Did Soldiers use Grenades in the Mid-Eighteenth Century?

 

Plate from, The Grenadiers exercise of the Granado...
published December 4th, 1744

Dear Reader,

I sincerely apologize for the long silence. It has been too long since I've created any content on this site. I promised someone very dear to me that I would not write any more posts until after I had defended my dissertation, and I am delighted to report that I passed my dissertation defense on March 1st. Although I am still hard at work on revisions, I decided to take a bit of time out of that schedule to provide a short write-up on grenades. 

The use of hand grenades is commonly associated with the period just before the Seven Years War: the grenadiers of the 1690s employed grenades in siege combat, and no-one would dispute this.  Likewise, it is common knowledge that grenades continued to be employed by naval forces during the eighteenth century. On land, however, it is commonly asserted, that grenades fell out of fashion after the War of Spanish Succession, and played little part in warfare during the Seven Years War or American War of Independence. Evidence shows that this is incorrect. Grenades continued to play an important part in siege warfare throughout this period, and both European and American officers concurred that armies needed to be supplied and equipped with grenades. 

During this entire period, the hand grenade was a hollow ball of metal (glass grenades were also employed by the Austrian military, but may be from an earlier period) filled with gunpowder and ignited by means of a short fuse. A military author defined grenades in 1783: 

The hand-grenade, which is a hollow ball or shell, generally of iron, but sometimes of tin... of about 2 1/2 inches in diameter; was first used in 1594... it is filled with a very fine powder, and set on fire by means of a small fuze driven into the fuze hole.[1]

 

A pile of early modern grenades and musket balls,
Forchtenstein Castle

Evidence for the continued use of grenades by European armies is substantial. In 1747, two (probably drunk) Prussian cantonists disrupted a engagement party by exploding hand grenades nearby, until the minister had them chased off (no mean feat).[2] When the Austrians captured Schweidnitz in 1757, they inherited a store of almost 81,000 hand grenades from their former Prussian owners.[3] In 1779, Gaston de Commines, a soldier formerly in Austrian service, writing from the United Provinces, attempted to convince Benjamin Franklin of the efficacy of his new grenade launcher, which he envisioned mounted troops employing.[4] Lewis Lochée, a naturalized British military writer from the Austrian Netherlands, wrote on hand grenades in his 1783 treatise on field fortification, arguing that camps should have, "palisades fixed at a certain distances from the parapet.. to obtain the additional security against hand grenades." Lochee continued, "the distance that hand-grenades can be thrown is from 25 to 30 yards."[5] Thus, Prussian cantonists had access to grenades in peacetime, and set a considerable store of them aside. Authors and inventors with Austrian, Dutch, and British connections likewise considered the use of hand grenades, and developed new weapons for their employ. However, were they used in actual combat? 

It seems that, much like their use during the Nine Years War and War of Spanish Succession, hand grenades were most commonly deployed around fortresses. British troops utilized hand grenades in colonial conflict, such as against the Native Americans who took part in Pontiac's War in 1763. Simeon Ecuyer, the officer commanding at Fort Pitt, noted that the Indians, "continued firing at the fort all night, [we] threw some hand grenades into the ditch where we imagined some of the enemy were."[6] Captain Dalrympe of the Loyal Irish Volunteers wrote Lord Germain in 1779, describing the attack on the fortress at Porto Omoa, asserting that his troops, "were formed into four columns in line, four men advanced in each column, with guides at the head... followed [by] eight men with carrying the ladders, who were followed by a few hand grenade men."[7] Although the Loyal Irish took part in this assault, seamen and marines also formed part of the attack. 

Grenades were also captured, acquired and employed by American troops during the War of Independence. At the capture of Fort Chambly in October of 1775, part of the stores which fell into American hands were, "500 hand grenades."[8] American Colonel Richard Gridley estimated that American troops would need, "2000 hand grenades" in order to successfully besiege Boston.[9] Captain Thomas Antoine Mauduit du Plessis, a French engineer working with the American troops, wrote to Washington in 1777 that Fort Red Bank could better defended if, "we can with mines [and] hands grenades... secure him."[10] Like most European armies, then, the North American rebels primarily used grenades in the context of sieges and defending positions. 

Russian Troops experimenting with mortars, 1750s[11]

The Russians, in contrast with most armies in Military Europe, stood out for their great love of hand grenades during the eighteenth century. Russian grenadiers and fusiliers carried grenades throughout the Seven Years War, carrying two grenades in a special bandoleer.[12] Grenadiers were instructed to throw these grenades whenever the enemy was close enough.[13] This was also done by the dragoon regiments in the Russian Army, who like the infantry had special ammunition carts for the transport of grenades. Perhaps uniquely among eighteenth-century armies, Russian troops planned for the use of grenades outside siege warfare. In skirmishes with East Prussian militia forces, Russian dragoons were instructed to dismount and throw their grenades whenever the enemy took cover or used buildings as a strongpoint.[14] The Russian army employed grenades in a variety of settings, and even equipped their mounted troops with grenades.

Thus, although there were some regional differences, troops all across Europe and North America continued to employ hand grenades in specific settings during the middle decades of the eighteenth-century. These weapons did not disappear with the end of the War of Spanish Succession, and continue to be employed throughout the period. 

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Lewis Lochée, Elements of Field Fortification, 22.
[2] William W. Hagen, Ordinary Prussians, 155, 472.
[3] George Grey Butler (editor) and Horace St. Paul, A Journal of the First Two Campaigns of the Seven Years War, (Cambridge: 1914), 380.
[4] Barbara B. Oberg, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, November 1, 1779, through February 29, 1780, Volume 31, 48–54.
[5] Lewis Lochée, Elements of Field Fortification, 22.
[6] Mary C. Darlington, Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, 105.
[7] The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure, Volume 65, 319.
[8] The Scots Magazine, Volume 37 (1775), 651.
[9] Philander D. Chase, The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, Volume 2, 210.
[10]Philander D. Chase, The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, Volume 12, 287.
[11] For this and more excellent images of the Russian Army, see: Tomasz Karpinski, "Unknown Iconographic Sources for the History of the Russian Army: The Russian garrison in Elblag during the Seven Years War though the Observation of Eyewitnesses," Milihist Info. Link

[12] Groβen Generalstabe, Die Krieges Friedrichs des Groβen, Teil 3, Der Siebenjaehrige Krieg, Volume 4 (Berlin, E. Mittler und Sohn, 1914) 5,29.
[13] Ibid.
[14]Christopher Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West, 64.

Russian Soldiers on American Soil? Catherine the Great, George III, and the American Revolution

Russians troops, 1770s
image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to examine a subject which may be familiar to some of you, but I hope to explore the topic with a source base that will be new for many of you. The apocalyptic vision of Russian troops invading the United States became increasingly common during the Cold War, and has carried on into the post-Cold War era through the medium of video games like Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. The most famous example of this trend is perhaps the 1984 film, Red Dawn. 
The American fear of invasion by Russian troops existed long before the twentieth century, however. During the American War of Independence, many Americans feared that the Tsarina of Russia, Catherine II "the Great", would send troops to support the British during the War of Independence.

This possibility, both eagerly anticipated by British officers, and feared by the American people, has been addressed by a number of diplomatic historians, going all the way back to Frank A. Golder's 1915 treatment of the subject, "Catherine the Great and the American Revolution" in the American Historical Review. The best book in English on this subject is doubtlessly still Normal Saul's Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867. More recently, Norman Desmarais has covered the topic via published writings by British officers, as well as tracking down newspaper reports of Russian involvement throughout the war. This is a post about an agreement between two countries that was never reached: in the words of Norman Saul, "Russians would not be Hessians." For first making me aware of this incident, and all of his incredible assistance during my MA studies, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sergei Zhuk, of Ball State University, who was gracious enough to work with a student who was interested in the Hessians.

A Court Portrait of Sir Robert Gunning

On the 7th of August, 1775, the British Ambassador at the Russian Court, Sir Robert Gunning, received a letter from Henry Howard, the 12th Earl of Suffolk. Suffolk, a highly placed minister in Lord North's government, who eventually secured the use of Hessian and Hanoverian forces for the British Crown, wrote to Gunning, the Ambassador in Russian, confidentially asking him to put out feelers regarding obtaining Russian troops for British use in North America. In his cyphered reply to Suffolk, on the 8th of August, 1775, Gunning spoke of the "delicate and difficult commission" which the government had charged him, namely, obtaining, "a Body of Her Imperial Majesty's Infantry[.]"[1]

Henry Howard, 12th Earl of Suffolk

Almost immediately in this process, Gunning appeared to hedge his bets in his letters back to his handler in London: he carefully explained that he needed to bring this topic of conversation up organically with the Empress herself, or with her minister Nikita Ivanonvich Panin. He planned to wait for the Empress to make one of her "numberless assurances [that] she has formerly given me of Her wishes to have any opportunity of serving the King (George III)."[2] This type of assurance was normally given in the course of diplomatic niceties at court, and can be understood as the equivalent of the modern English nicety, 'let us know if you need anything.' In a difficult situation, Gunning planned to follow-up this nicety with, 'actually, your Imperial Majesty, we need about 20,000 troops for service in North America.'

Nikita Ivanonvich Panin

By the 8th of September, Suffolk had replied to Gunning, indicating that he should be prepared to offer the Russian Empress a subsidy treaty in exchange for use of this "body of troops", but that "it is more profitable," for Gunning to pursue, "the same line of sentiment on which she [Empress Catherine] has thus far proceeded; she may think a treaty unncessary and lend the assistance required without any formal obligation whatever."[3] Acknowledging that this level of generosity seemed unlikely, Suffolk continued, "That you however may be prepared for every possible contingency, His Majesty commands me to inform you that the proposal of a Subsidy is not to frustrate the negotiations."[4]

Helpfully, Suffolk drew up a draft of a subsidy treaty, leaving key areas, such as numbers of troops committed, blank, so that Gunning would have something tangible to present the Russian Empress. This treaty, written in French, contained the following points:

1. George III would secure a body of troops for service, the exact number of troops left blank, they would be officered by Russians.
2. The troops would be picked up by British transports from various seaports on the 25th of March, 1776.
3. The troops would be reviewed before embarkation by an English commissioner, who would administer an oath of loyalty to George III, which the treaty was careful to note, "of course, this will not supersede their oath of Loyalty taken to the Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russians."[5]
4.The British crown would provide two battalion guns (light cannon) to each battalion serving in this manner, and also provide the necessary men for crewing these pieces.
5. Having taken the oath of Loyalty on March 25th, they would for all intents and purposes be British National Troops, receiving pay at the same rate as their British counterparts.
6. Should these battalions be damaged or destroyed while in British service, the British crown would pay for the cost of re-raising the troops, and return them into Russian service in the same condition that they were received.
7. The troops will serve for the duration of the treaty, the British crown would give a three-month warning when the treaty was to be dissolved, and send the troops back to Russian with two months pay for their travel costs.
8. Should hostilities break out in Russia, the troops would be returned immediately with the same arrangement for back pay, and in addition the British government would transport them free of charge.
9. The treaty would last for two years with the possibility of renewal.
10. The Russians have ten weeks from the British signature to ratify the treaty.[6]

Having drafted the treaty, Suffolk felt the need to clarify points in his following letters to Gunning, instructing him, "have it fully understood that the supreme command is to be with General Carlton, or Genl. Howe, or whoever may be the British commander in chief in the District where the Russians are to act[.]"[7] Suffolk continued, "I must again remind you of the great importance of bringing this matter to an immediate Decision so as the Account of it may arrive on or before the 24th of October."[8]

On the September 11th, 1775, Gunning reported to Suffolk a conversation with Catherine II, where she had asked the British Ambassador "whether any progress had been made in settling disputes in America."[9] Before Gunning could reply, the Empress continued, "for God's sake, put an End to it as soon as possible, and do not confine yourself to one Method of accomplishing this desirable End there are various means of doing it, and they ought all to be tried."[10]

Tragically for the British, Gunning was at this particular moment unaware of the drafted subsidy treaty, which had just been written three days earlier by Suffolk, and was still enroute to him. Only on October 1st did Gunning report back that the message had arrived to late, and the empress had departed for another country seat when the subsidy treaty arrived. Notwithstanding this setback, Gunning immediately approached Panin, "the next morning, and on account of the extreme Readiness and good Will which he had shewn in the Business hitherto, I was resolved to treat with him with all possible Openness."[11] Panin initially treated Gunning's request with favor: "Neither the number of troops nor the place of their destination seemed to strike him as exceptionable: he repeated to me that he saw it perfectly in the light I did, as a matter of Friendship between sovereign and sovereign."[12] Panin seemed to wholeheartedly support the plan, but Gunning related that his, "impatience to have the business communicated to the Empress was checked by my knowledge of the persons by whom she was then surrounded, Mons. Potemkin and the Tchernychevs."[13] Panin confirmed Gunning's suspicions that the idea might be shot down in the presence of this hostile party, and "was of the opinion that he ought himself to be the Bearer of His Majesty's Letter to the Empress."[14]

Count Osterman

Gunning next approached Count Ivan Andreyevich Osterman, and received a cooler response. Osterman, "asked me whether such an assistance would not alarm the other powers."[15] Gunning was unable to convince Osterman of the feasibility of the scheme. When Gunning had the opportunity to speak to Panin once again, "the less positive manner in which he expressed his hopes of the success of my application made me very much apprehensive that Count Osterman's ideas of the difficulty of the business had infected him."[16] That was Wednesday. By Friday, at 5pm, Panin relayed to Gunning that the Empress,

"shewed much repugnance to the [idea of] having her troops employed in America, where they could have no communication with this country; and that the number requested was so great that she did not think it was possible to grant them in the present state of her forces, wasted as they were by the length of hte late war; as well as on account of the unsettled state of Poland and the uncertainty of that of Sweden[.]... She had asked whether it was not possible for Her to assisted Us in any other Manner than by sending Her troops out of Europe?"[17]

Panin, in passing, added to Gunning, "could not His Majesty make use of Hanoverians?"[18] At this point, Gunning resorted to begging, pleading, and that most unhelpful of suggestions, 'we could have assisted the Turks in the late war.'  Gunning then attempted to negotiate for a smaller body of troops, reducing his request to 15,000 men. Panin was noncommittal,  and Gunning concluded, "I can scarcely entertain any Hopes at present that Her Imperial Majesty will be prevailed upon to send Troops to America[.]"[19]

Finally, Catherine II sent a lengthy letter to George III via Gunning. Despite a warm and effusive opening, Catherine indicated that, "your minister explains and desires a body of twenty thousand men from my troops be transported to Canada next spring, I cannot hide from your Majesty that such aid with such a destination not only sits ill with me, but also exceeds the limits of my powers to oblige."[] She continued, "Nor can I stop thinking about what should have resulted for Our own dignity, if  two monarchies and two nations had thus joined of our forces simply to calm a rebellion."[20]

In summary, though Gunning and Suffolk worked at some length to obtain a body of Russian subsidy troops, the opinions of Count Osterman and other prominent members of the Russian Court intervened to prevent Russian soldiers from intervening on the British side of the American War of Independence.

Now, we turn to that most dangerous of historical enterprises: the counterfactual hypothesis. What would have occurred if Tsarina and her ministers had been disposed to accept the subsidy treaty with the government of George III?  Obviously, take what follows with a giant helping of salt.

Period drawing of Russian Troops, 18th Century
Unknown artist, oil on canvas, image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич

Assuming all went well with the inspection and embarkation of troops on March 25th, the Russian force of 20,000 men would have been available for the New York offensive, and could have arrived off Long Island with the rest of Howe's forces by the end of June. Uniformed in their red summer jackets  the Russians would have fit in quite well with the British forces. There is little doubt that they would have performed as effectively as the Hessians did in the late summer and fall campaign across New York in 1776. As the year drew to a close, gaining a similar amount of ground, Howe would likely have dispersed his men into garrisons, and placed 1,500 men under the command of Major General Alexander Suvorov in the area around Trenton. Following established Russian doctrine, Suvorov followed his subordinates' suggestion to place redoubts around key positions at Trenton. When the American attack came on December 26th, 1776, the Russians where still operationally surprised, but doggedly held out in their defensive positions, suffering numerous casualties, but rebuffing Washington's surprise counterattack. With the final failure of this gamble, American resistance continued, but the war ended in a negotiated settlement with most of the thirteenth colonies returning to British rule. Perhaps a bit too, "on the nose," but you get the point.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Robert Gunning to Earl of Suffolk, August 8th 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 44,46.
[2] Ibid, 45.
[3]Suffolk to Gunning, 8th September 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 59-60.
[4] Ibid
[5] Draft of Subsidy Treaty, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 63.
[6] Ibid, 62-65.
[7] Suffolk to Gunning, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 72.
[8] Ibid
[9]Gunning to Suffolk, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 99-100.
[10]Ibid.
[11] Gunning to Suffolk, 1st October, 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 109.
[12] Ibid, 110.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 111.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, 112.
[17] Ibid, 113.
[18] Ibid, 114.
[19] Catherine II to George III, 7th October 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 128.
[20] Ibid, 129.

Russian Expansion in the Kabinettskriege Era

Putin as Peter the Great

Russia has a long and complicated history with her eastern European neighbors. At the beginning of the Kabinettskriege era, in 1648, there was no reason to suspect that Russia would rise to the status of a European power. Indeed, in those days, there was no Russia, only the small state of Muscovy. All eyes were on Sweden. Her powerful army, and exceptional leadership, gave the Swedes control and domination of much of eastern Europe, particularly in the Baltic region. By the end of the Kabinettskriege era, Russia had displaced Sweden as the dominant power in eastern Europe, and was able to do this through a complex mix of factors.

Eastern Europe in the late 17th Century

Situation in 1648

Russia (Teal/Green) had a impressive territorial empire, but lacked strategic positions and resources. Russia also had a number of powerful enemies. The greatest of these, until 1721, was the Baltic empire of Sweden (pink). Another power opponent of Russian interests was the Ottoman empire (brown), and the Ottoman empire's client state, the Crimean Khanate (bright green). Directly to Muscovy's west, the Poland-Lithuanian commonwealth possessed much territory, but was showing signs of decline.

Muscovy itself had a number of problems. Muscovy had recent emerged from the time of troubles, a disastrous  period in Russian history, which saw much instability. The Russians had also managed to survive a series of long wars against the Mongols, but the army which defeated the Mongols was now outdated. In order make Russia into a great power state, the Russians needed: 1). A stronger army 2). powerful, skillful leadership, 3) and divided and weakened states in the rest of eastern Europe. By 1789, the end of the Kabinettskriege period, Russia would achieve all of these goals, and join the ranks of the European great powers.

Figurines of 17th Century Russian Streltsy

1). Reforming the Military
Until the turn of the eighteenth century, Russian military life was dominated by the type of soldier you see above, Streltsy. These soldiers were state of the art in 1550s, but by the 1650s, had begun to show their age. In order to join the ranks of European great powers, the Russians needed to reform their military along European lines.

They adopted the flintlock musket, as opposed to the primitive matchlock used by the Streltsy, and began to dress in French and German military fashion. For most of the Kabienttskriege era, the Russian military was one of the best in the world. By 1709, the time of the cataclysmic Battle of Poltava, the Russian army began to look a bit more like this:

Early 18th Century Russian Soldiers

Peter I of Russia, "the Great"

 2). Effective Leadership

The Russian army was modernized by a man who was not a masterful tactician, but a great leader: Peter I of Russia. He lost battles in the Great Northern War, but kept Russia in the fight when his allies deserted him. He was often a brutal leader, but his methods produced results. It was his influence, more than any other factor, which led Russia to embrace a distinctly European way of life and thinking.

He had other, very effective rulers follow him as well. Both Elizabeth Petranova, his daughter, and Katherine the Great of Russia followed in his mold of making Russia a first rate European power. Under Elizabeth, the Russians defeated Frederick the Great's Prussia in the Seven Years' War, and Prussia only survived this disastrous war by tenaciously hanging in the fight until Elizabeth's death in 1762.

Katherine the Great in military dress

 3). Weakened Neighbors in Eastern Europe

The Russians were able to achieve spectacular success, because of their great army and leadership, but also because of their diplomatic choices and options. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russia was able to isolate specific enemies, and destroy them in detail. This began with the Great Northern War in 1700, and would continue throughout the eighteenth century. In the Great Northern War, Russia was able to isolate Sweden, and attack it, in an alliance with Denmark and Poland.  This war was successful and Sweden's empire was dismantled. However, this achieved a dual purpose. In the course of the war, Poland was also weakened, both economically and militarily. This would lead to the partitions of Poland, later in the eighteenth century, where Russia, Prussia, and Austria would claim large swaths of Polish territory.

Another example of this is the Russian conflict with the Ottoman empire. The Russians used their common Christianity with the Austrians to gain powerful allies, and force the Ottomans to fight a two-front war. Many of the smaller states in eastern Europe, such as Courland or the Crimean Khanate, were snapped up in times of crisis, when larger powers were too busy to intervene.

 Practical Application Today

At first glance, it might seem as though Putin is a "new" Peter the Great, as the picture at the top implies. However, there are a number of historical differences which actually work in favor of the EU and their allies. First- in the twenty-first century, it is much more noticeable when large countries annex smaller ones, thanks to instantaneous communications, social networks, etc.

Second, Putin may be a charismatic strongman, and a capable strategic leader. His diplomatic maneuvering shows some skill, and his handling of the 2008 South Ossestia war show that he has the potential to force opponents to make mistakes, and back down. With that being said, he is no Peter the Great. While he may be attempting to revitalize the Russian armed forces, those forces are still years away from matching and exceeding first world armies, such as the United States, or even France and Germany. The fact that the dispute is happening in Russia's back yard, Ukraine, indicates that despite the saber rattling, NATO and their allies have Moscow on the back foot.

Third,  the Russian army, unlike the Russian army of the eighteenth century, is badly in need of reform. However, the Ukrainian forces they would be fighting are not much better off. With that being said, Russia should worry about more than just Ukraine, should it choose to invade. While the United States might not intervene, other powers, such as Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic States, will certainly not take Ukrainian annexation lying down.

This brings us to the fourth and final point: Europe is not divided. This is not 1914. This is not 1938. The entire continent of Europe condemns what Moscow is doing, and should Moscow attempt the total annexation of Ukraine, will act to protect European interests. The Poles, particularly, will fight to keep independence.


Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns