Rediscovering Lost Art: The Painting of the Surrender at Breslau on 21st December, 1757

A photograph of the original painting

In his book, Unter dem Preußen- Adler (Under the Prussian Eagles) Hans Bleckwenn suggests the first image above has been lost to time. This oil painting by an unknown artist depicts an important event in the history of the Seven Years War: the recapture of Breslau by Prussian forces after the Battle of Leuthen, and the surrender of the large Austrian garrison.

This image is important for the detailed pictures of Prussian soldiers, and as you may have noticed from a previous Kabinettskriege post, is one of the few period images to depict an African soldier serving as a musician in the Prussian Army.  While searching through the Catalogue at the Society of the Cincinnati, I was amazed to discover an entry which read, "Der Aufmarsch der zu Kriegesgefangen gemachten Osterreichiscehn Besatzung aus Breslau am 21. December, 1757".  (The Marching out of Austrian Prisoners taken at Breslau on December 21st, 1757).

I eagerly ordered the item, and waited for the archival staff to bring it from the vault.  For the rest of the story, and images of the rediscovered print, see: https://www.patreon.com/posts/32471624

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

An Odd Battlefield Walk: The Berlin Raids of 1757 and 1760

Dear Readers,

A battlefield walk, or prepared visit to any historic place, is one of the delights of the those who are alive to a sense of the past. Many organizations have their own term for this concept. Militaries call them, "staff rides," American Civil War reenactors have their own, less savory term.  After my work at the archive yesterday, I conducted a battlefield walk in Berlin. It is possible to do many of these walks in Berlin, but rather than focus on the Second World War, I examined the ground marked by Austrian and Russian raids on Berlin during the Seven Years' War.

Battlefield walks in urban environments are the most difficult and least rewarding type of staff ride. The ground has changed and the spaces are often crowded, noisy and distracting. But, if I wanted something easy, I shouldn't have chosen the mid-eighteenth century as a focus for my studies. If you are hazy regarding the Seven Years' War, you can pop over to this website for a quick refresher.  For the purposes of our discussion today, you only need to know that Berlin, the capital city of the Prussian state, was being threatened by the Austrian and Russian armies. Before embarking on the battlefield, let's discuss the city of Berlin in the eighteenth century for a moment. The map above is from 1789, while the map below is from just before the Seven Years' War in 1748.

You can see the outline of the city. The city center contained crumbling defenses that had not been repaired since 1740. A small wall, more for taxation than defense, surrounded the entirety of the city. The only real fortress in the area was outside the city itself, slightly northwest in Spandau. In times of crisis, the royal family would flee to Spandau, rather than stay in the city. The customs wall, as it was called, can be seen outlining the city on both maps. The southern side of the city contained extensive pastures and this open land was also enclosed by the customs wall. You can see that feature on the southern side of the city in both maps. Our story today primarily takes place in that open land, and around three gates on the southern side of the customs wall: the Halle Gate (Hallesches Tor), the Cotbuss Gate (Kotbusser Tor) and the Silesian Gate (Schlesisches Tor). It is possible to (roughly) retrace the line of the customs wall, by following the U1 or U3 Ubahn lines traveling to or from the Warschauer Straße Ubahnhof. While the line does not follow the course of the customs wall exactly, and while the stations are not exactly on the site of the gates, it is possible to quickly move to the approximate locations of these former gates. The map below shows the 1757 raid of the city.

Grosser Generalstab Map

In 1757, Austrian FML Andreas Hadik chose to approach the city from the southeastern side, in order to cover the relatively small size of his force.  Hadik had perhaps 7,000 men with which to confront the Berlin garrison of roughly 4,000. Moreover, many of Hadik's troops had been detached, and he knew that Prussian reinforcements were quickly approaching from various quarters. On 11am on the 16th of October, 1757, Hadik began offensive operations against the city.

Looking southeast towards the initial Austrian positions. 

The commander of the Berlin Garrison, Lt. General Rochow, upon recovering from his initial shock, quickly deployed troops to the southern city gates. Around 500 men of the Leon Fusiliers were in the vicinity of the Silesian Gate when Hadik began his attack. Major Tesmar and six companies of the 7th Garrison regiment were dispatched to the Silesian Gate shortly before Hadik began firing towards the defenses with three-pounders.[1] The Austrian gunner Georg Joseph Thun managed to lower the drawbridge across the Spree, by damaging one of the chains suspending it, which precipitated an attack by two companies of Austrian Grenadiers. The troops rushed from the southwest side of the Spree across the now passable bridge towards the Stralauer Tor on the far side, scattering the opposition.

The modern far side of the Spree, and bridge towards the Stralauer Tor. 

Hadik deployed more artillery, and his six-pounders smashed the Silesian Gate itself, which permitted around 1,400  Austrian troops to make their way inside the city.

Looking northwest towards Berlin. 

Although most of the formerly open land has been built up, there are a few parks which give a better sense of the space confronting Hadik and his troops. Hadik's troops moved inside the wall to the northwest, and began to notice Prussian reinforcements approaching. Major Tesmar and the six companies of Garrison Regiment 7 wheeled to anchor their right flank on the customs wall, and began to move towards the Austrians pouring through the Silesian gate.[2] The situation can be seen below.

A detail showing the combat at this point. 

A modern version of the view from the perspective of the Prussian reinforcements,
under Major von Tesmar

Hadik used the relative openness of the terrain to outflank and charge the Prussian troops. The six companies were charged from the front by 700 hundred cavalry, while attacked in the flank by an indeterminate number of Croats. The Prussians immediately opened a 'heavy fire' on these approaching forces, but numbers and combat experience took their toll, and the Austrians quickly routed the Prussian troops in the ensuing melee.

The view northeast between the Silesian and Cotbuss Gates 

Having failed to stop the Austrians, Lt. General Rochow retreated with the remainder of his forces towards Zitadelle Spandau. Hadik had too little time to effectively disable the Prussian capital and made some minor demands which were granted before he withdrew. The Austrians were on the road southwards by 10pm, having extracted 14 carriages of currency from Berlin. According to legend, Hadik also demanded 20 pairs of gloves for Maria Theresa. 

The interior of Charlottenburg Palace was badly damaged during the 1760 raid

The Prussian capital would come under attack again in 1760, when forces under Austrian FM Lacy and Russian General Chernyshev concentrated on the city in October of 1760. As opposed to the previous raid, major forces were involved, and by the 7th of October, perhaps 15,000 Prussians faced over 30,000 Austro-Russian allies around the city. Prussian General Johann von Hülsen defended the south approaches to the city against the Austrians, while Prinz Eugen von Württemberg guarded northeastern side against Russian troops. Seeing that the allies possessed almost double their numbers, the Prussian commanders decided to avoid a Maxen-like debacle and withdraw their forces. In essence, to Hülsen and Württemberg, the army was more important than the capital. 

Hülsen's view looking south from the Halle Gate
 towards Austrian positions near Tempelhof

Russian General Totleben had been in negotiations with the commandant of Berlin, the venerable Prussian Lt. General Rochow. Among the generals of the eighteenth century, Rochow possesses the infamous distinction of having lost his prince's capital twice. Rochow and Totleben concluded terms without consulting the Austrian commander Lacy, who was furious. Totleben was a man with a reputation for nepotism and kleptomania, and personally profited a great deal from his military career. 

The courtyard behind the Halle Gate, by which Lacy and the Austrians entered.

The Zeughaus, or armory, which now houses the German History Museum,
was heavily damaged.

Lacy, as a result, did little to stop his troops from looting the city, in violation of Totleben's agreement. The Russians targeted their fury on state-owned buildings, while the few Austrians who managed to get into the city before the agreement was ratified destroyed whatever property they could. Eventually, Russian troops ostensibly guarding the city (for their own, sanctioned, looting) fired on Austrian looters to force them to desist. By the 11th of October, word had reached the capital that the Prussian main army was on the move. The Austrian and Russian forces left a badly damaged Prussian capital and rejoined their main armies. 

Both raids on Berlin had the effect of badly slightly weakening the Prussian war economy, and causing Frederick to lose face before an international audience. However, despite the paintings lost and treasure stolen, losing Berlin did not prevent the Prussians from continuing the war effort. Indeed, the raids on Berlin were less strategically significant than losing a Silesian fortress such as Glatz or Schweidnitz. If you seek to walk the Berlin raids, print off a large period map, and bring both a readable secondary account of the action, as well as print-offs of the relevant articles on Kronoskaf. All three are invaluable in orienting you to the actions which occurred. 

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1]Duffy, By Force of Arms, 69.
[2] Ibid, 70. Hadik claims that nearly all the Prussians were taken prisoner, and only six colors were captured. 

Kolin: Why did Frederick lose?

Richard Knoetel's reimagining of Frederick and a Cuirassier after Kolin. 
Edited for Richard's apparent lack of understanding how shadows work.

Dear Reader,

This Sunday is the 260th anniversary of one of the most important battles in the Seven Years' War, the Battle of Kolin. In this battle, fought on June 18th, 1757, Frederick II of Prussia (Frederick the Great) lost for the first time in his military career. From the beginning of his military career as king in 1740, to the Battle of Prague, fought on May 6th, 1757,  Frederick had never lost a battle. Without delving too far into the narrative of the battle, this post attempts to establish why this battle was Frederick's first taste of defeat.

Christopher Duffy's map of the Battle of Kolin

If you want a narrative of the battle, and don't have any books by Christopher Duffy close at hand, try this site, or this one.

So: What explanations for the defeat have historians advanced in the past?

1) The Lost Cause explanation
According to this line of thinking, it was hopeless to expect the Prussians to win at Kolin. How could 34,000 Prussians ever hope to overcome 52,000 Austrians in a defensive position? Oddly enough, the folks in this camp are often cheering the most when 22,000 Prussians beat 42,000 Frano-Imperials at Rossbach five months later at Rossbach, or when 33,000 Prussians defeat 65,000 Austrians six months later at Leuthen.

2) The Overconfident Frederick explanation
According to this theory, such as advanced version advanced at the second link above, all of the success had gone to Frederick's head, and he did not respect the real threat presented by Daun and the Austrian field army under his command. "Like Lee at Gettysburg," in the words of the blogger above, Frederick believed that his men were invincible and that they could carry any position. If that is true, why didn't Frederick order frontal assaults more often? Why did maneuver and flanking still form such a key part of his strategy?

3) The Exhausted Prussians explanation
For believers in this explanation, the Prussian army was simply pushed to the breaking point by the the Battle of Prague on May 6th, 1757, and had not had sufficient time to recover. Christopher Duffy appears to be in this camp, quoting the following source:

"Never did troops march less willingly than did our men on this occasion - it was as if they were being led to a place of execution. They were shocked by the resistance the Austrians had put up [at Prague], and they feared the worst... our strength and courage seemed to have drained away."[1]

This is a hard idea to refute, supported as it is by primary source evidence. With that said, Warnery was writing over thirty years after the events. A quick examination of the service record of Prussian infantry regiments reveals that around 40% of the infantry regiments had not fought at Prague, while 60% had. In addition, as the day wore on, multiple units who had been engaged at Prague were moved from the rear of the Prussian army into the heaviest fighting.

An artist's re-imagining of the Prussian 2nd Battalion of Guards at Kolin

4) The Frederick's Tactical Blunders explanation
Frederick II's military reputation has suffered in recent years, as impartial (though incorrect) historians credit him with a 50/50 win-loss record, polemic Frederick-bashers place all blame for Prussian defeats on his shoulders, and even positive biographers note that he was more useful as a campaign planner than as a battlefield commander.  Could his plan have been flawed? Absolutely. Frederick would misjudge attacking a defensive position again in the Seven Years' War, at the Battle of Kunersdorf. However, his exact plan at Kolin seems to have made sense and been clearly understood by his generals. According to a Royal Page, Prinz Moritz von Anhalt-Dessau replied after the king's briefing: "No one can misunderstand it: It is so clear that no-one will make a mistake."[2] It is also reasonable to argue that Frederick's micromanagement might have cost him the battle, in that he ordered Prinz Moritz to form the line of battle too quickly during the main approach, preventing the Prussians from reaching the Austrian's flank. Upon forming the line of battle, Prince Moritz became dejected, believing that the battle was lost. [3] 

5) The Blundering Subordinates explanation
The previous anecdote may remind readers of the behavior of subordinates who believed that they were doomed to failure in other conflicts. Like the American Civil War lost-causers attempting to blame James Longstreet for what happened at Gettysburg, Frederick's subordinate generals have certainly been accused of failing the Prussian monarch at this critical juncture. In this view, Johann Dietrich von Hülsen, Prinz Moritz von Anhalt-Dessau, or Duke August Wilhelm von Bevern are responsible for the failure of the Prussian attack. By and large, these accusations are unfounded. Hülsen rose to successful independent command later in the Seven Years' War, winning smaller battles such as the Combat at Strehla. Prinz Moritz was also successful, and redeemed his reputation at Leuthen, but died in the course of the war. Bevern had shown great skill in commanding men on the battlefield, and would again, at battles such as Reichenbach in 1762.

6) The Austrian Military Competence explanation
This final explanation put forth by Christopher Duffy over his two-volume examination of the Austrian army in the Seven Years' War, makes the most sense. The Austrians knew Frederick's strategy and planned accordingly. A clever Austrian junior officer, Franz Vettesz, correctly predicted the Prussian plan of attack on the morning of the battle. Daun, the Austrian field marshal, quickly acted on this information. Seeing his path to victory, Daun used delaying forces such as Croats and light artillery to slow the Prussian attack under Hülsen while bringing the weight of his superior numbers to bear on the Prussian force.

With this in mind, the battle looks less like an Austrian Gettysburg and more like an Austrian Antietam. The Austrians correctly divined the Prussian plan, and defeated the Prussian army, but failed to capitalize their victory or, as was common in the eighteenth century, pursue their defeated foe. In addition, the battle was costly for the Austrian force.  When the 4,000 Prussian prisoners are removed from the equation, the Austrians and Prussians lost a very similar number of men (approx. 9,000) dead and wounded. Kolin was a hard fought Austrian victory. Rather than always looking for an explanation on the Prussian side of the equation, perhaps some credit is due to the men who earned it.

Austrian Grenadiers in 1748, David Morier

At Kolin, the Prussians fought hard and long, following a strategy that had previously been highly successful. They inflicted large losses on the Austrian army and exhausted the Austrians so much that a pursuit of the defeated Prussian army was impossible. Kolin ended a victorious chapter in the history of the Prussian army but did not end the Seven Years' War. It would take five more years of bloody conflict to draw this war to a close.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

[1] Warnery, Campagnes de Frederic II, 135.
[2] Duncker, Aus der Zeit Friedrichs der Grossen und Friedich Wilhelm III, 90.  

[3] Ibid, 76. 

Battle of Rossbach: 5th November, 1757

Map of Rossbach from-Rossbach and Leuthen: Prussia's Eagle Resurgent

Dear Readers,

When we last left our heroes, the Prussian army was shadowing a larger French and Reichsarmee force. (The Reichsarmee was made up of troops from a motley collection of small German states.) While the French and Reichsarmee had the advantage in terms of number of soldiers, (about 40,000 to 22,000) the Prussians indisputably outmatched the allies in terms of quality.

On the morning of November 5th,  the allies began a wide flanking move in an effort to get around the Prussian army, and potentially destroy it with a flank attack. The supposedly "Great" king, Frederick, failed to notice this movement on the part of the enemy, he was busy having lunch.  The first Prussian to notice the movements of the enemy was Frederick's young Flügeladjutant, Captain Friedrich Wilhelm Ersnt von Gaudi. According to historian Christopher Duffy, Gaudi reported to the king, "who was lunching with Prince Henry (his royal brother) Seydlitz, and a number of officers in the chamber below. If there was anything Frederick disliked more than having his monologues interrupted, it was signs of panic in a junior officer." Frederick told Gaudi that he was wrong about the flanking movement. Later, when the commander of a Frei-Battalion charged with watching the French, (the same Frei-Battalion a certain young Baron von Steuben was serving in...) reported the same, he was met with similar disdain from the great king.

Frederick dismisses Gaudi's (on right) report

However, Frederick is not, as historian Franz Szabo claims, totally at fault. After all, he had created a system in which these younger officers could report to him, and encouraged initiative among his advisers.  While I agree with Szabo that Frederick was in the wrong in this instance, I can not share his opinion on the Prussian military, which encouraged initiative, so that the army would not be destroyed if the king was at fault.

In time, when the movements of the enemy became more clear, subordinate Prussian officers made plans for movement in spite of the king's indifference, a move which undoubtedly saved the Prussian army. Frederick, finally awakening to the danger, moved prepared his infantry to move, and instructed General Seydlitz to take command of the Prussian cavalry.

The map of the Battle of Rossbach, from Christopher Duffy's: Prussia's Glory, pg 67.

Seydlitz immediately sprang into action, and his cavalry attack shattered the allies advanced guard. Young Fahnen-Cadet von Barsewisch, who we heard from in the last post, described the battle from his place with Prussian Regiment von Meyerinck (IR 26), on the map, von Meyerinck is right by the box which reads, "Final Attack."  Barsewisch describes the battle:

"To that end, His Majesty had re-positioned eight Battalions, of which our regiment was one, because of the re-positioning of the enemy.  There we stood, calmly, and went about our lunch, while awaiting further orders.  At roughly 2 O’clock in the afternoon, the enemy suddenly shifted their march left towards Rossbach, in an effort to turn our left flank, and began to march up. The speed with which we broke down the camp, formed battle array, and began to march up was indescribable. About 3 O’clock in the afternoon, a cannonade began, and the army stood in battle order. Our cavalry on the left wing, under the command of General Seydlitz crashed into the enemy cavalry, and on the second shock, the enemy cavalry took flight, and threw many of the infantry behind them wholly into ruin.
 Our infantry battalions from the left wing appeared from under our cannon, and engaged the French Swiss corps in such a way that they were still in columns. These columns were in the form of an ancient Phalanx, and through want of time and space to deploy, they were situated in rows of men a hundred deep. In this manner, they attempt to charge. This unstoppable Swiss Phalanx of left thousands of dead behind, and the whole of the French army was in such confusion, that they attempted to escape and flee, and by nightfall, they had left their cannons behind and were totally defeated by our left wing."

In essence, the Prussian cavalry attacked, defeated the enemy cavalry, and then reformed. The Prussian infantry regiments advanced on the allies, who were still in marching columns. Desperately, these marching columns attempted to charge and break the Prussian infantry through force of shock. The incredible firepower of the Prussian infantry and artillery stopped this attack, which developed into a firefight. This phase of the battle is artistically represented below:

Painting from- Rossbach and Leuthen: Prussia's Eagle Resurgent 

 However, by this point in the battle, General Seydlitz had reformed the Prussian cavalry, and they attacked the flank of the allies, throwing their army into a total rout.  The Prussian's lost 548 men, while the allies lost 5,000 dead and wounded, and 5,000 prisoners. Franz Szabo deliberately misrepresents these casualty figures, stating that the allies only lost 5,000 total men.

 While Frederick may have been slow to recognize the danger, and even slower to accept the advice of his subordinates, his handling of the main infantry line enabled the allies to be caught between the anvil of the Prussian infantry, and the hammer of Seydlitz and Prussian cavalry.

Why is Rossbach important? Why should we "remember remember," THIS 5th of November?

Remember in the last post when I was talking about how the English had been basically knocked out of the war, and the French were going to be able to send more troops to North America? Rossbach changed all that. This Prussian victory gave the British an excuse to get back into the war in Europe, where they were able to prevent French expansion into western Germany. It also tied down French forces in Europe, which allowed the British to conquer Canada, which retains ties with the British to this day. If this battle had not happened, the Seven Years' War would have been much shorter than seven years, with a different victor.

If this 5th of November had not occurred, the whole geopolitics of the Atlantic world could be radically different than it is today. That is why you should remember the 5th of November, 1757.

Thanks for reading,

Alex Burns

If you liked this post, let me know in the comments below! Feel free to follow the blog. Its free, and lets me know that you enjoy what I'm doing-basically the only reason I write this thing.

November 1757

The lead-up to the Battle of Rossbach

Dear Readers,

Tomorrow is the 5th of November. The one day a year college students can pretend to be anarchists for a few hours. "Remember, Remember," the saying goes. Well, today, here on Kabinettskriege, I am going to take you to a different 5th of November. Forget the Gunpowder Plot. This 5th of November has much more significance to British history than a few disgruntled Catholics.

At the beginning of November, 1757, England, and the liberties of Englishmen everywhere, were in much greater danger than in 1605. The French had defeated the forces of the English king at the battle of Hastenbeck on the 26th of July, 1757. This led to the surrender of the army which fought for Britain, mostly comprised of Hessian, Hanoverian, and Braunschweiger soldiers. At surrender following the Convention of Kloster-Zeven, Britain had been all but knocked out of the Seven Years' War in Europe. This would allow the French to send more troops to serve in North America, potentially threatening England's overseas colonies.

The English could only hope for their allies on the continent, the Prussians, to somehow pull their European irons out of the fire. And in November 1757, this did not look very likely. The Prussians were reeling from three important defeats. On the 18th of June, 1757, King Frederick II of Prussia's army had been badly defeated at the battle of Kolin. On the 30th of August, a minor Prussian army had been defeated at the battle of Gross-Jägersdorf. And finally, On the 7th of September, the Prussians were worsted in the small battle of Moys.

The defeat at Moys was particularly damaging to Frederick II of Prussia. His most trusted friend, and confidant, Hans Karl von Winterfeldt, had been killed in this skirmish. Winterfeldt was Frederick's chief of staff, and spymaster. But even more importantly, he was Frederick's close personal friend. After being told of Winterfeldt's death, Frederick responded, "Einen Winterfeldt finde ich nie wieder. Er war ein guter Mensch, ein Seelenmensch. Er war mein Freunde." Roughly translated, "I will never find another Winterfeldt. He was a good man, a soulful man. He was my friend." For spiky old Fritz, close personal friendships did not come easy-he would often recall this as one of the greatest blows of the war.

After a year of repeated defeats, the English and the Prussians appeared as if they were about to lose the Seven Years' War.

In early November, Frederick was shadowing a French and Reichsarmee, which significantly outnumbered his own. Most historians agree that the French and Imperials had an army of between 38,000 to 44,000 men, and Christopher Duffy gives the figure of 44,750. Franz Szabo states without proof that the army had a, "total strength... about 30,000." Even if we accept Szabo's figure, we can generally agree that the French and Imperials had a generous margin of error over the Prussians, which historians agree had 22,000 men.

Ernst Friedrich Rudolf von Barsewisch, a twenty-year-old Fahnen-Cadet (Junior Ensign), recalled his experiences directly before the battle:

"On the 1^st of November, near Halle, an Imperial Corps burned 200 Ducats, plundered different locations during the night, and broke a bridge over the river Saale on the 2^nd. On this day, we constructed three bridges over the Saale. The 3^rd (of November) brought us to pass by Merseburg on the Saale, and we moved one mile passed Merseburg to Braunsdorf, and camped there. We marched three miles. Here, we stood close to the combined French and Reichsarmee force, so that our Advanced-Guard attacked and skirmished with their outposts.  During this night, His Majesty the King reconnoitered the enemy camp. They were met with a violent cannonade. On the Morning of the 4^th of November,  the army broke up, and his Majesty the King was minded to attack the enemy with his cavalry and the left wing of the army. But because the enemy army past with their flank in sight, the enemy in four detachments, in such a way that opened the camp, that the cavalry camped behind the infantry in a valley, meanwhile, constantly the Hussars and the Freibattalions  skirmished with the enemy. The headquarters was near Rossbach."

The battle that followed, on the 5th of November, would change the balance of power in Europe, and North America. Tune in tomorrow, to see how the epic battle on this 5th of November occurred, and how it changed western history.

Thanks for reading,




Alex Burns

If you liked this post, let me know in the comments below! Feel free to follow the blog. Its free, and lets me know that you enjoy what I'm doing-basically the only reason I write this thing.