Wednesday, January 31, 2018

How Close Ranged were Mid-Eighteenth-Century Firefights?



The British Prepare to Give Fire

Dear Reader,

After the post last week on ammunition expenditure, I noted a number of surprised conversations on social media. If many eighteenth-century battles in Europe, and some in North America, resulted in troops expending their ammunition load (of 30, 40, 60, or 90+ rounds) how could any soldiers be left alive? Or in other words, in battles with such high rates of ammunition expenditure, how could casualties be so low?

The answer to this riddle is not the supposed inaccuracy of muskets, or the failure of soldiers to aim properly, but the ranges at which battles were often fought. When picturing eighteenth-century combat, historians and the public often imagine battle reenactments. In these reenactments, troops often open fire at a very short range, at say 50 or 25 yards. For those unused to picturing such ranges, imagine one half or one-quarter of an American football field. Troops in the eighteenth-century occasionally fired at such close range (such as the Swedish Karoliner of the Great Northern War) but MUCH more frequently, fire-fights developed at a longer range.

Reenactors represent Regiment von Bose at Guilford Courthouse



In the eighteenth-century, the term "musket-shot" usually referred to a distance of around 300 yards. Commanders, concerned about the accuracy of their musketry, often performed tests in peacetime to discover an optimal range.  During the era, such tests were conducted at between 500 yards and 80 yards, 200 yards and 100 yards, and further estimations of 250 yards and 80 yards and 200 yards and 80 yards.[1] I find it strangely compelling that none of these tests felt the need to practice at ranges underneath 80 yards, perhaps implying that combat infrequently reached those close distances.  Leaving aside this theoretical point, let us turn to what the soldiers of the era say in their writings: how close range were eighteenth-century firefights?

Although there is no way to truly measure the surviving descriptions of range scientifically, we can perhaps arrive at a few conclusions regarding the range of eighteenth-century firefights. In the first category, there are skirmishes and premature fires by inexperienced troops. These preliminary skirmishes often occurred at 300 yards, or even a greater distance. As a result, they were not very deadly. During skirmishes in 1759 and 1760, French troops and their native allies opened fire on the British at a range of 300 yards, which seemed quite normal to the participants.[2] During a skirmish on Staten Island in June of 1777, preliminary skirmishing began at about 300 yards.[3] At the Battle of Mollwitz in 1741, the Prussian infantry, inexperienced in real combat, opened fire at the considerable range of 600-800 yards.[4]

A small group of Prussians engaged in a firefight

In Europe during large-scale and determined combat, battle-lines could draw much closer. A good "average" range for combat during the Seven Years' War appears to be between 200 yards and 100 yards. At the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, Ernst von Barsewisch recalled, "As soon as we had cleared the forest, we approached the enemy's second line of battle at a distance of 200 paces [150 yards], which was preparing to march against us. Now... our officers ordered, "Fire! Fire!"[5] Later in the war, Barsewisch recalled being fired on by Croats at a similar distance.[6] The battle lines at Prague in 1757 appear to have been around 150 yards apart.[7] At Hochkirch in 1758,  Johann von Archenholz recalled that the Austrians opened fire at, "a few hundred paces."[8] During a skirmish near Prenzlow in October of 1760, hostile forces approached to within 200 paces [150 yards] of one another.[9]  At the Battle of Vellinghausen in 1761, official reports indicate that battle lines were 150 paces [100 yards] apart, and indicate that this was uncomfortably close.[10] By contrast, when the battle lines closed to 80 yards at the Battle of Minden, the contest was no longer in doubt, and the French began to retreat.[11]

In North America, infantry firefights followed a similar mold. Although the French and Indian War saw few large-scale field battles, a few sources describe infantry firefights. At the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, the French opened fire a very regular European distance, 130 yards.[12] During fighting in the Carribean in 1759, Francis Downman noted that the enemy moved away from the British, "keeping always 200 yards in our front."[13] During the American War of Independence, firefights continued to follow a European pattern, at least with regards to range. During the flank attack at the Battle of Brandywine, both the British and Americans gave fire at 150 yards, and then the British immediately charged at the run with their bayonets.[14] The French attack on St. Lucia in December of 1778 was conducted, "at a distance not less than 280 yards."[15] At the Battle of Camden, John Robert Shaw describes an infantry firefight at 100 yards.[16] At Guilford Courthouse, Roger Lamb reports that the American line opened fire at 140 yards.[17] Berthold Koch, a sergeant with the Von Bose Regiment, recalled receiving fire at 100 yards from the American line.[18]

British Reenactors representing the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry

Troops were often ordered to hold their fire until very close to the enemy line, but appear to have found it difficult to follow this directive. At the Battle of Germantown in 1777, Joseph Plump Martin describes this in his humorous way:
"Our brigade moved off to the right into the fields. We saw a body of the enemy drawn up behind a rail fence on our right; we immediately formed in line and advanced upon them. Our orders were not to fire till we could see the buttons upon their clothes, but they were so coy that they would not give us an opportunity to be so curious, for they hid their clothes in fire and smoke before we had either time or leisure to examine their buttons."[19]
Here, we find a unit ordered to hold fire until close to the enemy, but because the enemy began returning fire a long range, a longer ranged firefight developed. When troops did approach (or fire) at ranges closer than 100 yards, it was often because a bayonet attack was underway. The Swedish Army in the Great Northern War, and the British Army in the American War of Independence, both made quick moving assaults supported by one close-range volley a standard of their tactical repertoire. Nicholas Creswell describes this type of attack on Staten Island in 1777:
When [the two sides] were about 100 yards from each other, both parties fired, but I did not see any fall. They still advanced to the distance of 40 yards or less and fired again. I then saw a great number fall on both sides. Our people rushed upon them with their Bayonets and the others took to their heels. I heard one of them call out murder lustily, this [would  have been] laughable if the consequence was not serious. A Fresh party immediately fired upon our people but was dispersed and pursued into the woods by a company of the 15th Regmt."[20]
British Troops. The man in front appears to be calling out, murder, lustily.

Here, Nicholas Creswell describes the archetypal bayonet attack as practiced by the British Army in the American War of Independence. If troops moved into 50 yards or closer, it was not to have an extended firefight, but because one or other intended to make an attack with bayonets, or was in the process of doing so.  Some British commanders may have preferred try and close the distance before firing.  Prescriptive source: drill manuals, books offering advice to officers, etc, often instructed soldiers to reserve their fire until at thirty or fifty yards of the enemy.[21] Often, the commanders judged their tactics on a case-by-case basis. At the Prussian 1785 Review, British General Cornwallis criticized Prussians for advancing too close to their mock enemies before opening fire.[22] While a good idea in theory, advancing into such close range under a heavy fire proved difficult to do. Notably, the British seem to have achieved this at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, but examples of this kind are rare. On average, troops seem to have fired at ranges of 100 yards or longer. 

How might reenactors represent this to the public? Battles should occur at greater ranges. If you are engaged in a standup firefight with other reenactors, and you are much closer than 75 yards away, something is wrong. If the British advance to within 40 yards and fire a volley, they should immediately follow that volley with a bayonet attack and either way, Continental forces should quickly prevail or retreat. Engaging in standup firefights with 20+ rounds expended is acceptable, even laudable. Just make sure that you have a football field or two between you and the opposing forces while doing so.

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Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns 


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[1] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 207.; The Army of Frederick the Great, 128.;  Lossow, Denkwürdigkeiten, 260-61, 275.
[2] John Knox, An Historical Journal,  Vol 2, 274.; Vol 1, 305.
[3] Nicholas Creswell, A Man Apart, 170.
[4] Valorie, Quoted in Duffy, Military Experience, 212.
[5] Barsewisch, Meine Kriegs-Erlebnisse, 36.
[6] Ibid, 170.
[7] Johann von Archenholz, Geschischte des Siebenjährige Kriegs , (1911, Leipzig), 52.
[8] Ibid, 187.
[9] Sammlung ungedruckter Nachrichten, Vol 5, 358.
[10] Westfalen, Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand, Vol 5, 623.
[11] Ibid, Vol 3, 486.
[12] Knox, Journal, 70. (The British, it must be said, held their fire until 40 yards on this occasion).
[13] Francis Downman, The Services of Lt. Colonel Francis Downman, 8.
[14] Martin Hunter, Extracts from the Journal of General Sir Martin Hunter, 27.
[15] Downman, The Services, 98.
[16] John Robert Shaw, John Robert Shaw, 31.
[17] Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal, 350.
[18] Bertold Koch, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse, 7.
[19] Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, 72-73.
[20] Creswell, A Man Apart, 170-171
[21] David Blackmore, Destructive and Formidable, 136-137
[22] Charles Cornwallis, Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, Vol 1, 211.

22 comments:

  1. Another highly interesting discussion! Thank you.

    Best Regards,

    Stokes

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  2. Well done. Thank you for this insight into the reality of the time. I am guessing most reenactments of battles have to fit the space and viewing capacity of the venue, but this does give the imagination a fuller picture.
    Rick schuman

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  3. I am currently readi g a number of books about a similar subject for the Napoleonic Wars. I am currently reading 'Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies'by Brent Nosworthy which includes chapters on firepower. He mentions the ranges that firing take place and the effectiveness during testing. Looks very similar!

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  4. Alex, I enjoy your posts and as usual, this is an interesting one, but I have a couple of questions.1. What is the basis for saying 200 paces = 150 yards? I've seen several different references to the distance a pace is. Was it standard unit of measure in the 18th c. 2. Many of your sources are from German speaking lands. The German lands did not use the yard, but something called the "Elle", which was 2 feet. Is it possible the translator used yard for Elle, which would have made the distances closer. 3.Finally, the absence of evidence for testing at under 80 yards hardly indicates lack of firing at that range. When your target was 50-80 yards away and 1/2 mile long, it was hard to miss.

    You article does raise an interesting question. Was firing at long distance indication of lack of discipline, since even the contemporary sources indicate that soldiers rarely hit anything at long range. Thanks again for the article.

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    1. Hey Tom! Thanks for the comment!

      In converting paces to feet, I have [by and large] followed the guidelines laid out by Christopher Duffy on page 208 of "Military Experience in the Age of Reason." You are correct that Prussia did not use the yard, however, they did have a similar measurement, the "schritte" which I have translated as "pace" in these sources. All Prussian examples I have used in the post employ "schritte" rather than any other form of measurement.

      A schritte is generally reckoned at 29 English inches, which is how Duffy arrives at his conversion. [See "The Eclaireur: a Military Journal, Devoted to the Interests of the Military Forces of the State of New York", Volume 3, as evidence of this conversion.] As with all descriptions of range on the battlefield, I take these to be estimates made by soldiers at the time, rather than exact measured distances.

      I would agree with your final point: lack of evidence that soldiers practiced firing at close range is not evidence that close range firefights did not occur. That is why I have included a number of eyewitness accounts in the post.

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  5. Thanks, very helpful. The really puzzling question is why they would fire at such distances when doing so was such a waste of powder and shot.

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    1. I ind this to be an excellent analysis of linear tactics and musketry combat. I applaud your scholarship, and recognize in your contention what we in reenacting the past and demonstrating historic weapons (as I do in the N.P.S.) the difficulty in conveying the reality of past combat to the audience, who are steeped in modern misconceptions. On the "waste of powder and shot," I would opine that enough casualties were suffered at such ranges that it was effective, and consider that as firepower and martial technology has progressed, the expenditure of ammunition has only burgeoned to become almost profligate. 1750 = 500 cartridges per casualty; 1850 = 1000 cartridges per casualty; 1950 = 5000 cartridges per casualty; 1970 = 10000 cartridges per casualty. I have seen these estimates in print, and of course, there is also the evolution of tactics from linear to seeking cover and concealment, the adaptations of camouflage, etc. Of course, discipline and bravery are constants. Shouldering a Brown Bess or an M-4, soldiers are soldiers, and they still carry (and fix, occasionally) bayonets.

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    2. In his very interesting Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, Rory Muir relates that poor quality troops would sometimes open fire at extreme range in order to try and fire away all their ammunition. This would give them an excuse to stay out of the action while being resupplied, or even to drift off to the rear to get more cartridges. The risk of whole battalions essentially disbanding on the battlefield was a constant concern for officers.

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  6. Alex It would be awesome to see longer range firefights practiced in reenactments but reenactors have a huge issue of scale that will likely never be overcome. If you could muster 500-1000 men on a field perhaps a demonstration of a 100 yard firefight would be possible but with the tiny units and the spectator-centric focus of battle reenactments it's unlikely we'll see accurate battle or tactical reenacting done any time soon.

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  7. As a gamer and a reenactor, this is a very interesting post - thank you

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  8. Whereas I agree that the ranges should be longer, it just isn't practical. Most are at a park, living history event, or such with an audience that needs to see as close as possible both sides of the engagement. I'm a Civil War reenactor(7thWISVI) and do several events every year. The only time we fought at realistic distances was at Gettysburg in 2013. Would be cool though!

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  9. In terms of casualties, it is useful to remember that the muskets of the time were not sighted and were merely pointed at the enemy. As a result, fire was not zeroed in accurately for RANGE. The trajectory of a musket ball - especially at the relatively low velocity of the era - is parabolic. As a result, it is easy to project the ball either over and beyond the foe or in the area in front of the opposing formation. People say of 18th Century warfare "How could they miss?!"... Well, they missed by over-shooting or under-shooting their opponents.

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    1. Hugh, there are a number of issues with your points. First, many muskets have back-sights carved into them. European nations such as Prussia and the Netherlands had dedicated front sights, and divots in the back of the musket to assist with aiming. Period authors estimated that the lead shot did not begin to lose altitude until it had traveled 300 yards. I address some of these points in my post on the accuracy of soldiers. Certainly a great deal of lead went astray, but it does today as well.

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  10. A couple of thoughts...the absence of experimentation at distances closer than 80 yards might indicate, as you suggest, that most fighting took place at longer distances. It might also indicate that accuracy didn't increase when you got much closer than 80 yards. It would also be interesting to connect distances between the lines with time, both the time necessary to reload and the time necessary to cross that distance in a bayonet charge. In small unit actions at least, one clearly doesn't want to approach the enemy and fire if one isn't going to have time to reload while the enemy is charging you. I suspect that the distance/time connection isn't particularly powerful in comparison to the data you've unearthed, but it would be valuable nonetheless. (back of the envelope-type calculation: 15 seconds to reload. Enemy advancing at roughly 2 paces/second (doubletime), means that closing to 30 yards is clearly too close--and that's without considering how much distance is necessary to prevent your men from breaking).

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  11. Fascinating observation about raw troops and their propensity to empty their cartridge boxes at long shot to escape close combat. Their officers, sergeants, and corporals must have been as spineless as they were. I cannot see any martinet countenancing such behavior in his ranks, nor can I see such calculated cowardice, tantamount to mutiny, being endemic. more like the American experience of rifle-armed militia: good for one volley, and then they took to their heels, while the disciplined musket-armed line troops stood to the ensuing combat. The whole rationale of close order drill and discipline was to instill obedience and resilience in the ranks.

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  12. Unknown has been scoring direct hits on what is relevant. It is not fair to judge green/untried units as having the propensity to take to their heels.If that unit has a long and involved history between these men and these leaders, the discipline could very well provide a more solid, cohesive unit than their less disciplined sister unit. Remember: No two men are alike. Units are comprised of men. Therefore, no two units would ever be the "same". The quality and training of the men, the quality and training of the leaders and more importantly, the length of service together as a unit are value sets not looked at in most games. Having same ratings is commonly seen which shows a lack of understanding of basic principles. But to many, it's just a game until the fun is lost by comparing real stats to what happened on the table.

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  13. Funny, I've been trying for many years to assess the Mediaeval range of combat- and arrows -v- musket balls aren't that different! I suspect that ignoring flight arrows, battle range was about 125 yards, perhaps 180 paces. Nothing changed then!

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  14. While it is a different usage, it might be informative to include the naval use of the term 'pistol shot' - At least according to Adm Lord Rodney, in a footnote to John Clerk's treatise on naval tactics, in which part of the text the failure of English fleets to close - with analysis of fleet spacing and numbers of ships engaged leading to a conclusion that many actions were decided by the crippling of the head of the English line at 800-1200 yds, and a subsequent collapse into disorder, while the French wore away and prepared to repeat on the opposite tack at a longer range again.... the intent to close to pistol shot and it's near universal failure was noted - and Adm Lord Rodney adds the footnote that the pistol shot referred was 400 yds.

    This is an appropriate distance for a pistol elevated at ~ 5 degrees to hit the water - which is a similar standard to that used for stating the range of carronades (~1000-1200 yds) or guns (~1400-1800yds).
    Musket shot in this context would be something on the order of 700 yds

    With a higher elevation available (e.g. with the stool bed removed and the breech on the axletree - a weapon could throw shot randomly to a longer range - but even these at 5 degrees 'elevated' with stool bed present - were considered 'random shot' and mostly a waste of powder - with significantly better results at line of metal ranges (~500-700 yds) according to the power and shape of the ordnance in question, where hits could be expected to occur near the point of aim, rather than requiring an offset pointing.

    The same pointing could also give sets of aimpoints at shorter ranges if the powder charge or shot weight/number were altered to reduce the velocity.

    Carronades with a steeper line of metal 'point' further than guns, despite a lower velocity...

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