Swedish Gå På Tactics During The Great Northern War

Swedish Reenactors 

Dear Reader,

Today we have another excellent guest post focusing on the Karoliner, by historian Mike Glaeser.[1]

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"Never have I seen such a combination of uncontrollable dash and perfectly controlled discipline, such soldiers and such subjects are not to be found the wide world over except in Sweden"[2]
- General Magnus Stenbock after the Battle of Gadebusch, 1712

If students of early modern warfare know one thing about the Swedish Karoliner, it is that they preferred aggressive tactics often executed in the face of overwhelming odds. Their successes in the first half of the Great Northern War bewildered their enemies and endeared the Karoliner to many a historian and wargamer since. Known as Gå På, translated as “go on”, the Swedish tactics emphasized speed over firepower and closing with cold steel.[3] At a time when much of Western European warfare devolved into long and grueling sieges, Gå På allowed the Swedes to play an attacking role and quickly move against a numerically superior foe before excessive firepower could be brought to bear. In this way the Swedes were victorious at Narva (outnumbered 3:1), Klissow (2:1), and Fraustadt (2:1), to name a few. What follows is a brief look at the mindset of the Swedish army, their weapons, and how this combination allowed them to execute Gå På with élan.

Swedish Infantry Formation, Alf Aberg, Karoliner, 156.

Voltaire described the Swedes as “well made, robust, agile and capable of enduring the greatest hardships, hunger and poverty. They are born warriors, full of pride and more brave than industrious” .[4] It is from this stock that the army drew its manpower. Military reforms undertaken by King Charles XI in the 1680s and 90s helped create a strong, unified force that could be sustained in times of peace and quickly mustered for war.[5] The men in each provincial regiment came from the same geographic area which fostered an esprit de corps. Continuous training was a high priority and companies would gather once a month while the full regiment assembled annually for drills under the supervision of the king. They were expected to follow orders without question: “Commands will be carried out soberly and silently without any observation on the part of those whose business it is to obey”.[6] While the men honored their king, they also feared God. Each regiment had an attachment of chaplains who preached the Lutheran creed. Ultimately, God alone decided when and where each soldier would die so it was a moot point to fear death. This religious fatalism allowed the Swedes to march and ride undaunted into enemy fire. Rigorous training, strict discipline, and a shared faith provided the foundations for effective Gå På.

Gå På tactics affected the selection and use of certain weapons. The most notable armament difference between Swedish armies and those of Western Europe was the deployment of the pike. Starting with the Spanish Tercios and Swiss mercenaries of the 1500s, the pike became the queen of the battlefield for much of the following century. It was primarily used as a defensive weapon to help protect matchlock musketeers from cavalry attacks. True to form, the Swedish pike held off a charge of the Polish Crown army at Klissow and then shattered them with two volleys of musket fire. However, the “push of pike” was also a devastating offensive maneuver but one that relied on momentum to see the attack through. With the advent of effective bayonets towards the end of the 17th century, as well as the improvements in gun technology, the pike began to fall out of favor.[7] Nevertheless, the Swedes and Russians tended to make use of the pike throughout the Great Northern War.[8] For the Swedes, the pike suited Gå På tactics perfectly as an offensive shock weapon. Up to one third of each battalion was equipped with the 12-18 foot long weapon with the pikemen taking up the center of the formation. With a typical musket and bayonet amounting to ~6.5 feet, the pike enjoyed a distinct reach advantage. Following the one or two volleys from the musketeers, the entire battalion would charge with pikes leveled.

The Swedes put their faith in the effectiveness of cold steel. While Charles respected firepower, the prevailing belief was that the sword could be more accurate and devastating. At Holowczyn in 1708, “…the king himself went from one battalion to another ordering them above all things, instead of firing, to use their pikes, bayonets and their swords”.[9] All infantry, musketeers and pikemen alike, were equipped with a sword that the king himself had a hand in designing. Once the initial volley was delivered, bayonets would be fixed and swords drawn. The musket with fixed bayonet would be tucked under one arm and the sword leveled in the other. The horse and dragoons had a similar blade and it was used to the same effect. It is worth noting that the blade was straight rather than curved, reinforcing the emphasis on stabbing rather than slashing.

Tent of Augustus the Strong, captured in 1702 by Swedish Karoliner

There is a common perception that Charles had no use for the artillery as it was rarely fielded en masse in his armies. Even the head of the artillery, General Carl Cronstedt, had a similar observation: “At the beginning of the war His Majesty had a sort of contempt for the artillery; but later bitter experience taught him how valuable a weapon it could be”.[10] For Charles and the spirit of Gå På, it was a matter of deployment and speed. Many of Sweden’s victories saw them start the battle as the outnumbered attacker which meant a traditional artillery duel was unsustainable. Deploying cannons could be a time-consuming process and in most cases the Swedes had a tactical disadvantage in terms of terrain. To maintain the initiative, the larger pieces simply had to be kept out.

With morale and discipline established and the appropriate weaponry in place, the Gå På tactic was ready to be unleashed. A provincial infantry regiment consisted of about 1200 Swedes. This was broken down into two battalions and these served as the primary tactical unit. During battle, a battalion would line up four ranks deep with pikes in the center, musketeers on either side, and grenadiers on the flanks. The order to advance would be given by the sound of drums and there are examples of Swedes marching in total silence. At about 40 paces from the enemy, the two front ranks would kneel and the two rear ranks would give fire. The advance would then continue through the cover of the blackpowder smoke to about 20 paces where the two front ranks would fire.[11] General Stenbock’s Instructions stressed holding fire until the foe was within bayonet range.The order was then given to charge and if the enemy unit was not already wavering from being shot at point-blank range, they were now assaulted with sword, bayonet, and pike. At Fraustadt in 1706, some battalions attacked the Saxon lines without firing a single volley. More often than not, the first volley or charge was enough to break a unit and the momentum then carried the Swedes through enemy lines. At the first battle of Narva, the rapidity of the assault allowed the Swedes to close on their opponents with minor casualties and despite being outnumbered three to one, the majority of fighting was over within three hours. The Gå På tactic was devastating against low discipline/ ill-trained units but occasionally proved more problematic against a disciplined foe, especially one that was entrenched like the Russians at Poltava.

Reconstructed Karoliner (Svenska Armeemuseum)

The Swedish cavalry tended to make up around fifty percent of the fighting force. The cavalry was divided between the horse and dragoons although they acted and fought the same way.[12] The tactical unit was the squadron of about 250 men. Deployed on the flanks, the Swedish cavalry tended to move quicker than their enemy counterparts and would charge home at the gallop rather than the trot. The squadron would advance “knee behind knee” with the cornet at the front and each man slightly behind the next to form an arrow. This wedge shape helped punch holes through infantry and cavalry alike. While the horse had pistols and the dragoons their carbines, doctrine decreed that guns should not be fired (unless the attack wasn’t slowed as a result) and the unit should charge home with cold steel.[13] At Klissow in 1702, the Saxon horse surprised the Swedes with a quick deployment through swampy terrain. However, any impetus was lost when the Saxons slowed down and began to caracole .[14] The Swedish cavalry recovered, formed up, and charged with swords. They managed to break the Saxons before turning in on the flank. Here then is a clear example of cold steel having a greater effect than black powder.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,


Mike Glaeser

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[1] Michael Glaeser is an early modern historian specializing in the Great Northern War and the reign of Charles XII of Sweden. He is published in The Great Northern War Compendium and taught history at the University of New Hampshire. He is also an avid reenactor and wargamer. He completed his graduate work at the University of Sheffield, England.
[2]Robert Nisbet Bain, Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, 243.
[3]The “a” has a ring diacritic which gives it a similar pronunciation as “o”. Gå På is therefore pronounced as “go-po”
[4]Voltaire, The History of Charles XII of Sweden, 31.
[5]This was known as the indelningsverk, or allotment system
[6]Charles XI quoted by Alf Aberg, Sweden’s Age of Greatness 1632-1718, 272.
[7]Despite being outdated, Maurice de Saxe still supported use of the pike later in the century.
[8]The Danes, having seen the effectiveness of the pike earlier in the conflict, fielded them when they re-entered the war in 1710.
[9]Robert Frost, The Northern Wars 1558-1721, 274.
[10]Aberg, 284.
[11]David Chandler suggests 40-20 paces whereas Einar Lynth and Lars-Eric Hoglund suggest 70-30.
[12]Dragoons were cheaper to raise and equip but they behaved like cavalry on the battlefield. Their carbines tended to be employed more during foraging missions.
[13]Stenbock, Instructions, Waxjo 1710.
[14]The caracole (Spanish for snail) was a tactic that saw cavalry advance on the enemy at a trot, fire their pistols, and then retreat to the rear to reload while the next rank repeated the same steps.

Russia Admonished: The Battle of Narva in the Great Northern War

Swedish Reenactors portray Karoliner on the march in summer months
Photo by Anders Bertrandsson

Dear Reader,

Today, we have our second guest post- this time from Michael Glaeser.[1] As a historian who has published on the Great Northern War, Michael brings a great depth of experience to the subject in this post: the Battle of Narva.

If you would like to write for Kabinettskriege, or have an idea for a post, please contact us via the link on the upper right. Without further introduction- here is Michael's post:

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In the year 1700, the Kingdom of Sweden was the dominant power in the Baltic. The sea was very much a Swedish one with the nation’s territory circling around the waters to include Finland, Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, and parts of northern Germany. For many socio-political reasons, Denmark-Norway, Saxony-Poland-Lithuania, and Russia formed an alliance to seize control and beat back Swedish hegemony. The three-pronged attack was meant to be quick and decisive. After all, the King of Sweden, Charles XII, was only an eighteen-year-old adolescent…

Immediately after declaring war on Sweden on August 20th, the Russians began their push into Ingria to besiege the fortified town of Narva. With Russia having no access to the Baltic, Ingria was a vital strip of land that Tsar Peter I desperately wanted to have back. As Narva was also the lynchpin fortress on the border of Ingria and Estonia, Peter wanted to take the town first and use it as a base of operations from which Russian troops could pour into neighboring regions. More importantly, it was only fourteen kilometers away from the Gulf of Finland and that vital seat on the Baltic Sea.

Looking for sources: a British Newspaper from 1700 describes the battle

Due to its strategic location, the town of Narva was well fortified. The Swedes added a ring of bastions in the 1680s to supplement the existing 15th-century castle. This was done under the watch of the aged field marshal and engineer Erik Dahlberg, the "Swedish Vauban". The western side of the town had the most open approach but this too had defensive features including a dry moat. The town itself held a garrison of 1,460 infantry, substantially lower than the planned 3,100, but it did include additional cavalry as well. These were under the command of Henning Rudolf Horn at the time of the siege.

While Russian troops immediately advanced into Ingria, it wasn't until the end of October that the artillery and siege guns arrived at the outskirts of Narva. With over 37,000 men facing the town, the general expectation was that Narva could only hold out until the end of the month. Peter had arrived to personally supervise the siege and take part in the forthcoming surrender. Horn and his men clung to the safety of the town walls and were no doubt encouraged by the letters sent from Charles indicating that "we will soon be with you and dislodge the enemy".[2]

Russian Army flags used at Narva (later captured by the Swedish Army)

Following the sweeping success against Denmark, Charles and the Swedish army mustered for shipment to the Baltic provinces in early October. They had arrived and disembarked by the 8th and a plan was formulated to send a relief force to Narva while the king and another body of troops headed south to break the siege of Riga launched by Augustus, the Elector of Saxony.[3] Swedish commander Otto Vellingk brought news of an improved situation- Augustus did not get the necessary support from his ally Peter and rather than face the wrath of the Swedes alone, decided to break his siege and send his army into winter quarters. Given the suspension of Saxon operations and the seasonably bad weather that mired the roads, Charles felt safe enough to divert all efforts towards Narva and come to grips with his cousin at a later point.

On November 13, the Swedish army began its march through soggy and scorched lands. Given the scarcity of food, the weather, and the state of the roads, the army was in need of a morale boost. This came on the 17th when the king led a small detachment against a much larger Russian force led by General Boris Sheremetev at a chokepoint called Pyhajoggi pass. Sheremetev was under orders to withdraw without forcing a battle but the retreat of 5,000 of the enemy had an uplifting effect for the tired Swedes. More importantly, this was the first independent action for Charles who held his own and managed his men well enough to earn praise.

Despite hearing news from Sheremetev that the Swedes were approaching, the Russian command was unconcerned. Western European warfare had become known for lengthy sieges rather than fast assaults and pitched battles. The belief in the Russian camp was that the Swedes would halt, gather strength, and then force the issue. Tsar Peter even left the siege a day and a half before the Swedes arrived on the 19th in order to direct more reinforcements. The tsar's leave of absence on the eve of battle has garnered much attention from contemporary observers and historians. Naturally, the Swedes painted Peter as a coward, someone who saw the writing on the wall and wanted no part in an eventual defeat. But given the prevalence and preference for siege warfare, Peter probably thought he had more time. In any case, it was a fortuitous move on his part.

Battle of Narva, Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great, 331.

In the tsar's place as acting commander was Field Marshal Charles Eugene Du Croy, a western trained general who fought against the Swedes at Lund and the Ottomans at Vienna. He had the vastly larger Russian force organized behind a nine-foot-high wall in front of which was a six foot wide dry trench. He was also backed up by over 140 cannon and mortars. Due to the size of Narva, the most glaring error was that his forces were stretched out over a six-kilometer line. The Swedish attack would focus on two columns smashing into the enemy and then rolling up both flanks. With poetic timing, or perhaps divine intervention, a snowstorm picked up in intensity and blew directly into the faces of the waiting Russians. The Swedes used the opportunity to launch their attack with Charles and his Drabants concentrated on the left column. It was this group that was the first to shatter their opposition. A Swedish volley within 30 paces caused many of the defenders to “fall like grass”. Hastily made fascines filled the dry trench, and ladders allowed the Swedes to scale the walls and enter the Russian camp. Success quickly followed on the right as well: “We charged directly sword in hand and so entered. We slew all who came at us and it was a terrible massacre”.[4] That the fighting was intense is evidenced by the commentary surrounding Charles. He had a horse shot out from under him and lost a shoe in the soggy mud. After the battle, a bullet was found lodged in his neckcloth, the first of five to hit him in his life.

With the Swedes storming into the camp, a panic set in. Many of the Russian commanders were foreign and some could not even communicate in the language of their subordinates. Distrust and an unwillingness to fight for their officers led many Russians to flee. Most famous was the rout across Kamperholm bridge which became so inundated with fleeing men that it collapsed under their weight. Many drowned as a result. Du Croy and the Russian guard regiments provided a valiant resistance but were forced to surrender. A small holdout of Russians continued to fight until nightfall at which point friendly fire was inflicting unnecessary casualties on the exhausted Swedes. By the morning, the battle was over.

More Russian Banners Captured at Narva 

The Swedes counted over 600 dead. The Russians had anywhere between 8,000 to 12,000. The number that surrendered was even higher forcing the Swedes to set the majority free and allow them to return to Russia with and without arms. Leading commanders were taken prisoner for ransom or future exchanges. All of Peter's artillery was claimed as war booty forcing the tsar to famously confiscate church bells in an effort to cast new cannon. A near spiritual success was the capture of a large number of Russian flags and standards.[5] Among the victors, General Magnus Stenbock was quick to praise his colleague and king: “It is God’s work alone, but if there is anything human in it, it is the firm, immovable resolution of His Majesty and the ripe dispositions of General Rehnskjold.”[6] For all his losses, Tsar Peter remained optimistic and redoubled his efforts to modernize his forces: “When we had that misfortune, or putting it better great fortune, compulsion then drove away sloth, and forced us to labor day and night."[7] It was a process that paid dividends on a summer day in the Ukraine some nine years later.


Thanks for Reading,



Mike Glaeser,


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[1] Michael Glaeser is an early modern historian specializing in the Great Northern War and the reign of Charles XII of Sweden. He is published in The Great Northern War Compendium and taught history at the University of New Hampshire. He is also an avid reenactor and wargamer. He completed his graduate work at the University of Sheffield, England.
[2] Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, 150.
[3] Augustus "the Strong" was both the Elector of Saxony, King of Poland, and Duke of Lithuania.
[4] Massie, Peter the Great, 333.
[5] A vast majority of these captured flags still reside in the Army Museum in Stockholm, and are on display.
[6] Massie, Peter the Great, 337.
[7] Rothstein, Peter the Great and Marlborough, 35.

The Spanish Military in the 18th Century

The Storming of Fort George: Pensacola, Florida, 1781

Dear Reader,

English language historians gloss over the role and effectiveness of the Spanish military in the later Kabinettskriege period. Christopher Duffy, a leading authority on 18th century warfare, discusses the Spanish briefly in his otherwise excellent book, Military Experience in the Age of Reason. On page 21, he gives us German military thinker Scharnhorst's views on the Spanish:       

           "The Spaniards have never changed. Except for their hair, which is now powdered and curled, the soldiers remain in the same condition as seventy years ago. Their generals are totally ignorant of tactics, they owe their promotion to favoritism, or to long service in the garrisons, where their only occupation is to arrange the processions to the burnings at the stake, and so on." (Scharnhorst, 1782) 

Unfortunately, Scharnhorst's perception of the Spanish doesn't match up with the Spanish military's historical actions, especially in the early 1780s, when he published his account. While English language accounts tend to focus on the Spanish failures in the 18th century, the Spanish often succeed in combat operations, and showed a great talent for combined navy-army operations. In addition, the Spanish possessed a massive overseas empire, and in most cases, successfully defended their overseas holdings through an effective system of fortification. 

Early 18th Century Spain

The Spanish military record in the early 18th century reads like a litany of defeats and disasters. For a complete list of the wars of this period, click here. While Spain participated in many wars during the early 18th century, the most damaging to Spanish interests in the short term was the global War of Spanish Succession. The War of Spanish Succession created internal conflicts in Spain, as various factions chose to support either the Bourbon or Hapsburg candidate for the Spanish throne. This made excellent opportunity for expansion by smaller powers, who were jealous of Spanish holdings in the Americas. At the end of this war, the Bourbon candidate won out, but the Spanish were forced to give up huge swaths of territory. In Northern Europe, the Spanish Netherlands became the Austrian Netherlands. In the Mediterranean, the Spanish lost the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Milan, Sicily, the Kingdom of Savoy, and the naval bases at Minorca and Gibraltar.

The War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1718 ended Spanish hopes of regaining significant Italian holdings. The  Anglo-Spanish war of 1727 quickly ended with no advantage to either side.  The War of Jenkins Ear in 1739, and its continuation in the War of Austrian Succession, saw the Spanish fight the British and their allies to a draw, with no territorial changes in the colonies. The Spanish soldiers saw some successes during this war, such as the Battle of Campo Santo in 1743. (Dale Wood, shout out to you.)
 During the Seven Years' War, the British gained Florida, but this was a result of the losses of Spanish allies, the French, who gave the Spanish the Louisiana territories to make up for the loss of Florida. While the British took Cuba and the Philippines during the actual fighting, these territories returned to Spanish control after the War.

The American Gulf Coast War

In the global war surrounding the American War for Independence, the Spanish reclaimed much of the key territory they had lost in the early 18th century. Along the Gulf of Mexico, the Spanish waged a successful war from 1779-1781, defeating the British forces in a number of confrontations on both land and sea. Thomas Chavez covers this portion of the war in his 2002 book, Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift. Chavez draws much needed attention to the Spanish role in the American War for Independence, and the book is an excellent read.

Thanks in part to the excellent command decisions of Bernardo de Galvez, the Spanish defeated the British at every turn in the campaign. The British (and German forces from Waldeck,) were eventually captured by the Spanish during the siege of Pensacola, depicted in the painting at the top of the post. On the right side of the painting, an African member of the Havana militia is shown charging into the breach with the grenadiers. With the growth of the New Military History in the scholarship surrounding the Revolution, I am surprised that no study of the ethnic minorities in the Spanish army is currently available.

In Europe, a French officer in Spanish service, Louis de Crillon, led the effort to retake the naval base of Mahon on the Mediterranean Island of Minorca. He was successful, and the war ended with the Spanish retaking of Florida and Minorca.

Castillo de San Marcos

Fortifications

The vast amount of Spanish fortifications in Latin America help explain Spain's continued grasp on her American Empire. Vauban style fortifications, or "Star-Forts," such as the Castillo de San Marcos in St. Augustine, Florida (above), or the Fortaleza San Carlos de la Cabana in Cuba (below), allowed the Spanish Empire to survive a period in the early 18th century when the Spanish army and navy were recovering from the War of Spanish Succession. Without the Castillo de Immaculate Concepcion in Nicaragua, the British forces under the direction of William Lyttelton might have taken Granada in 1762, splitting the Spanish overseas empire in two.

Fortaleza San Carlos de la Cabana

 Like Sweden, the Spanish Empire spent the majority of the 18th century in decline, struggling to return to a position of prominence. And, like the Swedes in the Russo-Swedish War of 1788, the Spanish experienced a resurgence in military capability at the end of the 18th century. However, the Spanish, unlike the Swedes, had significant fortifications to keep their holdings intact during the period of crisis.

When examining the Spanish military during the 18th century, historians should not be so quick to accept biased northern European observers at their word. Scharnhorst, as he lambasted the Spanish in 1782, failed to see that the Spanish had changed, and that under leaders like Galvez, they were capable of competing with, and succeeding against, the British.

Thanks for reading,


Alex 

Spotlight on: Battle of Fraustadt, 1706

Prayer after the battle of Fraustadt: Gustav Cederströrm

Dear Reader,

On February 13th 1706, in the middle of the Great Northern War, general Carl Gustaf Rehnskiöld of the Swedish army faced a difficult situation. The Saxon army under general Johann von Schulenburg outnumbered Rehnskiölds' force by slightly over two to one (9,500 to 20,000). The Saxons and Russians under Schulenburg had been following Rehnskiöld, with the hopes of destroying his much smaller army.  Rehnskiölds' situation was only worsened by the fact that King Augustus the Strong of Poland (another member of the anti-Swedish coalition) was approaching with an additional 8,000 horsemen. If Schulenburg and Augustus completed a junction, the force against Rehnskiold would increase to three to one.

North of the town of Fraustadt, (present day Wschowa) the Saxo-Russian force established a defensive position of roughly two miles in length, between the villages of Röhrsdorf  (present Osowa Sein) and Geyersdorf (present Debowa Leka). The defensive positions were littered with cannons and Chevaux de frise, spikes designed to impale horses.

Chevaux de frise

Schulenburg deployed his army in a traditional Kabinettskriege pattern: the infantry in the center, with the cavalry on the wings, and Rehnskiöld followed suit. Schulenburg placed his Russian allies on the left flank of his infantry line, and supposedly ordered them to turn their uniforms inside out to disguise the fact that they were Russian. (The inside of the Russian coat was red, like the outside of the Saxon coat.) Schulenburg was dubious about the value of his Russian allies, based on their poor performance at the debacle of Narva in 1700.

At the outset of the battle, the Saxons and Russians had most of the traditional military advantages. They had a larger army, much more artillery (the Swedes didn't have any cannons at this battle) , the flanks of their infantry line were protected by cavalry, villages, and a marsh, and they had strong fortifications in the front of their army.

Despite all of these disadvantages, Rehnskiöld ordered the Swedes to attack. The Swedes possessed one advantage that the other forces of the Great Northern War did not: superior morale. The Swedes would attack against incredible odds again and again during the Great Northern War. Rehnskiöld also knew that he had great superiority in cavalry, and as we has seen before, if cavalry could break into enemy lines, they would cause panic and massive casualties.

Before we continue, here is a map of the battle of Fraustadt, drawn by yours truly. Do not copy this map for anything except personal use.

Map by author 2/13/2013

My map is based on contemporary maps and shows the course of the battle.  Oskar Sjöstrom provides a more accurate map of the deployment, in his book, Fraustadt 1706 - ett fält färgat rött ("Fraustadt 1706- a field colored red".) Here is his map.

Map by Oskar Sjöstrom (2008)

Rehnskiöld knew that to frontally attack Chevaux de frise meant suicide for his horsemen, so he sent them around the enemies' flank. On the right flank, the cavalry under Krassow and Rehnskiöld would sweep around the left flank of the Saxon and Russian army. On the Swedish left flank, the cavalry under Hummerhielm would by pass by the Chevaux de frise by moving through a frozen swamp in front of the Saxon right flank. The result of this flanking movement can be seen on my map, above.

The Swedish cavalry moved to envelope the Saxon flanks, while the Swedish infantry moved against the centre of the of the Saxon and Russian forces, preventing them from assisting the cavalry. The Saxon cavalry did not attempt to countercharge the Swedes during the flanking movement, and the result was disasterous for the Saxons.

Both Saxon cavalry wings broke under the onslaught, and the Swedish cavalry, showing considerable restraint, moved to attack the rear of the Saxon and Russian infantry.  This can be seen on my map. Once the Swedish horsemen were in among the enemy infantry, the battle was over, and the Saxon and Russian army ceased to exist. The Swedes lost around 1,500 men killed and wounded, while the Saxons and Russian lost around 15,000 killed, wounded and captured.

This double envelopment has often been compared to Hannibal's miraculous victory at Cannae, and the Swedish army was grateful for its incredible victory.  The regimental chaplains led the men in prayer, to thank God for the victory.  This scene was immortalized by the great Swedish painter, Gustaf Cederström, in the painting at the beginning of this post. 

For further information, check out Oskar Sjöstrom's book Fraustadt 1706 - ett fält färgat rött. Even for non-Swedish readers, the book has many helpful maps and diagrams.

Thanks for reading,

Alex