Russian Soldiers on American Soil? Catherine the Great, George III, and the American Revolution

Russians troops, 1770s
image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to examine a subject which may be familiar to some of you, but I hope to explore the topic with a source base that will be new for many of you. The apocalyptic vision of Russian troops invading the United States became increasingly common during the Cold War, and has carried on into the post-Cold War era through the medium of video games like Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. The most famous example of this trend is perhaps the 1984 film, Red Dawn. 
The American fear of invasion by Russian troops existed long before the twentieth century, however. During the American War of Independence, many Americans feared that the Tsarina of Russia, Catherine II "the Great", would send troops to support the British during the War of Independence.

This possibility, both eagerly anticipated by British officers, and feared by the American people, has been addressed by a number of diplomatic historians, going all the way back to Frank A. Golder's 1915 treatment of the subject, "Catherine the Great and the American Revolution" in the American Historical Review. The best book in English on this subject is doubtlessly still Normal Saul's Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867. More recently, Norman Desmarais has covered the topic via published writings by British officers, as well as tracking down newspaper reports of Russian involvement throughout the war. This is a post about an agreement between two countries that was never reached: in the words of Norman Saul, "Russians would not be Hessians." For first making me aware of this incident, and all of his incredible assistance during my MA studies, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sergei Zhuk, of Ball State University, who was gracious enough to work with a student who was interested in the Hessians.

A Court Portrait of Sir Robert Gunning

On the 7th of August, 1775, the British Ambassador at the Russian Court, Sir Robert Gunning, received a letter from Henry Howard, the 12th Earl of Suffolk. Suffolk, a highly placed minister in Lord North's government, who eventually secured the use of Hessian and Hanoverian forces for the British Crown, wrote to Gunning, the Ambassador in Russian, confidentially asking him to put out feelers regarding obtaining Russian troops for British use in North America. In his cyphered reply to Suffolk, on the 8th of August, 1775, Gunning spoke of the "delicate and difficult commission" which the government had charged him, namely, obtaining, "a Body of Her Imperial Majesty's Infantry[.]"[1]

Henry Howard, 12th Earl of Suffolk

Almost immediately in this process, Gunning appeared to hedge his bets in his letters back to his handler in London: he carefully explained that he needed to bring this topic of conversation up organically with the Empress herself, or with her minister Nikita Ivanonvich Panin. He planned to wait for the Empress to make one of her "numberless assurances [that] she has formerly given me of Her wishes to have any opportunity of serving the King (George III)."[2] This type of assurance was normally given in the course of diplomatic niceties at court, and can be understood as the equivalent of the modern English nicety, 'let us know if you need anything.' In a difficult situation, Gunning planned to follow-up this nicety with, 'actually, your Imperial Majesty, we need about 20,000 troops for service in North America.'

Nikita Ivanonvich Panin

By the 8th of September, Suffolk had replied to Gunning, indicating that he should be prepared to offer the Russian Empress a subsidy treaty in exchange for use of this "body of troops", but that "it is more profitable," for Gunning to pursue, "the same line of sentiment on which she [Empress Catherine] has thus far proceeded; she may think a treaty unncessary and lend the assistance required without any formal obligation whatever."[3] Acknowledging that this level of generosity seemed unlikely, Suffolk continued, "That you however may be prepared for every possible contingency, His Majesty commands me to inform you that the proposal of a Subsidy is not to frustrate the negotiations."[4]

Helpfully, Suffolk drew up a draft of a subsidy treaty, leaving key areas, such as numbers of troops committed, blank, so that Gunning would have something tangible to present the Russian Empress. This treaty, written in French, contained the following points:

1. George III would secure a body of troops for service, the exact number of troops left blank, they would be officered by Russians.
2. The troops would be picked up by British transports from various seaports on the 25th of March, 1776.
3. The troops would be reviewed before embarkation by an English commissioner, who would administer an oath of loyalty to George III, which the treaty was careful to note, "of course, this will not supersede their oath of Loyalty taken to the Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russians."[5]
4.The British crown would provide two battalion guns (light cannon) to each battalion serving in this manner, and also provide the necessary men for crewing these pieces.
5. Having taken the oath of Loyalty on March 25th, they would for all intents and purposes be British National Troops, receiving pay at the same rate as their British counterparts.
6. Should these battalions be damaged or destroyed while in British service, the British crown would pay for the cost of re-raising the troops, and return them into Russian service in the same condition that they were received.
7. The troops will serve for the duration of the treaty, the British crown would give a three-month warning when the treaty was to be dissolved, and send the troops back to Russian with two months pay for their travel costs.
8. Should hostilities break out in Russia, the troops would be returned immediately with the same arrangement for back pay, and in addition the British government would transport them free of charge.
9. The treaty would last for two years with the possibility of renewal.
10. The Russians have ten weeks from the British signature to ratify the treaty.[6]

Having drafted the treaty, Suffolk felt the need to clarify points in his following letters to Gunning, instructing him, "have it fully understood that the supreme command is to be with General Carlton, or Genl. Howe, or whoever may be the British commander in chief in the District where the Russians are to act[.]"[7] Suffolk continued, "I must again remind you of the great importance of bringing this matter to an immediate Decision so as the Account of it may arrive on or before the 24th of October."[8]

On the September 11th, 1775, Gunning reported to Suffolk a conversation with Catherine II, where she had asked the British Ambassador "whether any progress had been made in settling disputes in America."[9] Before Gunning could reply, the Empress continued, "for God's sake, put an End to it as soon as possible, and do not confine yourself to one Method of accomplishing this desirable End there are various means of doing it, and they ought all to be tried."[10]

Tragically for the British, Gunning was at this particular moment unaware of the drafted subsidy treaty, which had just been written three days earlier by Suffolk, and was still enroute to him. Only on October 1st did Gunning report back that the message had arrived to late, and the empress had departed for another country seat when the subsidy treaty arrived. Notwithstanding this setback, Gunning immediately approached Panin, "the next morning, and on account of the extreme Readiness and good Will which he had shewn in the Business hitherto, I was resolved to treat with him with all possible Openness."[11] Panin initially treated Gunning's request with favor: "Neither the number of troops nor the place of their destination seemed to strike him as exceptionable: he repeated to me that he saw it perfectly in the light I did, as a matter of Friendship between sovereign and sovereign."[12] Panin seemed to wholeheartedly support the plan, but Gunning related that his, "impatience to have the business communicated to the Empress was checked by my knowledge of the persons by whom she was then surrounded, Mons. Potemkin and the Tchernychevs."[13] Panin confirmed Gunning's suspicions that the idea might be shot down in the presence of this hostile party, and "was of the opinion that he ought himself to be the Bearer of His Majesty's Letter to the Empress."[14]

Count Osterman

Gunning next approached Count Ivan Andreyevich Osterman, and received a cooler response. Osterman, "asked me whether such an assistance would not alarm the other powers."[15] Gunning was unable to convince Osterman of the feasibility of the scheme. When Gunning had the opportunity to speak to Panin once again, "the less positive manner in which he expressed his hopes of the success of my application made me very much apprehensive that Count Osterman's ideas of the difficulty of the business had infected him."[16] That was Wednesday. By Friday, at 5pm, Panin relayed to Gunning that the Empress,

"shewed much repugnance to the [idea of] having her troops employed in America, where they could have no communication with this country; and that the number requested was so great that she did not think it was possible to grant them in the present state of her forces, wasted as they were by the length of hte late war; as well as on account of the unsettled state of Poland and the uncertainty of that of Sweden[.]... She had asked whether it was not possible for Her to assisted Us in any other Manner than by sending Her troops out of Europe?"[17]

Panin, in passing, added to Gunning, "could not His Majesty make use of Hanoverians?"[18] At this point, Gunning resorted to begging, pleading, and that most unhelpful of suggestions, 'we could have assisted the Turks in the late war.'  Gunning then attempted to negotiate for a smaller body of troops, reducing his request to 15,000 men. Panin was noncommittal,  and Gunning concluded, "I can scarcely entertain any Hopes at present that Her Imperial Majesty will be prevailed upon to send Troops to America[.]"[19]

Finally, Catherine II sent a lengthy letter to George III via Gunning. Despite a warm and effusive opening, Catherine indicated that, "your minister explains and desires a body of twenty thousand men from my troops be transported to Canada next spring, I cannot hide from your Majesty that such aid with such a destination not only sits ill with me, but also exceeds the limits of my powers to oblige."[] She continued, "Nor can I stop thinking about what should have resulted for Our own dignity, if  two monarchies and two nations had thus joined of our forces simply to calm a rebellion."[20]

In summary, though Gunning and Suffolk worked at some length to obtain a body of Russian subsidy troops, the opinions of Count Osterman and other prominent members of the Russian Court intervened to prevent Russian soldiers from intervening on the British side of the American War of Independence.

Now, we turn to that most dangerous of historical enterprises: the counterfactual hypothesis. What would have occurred if Tsarina and her ministers had been disposed to accept the subsidy treaty with the government of George III?  Obviously, take what follows with a giant helping of salt.

Period drawing of Russian Troops, 18th Century
Unknown artist, oil on canvas, image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич

Assuming all went well with the inspection and embarkation of troops on March 25th, the Russian force of 20,000 men would have been available for the New York offensive, and could have arrived off Long Island with the rest of Howe's forces by the end of June. Uniformed in their red summer jackets  the Russians would have fit in quite well with the British forces. There is little doubt that they would have performed as effectively as the Hessians did in the late summer and fall campaign across New York in 1776. As the year drew to a close, gaining a similar amount of ground, Howe would likely have dispersed his men into garrisons, and placed 1,500 men under the command of Major General Alexander Suvorov in the area around Trenton. Following established Russian doctrine, Suvorov followed his subordinates' suggestion to place redoubts around key positions at Trenton. When the American attack came on December 26th, 1776, the Russians where still operationally surprised, but doggedly held out in their defensive positions, suffering numerous casualties, but rebuffing Washington's surprise counterattack. With the final failure of this gamble, American resistance continued, but the war ended in a negotiated settlement with most of the thirteenth colonies returning to British rule. Perhaps a bit too, "on the nose," but you get the point.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Robert Gunning to Earl of Suffolk, August 8th 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 44,46.
[2] Ibid, 45.
[3]Suffolk to Gunning, 8th September 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 59-60.
[4] Ibid
[5] Draft of Subsidy Treaty, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 63.
[6] Ibid, 62-65.
[7] Suffolk to Gunning, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 72.
[8] Ibid
[9]Gunning to Suffolk, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 99-100.
[10]Ibid.
[11] Gunning to Suffolk, 1st October, 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 109.
[12] Ibid, 110.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 111.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, 112.
[17] Ibid, 113.
[18] Ibid, 114.
[19] Catherine II to George III, 7th October 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 128.
[20] Ibid, 129.

Russia Admonished: The Battle of Narva in the Great Northern War

Swedish Reenactors portray Karoliner on the march in summer months
Photo by Anders Bertrandsson

Dear Reader,

Today, we have our second guest post- this time from Michael Glaeser.[1] As a historian who has published on the Great Northern War, Michael brings a great depth of experience to the subject in this post: the Battle of Narva.

If you would like to write for Kabinettskriege, or have an idea for a post, please contact us via the link on the upper right. Without further introduction- here is Michael's post:

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In the year 1700, the Kingdom of Sweden was the dominant power in the Baltic. The sea was very much a Swedish one with the nation’s territory circling around the waters to include Finland, Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, and parts of northern Germany. For many socio-political reasons, Denmark-Norway, Saxony-Poland-Lithuania, and Russia formed an alliance to seize control and beat back Swedish hegemony. The three-pronged attack was meant to be quick and decisive. After all, the King of Sweden, Charles XII, was only an eighteen-year-old adolescent…

Immediately after declaring war on Sweden on August 20th, the Russians began their push into Ingria to besiege the fortified town of Narva. With Russia having no access to the Baltic, Ingria was a vital strip of land that Tsar Peter I desperately wanted to have back. As Narva was also the lynchpin fortress on the border of Ingria and Estonia, Peter wanted to take the town first and use it as a base of operations from which Russian troops could pour into neighboring regions. More importantly, it was only fourteen kilometers away from the Gulf of Finland and that vital seat on the Baltic Sea.

Looking for sources: a British Newspaper from 1700 describes the battle

Due to its strategic location, the town of Narva was well fortified. The Swedes added a ring of bastions in the 1680s to supplement the existing 15th-century castle. This was done under the watch of the aged field marshal and engineer Erik Dahlberg, the "Swedish Vauban". The western side of the town had the most open approach but this too had defensive features including a dry moat. The town itself held a garrison of 1,460 infantry, substantially lower than the planned 3,100, but it did include additional cavalry as well. These were under the command of Henning Rudolf Horn at the time of the siege.

While Russian troops immediately advanced into Ingria, it wasn't until the end of October that the artillery and siege guns arrived at the outskirts of Narva. With over 37,000 men facing the town, the general expectation was that Narva could only hold out until the end of the month. Peter had arrived to personally supervise the siege and take part in the forthcoming surrender. Horn and his men clung to the safety of the town walls and were no doubt encouraged by the letters sent from Charles indicating that "we will soon be with you and dislodge the enemy".[2]

Russian Army flags used at Narva (later captured by the Swedish Army)

Following the sweeping success against Denmark, Charles and the Swedish army mustered for shipment to the Baltic provinces in early October. They had arrived and disembarked by the 8th and a plan was formulated to send a relief force to Narva while the king and another body of troops headed south to break the siege of Riga launched by Augustus, the Elector of Saxony.[3] Swedish commander Otto Vellingk brought news of an improved situation- Augustus did not get the necessary support from his ally Peter and rather than face the wrath of the Swedes alone, decided to break his siege and send his army into winter quarters. Given the suspension of Saxon operations and the seasonably bad weather that mired the roads, Charles felt safe enough to divert all efforts towards Narva and come to grips with his cousin at a later point.

On November 13, the Swedish army began its march through soggy and scorched lands. Given the scarcity of food, the weather, and the state of the roads, the army was in need of a morale boost. This came on the 17th when the king led a small detachment against a much larger Russian force led by General Boris Sheremetev at a chokepoint called Pyhajoggi pass. Sheremetev was under orders to withdraw without forcing a battle but the retreat of 5,000 of the enemy had an uplifting effect for the tired Swedes. More importantly, this was the first independent action for Charles who held his own and managed his men well enough to earn praise.

Despite hearing news from Sheremetev that the Swedes were approaching, the Russian command was unconcerned. Western European warfare had become known for lengthy sieges rather than fast assaults and pitched battles. The belief in the Russian camp was that the Swedes would halt, gather strength, and then force the issue. Tsar Peter even left the siege a day and a half before the Swedes arrived on the 19th in order to direct more reinforcements. The tsar's leave of absence on the eve of battle has garnered much attention from contemporary observers and historians. Naturally, the Swedes painted Peter as a coward, someone who saw the writing on the wall and wanted no part in an eventual defeat. But given the prevalence and preference for siege warfare, Peter probably thought he had more time. In any case, it was a fortuitous move on his part.

Battle of Narva, Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great, 331.

In the tsar's place as acting commander was Field Marshal Charles Eugene Du Croy, a western trained general who fought against the Swedes at Lund and the Ottomans at Vienna. He had the vastly larger Russian force organized behind a nine-foot-high wall in front of which was a six foot wide dry trench. He was also backed up by over 140 cannon and mortars. Due to the size of Narva, the most glaring error was that his forces were stretched out over a six-kilometer line. The Swedish attack would focus on two columns smashing into the enemy and then rolling up both flanks. With poetic timing, or perhaps divine intervention, a snowstorm picked up in intensity and blew directly into the faces of the waiting Russians. The Swedes used the opportunity to launch their attack with Charles and his Drabants concentrated on the left column. It was this group that was the first to shatter their opposition. A Swedish volley within 30 paces caused many of the defenders to “fall like grass”. Hastily made fascines filled the dry trench, and ladders allowed the Swedes to scale the walls and enter the Russian camp. Success quickly followed on the right as well: “We charged directly sword in hand and so entered. We slew all who came at us and it was a terrible massacre”.[4] That the fighting was intense is evidenced by the commentary surrounding Charles. He had a horse shot out from under him and lost a shoe in the soggy mud. After the battle, a bullet was found lodged in his neckcloth, the first of five to hit him in his life.

With the Swedes storming into the camp, a panic set in. Many of the Russian commanders were foreign and some could not even communicate in the language of their subordinates. Distrust and an unwillingness to fight for their officers led many Russians to flee. Most famous was the rout across Kamperholm bridge which became so inundated with fleeing men that it collapsed under their weight. Many drowned as a result. Du Croy and the Russian guard regiments provided a valiant resistance but were forced to surrender. A small holdout of Russians continued to fight until nightfall at which point friendly fire was inflicting unnecessary casualties on the exhausted Swedes. By the morning, the battle was over.

More Russian Banners Captured at Narva 

The Swedes counted over 600 dead. The Russians had anywhere between 8,000 to 12,000. The number that surrendered was even higher forcing the Swedes to set the majority free and allow them to return to Russia with and without arms. Leading commanders were taken prisoner for ransom or future exchanges. All of Peter's artillery was claimed as war booty forcing the tsar to famously confiscate church bells in an effort to cast new cannon. A near spiritual success was the capture of a large number of Russian flags and standards.[5] Among the victors, General Magnus Stenbock was quick to praise his colleague and king: “It is God’s work alone, but if there is anything human in it, it is the firm, immovable resolution of His Majesty and the ripe dispositions of General Rehnskjold.”[6] For all his losses, Tsar Peter remained optimistic and redoubled his efforts to modernize his forces: “When we had that misfortune, or putting it better great fortune, compulsion then drove away sloth, and forced us to labor day and night."[7] It was a process that paid dividends on a summer day in the Ukraine some nine years later.


Thanks for Reading,



Mike Glaeser,


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[1] Michael Glaeser is an early modern historian specializing in the Great Northern War and the reign of Charles XII of Sweden. He is published in The Great Northern War Compendium and taught history at the University of New Hampshire. He is also an avid reenactor and wargamer. He completed his graduate work at the University of Sheffield, England.
[2] Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, 150.
[3] Augustus "the Strong" was both the Elector of Saxony, King of Poland, and Duke of Lithuania.
[4] Massie, Peter the Great, 333.
[5] A vast majority of these captured flags still reside in the Army Museum in Stockholm, and are on display.
[6] Massie, Peter the Great, 337.
[7] Rothstein, Peter the Great and Marlborough, 35.

Spotlight on: Battle of Fraustadt, 1706

Prayer after the battle of Fraustadt: Gustav Cederströrm

Dear Reader,

On February 13th 1706, in the middle of the Great Northern War, general Carl Gustaf Rehnskiöld of the Swedish army faced a difficult situation. The Saxon army under general Johann von Schulenburg outnumbered Rehnskiölds' force by slightly over two to one (9,500 to 20,000). The Saxons and Russians under Schulenburg had been following Rehnskiöld, with the hopes of destroying his much smaller army.  Rehnskiölds' situation was only worsened by the fact that King Augustus the Strong of Poland (another member of the anti-Swedish coalition) was approaching with an additional 8,000 horsemen. If Schulenburg and Augustus completed a junction, the force against Rehnskiold would increase to three to one.

North of the town of Fraustadt, (present day Wschowa) the Saxo-Russian force established a defensive position of roughly two miles in length, between the villages of Röhrsdorf  (present Osowa Sein) and Geyersdorf (present Debowa Leka). The defensive positions were littered with cannons and Chevaux de frise, spikes designed to impale horses.

Chevaux de frise

Schulenburg deployed his army in a traditional Kabinettskriege pattern: the infantry in the center, with the cavalry on the wings, and Rehnskiöld followed suit. Schulenburg placed his Russian allies on the left flank of his infantry line, and supposedly ordered them to turn their uniforms inside out to disguise the fact that they were Russian. (The inside of the Russian coat was red, like the outside of the Saxon coat.) Schulenburg was dubious about the value of his Russian allies, based on their poor performance at the debacle of Narva in 1700.

At the outset of the battle, the Saxons and Russians had most of the traditional military advantages. They had a larger army, much more artillery (the Swedes didn't have any cannons at this battle) , the flanks of their infantry line were protected by cavalry, villages, and a marsh, and they had strong fortifications in the front of their army.

Despite all of these disadvantages, Rehnskiöld ordered the Swedes to attack. The Swedes possessed one advantage that the other forces of the Great Northern War did not: superior morale. The Swedes would attack against incredible odds again and again during the Great Northern War. Rehnskiöld also knew that he had great superiority in cavalry, and as we has seen before, if cavalry could break into enemy lines, they would cause panic and massive casualties.

Before we continue, here is a map of the battle of Fraustadt, drawn by yours truly. Do not copy this map for anything except personal use.

Map by author 2/13/2013

My map is based on contemporary maps and shows the course of the battle.  Oskar Sjöstrom provides a more accurate map of the deployment, in his book, Fraustadt 1706 - ett fält färgat rött ("Fraustadt 1706- a field colored red".) Here is his map.

Map by Oskar Sjöstrom (2008)

Rehnskiöld knew that to frontally attack Chevaux de frise meant suicide for his horsemen, so he sent them around the enemies' flank. On the right flank, the cavalry under Krassow and Rehnskiöld would sweep around the left flank of the Saxon and Russian army. On the Swedish left flank, the cavalry under Hummerhielm would by pass by the Chevaux de frise by moving through a frozen swamp in front of the Saxon right flank. The result of this flanking movement can be seen on my map, above.

The Swedish cavalry moved to envelope the Saxon flanks, while the Swedish infantry moved against the centre of the of the Saxon and Russian forces, preventing them from assisting the cavalry. The Saxon cavalry did not attempt to countercharge the Swedes during the flanking movement, and the result was disasterous for the Saxons.

Both Saxon cavalry wings broke under the onslaught, and the Swedish cavalry, showing considerable restraint, moved to attack the rear of the Saxon and Russian infantry.  This can be seen on my map. Once the Swedish horsemen were in among the enemy infantry, the battle was over, and the Saxon and Russian army ceased to exist. The Swedes lost around 1,500 men killed and wounded, while the Saxons and Russian lost around 15,000 killed, wounded and captured.

This double envelopment has often been compared to Hannibal's miraculous victory at Cannae, and the Swedish army was grateful for its incredible victory.  The regimental chaplains led the men in prayer, to thank God for the victory.  This scene was immortalized by the great Swedish painter, Gustaf Cederström, in the painting at the beginning of this post. 

For further information, check out Oskar Sjöstrom's book Fraustadt 1706 - ett fält färgat rött. Even for non-Swedish readers, the book has many helpful maps and diagrams.

Thanks for reading,

Alex