Book Review: Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years War

Cover Art 

Dear Reader,

Today, I am writing a review of Katrin and Sascha Möbius' new book: Prussian Army Soldiers and the Seven Years War: The Pyschology of Honour. This brief book, published by Bloomsbury Academic, provides the first major analysis of Prussian common soldiers in the era of the Seven Years War available in English. The married authors have brought their considerable linguistic and academic talents to the study of the army of Frederick II ("the Great"). By examining the considerable body of writings that Prussian soldiers left behind, in addition to those of elites such as Feldprediger Karl Daniel Küster, the authors manage to provide a much needed overhaul of the image of the Prussian common soldier. In doing so, they follow the path begun by Michael Sikora, Ilya Berkovich, Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven, in their own research. 

Treading little of the same ground as Sascha's 2007 book Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind, (highly recommended for German readers) Prussian Army Soldiers explores the concept of honor, and its psychological underpinnings in the Prussian Army during the Seven Years War. The authors correctly assert, ""This book is the first in-depth investigation of the long-dismissed idea of a characteristic sense of honour held and shared by common... Prussian soldiers and their families, based upon their own accounts."[1] Their exploration is highly rewarding and successful for students of old-regime armies. 

The 220-odd pages of main text are broken down into three main chapters and two useful appendices. The first chapter addresses the origins and structure of the Prussian Army, the second explores common soldiers emotional responses to combat, and the third examines the various factors, when which taken together, constituted Prussian soldiers' sense of honor. The various contemporary  reglements and military treatises are outlined in appendix I, while English language translations of twelve Prussian soldiers' letters are included in appendix II. The second appendix makes this book a vital source for popular enthusiasts (such as wargamers and reenactors) who are interested in this era but do not have German language skills. 

As a specialist in this field, reading this book was a true delight, and I am in the debt of Katrin and Sascha for producing such a fine manuscript. Two minor criticisms: 1) the order of the chapters is not intuitive,  it might have made more sense to place the chapter explaining the constituent parts of honor before the chapter examining that honor on the battlefield. 2) The book uses non-period images of fine artistic value, but perhaps questionable historic value. These minor complaints in no-way detract of from an admirable and enjoyable study of soldiers in the Seven Years War era.

Katrin and Sascha have forcefully demonstrated that the Prussian soldier of the eighteenth century was not a "clockwork soldier" or "automaton... but a human being[.]"[2] Instead, the authors provide a persuasive case that "we must refute the image of the machine-soldiers beaten into battle by their officers. Instead, we encounter men of flesh and blood with human emotions, who wanted to defend their honour, serve their God and stay alive for their families."[3] This book will become required reading for specialists of eighteenth-century Prussia, and vital reading for historical enthusiasts who desire a more realistic picture of the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great. Highly Recommended. 

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always: 

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Möbius and Möbius, Prussian Army Soldiers, 2.

[2]Ibid, 169.

[3]Ibid, 172.     

Et sans résultat! Wargame Ruleset Review

Dear Reader,


What is a wargame? To some, it is a game, a way to see friends, roll dice, and enjoy a fun competition. To some, it is a simulation, scientifically calculated in a detailed manner as possible. For others, it is a way to connect with a particular period of the past, carefully reproducing uniforms and weapons in miniature. All this to say, wargaming is not one thing, it is many things. It is as much art as science, and as the recent passing of my friend Dean William West has reminded, art can be lost if it is not passed on and remembered.

Today, we are going to examine a particular ruleset, David Enteness'  Et sans résultat!, published by The Wargaming Company, LLC. You can find this product at The Wargaming Company website, and the UK and EU at Magister Militum. David is  attempting to follow the Flames of War/Games Workshop model of wargaming in the Napoleonic Era, in order to make this era more accessible to younger gamers. We here at Kabinettskriege wish him all the success in the world in that regard.

ESR (Et sans résultat!) is a rather unique wargaming platform, as it eschews much of the tactical level simulated detail in order to place the player specifically at the level of the division, corps, and army commander. It is thus, as it claims on the front cover, a "highly playable, perspective based wargame." Before evaluating ESR too carefully, I want to discuss the format of the ruleset, and then move from there into critiques and praise.

150 yard quick reference guide

The image above is the 150-yard scale quick reference guide. It gives a breakdown of the turn, and also gives you an idea of the high quality production value which goes into ESR products. Each turn is broken down into the Command, Movement, Artillery & Skirmish, and Combat phases.

A French Commander mulls over his options

In the Command phase, players (representing generals) Activate Orders, Issue Orders, and perform Leader Actions. In many ways, this is the most important phase. On the first turn, players issue orders. These include Attack, Defend, Support, Move and Reserve orders. An Attack order will move a formation directly towards its target (usually a terrain piece) at full speed. A Defend order will keep a formation in place. A Support order will keep a formation behind or alongside another friendly formation. A Move order will move a formation (at variable speed, with some latitude) towards an objective, while a Reserve order will keep a formation in place, and enable it to quickly transition into another task.

Once these order have been issued, there are dice rolls to activate them on the following turn, and orders may be delayed a few turns. Leader Actions allow the player to personally intervene with a number of special actions, such as committing an artillery battery, creating a detachment, or taking personal command of a body of troops. All of these are achieved by a dice roll which is relatively easy at the beginning of the game, but becomes increasingly difficult as formations take damage (or Fatigue, to use the ESR specific term.)

ESR Troops on the March

The Movement phase is obviously when movement occurs, but also when formations ploy and deploy. During the phase, the steps are Order Conversions, Movement, Ploy and Deploy, and Fatigue Recovery. Order conversions allow certain types of troops to launch fast attacks. Deployment is a very critical part of the game, as all formations usually begin ployed, or in a column of march. It takes time and effort to deploy troops for battle, (as it did historically!) and a division can usually deploy about 3-4 battalions per turn, or twenty minutes.  Formations which are attacked while ployed suffer a severe disadvantage, and will usually retreat. Fatigue Recovery is when troops shed Fatigue and become more combat effective.

The Artillery & Skirmish is the first of two battle-related phases. The phase consists of  Artillery & Skirmishing, Leader Fate, and Assessments. In this phase, forrmations can bombard and skirmish with one another, attempting to inflict Fatigue (damage) and Assessments (morale checks) on the enemy. Factors such as the types of guns firing, weather, and intensity of the assault influence the Artillery phase, while the skirmish phase is impacted by whether or not your army possesses an effective skirmishing doctrine. This is also the phase of the game where "officer casualties" are resolved, during the Leader Fate segment.

An ESR Battle in full swing

During the Combat Phase, brigades and divisions battle one another for control of the field. Compared with many rulesets, combat is streamlined, consisting of numerous opposed 2d6 rolls with modifiers added. For example, if a battalion of Landwehr was opposed to the Middle Guard Infantry, the French would add 6 to their dice, and the Prussians would add 3 to theirs. This is also impacted by the quality of commanders. An exceptionally good division commander might allow you to add 3, an average one might allow you to add 1. The goal is to beat your enemy by greater than 4, allowing you to breakthrough further into his formation. After combat, the formations who took part perform an assessment, once again a 2d6 roll which can result in the formation taking Fatigue, retreating, or breaking in a rout.

I will close out this review with a bit of analysis, describing features which players may or may not enjoy regarding the game, and then evaluating it as a historian. This basic maneuver units are the battalion/regiment and squadron. Units of that size are represented on a single base, or stand. The ruleset is designed for fast play and large armies. If you want to wargame the Napoleonic Era on a large scale, seriously consider this ruleset. Battles of 20,000-30,000 men per side routinely take 3 hours. It is possible to game larger battles in a reasonable amount of time, something that is usually not offered by highly detailed, simulation-type wargames. It is quite possible to be charged by a division of French Cuirassier, and resolve their charge in real time.

The battlefield awaits!

In order to achieve this quick-play time, ESR dispenses with much tactical detail. Indeed, this is almost a wargame set at the operational level. Battalions fight, but do so in base contact. Hussar squadrons make take an enemy regiment in the flank, but receive no bonus for doing so, unless not just the squadron, but the whole maneuver element outflanks the enemy. In example: a Polish Uhlan Squadron charging a Russian infantry battalion on the flank would receive no bonus, while a French Cuirassier division charging a Russian infantry division on the flank would. There are absolutely tactical aspects to the game (deploying batteries, launching intense skirmish assaults) but focusing on them misses the point of the game. Your goal is not to destroy the three enemy regiments in your front, your goal is to push back the three enemy Corps in your front. I was initially rather horrified by this idea: after all, wrecking enemy battalions is one of the more enjoyable aspects of games such as Johnny Reb III, Final Argument of Kings, and Warfare in the Age of Reason. It isn't the goal in ESR, and ESR makes no bones about that fact.

As a historian, I find ESR to be a breath of fresh air. The ESR Campaign Guides come with selections for further reading, it would be interesting to see that included in future versions of the ruleset as well. It is clear that David has done a great deal of research into this era of history. ESR has carefully identified what it was possible (and not possible!) for commanders to do on Napoleonic battlefields. The game does what all wargames should try to do: present the player with the role of a commanding officer in that era. If you want to discover what it was like to be in the 21eme regiment d'infanterie de ligne, go be a reenactor, or even better, read the extensive literature on common soldiers which has grown up on the Napoleonic era. If you want to be faced with some of the choices which plagued Napoleonic commanders on the battlefield, try ESR.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

ESR (Et Sans Résultat!) 1809 Wargame Battle Report

French and Austrian Troops begin to deploy

Dear Reader,

Today, I wanted to offer a wargaming battle report. A few weeks ago, the designer of Et sans résultat!, David Enteness, and I played a short game of his excellent ruleset. Although the game is set in the Napoleonic era, David hopes to someday expand his ruleset and miniatures sales into the Seven Years' War era.  I will describe the battle, and then offer a few thoughts on the ruleset. You can find these rules, published by The Wargaming Company, on their website, here.

Battle Report:

A few notes on the scenario. Based on the uniforms and ratings of forces involved, this was a battle between 1 Austrian and 1 French army corps, in 1809. Both forces had around 20,000 men, and entered from opposite sides of the table, as you can see from the map below. Both commanders were trying to make way for larger forces by driving the enemy off the table.

The French (Blue lines) axis of advance was from the west, (top of the map) while the Austrians (White lines) advanced from the east. Both players started with an initial force on the table (an advance guard and infantry division) with one additional element arriving each turn. The French, under Jean-Baptiste Bessières, moved forward in an effort to seize Huelsendorf. The Austrians, under Johann Karl, Freiherr von Hiller, moved their avant garde forward, while trying to seize high ground north-east of Fuerstenwald.

von Hiller hurries an Austrian column towards high ground north of the Fuerstenwald

The Austrians attempted to control the high ground in the north-east quadrant of the battlefield, while the French rushed forward to take possession of the town and surrounding terrain.

State of affairs after one turn of movement. 

The Austrian avant-garde deployed, rushing a 6-pound battery and uhlans forward, as Grenzers moved up as fast as they could. The French, moving at a more stately pace, still managed to concentrate their chasseurs à cheval and an infantry division around Huelsendorf.

French Cavalry crosses a bridge, while the Austrian Avant-Garde struggles to deploy

The picture above shows the view from the western (French) side of the table. The Austrian advance forces quickly realized that a whole French infantry division was deploying in their front, and sought the cover of the woods. As more French infantry moved up, von Hiller moved one infantry division into position on a ridge behind the Fuerstenwald.  Bessières began to mass more French infantry around Hueslendorf, but as a result of confused orders, a large infantry division became lost on its way to the battlefield, losing about 1 hour's marching time.

Both generals bring more forces towards the fight. 

Von Hiller moved one infantry division from the south side of the Kunersbusch marsh to the north side, directly across from the town of Hueslendorf. The main Austrian force concentrated around the Fuerstenwald, with the French forming opposite, near the town. Faced with an entire Austrian infantry division, the French avant-garde chasseurs à cheval retired in good order through the town. While Bessières brought up his second infantry division and a division of Cuirassiers, the recently redeployed Austrian infantry division formed up to assault the town. The situation at this stage of the battle is depicted below.  Click on the image below for higher resolution/clearer labels.

At this critical junction, von Hiller (yours truly) decided that the moment had come to assault the town. Radetzky's division, formed up alongside the avant-garde, as pictured above, was ordered to attack the town. The Austrian infantry moved up, taking fire from French skirmishers posted in the houses. At this critical juncture, with battalions of Austrian infantry moving to contact, General Radetzky, the Austrian division commander, fell from the saddle, killed by a bad roll, err, Tirailleur's ball. Though inflicting some damage on their French opponents, the Austrian infantry fell back after a brief combat, reforming 1,000 yards away from town.

The Austrian attack on Huelsendorf stalls, while another French division moves forward

Even worse, at the same moment, the delayed French infantry division appeared directly across the marsh from Huelsendorf, and General Morand began deploying the 4eme de Ligne. Colonel Vincent of the 3rd Ferdinand Hussars, seeing French infantry deploying to his front, faced a stark choice: fall back, allowing French yet another infantry division to commit to the fight, or charge with 5 squadrons against a full French infantry division. Being a colonel of hussars, Vincent, of course, decided to convert onto an attack order, and charge.

Colonel Vincent charges a partially deployed French Infantry Division

Colonel Vincent's five squadrons were handily turned aside by two battalions of the 4eme de Ligne, but crashed into the third, routing it. The battalion streamed along the rest of the ployed division, shouting, "sauve qui peut!" This was too much for the division, which pulled back to defensive positions outside of the hussars' reach. The hussars themselves, being quite depleted by this rash attack, were only too happy to see them go. Both the hussars and the infantry formed, and spent the next hour in desultory probing with no clear advantage. While the charge of the 3rd Ferdinand Hussars had inflicted little real damage on the French, it made Colonel Vincent's reputation, and from then on young ladies took to their smelling salts whenever he narrowed his eyes.

With Marmond's infantry division reforming, von Hiller decided that the moment to strike had come. A detached force of Austrian Chevaulegers and Grenadiers (pictured above) assaulted across the Kunersbusch, towards the rear of the town. At the same time, a large column of Austrian grenadiers assaulted towards the French left, and von Hiller took personal command of the final fresh Austrian infantry division, marching towards the French center.

By keeping French forces occupied in the town, the Austrian mixed detachment was able to keep some of the French infantry pinned in the town. The French cuirassier brigade, backed away from grenadiers, not wanting to charge fresh infantry while unsupported. Meanwhile, the infantry under von Hiller's personal command slammed into French center. The fighting between the center infantry divisions was heavy, with neither side gaining a clear advantage.

The Austrian grenadiers continued to advance, leaving the cuirassier brigade with little choice but to attack. The Austrians began to gain an advantage in the contest between the two infantry divisions, while the French cuirassier suffered horribly in their charge against the grenadiers  The French infantry managed to clearly repulse the mixed detachment of grenadiers and Chevaulegers, but the damage was already done.

With the cuirassier brigade pushed to the other side of the river in confused retreat, the Austrian grenadiers threatened to cut the French line of withdrawal. Bessières pulled his troops out of Huelsendorf, leaving the Austrians as masters of the field. The two sides had suffered a roughly equal amount of damage up until the later turns, when the disastrous attack by the cuirassiers began. All in all, von Hiller had achieved a solid, though not complete, victory over Bessières. This battle represented around five-six hours combat between two corps and took two players about four hours of play time to complete. For more photos of the game, check out The Wargaming Company's photo gallery.  You can also watch my review of the miniatures from the same company on youtube.

Ruleset Review:

These rules provide an interesting window into the Napoleonic era. The turns are broken down into 4 phases: Command (Blue) Movement (Green) Artillery and Skirmish (Purple) Combat (Red). Or, to put it another way, turns are spent planning objectives and performing special actions, moving and deploying forces, and inflicting damage on enemy formations. In this game, you force your enemy to flee by causing him to perform, "assessments," something like a division-wide morale check. The more "fatigue" (combat attrition) a formation suffers, the more likely it is that they would have to perform an assessment. You can find a link to the quick-reference sheet here.

In this game, we used small orange dice to track fatigue

As I will discuss below, this is very much a game about leaders. A general can perform any number of useful actions at the beginning of a turn (or game) but as the game continues, formations which suffer fatigue will become less responsive to actions. Likewise, as the game continues, it is more and more likely that a general will become bogged down and trapped in a formation which has suffered a great deal of fatigue.

 As the rules and The Wargaming Company website repeatedly state, this is a perspective-based wargame. Some wargame rulesets allow you to be Blücher, Ney, Bagration, Beckwith, O'Hare, and Riflemen Harris. That is to say, they allow you to command at the army, corps, division, regiment, company, and individual levels. Et sans résultat! is uncompromising in its commitment to deliver the best experience on one of those levels: that of a high-level commander. Whether you are commanding at the army, corps, or division level, that is scale of play. You are not interested in flanking the enemy's battalion, you are interested in flanking his division or corps.

In that sense, ESR is firmly perspective-based wargame fought on the grand tactical scale. If your favorite part of gaming is wrecking an enemy battalion, this game is probably not for you. On the other hand, if you want a realistic window into the type of decisions which troops commanders actually had to make. As a result, the experience of the game is quite different from other wargames I have played. Practically, what does this mean?

Troops begin ployed (in marching column) on the table's edges, commanders are left to develop the battle on their own. As opposed to many games, which plan for combat on turn 1 or 2, around a third of the game time was devoted to moving troops to the appointed positions on the battlefield. While this may sound like a drawback, in reality, much of the job of Kabinettskriege or Napoleonic general was accomplished before the first shot was fired. Et sans résultat! firmly demonstrates this to the player.

In ESR, generals are concerned with pressing things at their level of responsibility: committing and recalling artillery batteries to the fight, energetically deploying extra units from line into column, weighing the importance of personal intervention at crisis points on the battlefield, and forming new ad-hoc formations in order to plug gaps in the line. Your mileage may vary, but as a military historian focusing on this era, I found ESR to be incredibly compelling and enjoyable as a game system.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

Book Review of For God and Kaiser: The Imperial Austrian Army

Cover Art

Dear Reader,

Today we are going to examine a new work covering the Austrian military from 1618 to 1918. Richard Bassett, a British journalist, has set out to rectify a problem. He argues the idea of Austrian writer Hermann Bahr, that "Austria has not been lucky with its biographers," also hangs true for the Austrian Imperial and Royal Army. It seems a bid odd to be making this case in 2015, when both Christopher Duffy and Franz Szabo have done so much to show that Austria had an effective military in the Seven Years' War. Indeed, Duffy is referenced in the acknowledgements as the first among equals of Seven Years' War historians, yet Bassett makes no reference to Duffy's magisterial two volume work on the Austrian army in the Seven Years' War.

As general work on the Austrian Army over the the three centuries, the work is successful, and may well (sadly, as will be shown) become a standard reference work and textbook. However, in the Kabinettskreige era, Bassett makes several glaring mistakes, which are exacerbated by the painfully few number of footnotes provided. Bassett gives an insightful overview of the Theresian military reforms of the 1750s, but comes into more trouble when describing the course of the Seven Years' War itself. As with some previous historians, Bassett sees Frederick II of Prussia more as a mustachio twirling villain than an actual historical figure. Like Szabo, (indeed, Bassett cites Szabo frequently, and for the following quote) Bassett seems to revel in ambassador Mitchell's description Frederick II (at 46) as, "an old man lacking half his teeth, with greying hair, without gaiety or spark or imagination." Once again, Frederick's slovenly habits are brought to the fore, as Bassett notes his predilection for wearing uniforms past the point of no return, and the many stains on his clothing. All of this makes for good reading, and poetic catharsis from the Austrian viewpoint, but does it help advance the narrative forward?

As in Szabo, Frederick becomes the scapegoat in a flimsy morality play, where Prussian defeats are Frederick's sole responsibility. Bassett relates manifold Prussophobic anecdotes, usually without footnotes. Frederick's practice of detaching independent commands is blamed for the defeat at Maxen, and Bassett clearly fails to note that such practices were often devastatingly successful, as when Frederick used a detachment to force the Russian army to retreat from positions surrounding Bunzelwitz. Bassett continuously suggests that Frederick is responsible for failures.

For God and Kaiser becomes almost unreadable when Bassett suggests that at Torgau, the Prussians took 24,000 causalities a to the Austrian 2,000. To put it mildly, such figures are historically irresponsible. Estimates for Prussia losses at Torgau range from around 17,000 to 25,000, and a figure of 20,000 might be plausible, considering the nature of the Prussian attack against massed artillery. However, Austrian losses were comparable,  considering the all-day of the battle, which ended in the Austrian army abandoning the field, (through no work of Frederick's, it has to be said: Hans Joachim von Ziethen's corps, and Johann Dietrich von Huelsen's heroic attack won the battle.)  Duffy's most recent total places the Austrian causality figures around 15,000, which though still a heavy loss on the Prussian side was not the one-sided massacre which For God and Kaiser suggests. This might be compared to the totals at Kunersdorf, where the Prussians lost 18,000 men to the allied total of 16,500. Were these losses which Prussia could ill afford, brought on by Frederick's unwillingness to abandon his preferred method of war? definitely. Did the Prussian king recognize this after Torgau? certainly.

1761 is glossed over as a year of rebuilding, Frederick's achievement at Bunzelwitz does not even warrant a reference, and the text quickly moves to a description of the death of the Tsarina, Elizabeth Petrovna, who was replaced by her nephew, Peter III, who admired Frederick. This led to Russia switching sides in the conflict, but only briefly. Indeed- like Szabo before him, and doubtless others afterwards, Bassett is confronted by the problem of the events of 1762. For those who say that Frederick had no skill and imagination in the Seven Years' War, that the Prussian army was a broken force, 1762 becomes a severe problem. The Prussian army was certainly rescued from destruction by Elizabeth's death, but as Christopher Duffy has suggested, this only brought the Seven Years' War back into the balance. The Prussians won the Seven Years' War in 1762. Frederick's victories at Burkersdorf and Reichenbach, and Prinz Henri's victories at Doeblen and Freiberg won the Seven Years' War. Bassett spends most of this year on the Austria defense of Schwiednitz- admittedly, a heroic endeavor.

Bassett closes out his description of the Seven Years' War arguing that by 1762, the Austrian army was the most widely admired and emulated army in Europe. Clearly, then, Bassett has not heard of Prussomania. It should also be noted, Bassett spends a great deal of time discussing the Austrian success in the War of Bavarian Succession. Clearly, this would be a surprise for Charles IV Theodore of Bavaria, whose was placed on the throne of Bavaria as a result of Prussian military intervention (and perhaps more tellingly, Russian threats.) The Austrian army achieved spectacular feats in the Seven Years' War. They were well- led professional soldiers, who were able to score an impressive number of victories in their contest with Prussia. Kolin, Hochkirch, Maxen, and Landeshut all deserve to be remembered by Austrian soldiers with pride. But by making Frederick into a skin and bones scarecrow leading an army of ill-trained misfits, Bassett does a disservice to the past.

It may seem that I am nitpicking a rather small portion of Bassett's book, or that I have an ax to grind regarding Frederick II of Prussia. I would say that both of those observations are correct. Bassett's overly partisan account of the Seven Years' War takes his "history" into the realm of a morality play. If his book cannot be trusted to give an impartial (or even factual) account of eighteenth century Austrian military history, why should it be trusted to do so for the twentieth century? Indeed, the book resorts to blaming Prussia (and in turn Germany) for many of Austrians military failings, including when the German forces were allied with the k.u.k. army in the First World War. Bassett attempts to turn Holger Herwig's suggestions that the Austrian army dragged down German military capabilities on its head, suggesting that Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf was prevented from winning World War One by telegrams from Berlin.

In attempting to promote Austrian military success, For God and Kaiser follows an excellent revisionist scholarly trend. In attempting to create a wildly successful Austrian Royal Army which outshone, and was impeded by failures in Prussian and German military professionalism, he falls for a mirage. Bassett creates an excellent overview of Austrian military history, suitable for those who have a passing interest in the Habsburg past, and no serious interest in reading more in depth works on particular periods. For individuals who are interested in a more detailed picture of the past, eschew this work in favor of more focused studies.


Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

Book Review-Warfare in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871

Dear Reader,

Today, I am going to briefly review the book, Warfare in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600-1871, edited by Robert Doughty and Ira Gruber. I am considering this text for my "War and Culture in the Atlantic World" class in the spring semester.  This book is the first volume of a two part series covering warfare from 1600 to the present, this volume covers all of what we would consider the Kabinettskriege period, and a bit more besides. The book is divided into three parts: 1600-1783, 1783-1815, and 1815-1871.

The book has many fine features- including frequent maps, so important to the study of military history. Beginning with the, "Military Revolution" under Gustavus II Adolph of Sweden, the authors take the story all the way through to the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The coverage of topics and themes is quite broad- strategy, particularly the logistics of war, are given a large place in the narrative.

However, there are a few complaints as well. Social military history- attempting to understanding the life patterns of soldiers, plays a rather minor role in the overall story. In addition, nearly the entire third part of the book is spent on the history of the American Civil War, which is not entirely surprising when all of the authors come from American universities. Sadly, western military interaction with non-Europeans is not considered in any detail.

Overall, this is a good book for a undergraduate survey of the military history of this period. Professors may wish to supplement it with Jeremy Black's Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, if the class is supposed to cover both western and non-western warfare.

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

Book Review: Sweden in the Seventeenth Century

Dear Reader,

Interested in Swedish history, but don't speak Swedish? Want a look into how a relatively backwater country made a comet-like rise to great power status? Then Paul Lockhart's Sweden in the Seventeenth Century is the book for you.  This book examines the Stormaktid, or "great power period" of Swedish history. Lockhart is traditionally a Danish historian, and as his CV will tell you, has written numerous books on the geo-political role of Denmark in the early modern world. In more recent years, he has written a couple of wonderful books on the American War of Independence.

However, in this work, he takes a break from Danish history, (although his Danish viewpoint occasionally reasserts itself), and examines the role of Denmark's neighbor, Sweden. Lockhart eloquently argues that Sweden asserted its position as a great power by use of military force, and that Sweden lagged behind other European powers in terms of, "literary, artistic, scholarly, or commercial sophistication." The book shows that the Swedish state was build around the use of military force, specifically, the use of limited resources to conduct lengthy wars.

The book is more of a survey than a monograph, covering a roughly 120 (Lockhart begins in the 16th century and ends in the 18th) years of history in 177 pages. Lockhart gives time to Swedish military organization and reform, administrative reforms, and the lives of the men and women who made up the Swedish state in this period. In addition, Lockhart shows a great command of the relevant historiography of Sweden in both the English and Swedish languages, and as a result, this book will be very useful for younger scholars, and as a textbook for upper level undergraduate courses on the early modern world.

All in all: 5 Stars. I highly recommend that anyone interested in this period, or Swedish history as a whole, purchase this book.

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns