Niagara and Ticonderoga as Defensive Positions

Ticonderoga (left) and Niagara (right)

Dear Reader,

When it comes to eighteenth-century fortifications in North America,  writers often lean towards extreme hyperbole. Louisbourg, Fort Ticonderoga, Fort Niagara, and West Point have all been described as "the Key to a Continent."[1] Suffice it to say that many strategists labeled their next target or theater of war as, "the key to the continent". Leaving aside these grandiose visions, I would like to compare the defensive records of two prominent fortifications during the 1754-1815 period. Fort Ticonderoga (originally French Ft. Carillon) and Fort Niagara.  Both of these fortifications repeatedly changed hands in the course of this era, and were roughly handled by their occupiers and attackers.

According to European conventions, fortifications were primarily in place to delay the enemy long enough for relief to arrive. For a massive citadel such as Lille in Europe, a siege of forty days might be normal.[2] There were many instances where this system permitted the besieged to hold out against the besieger, such as the sieges of Prague and Olmütz in the European Seven Years War. I have addressed the topic of siege generally in this era in a different post, so let's focus in on Niagara and Ticonderoga. First, we will examine the fortifications themselves, before moving on their military record as defensive positions.

First of all, there are broad similarities between the two positions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, both were sites were selected as defensive positions by French explorers or engineers. Both use local high ground and water to make approaching the fort costly, and limit avenues of attack. Both sites benefit from the use of waterways, to speed communications and reliving forces.

A period map showing the Carillon positions of 1758

Ticonderoga possesses a number of flaws as a defensive position, which has handicapped it throughout its military record. The site of the fort is dominated by high ground to the northwest and southwest: the heights of Carillon, and the Sugarloaf hill or Mt. Defiance. When attackers ignore these advantages, and defenders occupy them, Ticonderoga becomes a formidable position.

Plan of Niagara during the War of 1812 era

Niagara possesses weaknesses as a position as well, these weaknesses did not become apparent until later in the history of the fort. The high ground to the west/southwest of the fortress, what is now the Canadian side near Niagara on the lake and Ft. George, proved to be a severe handicap during the War of 1812, but was not utilized by attackers until that point. As a result of its position on a bit of high ground jutting into the lake/Niagara River, Ft. Niagara is a bit more difficult to approach than Ticonderoga.  Having examined the positions, let us turn to the defenses at Ticonderoga and Niagara. Both were constructed in the era of the trace italienne, or bastion fortifications. Both forts utilize both a main series of bastions and curtain walls combined with outerworks. So, with that in mind, which fort possesses the stronger design?

Detail from above image of Ft. Carillon

Fort Ticonderoga (or Carillon, as the French called it during this era) had the dubious distinction of being constructed just in the nick of time before the French and Indian War. Construction started in 1755, and had been mostly finished by time of the 1758 British attack. In addition to the bastions and curtain walls, the fortress was defended by two ravelins, facing west and north. Ticonderoga is the smaller of the two forts, perhaps 250 feet across between the curtain walls.

Plan of Fort Niagara, dating from 1755

Though not as symmetrical, Niagara is a bit larger, measuring perhaps 400 feet from the lake to the curtain wall. As a result of primarily defending towards the east, Niagara possess only two bastions, but has a much more developed system of outworks, possessing a great central ravilen 100 feet across, flanked by two lunettes. The 1755 map above additionally shows two traverses, protecting the troops on the covered way from artillery enfilade fire.  In comparing the two positions and defenses, while I would argue that Ticonderoga is a much more complete fortress, Niagara is both situated in a more defensible position, and is a much tougher nut to crack in a formal siege as a result of the significant outerworks. Having examined both fortifications from a positional and engineering standpoint, let us now turn to their record in defense.

French troops garrison Ticonderoga 

During the French and Indian War, both Niagara and Ticonderoga were taken by enemy forces. Somewhat famously, the Marquis de Montcalm defended Ticonderoga in 1758 with around 3,600 men against 15,000 British opponents. In this battle, the French defended earthworks set out in front of the fort, and repulsed a series of British assaults made without artillery support. If the British had opted for a formal siege, it is possible that they would have enjoyed more success.

Reenactors depict the defense of Carillon in 1758

It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the foundation of Montcalm's success. Realizing that Ticonderoga was too small to contain all of his troops, (and possessing a number of doubts regarding its viability as a fortress[3]) Montcalm choose to occupy the heights of Carillon as his primary defensive position. The British commander, James Abercromby, failed to grasp the significance of the Sugarloaf hill, and wrecked his force in futile assaults on Montcalm's prepared earthworks. 1758 is the showy year, the year which made Ticonderoga's reputation. However, it seems that 1759 provides a better parallel view of the two fortresses under siege at the same time.

Reenactors portray the 1759 siege

In July of 1759, 5,000 British troops under John Prideaux used waterways to approach Niagara. Arriving on July 6th, Prideaux's troops summoned the French commander Pierre Pouchot de Maupas to surrender. The French garrison number approximately 600 men. Captain Pouchot's writings on the siege provide one of the best descriptions of a garrison's commander's role during a siege and remain one of my favorite primary sources from the eighteenth century.[4] Pouchot, understanding the gravity of the situation, immediately called for relief forces then at Presqu'isle (modern Erie, PA). Prideaux called for Pouchot to surrender on July 9th and opened a formal siege that evening after Pouchot's refusal.

British map of the siege

The British opted to dig their approach towards the northern bastion, and opened a series of batteries. The siege continued, Prideaux was killed by a prematurely exploding shell fragment on July 20th, and Sir William Johnson took over command of the attackers. French relief forces arrived on July 24th, resulting in the Battle of La Belle Familie, where the British defeated the reinforcements. Pouchot, realizing the helplessness of his situation, surrendered on July 25th. Niagara was taken, but the fort itself had achieved its purpose: allow the garrison to hold out until relief arrived.

A French soldier near the Dauphin battery, Niagara

Fort Ticonderoga was also besieged in 1759, by a much larger army than Prideaux's 5,000 men at Niagara. Jeffrey Amherst and approximately 11,000 men moved to attack Ticonderoga in July of 1759. French commander, François-Charles de Bourlamaque, despite having nearly the same amount of men (3,500) as Montcalm the previous summer, retired to the fortress as soon as the British troops landed on July 22nd. Deciding that defending Ticonderoga was hopeless, Bourlamaque withdrew all but 400 of his men on the 23rd of July. This garrison held out for three days, before blowing up the "Gibraltar of the North" and evacuating on the 26th.

The South Redoubt at Niagara

During the period between the Seven Years' War and American War of Independence, Fort Niagara was equipped with two large redoubts (they often initially appear like Pagodas to the untrained eye.) These structures were designed to allow the garrison to hold out in case of a surprise attack by Native Americans, and are somewhat unique in eighteenth-century fortress design in North America.

American troops garrison Ticonderoga in 1777

The American War of Independence saw Niagara's use as a base of operations for the British Army, but the fortress was never seriously threatened, even during the Sullivan Campaign of 1779. On the other hand, Ticonderoga changed hands a number of times, forever cementing its place as, "America's Fort." Surprised on May 10th 1775, Ticonderoga was taken with no loss of life by American forces under Ethan Allen. Ticonderoga's cannons would play a vital role for the young American military. During the Burgoyne Campaign in 1777, Ticonderoga was abandoned by the American's after British forces began to erect batteries on the Sugar Loaf hill in early July.

Brunswickers garrison Ticonderoga

The rebel forces, not to be outdone, attacked troops which Burgoyne left to garrison Ticonderoga on September 18th, 1777. This event, known as "Brown's Raid" as it was led by Colonel John Brown, liberated 100 American prisoners, captured approximately 4 companies of the 53rd Regiment and occupied the old French trenches from 1758.[5] The letters from the Brunswick troops of the Prinz Friedrich regiment who garrisoned Ticonderoga make it clear that it was simply a lack of artillery ammunition which prevented the American rebels from capturing the fort.[6] After the rebels had expended the approximately 100 rounds of ammunition that they captured from the outlying batteries, they were unable to threaten the garrison. The Brunswick troops deterred a surprise attack against the fort itself by a combination of vigilance and firing at movement near the fort.[7] After realizing that he had insufficient artillery on hand to take Ticonderoga, Colonel Brown withdrew. With Burgoyne's defeat, the British and Brunswickers abandoned the fort in November, damaging it as they departed. Ticonderoga would no longer play a significant role in military operations.

View towards Ft, George during the War of 1812

During the War of 1812, Fort Niagara once again became a center of military activity. The Americans possessed a disadvantage from elevated cannon emplacements at Fort George across the Niagara River but they turned buildings into makeshift gun batteries and used heated shot to decimate Fort George in 1813. The British, not to be outdone, surprised and assaulted Niagara in December of 1813. A British assault force captured American pickets in Youngstown, and learned the watchword of the day from them, and proceeded to the fort. The American troops defending the fort held out in the South Redoubt, a large building constructed after Pontiac's War in 1763, designed to safeguard the fort against surprise by Native Americans. The British eventually took this building, executing the defenders who had refused to surrender.

How can we evaluate this record? Ticonderoga has the distinction of warding off two attacks (1758, 1777) completely, however, neither attack was prepared to formally siege the fortress with proper amounts of artillery. Both fortresses were successfully surprised (1775, 1813), although Niagara, as a result of the redoubts, was able to temporarily resist the surprise. Niagara was successfully besieged after a siege of 15 days (1759), which allowed relief forces to arrive. Ticonderoga was abandoned by its defenders in the face of larger forces three times (1759, July 1777, November 1777), and managed to resist a siege for 3 days in 1759 before being abandoned. On the whole, it seems that Niagara is more defensible, while Ticonderoga rightfully plays a more prominent role in American memory. Both places remain an integral part of American military history.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

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[1] (West Point) Letter to George Washington from John Adams, 6 January 1776 (Niagara) “Reflections on the Present State of Affairs at Home and Abroad,” by A. Y[oung], Esq., author of the “Theatre of the Present War in North America,” London, 1759; (Ticonderoga) Edward Hamilton, Fort Ticonderoga: Key to a Continent; (Louisbourg) Fairfax Davis Downey, Louisbourg: Key to a Continent. 
[2]Duffy, Fire and Stone, 103-4.
[3] Carroll Lonergan, Ticonderoga: Historic Portage, 25.
[4] Pierre Pouchot, Mémoires sur la dernière guerre de l'Amérique Septentrionale : entre la France et l'Angleterre, Vols 1-3, (Yverdon, 1781). English translations of this memoir have been available since the early nineteenth century, the most recent was published in 2004 by the Old Fort Niagara Association.
[5] Letter from von Hille, September 28th, 1777.
[6] Letter to Riedesel from Ernst Schröder, September 26th, 1777.
[7] Letter from von Hille, September 28th, 1777.

How did the British Army adapt to North America in the French and Indian War?

Old Fort Niagara Staff portraying 46th Grenadiers in July of 2016
Photo Credit: Lee Charles Gugino

Dear Reader,


By this point, in most academic, reenacting, and wargaming circles, it has been firmly established that the British army adopted a two-rank, open-order formation during the course of the American War of Independence. Thanks to the painstaking research of individuals such as Matthew Spring, Don Hagist, and Steve Rayner, we know much more about the British Army during the American War of Independence than was thought possible thirty years ago. This shallow open formation, coupled with a rapid advance was the hallmark of British tactics for most of the American War of Independence.[1]

A company of AWI British reenactors formed in the "common open order of two deep" 

Scholars and reenactors rightly point out the importance of inter-war experimentation in the development of this formation, namely those carried out by Townshend and Howe in the early 1770s. However, the point of today's post is to highlight the use of this formation during an earlier war in North America: the French and Indian War.

Stephen Brumwell's excellent 2002 work, Redcoats:  The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, should be the starting point for anyone interested tactical developments of the British army during this era. How did the British army fight in North America? And is that fighting style accurately portrayed by reenactors and simulated by wargamers?

Observers in the era of the American Revolution remembered the adaptations of the British army during the French and Indian War quite clearly. During his stay in Canada in 1776, General Friedrich Riedesel (a soldier from Brunswick fighting as a British ally) recalled:

“But the English make it one of their chief rules and principles in this country, that no maneuvers may ever be carried out in serried ranks in these districts that are so terribly wooded. They found that out to their cost in the last war against the French in North America, in which they were always unsuccessful at the commencement, until they had taught their men to maneuver with open ranks and cover themselves by means of trees, after which they were always successful.”[2]

Riedesel's wife also kept a detailed journal of her experiences on campaign in North America

It is possible that Riedesel's received this information from British soldiers or French Canadian locals who were present at events. This quote makes it seem as though the British adopted this formation as a result of the harsh terrain of North America- a commonly cited reason for its adoption in the American War of Independence. Other observers in the revolutionary era, such as David Dundas, also commented on the development of the two-rank open-order formation as arising in North America during the French and Indian War.

"The Method almost universally adopted in our infantry, and in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files, deserves the most serious consideration. It was not produced by the experience of the German war [War of Austrian Succession], but by that of the first American [French and Indian War]...The desultory service there carried on by small bodies of men...first introduced it as proper for that country[.]"[3]

Dundas clearly states that the low number of British troops made a two-rank open-order tactical system feasible in North America. As we shall see, contemporary commanders from the French and Indian War agreed.  Dundas also formulates another belief on why the two-rank open-order system could be adopted in North America: the lack of cavalry:

"The very small proportion of cavalry employed in the American wars, has much tended to introduce the present loose and irregular system of our infantry. — Had they seen and been accustomed to the rapid movements of a good cavalry, they would have felt the- necessity of more substantial order, of moving with concert and circumspection, and of being at every instant in a situation to form and repel a vigorous attack."[4]

There are numerous orders indicating that men should be drawn up two deep. Captain John Knox reproduces several of the general orders from Amherst in the campaign of 1759 in his journal. These orders give us a good window into how common practice of forming men two-deep had become in the French and Indian War era:

"The grenadiers and brigades are, do be drawn up on all services two deep...The men to be acquainted that this is ordered, as the enemy have very few regular troops to oppose us, and no yelling of Indians, or fire of Canadians, can possibly withſtand two ranks, if the men are silent, attentive, and obedient to their Officers, who will lead them to the enemy ; and their silence will terrify the enemy more than any huzzaing or noise they can make, which the General abſolutely forbids[.]"[5]

Careful students of the American War of Independence will notice that this is quite the opposite of British noise discipline practice then, when British soldiers were encouraged to cheer at the enemy frequently. So, why did British infantry embrace this practice in North America, and were the files spaced apart, as in the American War of Independence?

Two men, possibly from the 60th Regiment Light Company,
portrayed in a painting by Benjamin West

The first explanation is that it was simply a North American practice transferred from the provincial forces to the regular army. Amherst recommends that the provincials form in a two-deep order, "as they have always been accustomed to it."[6] This would go a long way towards explaining why the regulars did so early in the war, especially at disasters like the Battle on the Monongahela in 1755 and Carillon 1758. The British did indeed form in two ranks deep at both of these disasters.[7]

On the other hand, it is possible that necessity forced the British to open their files, and that the two-rank formation was not always in open order. Quarter Master Sjt. John Johnson of the 58th Foot explains that at the Plains of Abraham in 1759, Wolfe ordered the British fight with a formation opened to a three-foot space between files, in order to extend the line.[8]

You can almost hear him nitpicking.

Again and again, sources indicated that the practice of drawing up two deep in the battle was a desperate measure designed to make the British force appear larger than it actually was, or extend the line to cover key portions of terrain. At Sainte-Foy in April of 1760, John Knox reports that, "The second line was composed of the thirty- fifth, and the third battalion of Royal Americans, drawn up, to appear more numerous, two deep."[9] So, perhaps as the war continued, the slightly different practice of forming two deep was modified into what became the "common open order of two deep"  by the American War of Independence.[10]

This could occasionally have disastrous consequences, as Brumwell argues happened at the Battle of Sainte-Foy. At Sainte-Foy, the open ranks of the British formation produced a relatively low volume of musket fire, especially as the firefight continued for a long period of time. Likewise, the British regiments at the Battle of Freeman's Farm in 1777 were unable to quickly drive off the enemy and began the process of slowly losing an infantry firefight with rebel Americans. Fortunately for the British at Saratoga, they had German allies prepared to support them in the nick of time; there were no such allies at Sainte-Foy in 1760.  

So, what does all this mean? For reenactors, forming in two ranks, usually in open order, should become the norm if portraying troops after 1758. It could certainly be used before 1758, although more sources have survived from the Plains of Abraham and Sainte-Foy to document its specific use in those field battles. Again- just to be clear, these sources are not describing light infantry, but rather are orders designed to manage the entire rank and file of the British army. 

For wargamers, basing British units a bit wider than normal might be a way to incorporate these changes. Also, after the first volley (which was quite devastating at close range at Quebec in 1759) the firepower of British infantry in this formation should drop off considerably. Likewise, they might want to take slightly fewer casualties than normal, to represent the space in the formation. At the Plains of Abraham, this formation was used to full effect: the British advanced with opened files, taking light casualties from long-range French fire before replying with a devastating double-loaded volley of their own. The ready adaptability of the supposedly hide-bound British army proved to be a great strength at battles such as Quebec and Brandywine. However, it also proved to be a weakness in the face of determined opposition, in battles like Sainte-Foy and Freeman's Farm.

 If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Best Regards,




Alex Burns

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[1] Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 139.
[2] Riedesel, Journal of General Riedesel, in Hessian Documents of the American Revolution, 118. (Microfilm)
[3] Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, 51.
[4]Ibid, 11.
[5] Knox, An Historical Journal of the Campaign in North America, Vol I, pg 384-395.   
[6] Ibid, 374.
[7] Brumwell, Redcoats, 255.
[8] Doughty eds, The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Vol V, 107.
[9] Knox, An Historical Journal of the Campaign in North America, Vol II, pg 293.
[10] Quoted in Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 143.