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| British Reenactors engaged in a mock fire-fight |
Dear Reader,
Today, we are going to examine a complex issue, which often lacks clear supporting data. The question before us is: how often did soldiers run out of ammunition on the battlefields of the Kabinettskriege era? Our first reaction might be: not very frequently. When I visited Fort Ticonderoga in the summer of 2010 (before the current administration, in other words), a member of the interpretive staff there intimated to me (and the entire tour group with me) that the average experience of eighteenth-century combat was similar to going to the battlefield, "with one clip in your AR-15, and only firing 15 rounds out of a 30-round magazine." Being rather pretentious and annoying, even in those early days, I approached this interpreter to talk about the experience of the Prussian army in Europe. A friendly conversation developed, and I spent the rest of afternoon collecting materials to build gabions offsite with this interpreter. It was one of the strangest and most surreal experiences of my life to date.
How might we go about answering this question of ammunition usage on eighteenth-century battlefields? Once again, numerous historians have addressed firepower in an eighteenth-century context. I am most familiar with the works of Christopher Duffy, David Blackmore, David Chandler, Stephan Brumwell, Matthew H. Spring, Jeremy Black, and John Lynn. These historians have addresses the mechanics of eighteenth-century combat in more detail than I will be able to in this post. I would also to thank Dr. Tomasz Karpinski for comments on this post. With that said: what do these historians and period sources tell us about ammunition expenditure?
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| Reenactors portray the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry at Germantown |
What can non-data-driven sources, tell us about the frequency of running out of ammunition? We must also carefully interrogate these sources: as running out of ammunition was often used by eighteenth-century soldiers as an excuse for failure, or in order to clear their reputations of any poor conduct in battle. With that said:
eighteenth-century soldiers ran out of ammunition quite frequently. Ammunition shortages plagued many major armies on the battlefield.
In the era of Frederick II of Prussia, the Prussian army developed new strategies for the rapid consumption of ammunition. At the Battle of Mollwitz in 1741, the Prussian troops quickly fired away their 30 issued rounds, and attempted to gather ammunition from wounded men nearby. After the battle, the standard ammunition load in the Prussian army was increased from 30 to 60 rounds, but even this proved insufficient.[1]
Two independent sources affirm that the Prussian infantry used all (or almost all) of their ammunition while attack the Lobosch Hill at the Battle of Lobositz in 1756. An individual soldier reports that in the "heat and excitement, I fired away nearly all my sixty rounds."[2] The personal secretary of the Duke of Bevern, Herr Kistenmacher, who observed his master at the battle, recorded the following:
The greatest difficulties had to be overcome in order to dislodge the enemy. We were under a small arms fire which lasted for five hours at an unimaginable intensity. Our lads shot away all their cartridges, and those of their dead and wounded comrades. Now we had reached a crisis point, since the enemy continued to fire heavily on our men, who did not flinch and could now not lift a finger to fire themselves. In this sorry state of affairs the Duke of Bevern came galloping up, passing though heavy fire like an intrepid hero, and saw how the lads of his regiment, because of the impractical terrain, were not in close order. Rather, they had to fight in small groups on the hillside, and did not reply to the enemies heavy volleys. "Children," yelled the Duke, "Shoot for God's sake, shoot and advance!" "Oh, dear father," the lads replied, "What shall we do?" We have no more powder, and are being shot dead without reply!" "What?" cried the Duke, "Don't you have bayonets? Go and kill the dogs!"[3]
The resulting Prussian charge decided the battle. Despite the obvious melodrama in Kirstenmacher's telling: he clearly indicates the feeling of helplessness which running out of ammunition could impart to soldiers. It is quite possible that these soldiers fired away 90 cartridges, rather than 60, as sources describe taking 30 rounds from unengaged units.[4] At the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, both sides replenished their rounds from ammunition carts, and it appears that some Prussian infantry may have fired over 180 rounds.[5] During the Battle of Zorndorf in 1759, many Prussians were wounded by the buckshot ammunition that the Russian infantry employed at that battle. At the Battle of Hochkirch in 1758, both the Prussian and Austrian infantry appear to have run short of ammunition.[6] In the Prussian case, some soldiers fired over 120 rounds.[7]
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| The fighting in Hochkirch, as imagined by 19th-century artist Karl Roechling |
At the Battle of Torgau in 1760, multiple sources in the Austrian Army reported that the primary reason for failure was a lack of infantry and artillery ammunition. Franz Moritz von Lacy reported"Finally, everyone was agreed that there was no more ammunition for either the artillery or the infantry [by the end of the battle.]"[8] Austrian veteran Jacob Cogniazzo reported that in this case, a previously useful innovation, filling drums with ammunition and employing drummers as ammunition runners, had failed the Austrians:
"...the lack of ammunition, a defect which should never be found in a purposeful institution, and is always a sign of irresponsibility. But we had experienced it before, particularly at the Battle of Breslau. Sufficient ammunition was not brought forward, by way of the drummers and their drums, because they had to haul the ammunition from a very great distance, losing a great deal of time. This put the loading troops at a great disadvantage."[9]
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| Hessian troops loading in winter |
When fighting in Continental Europe, the British often relied on firepower. A Dutch officer observed that at the Battle of Fontenoy, the British fired all their cartridges, or perhaps between 20-36 per man.[10] During the Seven Years' War, British infantry began to carry 30 and 60 rounds per man, rather the regulation 24. Yet more ammunition was ready-made in specialized wagons following the army.[11] In the Seven Years' War in North America, British ammunition allocation seems to have fluctuated between 36 and 70 cartridges per man. Despite the fluctuation, three extra flints appears to have been the standard issue.[12] In July of 1759, Townshend's Brigade received the following order:
"The light infantry of the army are to have their bayonets, as the want of ammunition may sometimes be supplied with that weapon: and, beacause no man should leave his post, under pretence that all his cartridges are fired, in most attacks by night, it must be remember, that bayonets are preferable to fire."[13]
The emphasis is present in the original. It is intriguing that the order commands to troops to stay at their posts when out of ammunition. This idea- that soldiers with empty cartridge pouches could return to the rear, also confronted the American Army at the Battle of Germantown in 1777.
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| British Regulars and Local Allies on a Raid in Upstate New York |
In the American War of Independence, there are also numerous examples of soldiers running short on ammunition. Despite the British Army's
clear preference for aggressive moment, British soldier's found themselves drawn into heavy firefights. One of the clearest examples of replenishing ammunition from fellow soldiers comes from Sjt. Thomas Sullivan of the 49th Regiment of Foot. During the Forage War in early 1777, Sullivan reports that during a skirmish, "Major Dilkes with [100 grenadiers] engaged them with two field pieces, and kept a continual fire up, until they expended all their ammunition at a rate of 60 rounds per man. Then they retreated to the second party of Grenadiers from whom they got more ammunition."[14]
At the Battle of Freeman's Farm, it is possible that the British Infantry regiments were able to access 100 rounds. This was the ammunition allotment set as a standard for the army by Guy Carleton in April of 1777. "...every soldier in the army should always be provided with 100 cartridges, of which the man should have 30 in his cartridge pouch and the other 70 should be well taken care of and conveyed by the company[.]"[15] Sargeant Roger Lamb of the 23rd Regiment of Foot recalled replenishing his cartridge pouch from the body of a slain member of the Brigade of Guards at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.[16]
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| Reenactors representing the 3rd New Jersey, "Grays" prepare to fire |
Continental Army soldiers, too, reported a heavy expenditure of ammunition. During the winter of 1775-1776, the American army outside of Boston, could scarcely, "furnish four rounds a man."[17] At the Battle of Germantown, Lt. Colonel Adam Hubley reported that almost every unit but his own 10th Pennsylvania had, "expended forty rounds," after a firefight that lasted, "4 hours, without the least intermission."[18] At the same battle, General John Sullivan recalled that "my division with a Regiment of North Carolinians,... finding themselves unsupported by any other troops[,] Their Cartridges all Expended[,]... retired with as much precipitation as they had before advanced[.]"[19]
Private soldier Joseph Plumb Martin, also present at Germantown, also mentions this idea:
"Affiars went on well for some time. The enemy were retreating before us, until the first division that was engaged had expended their ammunition. Some of the men unadvisedly calling out that their ammunition was spent, the enemy were so near that they overheard them, when they first made a stand and then returned upon our people, who, for their want of ammunition and reinforcements, were obliged in their turn to retreat, which ultimately resulted in the rout of the whole army."[20]
Timothy Pickering, a young officer present with George Washington at the battle, recalled that, "General Sullivan's divisions were warmly engaged with the enemy... this fire was brisk and heavy... Washington said to me, 'I am afraid that General Sullivan is throwing away his ammunition; ride forward and tell him to preserve it.'"[21] The soldiers began to withdraw from the battle, "holding up their empty cartridge boxes to show why they ran."[22]
From these sources, it is clear that soldiers often used their entire ammunition issue
, whether kept in their cartridge pouches or around their person in other ways. One of the few estimates for ammunition usage by an entire army is Mauvillion's calculation of the Prussian army at in 1742: "According to my sums, the Prussians fired 650,000 rounds of musketry during their advance at Chotusitz."[23] When we divide that sum by the roughly 17,000 Prussian infantry at the battle, it seems that
the average man fired 38 rounds. With the amount of guesswork, rounding and estimation involved, I would be very cautious about using such a sum as evidence in anything but a casual conversation.
Eighteenth-century firefights,
particularly when conducted at longer ranges, could last for a long time. In both North America and Europe troops frequently ran short of ammunition, and worked feverishly to bring more cartridges into the fight. As armies recognized this issue, soldiers began to carry more and more ammunition and enjoyed close support by ammunition wagons and carts. Firepower increasingly played a dominant role on Kabinettskriege-era battlefields.
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| Prussian and Russian Troops in a heavy firefight on the author's wargame table |
As wargamers and reenactors, do we represent these challenges? First, let us turn to wargamers. Some rulesets allow troops to only fire for a certain number of turns, but this usually represents smoke buildup, rather than ammunition expenditure. Rulesets such as
Final Argument of Kings often limit artillery ammunition but does not provide a clear maximum limit for infantry fire. Should rulesets include this level of detail? If a turn represents twenty minutes, and a soldier in firing constantly for twenty minutes might expend 20-30 cartridges, should troops only be able to fire for two turns unless more ammunition is obtained? How do you deal with these problems on the tabletop?
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| Photo Credit: Tom George Davison Photography |
Second: how does this problem affect reenactors? Sergeants sometimes function as ammunition carriers, providing extra ammunition to soldiers. It would be interesting to see musicians function in this role during extended firefights. At appropriate reenactments, it would be possible to simulate troops retiring when out of ammunition, first calling out that ammunition is dangerously low, and then retiring to the rear, preferring empty cartridge boxes to officers. In addition, many battle reenactments occur at very close range. Many of the longer duration firefights in the eighteenth century occurred at a range of 100-150 yards. [Imagine a football field between the firing lines.] At this range, firepower alone was often indecisive, leading to longer firefights. When at extremely close range (50 yards and below) firefights tended to have a very short duration.
How else might reenactors simulate this battlefield challenge?
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Thanks for Reading,
Alex Burns
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[1]Neue Militarische Zeitschrift, Vol 19, (1813) p. 21
[2] Ulrich Bräker,
Arme Mann, 150.
[3] Quoted in, Curt Jany, "Briefe Preussische Soldaten,"
Urkundliche Beiträge, Vol 1, 9-10.
[4] Ibid, 3.
[5] See Duffy,
Army of Frederick the Great, 274, for Prussian usage, and Duffy,
Prussia's Glory, 158, for a description of Austrian ammunition carts.
[6] Christopher Duffy,
By Force of Arms, 142, 144.
[7] Ernst von Barsewisch,
Meine Kriegs-Erliebnisse, 77.
[8] Quoted in Duffy,
By Force of Arms, 300.
[9] Jakob Cogniazzo,
Geständnisse eines Oesterreichischen Veterans, Vol 3, 298.
[10] Quoted in David Blackmore,
Destructive and Formidable, 136.
[11] William Todd,
The Journal of Corporal Todd, 141-143.
[12] John Knox,
An Historical Journal, Vol I, 160, Vol II, 188-190. 214, 238, 377.
[13] Ibid, Vol I, 314.
[14] Thomas Sullivan,
From Redcoat to Rebel, 102.
[15] Journal of General Riedesel,
Hessian Documents of the American Revolution, Microform, H.Z.974
[16]Roger Lamb,
An Original and Authentic Journal, 362.
[17] James Thatcher,
A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War, 35.
[18] Peter Force Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
[19] John Sullivan,
Letters and Papers of Major General John Sullivan, Vol 1, 546.
[20] Joseph Plumb Martin,
Private Yankee Doodle, 73.
[21] Timothy Pickering,
North American Review, Vol 23 (1826), 425-430.
[22] Quoted in Christopher Ward,
The War of the Revolution, 369.
[23]Translation by Christopher Duffy, quoted in
Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 209: Mauvillon,
Histoire de la derniere guerre de Boheme, Vol. 1, 100-101
