"But when their powderhorns were empty, their cannonading ceased": Brown's Raid Through German Eyes

Soldiers from Regiment Prinz Friedrich prepare to defend Ticonderoga

Dear Reader,

As public historians from across the United States gather this weekend at Fort Ticonderoga  for the commemoration of Colonel John Brown's Raid, I thought it would be appropriate to post some primary sources from the German-speaking soldiers defending the fort. These men, from the Prinz Friedrich Regiment of Brunswick (Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel), described the American attack on Ticonderoga: the last significant military event to occur at the famous American fort. Many of the details which these sources give are inaccurate, particularly the claims regarding the numbers of American soldiers. Despite that, they give a unique perspective on the fighting in September 1777.

Ensign von Hille of the Prinz Friedrich Regiment described the attack as follows:

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"Your Honor will surely have received my letter No. 9 from the 10th of this month, at least I hope so. In it I wrote that we had been cut off from Burgoyne's Army because of their changed position and suspected a provincial raid. That came to pass, for since that time, we know nothing about the army, because we have endured a five day blockade this side of Mount Independence and that on the side of Lake George, the 4 English Companies of the 53rd Regiment stationed there have been attacked and captured.

Sept. 18th ...At daybreak... Brigadier Brown on Lake George... wanted to make a surprise attack from all sides, against our very weak and sick garrison and take them prisoner. The reveille shot from the frigate Maria, which was riding at anchor together with the Frigate Carleton in front of the alarm battery to cover the dense woods towards Hubbardton was the agreed enemy signal. Brigadier Brown succeeded in making a surprise attack on and captured 4 English companies in their camp at the Portage of Lake George, taking the Canadians prisoner who were working there, and with 15 provincials making a surprise attack and seizing the so-called Sugar Loaf Battery that was occupied by 1 sergeant and 12 English soldiers. On the last map I sent you, it was marked, not laid out, it commands Ticonderoga as well as Mount Independence. Instead of the reveille shot from this battery, 4 small-arms shots were fired which got our attention in the camp. Thereupon several small-arms shots fell on our picket that consisted of 1 non-commissioned officer and 13 men and was stationed on a warning post about 1,000 paces on the road to Hubbardton.

The regiment hurried to the alarm posts. Your Honor's company had their's at the first battery, mine, those of von. Tunderfeldt's and Dietrich's companies had theirs behind the lines up to the 2nd battery where Lt. Colonel Praetorius' company was placed and the 5th and very weak company of the 53rd Regiment had their posts at the 3rd Battery.

The picket reported at their arrival that a corps was pushing through the dense woods against the 2nd and 3rd Batteries. We immediately became aware of several scouts on the large road. But because of the heavy cannonades from the battery and frigate there, nothing else could be seen further ahead.

Meanwhile, there was a cannonading from the 12pd. cannon on the Sugar Loaf Battery against Fort Ticonderoga, also Provincials frequently appeared but were again fired on. At 9am Musketeer Wilcke from your company had both thighs shot off by a cannonball and died immediately. At the same time, Lt. Volckmar, who had been commanded to the Fort with 40 men from the regiment, together with 1 captain and 2 officers and about 50 convalescing Englishmen was severely burned by a exposed gunpowder barrel together with Musketeer Francke from your company, and Musketeer Hartmann from my company.

At 11am, the Provincials sent one of their officers with a pole and a rag and invited the garrison to surrender and submit to captivity. It was rejected. Besides a few skirmishings, and cannonades, nothing else remarkable happened this day or night. . We remained at the alarm stations, pitched a few tents and half a company was under arms at all times.

September 19th. Our entire defense consisted of breastworks of trees and stones placed on top of one another. Here and there was an abatis in the woods. The provincials had taken 2 cannons they had discovered, (since they had none with them) into the nearest redoubt from Ticondergoa and cannonaded the fort. At  noon, Brigadier Brown again sent a letter to exchange the English officers for the Provincials here. Rejected.

At 4pm, a Provincial Captain of the militia came on this side with a fellow who carried a white rag, who in a letter from Brigadier Warner invited the garrison to enter captivity. Rejected.

Today their Excellenies, the Provincial Generals, observed our situation from the woods. The small-arms fire was at times very fierce.  About 9pm, in the evening, the Provincials seemed to move
around in the very near woods and sneak up towards the 2nd and 3rd Batteries. One noticed individuals moving up towards the 1st Battery. As we could not maintain any advanced post and because of the darkness of the night we were unable to distinguish anything, we trailed a general and violent small-arms fire and cannonade from the batteries and frigates on our side for 2 minutes. We learned afterwards that since they had succeeded in yesterday's surprise attack on this side, the provincials had been about to make a general attack at this time, meant especially between the 1st and 2nd Batteries but through this furious shooting had been deterred from it.  Each soldier had 60 cartridges and 40 in reserve. English Brigadier Powell had given orders to use the bayonets in forced charges and retreat only if extremely necessary into the barracks covered with palisades and artillery.

Nothing important happened during the night.  Lt. Wallmoden arrived from Canada with 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 Grenadiers this afternoon. During the night all remained on their old places under arms although it was very cold.

September 20th. There also was a little small-arms fire from the Sugar Loaf Battery, but all the more from the redoubt of the 2 cannons, against Ticonderoga, to which the cannons of the redoubt on Mount Independence at Lake Champlain gave a sharp reply.

September 21st. Around noon one Sergeant from the 53rd Regiment deserted from the 3rd Battery. He had been recruiting with Scheither [in German-Central Europe]. As it seemed that the Provincials had left the redoubt with the two cannons, 10 men Lt. Wolgast's command at the bridge were sent to Mount Independence in batteau to spike the cannons. At the disembarkation about 30 provincials rushed out of various ditches and holes against those people, wounded Musketeer Engelcke of Captain von Tunderfeldt's company very severly on his head and shot Musketeer Lieffert's hat, sword, and accouterments to bits and wounded him slighted in his left ear. Musketeer Engelcke was taken prisoner.

At 4pm, the officers and recruits from the Light Infantry, the Dragoons, Prinz Friedrich, and v. Riedesel came to us from Canada. These were quickly distributed among the regiment. Lt. von Reitzenstein had to stay at Chambly with all the large baggage. In the evening, Musketeer Bodemann from Captain Dietrichs' company deserted from the command at the left wing of the 3rd Battery-- the garrison remained under arms during the night and nothing of importance happened.

September 22nd. ...It redounds to our regiment's honor that it has to man the main posts while the English troops merely occupied the 3rd Battery. At 10pm, the enemy made an attack on Ticonderoga, but it was fiercely saluted. There also was much firing in the woods onto Mount Independence. On account of a day-long rainstorm, it was a bad night.

September 23rd. Nothing was heard or seen from the enemy, and later it was learned that their main corps had set out on the retreat at 5pm. They had done this because their first surprise attack the night of the 19th and 20th was a failure and because they lacked supplies.

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Young Lt. Ernst Schroeder, of Captain von Tunderfeldt's Company also wrote a report on the raid, submitted to General Riedesel:

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Gracious Lord, Dread General, Ect.

....It was on Sept. 18th about one hour before daybreak that the Rebels intended to attack us; but our picket was awake and quickly sounded the alarm. In less than half a minute, the entire regiment stood fully armed and occupied the line[s]... This line is well fortified by nature and in most places inaccessible. Close to the front of this line is a woods where we have for some time now erected several abatis and which we have cleared in front of us as far as a good musket shot. The Rebels, who are said to be 3,000 strong, withdrew into the woods on this side. In the little river their were two cannon ships, that when the rebels came out, could spray the whole terrain in front of our line. At the right wing lay a frigate in the bay with 2 canons that covered the regular road. The 3 Batteries and 3 newly built blockhouses were all covered with cannons. The Rebels, however, had no cannons but were trying almost every night to attack us.
We also were continually under arms every night and fired sharply as soon as they ventured out of the woods so that they quickly withdrew into the woods. They eventually lost the courage to come out and no longer risked a real attack on our side, although at their arrival, they had firmly challenged us. Just on the 18th of September towards noon, another rebel corps attacked, it was 5,000 men strong and had come from Fort George.
The first rebel attack occured before day-break against the new entrenchment on the Sugar Loaf Hill. This entrenchment commands both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and is the same where, at the capture of these places, we had set up our batteries and thus forced the enemy to withdraw.  This entrenchment and the portage where the rapids are, dividing Lake Champlain from Lake George, was occupied by 4 companies of the 53rd English Regiment. These were surprised and captured by the rebels. Fortunately, there were in the entrenchment no more than 2 cannons and about 100 rounds of ammunition, that the rebels took as booty and later used to fire on both forts. For this corps had neither taken any cannon along and when the ammunition was spent, they had to cease cannonading. After this they pressed forward up to the French lines and seized all small entrenchments ececpt the two that lay closest to Ticonderoga. Yet none of these had been occupied by us. Among the cannons that were in these entrenchments, the rebels had found three that had not been spiked, together with balls and cartridges; they fired with them upon the fort they had previously challenged as long as they powderhorns would last.

But when their powderhorns were empty, their cannonading ceased: our cannons did not stop firing, night and day. While the Rebels were now thinking every night how to make a surprise attack on this fort, we in turn received a small reinforcement: these were about 150 men who joined us instead of the recruits from the commands in Canada. They all came in batteaux, and the rebels tried to make their arrival difficult; but our cannons fired so violently on them that they forgot their project and let the batteaux land successfully.
Finally, the Rebels withdrew with considerable losses in the evening of September 23rd.

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Alex Burns

Niagara and Ticonderoga as Defensive Positions

Ticonderoga (left) and Niagara (right)

Dear Reader,

When it comes to eighteenth-century fortifications in North America,  writers often lean towards extreme hyperbole. Louisbourg, Fort Ticonderoga, Fort Niagara, and West Point have all been described as "the Key to a Continent."[1] Suffice it to say that many strategists labeled their next target or theater of war as, "the key to the continent". Leaving aside these grandiose visions, I would like to compare the defensive records of two prominent fortifications during the 1754-1815 period. Fort Ticonderoga (originally French Ft. Carillon) and Fort Niagara.  Both of these fortifications repeatedly changed hands in the course of this era, and were roughly handled by their occupiers and attackers.

According to European conventions, fortifications were primarily in place to delay the enemy long enough for relief to arrive. For a massive citadel such as Lille in Europe, a siege of forty days might be normal.[2] There were many instances where this system permitted the besieged to hold out against the besieger, such as the sieges of Prague and Olmütz in the European Seven Years War. I have addressed the topic of siege generally in this era in a different post, so let's focus in on Niagara and Ticonderoga. First, we will examine the fortifications themselves, before moving on their military record as defensive positions.

First of all, there are broad similarities between the two positions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, both were sites were selected as defensive positions by French explorers or engineers. Both use local high ground and water to make approaching the fort costly, and limit avenues of attack. Both sites benefit from the use of waterways, to speed communications and reliving forces.

A period map showing the Carillon positions of 1758

Ticonderoga possesses a number of flaws as a defensive position, which has handicapped it throughout its military record. The site of the fort is dominated by high ground to the northwest and southwest: the heights of Carillon, and the Sugarloaf hill or Mt. Defiance. When attackers ignore these advantages, and defenders occupy them, Ticonderoga becomes a formidable position.

Plan of Niagara during the War of 1812 era

Niagara possesses weaknesses as a position as well, these weaknesses did not become apparent until later in the history of the fort. The high ground to the west/southwest of the fortress, what is now the Canadian side near Niagara on the lake and Ft. George, proved to be a severe handicap during the War of 1812, but was not utilized by attackers until that point. As a result of its position on a bit of high ground jutting into the lake/Niagara River, Ft. Niagara is a bit more difficult to approach than Ticonderoga.  Having examined the positions, let us turn to the defenses at Ticonderoga and Niagara. Both were constructed in the era of the trace italienne, or bastion fortifications. Both forts utilize both a main series of bastions and curtain walls combined with outerworks. So, with that in mind, which fort possesses the stronger design?

Detail from above image of Ft. Carillon

Fort Ticonderoga (or Carillon, as the French called it during this era) had the dubious distinction of being constructed just in the nick of time before the French and Indian War. Construction started in 1755, and had been mostly finished by time of the 1758 British attack. In addition to the bastions and curtain walls, the fortress was defended by two ravelins, facing west and north. Ticonderoga is the smaller of the two forts, perhaps 250 feet across between the curtain walls.

Plan of Fort Niagara, dating from 1755

Though not as symmetrical, Niagara is a bit larger, measuring perhaps 400 feet from the lake to the curtain wall. As a result of primarily defending towards the east, Niagara possess only two bastions, but has a much more developed system of outworks, possessing a great central ravilen 100 feet across, flanked by two lunettes. The 1755 map above additionally shows two traverses, protecting the troops on the covered way from artillery enfilade fire.  In comparing the two positions and defenses, while I would argue that Ticonderoga is a much more complete fortress, Niagara is both situated in a more defensible position, and is a much tougher nut to crack in a formal siege as a result of the significant outerworks. Having examined both fortifications from a positional and engineering standpoint, let us now turn to their record in defense.

French troops garrison Ticonderoga 

During the French and Indian War, both Niagara and Ticonderoga were taken by enemy forces. Somewhat famously, the Marquis de Montcalm defended Ticonderoga in 1758 with around 3,600 men against 15,000 British opponents. In this battle, the French defended earthworks set out in front of the fort, and repulsed a series of British assaults made without artillery support. If the British had opted for a formal siege, it is possible that they would have enjoyed more success.

Reenactors depict the defense of Carillon in 1758

It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the foundation of Montcalm's success. Realizing that Ticonderoga was too small to contain all of his troops, (and possessing a number of doubts regarding its viability as a fortress[3]) Montcalm choose to occupy the heights of Carillon as his primary defensive position. The British commander, James Abercromby, failed to grasp the significance of the Sugarloaf hill, and wrecked his force in futile assaults on Montcalm's prepared earthworks. 1758 is the showy year, the year which made Ticonderoga's reputation. However, it seems that 1759 provides a better parallel view of the two fortresses under siege at the same time.

Reenactors portray the 1759 siege

In July of 1759, 5,000 British troops under John Prideaux used waterways to approach Niagara. Arriving on July 6th, Prideaux's troops summoned the French commander Pierre Pouchot de Maupas to surrender. The French garrison number approximately 600 men. Captain Pouchot's writings on the siege provide one of the best descriptions of a garrison's commander's role during a siege and remain one of my favorite primary sources from the eighteenth century.[4] Pouchot, understanding the gravity of the situation, immediately called for relief forces then at Presqu'isle (modern Erie, PA). Prideaux called for Pouchot to surrender on July 9th and opened a formal siege that evening after Pouchot's refusal.

British map of the siege

The British opted to dig their approach towards the northern bastion, and opened a series of batteries. The siege continued, Prideaux was killed by a prematurely exploding shell fragment on July 20th, and Sir William Johnson took over command of the attackers. French relief forces arrived on July 24th, resulting in the Battle of La Belle Familie, where the British defeated the reinforcements. Pouchot, realizing the helplessness of his situation, surrendered on July 25th. Niagara was taken, but the fort itself had achieved its purpose: allow the garrison to hold out until relief arrived.

A French soldier near the Dauphin battery, Niagara

Fort Ticonderoga was also besieged in 1759, by a much larger army than Prideaux's 5,000 men at Niagara. Jeffrey Amherst and approximately 11,000 men moved to attack Ticonderoga in July of 1759. French commander, François-Charles de Bourlamaque, despite having nearly the same amount of men (3,500) as Montcalm the previous summer, retired to the fortress as soon as the British troops landed on July 22nd. Deciding that defending Ticonderoga was hopeless, Bourlamaque withdrew all but 400 of his men on the 23rd of July. This garrison held out for three days, before blowing up the "Gibraltar of the North" and evacuating on the 26th.

The South Redoubt at Niagara

During the period between the Seven Years' War and American War of Independence, Fort Niagara was equipped with two large redoubts (they often initially appear like Pagodas to the untrained eye.) These structures were designed to allow the garrison to hold out in case of a surprise attack by Native Americans, and are somewhat unique in eighteenth-century fortress design in North America.

American troops garrison Ticonderoga in 1777

The American War of Independence saw Niagara's use as a base of operations for the British Army, but the fortress was never seriously threatened, even during the Sullivan Campaign of 1779. On the other hand, Ticonderoga changed hands a number of times, forever cementing its place as, "America's Fort." Surprised on May 10th 1775, Ticonderoga was taken with no loss of life by American forces under Ethan Allen. Ticonderoga's cannons would play a vital role for the young American military. During the Burgoyne Campaign in 1777, Ticonderoga was abandoned by the American's after British forces began to erect batteries on the Sugar Loaf hill in early July.

Brunswickers garrison Ticonderoga

The rebel forces, not to be outdone, attacked troops which Burgoyne left to garrison Ticonderoga on September 18th, 1777. This event, known as "Brown's Raid" as it was led by Colonel John Brown, liberated 100 American prisoners, captured approximately 4 companies of the 53rd Regiment and occupied the old French trenches from 1758.[5] The letters from the Brunswick troops of the Prinz Friedrich regiment who garrisoned Ticonderoga make it clear that it was simply a lack of artillery ammunition which prevented the American rebels from capturing the fort.[6] After the rebels had expended the approximately 100 rounds of ammunition that they captured from the outlying batteries, they were unable to threaten the garrison. The Brunswick troops deterred a surprise attack against the fort itself by a combination of vigilance and firing at movement near the fort.[7] After realizing that he had insufficient artillery on hand to take Ticonderoga, Colonel Brown withdrew. With Burgoyne's defeat, the British and Brunswickers abandoned the fort in November, damaging it as they departed. Ticonderoga would no longer play a significant role in military operations.

View towards Ft, George during the War of 1812

During the War of 1812, Fort Niagara once again became a center of military activity. The Americans possessed a disadvantage from elevated cannon emplacements at Fort George across the Niagara River but they turned buildings into makeshift gun batteries and used heated shot to decimate Fort George in 1813. The British, not to be outdone, surprised and assaulted Niagara in December of 1813. A British assault force captured American pickets in Youngstown, and learned the watchword of the day from them, and proceeded to the fort. The American troops defending the fort held out in the South Redoubt, a large building constructed after Pontiac's War in 1763, designed to safeguard the fort against surprise by Native Americans. The British eventually took this building, executing the defenders who had refused to surrender.

How can we evaluate this record? Ticonderoga has the distinction of warding off two attacks (1758, 1777) completely, however, neither attack was prepared to formally siege the fortress with proper amounts of artillery. Both fortresses were successfully surprised (1775, 1813), although Niagara, as a result of the redoubts, was able to temporarily resist the surprise. Niagara was successfully besieged after a siege of 15 days (1759), which allowed relief forces to arrive. Ticonderoga was abandoned by its defenders in the face of larger forces three times (1759, July 1777, November 1777), and managed to resist a siege for 3 days in 1759 before being abandoned. On the whole, it seems that Niagara is more defensible, while Ticonderoga rightfully plays a more prominent role in American memory. Both places remain an integral part of American military history.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns

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[1] (West Point) Letter to George Washington from John Adams, 6 January 1776 (Niagara) “Reflections on the Present State of Affairs at Home and Abroad,” by A. Y[oung], Esq., author of the “Theatre of the Present War in North America,” London, 1759; (Ticonderoga) Edward Hamilton, Fort Ticonderoga: Key to a Continent; (Louisbourg) Fairfax Davis Downey, Louisbourg: Key to a Continent. 
[2]Duffy, Fire and Stone, 103-4.
[3] Carroll Lonergan, Ticonderoga: Historic Portage, 25.
[4] Pierre Pouchot, Mémoires sur la dernière guerre de l'Amérique Septentrionale : entre la France et l'Angleterre, Vols 1-3, (Yverdon, 1781). English translations of this memoir have been available since the early nineteenth century, the most recent was published in 2004 by the Old Fort Niagara Association.
[5] Letter from von Hille, September 28th, 1777.
[6] Letter to Riedesel from Ernst Schröder, September 26th, 1777.
[7] Letter from von Hille, September 28th, 1777.

British Diary Part 3: War in America

Grenadier of the 52nd Regiment of Foot, Don Troiani

Dear Reader,

In the previous two posts, we have explored William Digby's journey to North America,  and his life experiences on campaign. Digby, a Grenadier in the 53rd Regiment of Foot, accompanied John Burgoyne's Canadian army south in an invasion of New York. In this post, we will explore his combat experience in North American during the 1777 Saratoga campaign.

For ease of reference, here is a map of the 1777 Saratoga campaign.

The British army which Digby was a part of, under the command of general John Burgoyne, hoped to reach Albany, which would split the rebellious American colonies in two. Attacking from Canada, the British army reached the first major obstacle, Fort Ticonderoga. Digby records the experience in his journal from July 4th 1777:

"About noon we took possession of Sugar loaf hill  on which a battery was immediately ordered to be raised. It was a post of great consequence, as it commanded a great part of the works of Ticonderoga, all their vessels, and likewise afforded us the means of cutting off their communication with Fort Independent, a place also of great strength and the works very extensive. But here the commanding officer was reckoned guilty of a great oversight in lighting fires on that post, tho I am in formed, it was done by the Indians, the smoak of which was soon perceived by the enemy in the Fort ; as he should have remained undiscovered till night, when he was to have got two 12 pounders up tho their getting there was almost a perpendicular ascent, and drawn up by most of the cattle belonging to the Army. They no sooner perceived us in possession of a post, which they thought quite impossible to bring cannon up to, than all their pretended boastings of holding out to the last, and choosing rather to die in their works than give them up, failed them, and on the night of the 5th they set fire to several parts of the garrison, kept a constant fire of great guns the whole night, and under the protection of that fire, and clouds of smoke they evacuated the garrison, leaving all their cannon, ammunition and a great quantity of stores."

Fort Ticonderoga

With Ticonderoga in British hands, Digby and the rest of the army move south, hoping to reach Albany by the winter. On August 16th, a contingent of Germans allied soldiers in the British army were defeated at the battle of Bennington. The British army regrouped, and attempted to break through the American forces to reach Albany. The resulting battle, called the battle of Freeman's Farm, ended in victory for the British, but they failed to break through to Albany.

Wargame of the Battle of Freeman's Farm

Battle of Freeman's Farm:

William Digby described his experienced at Freeman's Farm:

"At day break intelligence was received, that Colonel Morgan,195 with the advance party of the enemy, consisting of a corps of rifle men, were strong about 3 miles from us ; their main body amounting to great numbers encamped on a very strong post about half a mile in their rear ; and about 9 o'clock we began our march, every man prepared with 60 rounds of cartridges and ready for instant action. We moved in 3 columns, ours to the right on the heights and farthest from the river in thick woods. A little after, 12 our advanced picquets came up with Colonel Morgan and engaged, but from the great superiority of fire received from him — his numbers being much greater — they were obliged to fall back, every officer being either killed or wounded except one, when the line came up to their support and obliged Morgan in his turn to retreat with loss. About half past one, the fire seemed to slacken a little ; but it was only to come on with double force, as between 2 & 3 the action became general on their side. From the situation of the ground, and their being perfectly acquainted with it, the whole of our troops could not be brought to engage together, which was a very material disadvantage, though everything possible was tried to remedy that inconvenience, but to no effect, such an explosion of fire I never had any idea of before, and the heavy artillery joining in con cert like great peals of thunder, assisted by the echoes of the woods, almost deafened us with the noise. To an unconcerned spectator, it must have had the most awful and glorious appearance, the different Battalions moving to relieve each other, some being pressed and almost broke by their superior numbers. This crash of cannon and musketry never ceased till darkness parted us, when they retired to their camp, leaving us masters of the field ; but it was a dear bought victory if I can give it that name, as we lost many brave men, The 62nd had scarce 10 men a company left, and other regiments suffered much, and no very great advantage, honor excepted, was gained by the day."

Battle of Bemis Heights:

So, while the British won the Battle of Freeman's Farm on September 19th, 1777, but did not gain any major strategic advantage. Thus, the British fought a second battle, the Battle of Bemis Heights, on October 7th. 

Breymann's Redoubt, Don Troiani

Digby describes the battle:

"About 3 o'clock, our heavy guns began to play, but the wood around being thick, and their exact knowledge of our small force, caused them to advance in great numbers, pouring in a superiority of fire from Detachments ordered to hang upon our flanks, which they tried if possible to turn. We could not receive a reinforcement as our works, General Hospital Stores, provisions &° would be left defenceless, on which an order was given for us to retreat, but not before we lost many brave men. Brigadier General Frazier was mortally wounded which helped to turn the fate of the day. When General Burgoyne saw him fall, he seemed then to feel in the highest degree our disagreeable situation. He was the only person we could carry off with us. Our cannon were surrounded and taken — the men and horses being all killed — which gave them additional spirits, and they rushed on with loud shouts, when we drove them back a little way with so great loss to ourselves, that it evidently appeared a retreat was the only thing left for us. They still advanced upon our works under a severe fire of grape shot, which in some measure stopped them, by the great execution we saw made among their columns; during which, another body of the enemy stormed the German lines after meeting with a most shameful resistance, and took possession of all their camp and equipage, baggage. Col. Bremen fell nobly at the head of the Foreigners, and by his death blotted out part of the stain his countrymen so justly merited from that days behaviour."

While Digby's criticism of the Germans has no basis in reality, the rest of his account gives an idea of the confused nature of fighting in 18th century North America. The German forces were outnumbered and outflanked, and any 18th century army would have collapsed under these conditions.  While the British were often able to get the better of the Americans on the field of battle, they were often unable to turn it into battlefield success.

Thanks for reading,


Alexander Burns