteran gunner.

'Just let me show you!', riposted the king, and he aimed the cannon once again. They fired the gun, and this time the ball followed a totally different path."[1] 

Here, we see the random and unpredictable nature of eighteenth-century artillery and the micro-managing aspects of Frederick's personality.  In the second anecdote, a trained professional, Bombardier Kretschmer, is a bit more consistent:

"General Saldern, seeing the damage caused by the enemy battery, rode up to our gunners. 'Bombardiers' he said, 'if you can knock out those guns, I'll give you 10 Thalers.' [5 months wages for an enlisted man] Our bombardier, named Kretschmer...replied, "General, it won't take long." His first howitzer shell landed in front of the battery, forcing the Austrian gunners to fall back for a moment, giving us time for another shot. With this second shot, Kretschmer hit the Imperial ammunition caisson... now the enemy left their battery. The general immediately reached into his pocket and gave Kretschmer [his reward], saying, "that was a good hit."[2] 

In the first example, cannon fire seems almost random, even if the artillery is being carefully aimed. In the second, skilled gunners conduct accurate and devastating counter-battery fire. Which is more representative of Kabinettskriege artillery?

Reenactors fire a Prussian 12-pound cannon

In answering this question, we turn to a number of well-respected authorities. Christopher Duffy, as always, provides a great mass of material on European armies of the mid-eighteenth century. For those interested in the technical aspects of cannon during the Seven Years' War, there is no better source than Christian Rogge's blog on the subject. In English during this period, it was common to refer to artillery as "guns," and I do so several times in this post. So: how accurate and effective was eighteenth-century artillery?

In brief, artillery was quite effective, even out to 800 yards, if firing at large bodies of men.  When targeting single individuals, or troops using cover and concealment, artillery was somewhat less effective, particularly during the American War of Independence.  In addition, throughout the period, as a result of Austrian and French artillery reforms, artillery became more effective.

Although perhaps comparatively less effective than rifled artillery in the mid-nineteenth century, cannons still played a dominant role on Kabinettskriege battlefields, particularly in the latter portion of the period. The Swedish Army of Charles XII did not value artillery, perhaps as much as it should have. Relying on swift-movement and aggressive tactics to win the day, Charles and his army took four cannons with them to the battlefield at Poltava, compared with the Russian eighty-six. Charles should not suffer to much blame, as many military theorists undervalued artillery, particularly in the early and mid-Kabinettskriege era.

Prussian Artillerymen from the Von Schmalen studies

Eighteenth-century military observers often undervalued the role of their cannon, leading to statements such as Mauvillon's comment, "cannon fire does no great damage during a battle, and that it is a proverb among our military men that you have to be specifically foredoomed if you are to die of a cannon shot...".[3] Such statements by military intellectuals ignore the power of cannon on the battlefield, even before 1750.  Sampson Staniforth, a common soldier in the British Army, recalled his experience at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745:

"And in the mean time, the French batteries playing upon us, did us much hurt. We wheeled off, in order to get into the plains of Fontenoy. I had not marched far before we met a horse without his rider, and the lower part of his head taken off by a cannon-ball. A little after, I saw one of the guards lie dead ; and soon after, many more. We still advanced, and drew up in line of battle, in the plain of Fontenoy. The French before us were intrenched up to the neck, and many batteries of cannon were playing upon us. I was in the front rank, and the left-hand man joining the Dutch. We stood there, till the Dutch turned their backs and marched away. I was then left exposed to a battery on the left, and the batteries and small arms in the front. Soon after our regiment, with some others, were ordered to advance and attack the French in their trenches. We marched up boldly; but when we came close to the town of Fountenoy, we observed a large battery ready to be opened on us. And the cannon were loaded with small bullets, nails, and pieces of old iron. We had orders to lie down on the ground; but for all that, many were wounded, and some killed."[4]

 How can we account for this discrepancy between theory and practice? To a large, Mauvillon is correct that very few infantry were killed by solid-shot (non-explosive "cannon-balls") while advancing in line. These balls could be effective out to 900 yards, as they were at the Battle of Torgau. Howitzers sometimes fired explosive shells which could affect a large area. Artillery fire killed a much larger number of men when the gunners began to use canister: large numbers of smaller balls which turned the cannon into a giant shotgun. This type of ammunition became increasingly effective at under 300 yards, still outside the optimum range of musket-fire. Christopher Duffy asserts that " Canister was the tactical equivalent of machine gun fire, and in the Seven Years War it probably inflicted more casualties on the Prussian infantry than any other weapon."[5]

 Canister fire sometimes was able to repel large bodies of enemy infantry, even when the artillerymen in question were unsupported by friendly infantry. Captain Georg Pausch found himself in this rather unenviable position during the second battle at Saratoga in 1777: the Battle of Bemis Heights.  Pausch's two cannons kept up a heavy fire on the enemy, even as his infantry support collapsed:

"Now I and my cannons... held the respect of the enemy, who was before me, with cartridges for some time. How long the infantry left me alone, I cannot say with certainty.... [we] began firing alternately with canister and balls, whatever the piece would take...[the enemy] pushed forward vigorously towards my cannons, in the hope of silencing them. This effort failed twice, and was prevented by firing canister. Two cart-loads of ammunition were fired by my cannons, and I had started on the third. My cannons were so hot that no one could place a hand thereon."[6]

Pausch and his gunners were eventually overrun in the process of trying to move the guns to a safer position. Canister, then, even if only fired by two six-pound cannons, was capable of delaying enemy infantry.

Even firing round shot at longer ranges could have a devastating effect if enough cannons were present. The only example of a great infantry assault knocked back primarily by artillery, à la Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, comes at the Battle of Torgau in 1760. 10 battalions of Prussian grenadiers emerged from the woods in front of the Austrian Army and were quickly devastated by the firepower of massed Austrian guns. As a result of their reforms from the 1750s, the Austrian artillery system was probably the best of the eighteenth century. Frederick the Great agreed with this assessment, saying that the Austrian artillery was, 'as fine as it can possibly be."[7] Although it is possible that the Prussians took 24,000 casualties in the whole of this battle, 5,000 men were cut down in the first half-hour of this initial infantry assault.[8] This figure is astounding because the Austrians were firing round shot at over 800 paces rather than canister at close range. The exact number of cannons involved in the bombardment is unclear, but the Austrian army as a whole had 275 guns at this battle.

Temporary Matrosses on loan from the King's Regiment

When massed, or firing canister, cannons could knock back infantry assaults. They were also especially deadly when the enemy was formed in marching columns or the guns managed to fire on the flanks opposing troops. At St. Lucia in 1778, British Lt. Colonel Francis Downman had an ideal target for his guns:

"We are well in formed that the French did not lose less than 2,000 men during their stay on shore, and a very great number of them by cannon shot. The battery I had the honour to command on the attack of the 18th, did great execution. I received the thanks of Generals Grant and Medows, the latter called me his best ally. I had a fine situation for galling the French army as they marched to the attack in columns, I had them then charmingly, and while forming, and after being formed, and also in their retreat. I kept up as heavy a fire as I could on their flank which was presented to me the greatest part of the action. My shot in this situation swept them off by the dozens at a time, and Frenchmen's heads and legs were as plenty and much cheaper than sheep's heads and trotters in Scotland. Three of my guns were cracked during the action, one of them is rendered totally inservicable, the others will do at a pinch."[9]

Cannons did indeed suffer malfunction if used heavily, as both Pausch and Downman indicate. Despite this, artillery could be safely be fired twice a minute. Christopher Duffy asserts that the Austrians could safely fire four rounds a minute: as fast if not faster than a musket. [10] Eighteenth-century gunners were aware of the need to fire quickly: at Bemis Heights, Georg Pausch noted that his guns were not overrun because he guns made three shots for every one fired by British twelve pounders nearby.[11]

A Sargeant of the King's Regiment aims a gun at Fort Niagara

Gunners were often, as we saw with Bombardier Kretschmer above, called upon to duel with their opposite numbers. Various military authorities have strong opinions on counter-battery fire. Frederick the Great appears to have encouraged it in the 1750s, but wrote against it in the 1780s.[12] The American guns at the Battle of Brandywine appear to have engaged in extensive counter-battery fire, particularly while covering the retreat of troops late in the day.[13]

So- having shown that guns could be effective in some circumstances: let us move to moments when they were not: against individual targets, or against dispersed groups of soldiers in concealed positions. Sometimes, cannons could be used against individuals. Famously, King William III of England was slightly wounded by a cannon shot just before the Battle of the Boyne. However, I can think of nothing comparable to the veritable assassination of Leonidas Polk by rifled artillery in the American Civil War. Against troops in concealment or rifle-armed troops, gunners could swiftly run into trouble. In the Battle of Freeman's Farm, Lt. James Hadden lost 19 of his 22 gunners to enemy fire. When enemy troops were not on the advance, or in open terrain, artillerists struggled to destroy the enemy, or even drive them from concealment.

Reenactors portray Royal Artillerymen

Infantrymen knew that gunners were perhaps their greatest foe on the battlefield, and often took steps to preserve themselves. Throughout the eighteenth century, British troops frequently laid down under artillery fire, a practice which may have been adopted by the Russian Corps of Observation at Kunersdorf in 1759. It is possible that the Prussians used a different method to avoid artillery fire: continuous movement. During a rearguard action at Hochkirch in 1758, General Saldern,

"caused the regiments to move to the right or left whenever he saw cannon shot falling among them. In this advantageous manner, he made the retreat in a sort of zig-zag motion and lost barely 130 men in the retreat, notwithstanding the overpowering enemy and hail of bullets... Saldern's eyes were always moving between the enemy, the regiments, the surrounding terrain, and a place of safety and order."[14] 

Despite these measures, artillery remained a decisive force on eighteenth-century battlefields, possibly causing more casualties than any other branch of service during the Seven Years' War. Kabinettskriege artillery, far from adding dignity to an ugly brawl, added to the violence and chaos of already indescribable battlefields.

Thanks for Reading,




Alex Burns



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[1] Anonymous, Beträge zu dem Anecdoten, 17. (Translation is Christopher Duffy's.)
[2] Ernst von Barsewisch, Meine Kriegs-Erliebnisse, 115-6.
[3] Mauvillon, Histoire de la derniere guerre de Boheme, Vol II, 101. (Translation is Duffy's.)
[4] Thomas Jackson, Lives of the Early Methodist Preachers,  Vol IV,  125.
[5] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 217.
[6] Georg Pausch, Georg Pausch's Journal and Reports of the Campaign in North America, 87-89.
[7] Duffy, Instrument of War, 290.
[8] Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 303.
[9] Downman, The Services of Lieut.-Colonel Francis Downman, 105.
[10] Duffy, Instrument of War, 290.
[11] Pausch, Journal, 87.
[12] Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 184.
[13] Downman, Services, 33.
[14] Carl Daniel Küster, Characterzüge des Preussichen General-Lieutenants von Saldern, 12-13.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR IS OVER!!

(Hubertusburg: Where the peace treaty between Austria, Prussia, and Saxony was signed)

Well...........two hundred and fifty years ago, this Sunday, and next Friday.

Dear Reader,


After a long and costly war, the belligerent powers of the Seven Years' War signed the treaty of Paris on February 10th 1763, and the Treaty of Hubertusburg on February 15th 1763. (Confused as to the why or when of the Seven Years' War? Check out the links.) Great, you say, another war from history is over. Why should you care?

The Seven Years' War gives us the modern world. Most of the major conflicts and events of the 19th and 20th centuries have their roots in this pivotal war. If you live in Canada and speak English, that is a result of the Treaty of Paris. The fact that India became a British colony comes out of the Seven Years' War. The idea that the British Navy should police the world is confirmed in the Seven Years' War.

The fact that America moves out of the British sphere in 1775 comes from the Seven Years' War. Whether you believe, like historian Fred Anderson, that the Seven Years' War directly caused the American War of Independence, or like Gordon S. Wood, see it as only a catalyst of a change that was already occurring in the hearts and minds of the people; the importance of this war to world politics, and culture cannot be overstated. 

In North America, the loss of the French left Native Americans without a second major European power to slow down European expansion. The monopoly of power created by British control of North America made the Native American struggle against European expansion even more difficult. 
In Germany, some historians see the roots of German militarism in this period, which would only end in 1945. While I don't necessarily agree with this view, I can definitely see the that this argument contains elements of truth. In Russia, the Seven Years' War was another effort of expansion towards Europe, which would culminate in the events of 1945-6 and the beginning of the cold war.

In fact, we can easily see that many chapters of world history which begin in 1763 don't end until 1945. In the historical tradition today, military history is viewed with disdain, and seen as unimportant. Well, this VITAL event is the Seven Years' WAR. Armies fought, men and women died, and peoples lives were vitally effected, people of every race, age, gender and creed.

People like Rafaela Herrera, the bi-racial, illegitimate daughter of a Spanish garrison commander in Nicaragua. She would use the opportunities created by the war to rise to a position of wealth and fame.

People like Prinz Johann Casmir von Isenburg, who would die on the battlefield, after facing incredible odds, caught by a stray bullet.

People like Maria Theresa of Austria, who would try to process the experience of the war and failure through a template of religion.

People like Jakob Cogniazzo, who would write of their experiences, and how the war affected their lives.

Because at the end of the day, the Seven Years' War was a part of human experience, that touched many lives, over the course of, well, seven years. And that is yet another reason why the war is important, and worthy of serious scholarly study.

As a fun aside, here is the full text of the Treaty of Paris.

Thanks for reading,

Alexander Burns
Muncie Indiana
2/7/2013

(Portions of the above are part of an academic paper by the author, his intellectual property, and have copyright pending. Do not copy without permission.)

Kabinettskriege Warfare: An Introduciton to Weapons

Picture by Joanne Rathe/Boston Globe

Dear Reader,

So, having addressed, why you should care about Kabinettskriege period, and roughly when it occurred, lets move on to what type of weaponry soldiers employed in these wars.

Infantry Weapons

The primary infantry weapon of the Kabinettskriege period was the musket. Muskets were used by infantry  to fire walls of lead in order to kill opposing infantry forces, who were attempting to do the same thing to them. An eighteenth century battle might look something like this:

Félix Henri Emmanuel Philippoteaux, The Battle of Fontenoy, 1745: The French and the Allies Confronting Each Other

While this view of the Kabinettskriege period might be a bit too "pretty" or simplistic, it gives an excellent picture of what some battles during this period was like. The infantry in lines with officers on horseback, preparing to fire walls of lead towards the enemy. The drummers behind the men provided auditory orders, and inspiration on the battle. The spear-like weapons leveled at the backs of men are called Spontoons. They officers used them to keep panicked soldiers from running away.

The firing would continue until on or other of the lines of men withdrew, and the victors would take the position previous occupied by their enemies.

Gunpowder Small Arms

During the early modern period, their were four varieties of musket used:

1) The Matchlock.
The oldest, and least reliable of the musket family, the matchlock used a burning cord ( a "match") to explode the gunpowder charge, propelling the musket ball towards the enemy. The matchlock was wide used by European infantry from roughly 1500 to 1700, with less developed nations leaving it in use towards the end of that date range.

2) The Wheel-lock.
The second oldest type of musket firing mechanism, the Wheel-lock was primarily used in cavalry pistols, and was to complicated to be mass produced easily for infantry use. In use roughly 1550-1680.

3) The Snaphance.
The Snaphance used a piece of flint to strike a metal bar suspended above the powder charge. While used for infantry muskets,  the Snaphance fell out of favor just before the Nine Years' War, and was still being used by some units at the time of the war. In use roughly 1560-1680

4) Flintlock (Fusil, Firelock).
The French developed the Flintlock in the 1610s-1620s, and this love-able system had wormed its way into the hands of most European armies by 1660-1670. While some older muskets persisted, the majority of soldiers in modern European armies (ie, not the Russians) had Flintlocks by 1690-1700. Of all the muskets the Flintlock proved the most reliable, and would remain in use by most European armies until after the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815.

Melee Weapons

Pikes
Infantry used pikes up through the end of the 17th century, although except in the case of Sweden, infantry firepower attained more and more primacy from the end of the 1650 to 1700. Infantry used pikes (long spears) to deter cavalry attacks, and as a means of terrifying the enemy.

The pikes of the Swedish Karoliner can be seen in the background. (Poltava 1709, Angus Konstam, Osprey Publishing) 

Swords
In the above picture, you can see the Swedish soldier on the right holding a sword in his right hand. While most armies in this period attacked with bayonets, some armies, such as the Swedish Karoliner, attacked with sword in hand. These swords, known as "hanger" swords, were primarily decorative, and view as a mark of honor by the soldiers. After performing poorly, the swords could be taken away to punish a regiment. If the regiment performed well, they would have the swords returned.

Cavalry 

Cavalry during these period took on two primary roles. Horseman could either perform a Caracole attack, in which they would ride up to the enemy forces, discharge both of the pistols they carried, and then retire to the back of their formation to reload. Military theorists designed this formation for use in conjunction with attacking cavalry, and it was used successfully to disrupt infantry formations on several occasions.

The second school of though, promoted by Gustav II Adolf, Karl XII of Sweden, and Frederick II of Prussia, encouraged an all out cavalry attack, in which the cavalry would move forward swiftly, and discharge its pistols a few seconds before impacting the enemy lines. The following depicts a Swedish cavalry charge during the Great Northern War. This picture represents the all out cavalry attack theory.

Box Art from Zvezda Miniature Company

Artillery

During the Kabinettskriege period, the artillery performed the necessary job of crowd control.  While the cannons fired single cannon balls referred to as roundshot, it was most effective while using cannister shot, which turned the cannon into a giant shotgun. Dan Snow gives an excellent introduction to cannister shot in the BBC production of "Battle for North America." You can watch it here. 

Conclusion

The Kabinettskriege period contains an incredible amount of change in military technology, enough that many books have been written on the subject. This blog provides a simplified, non-academic approach to this story. I spend my days writing academic papers, where this type of history is out-of style. This blog is an attempt to explain a vital part of military history in simple steps. I will become more complex later on, fear not.

Thanks for reading,

Alex