Showing posts with label reenactors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reenactors. Show all posts

Monday, November 27, 2017

Reenactors and Wargamers: Representing the British Army in the Mid-Eighteenth Century

A British Soldier on Campaign in North America
Dear Readers,


Today, I want to discuss the diffusion of historical knowledge and the representation of the past. Representations of the past are powerful. Many people will never open a footnoted history book, but they will attend a film, watch a reenactment, or play a game regarding the past. As a result, representations of the past, whether professional historians such as myself approve it or not, are often more powerful than scholarly books. This post examines the work of one historian, now almost a decade old, and surveys the impact of his ideas on representations of the British Army in the America War of Independence. After outlining the main areas of major research, the post will point to four ways that both mainstream reenactors and wargamers could improve their representations of the British Army on the battlefield during the "American War."

Since 1980, a number of brilliant scholars have redefined how historians understand the British Army in the eighteenth century. They include Don Hagist, Steve Rayner, Stephen Conway, Will Tatum, Stephen Brumwell, Mark Wishon, Todd Braisted, Mark Odintz, J. A. Houlding, Sylvia Frey, and Glenn Steppler. Their work, and the work of other historians not listed, has drastically changed how we view the British Army, and we are greatly in their debt. For the era of the Seven Years' War, Stephen Brumwell has radically altered the picture of how battlefield engagements occurred. However, today, we are going to specifically focus on the work of one historian: Matthew H. Spring. Spring's work deals with the British Army on the battlefield in the American War of Independence, and as a result, has perhaps the most import for representations of the British Army.

 Front Cover 
Over a decade ago, Spring authored his first book, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only. Like many revisionist histories, Spring's work has generated much controversy. However, it is possible to sum up 10 of Spring's contributions to understandings of the British Army in the American War of Independence:

1) In North America during the American War of Independence, British commanders often sought to maintain the operation and tactical offensive, frequently targeting rebel forces in flank attacks.[1]

2) In the course of their offensive actions, quickly-moving British troops often fought individual combats between regiments, in "fluid and ragged" battles, rather than deploying slowly with geometric precision.[2]

3) British soldiers were highly motivated by unit pride, a sense of their superior military abilities, and a distaste for rebellion. [3]

4) The British Army fought deployed in open order, in two ranks, rather than close order and three ranks.[4]

5) The British "made their initial advances into action at about a quick step, accelerated to a trot or a jog within small-arms range of the enemy, and then broke into a run for the bayonet charge." The British frequently cheered when close to the enemy, in order to weaken enemy morale.[5]

British Troops "Giving the Indian Halloo"

6) British junior officers directed the battle at the regimental level (see point 1) and exercised a large degree of initiative in North America that would have been impossible in Europe.[6]

7) The British Army relied on shock tactics, rather than pure firepower, to drive its opponents from the battlefield. As a result, the effectiveness of British firepower suffered. Technical problems, such as the low quality of flints, also decreased British fire effectiveness.[7]

8) Early in the war, the British reliance on bayonet charges proved useful, but by the later stages of the conflict, continental troops had become adept at standing firm in the face of British steel. [8]

9) British light infantry troops, though adept at seizing defensive positions and making use of individual cover, often employed the same bayonet tactics as the rest of the army. In open and light terrain, this was effective, but often more costly in heavily wooded areas.[9]

10) Despite winning the majority of battlefield engagements during the American War of Independence, British policymakers overestimated the politic results of battlefield victory and were eventually incapable of fully destroying the rebel field armies.[10]

"Progressive" Reenactors

Published in 2008, Spring's book has certainly made a stir in certain circles of the historically-conscious community. Many reenactors who portray the British Army, such as those in the "progressive" movement, attempt to demonstrate Spring's ideas to the public. However, the majority of British American War of Independence reenactors continue to portray an army which looks more like the eighteenth-century British army in Europe, or perhaps in The Patriot, than the historical reality of the British Army. With that in mind, I have the following four suggestions to British Army reenactors. Offering these suggestions does not in any way criticize the units currently not employing them. Historical knowledge, like medical knowledge, is frequently updated as new primary sources become available. Constantly being aware of new information is a key feature of any hobby or profession.

1)  Although this idea has already been adopted by many reenactors, British reenactors should commonly form at open order, in two ranks. This battlefield practice became so common that it was used for a royal review by Prince William in 1781. Although it might be a bit much to expect modern reenactors to run everywhere, British reenactors might attempt to portray troops slowly jogging into action, particularly when under fire by their Continental counterparts.

2) Rather than arranging troops by lines of battle, event organizers might consider pairing Continental and British units, and include interplay between individual units, rather than lines of battle as a whole. Especially in the later stages of battles, it may be easier to visualize combat between units, or groups of units, rather than battle lines as a whole.

3) Though often impressive to spectators, drums and colors often played a rather small role on the historical battlefield. As they fought these "fluid and ragged" battles, British soldiers usually did not worry about keeping drill-square precision. Though drummers accompanied troops into battle, keeping step, and especially calling cadence, should be a rather low priority for reenactors portraying troops in battlefield conditions.

4) Reenactors should avoid prolonged firefights at close range. British troops should quickly move into range of their opponents, and either push them back or be repulsed. Examining battles such as Guilford Courthouse, groups of British units approached the Continental third line, and were repulsed in waves, until finally breaking through. Rather than simply stopping at close range, the British attacks were mobile and fluid, as regiments advanced, fell back to regroup, and advanced again.

Perry Miniatures' plastic box set of British troops


Finally, we turn to wargamers. The recent plastic box set by Perry miniatures seems to show a familiarity with modern ideas on the British Army. Many individual wargmers understand the tactical realities of the American War of Independence. I recall a conversation with Lynn Langer at the 2012 Seven Years' War convention. We had both read With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, and were entirely convinced by the weight of Spring's evidence. We were disappointed to see that no rulesets at the convention captured the nature of the British Army in the AWI. To my knowledge, and I would love to be corrected, the only ruleset which allows the British to move and fight as Spring describes is Loose Files and American Scramble by Andy Callan. You can find a PDF here. This four-page ruleset, published in the 1980s by Wargames Illustrated, captured many of the conflict's historical realities, and was published many years before With Zeal and With Bayonets Only. While there are a large number of widely used rulesets, few allow for tactical developments like Spring describes. With that in mind, here are four suggestions for AWI wargame rulesets.

1) British troops should be able to move quickly. In the house-modified version of Dean West's Final Argument of Kings, that I use, British movement is increased to 14 inches when in line formation.

2) Because of their "loose files and America scramble" (a quote from David Dundas) British troops should take some sort of organizational check each turn in order to avoid falling into disorder. Period sources frequently describe British troops advancing at great speed, "in tolerable order." Speed comes at a price. This organizational check should be easy to pass when not in combat, but become more difficult as the game progresses.

3) British troops should be equal to or at a slight disadvantage to their opponents in terms of firepower. Particularly in the late war, Continental troops were capable of delivering fire which stunned British forces.

4) British troops frequently employed terrain to their advantage when under fire, and fought in open order. It should be slightly more difficult to hit British troops than their close-order Hessian and American counterparts. Some wargamers may feel more comfortable only giving this bonus to troops being targeted by artillery, and not small arms. It appears that British troops used cover in many combat situations, when not advancing with the bayonet.

As ever, I appreciate my readership's ideas and opinions. How do you think that we can better portray British soldiers on the battlefield as reenactors and wargamers? How important are realistic representations of the past to you?

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:


Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns
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[1] Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 74-75.
[2] Ibid, 102.
[3] Ibid, 137.
[4] Ibid, 139-143.
[5] Ibid, 161.
[6] Ibid, 190.
[7] Ibid, 215.
[8] Ibid, 244.
[9] Ibid, 262.
[10] Ibid, 281.


Thursday, June 8, 2017

What Percentage of Soldiers were Killed and Wounded in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Battles?

British reenactors attacked by continental dragoons


Dear Reader,

I thought I would follow up my previous post with a corollary: what percentage of soldiers were killed and wounded in eighteenth-century battles? Being an eighteenth-century soldier was a risky business, and not just from death on the battlefield. More soldiers perished from disease and inclement conditions than died from enemy fire on the battlefield. Indeed, this is a common feature of most pre-twentieth century wars, and Andrew Bamford has just published an excellent book on the subject in the Napoleonic era, entitled Sickness Suffering and the Sword: The British Regiment on Campaign 1808-1815.  Between 1740 and 1783, how many soldiers became casualties on the battlefield?

I hope this preliminary post will be interesting for any military history studying the collection of casualty data for this era. However, as with the previous post, I produce this mainly for reenactors and wargames, in a hope that their displays and simulations of eighteenth-century combat might be as accurate as possible. Like many wargamers and reenactors, I imagine, I have been party to events and scenarios where one side takes more than 50% casualties on a regular basis. How accurate are these representations? As in the previous post, I will aggregate data from a large number of battles in the era, and present the data in a number of different arrangements. In assembling this data, I examined 69 battles across the mid-eighteenth century.

It should also be noted: Christopher Duffy has already presented much of the data for the European Seven Years' War in two books: his second edition of The Army of Frederick the Great, and By Force of Arms: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years' War, Vol II.  In the case of the European Seven Years' War, I am truly standing on the shoulders of a scholarly giant. In terms of the statistics, I have included as losses men who were killed, wounded, missing, and captured on the battlefield. Large surrenders like Yorktown, Bennington, or Maxen only include soldiers who were captured in the course of the fighting, not in surrenders after the battle.

And a final note: these were all real men, with lives and hopes. To counteract the faceless nature of these statistics, read this letter from Frantz Reiß:

"all the while I stood in such danger that I cannot thank God enough for my health. In the very first cannon shots {my friend} Krumpholtz took a cannon ball through his head and the half of it was blown away, he was standing just beside me, and the brains and skull of Krumpholtz sprayed into my face and the gun was blown to pieces from my shoulder, but I, praise God, was uninjured. Now, dear wife, I cannot possibly describe what happened, for the shooting on both sides was so great, that no-one could hear a word of what anyone was saying, and we didn’t see and hear just a thousand bullets, but many thousands.  But as we got into the afternoon, the enemy took flight and God gave us the victory. And as we came forward into the field, we saw men lying, not just one, but 3 or 4 lying on top of each other, some dead with their heads gone, others short of both legs, or their arms missing, in short, it was a horrifying sight. Now, dear child, just think of how we must have felt, we who had been led meekly to the slaughterhouse without the faintest inkling of what was to come.”[1]

Total Average: 
Average percentage of losses suffered in combat, Europe and North America, 1740-1783:
(Battle sample size: 69) 14.552% 

Average by War 
War of Austrian Succession 
(Battle sample size: 9) 15.811%

Seven Years' War in Europe and North America
(Battle sample size: 33) 15.403%

American War of Independence
(Battle sample size: 27) 13.093%

La Pegna's depiction of the attack at Hochkirch
Average by Theater of the Seven Years' War
War in Central Europe (Brandenburg, East Prussia, Saxony, and Silesia)
(Battle sample size: 18) 20.522%

War in Western Germany (Hessen and Hanover)
(Battle sample size: 10) 9.11% 

War in North America (Canada and the Ohio Country)
(Battle sample size: 5) 19.4%


La Pegna depiction of Finck Surrendering at Maxen


Average percentage of loss by Nation/Army in the Seven Years' War (Highest to Lowest)
British(Outside Europe): 24.56%
Prussians: 22.8%
Russians:  21.92%
Austrians: 18.53%
French (Outside Europe): 14.4%
French (in Europe): 10.6%
Allies(British/Hessians/Hanoverians/et al in Europe): 7.58%

Don Troiani's Reimagining of Oriskany 


Average Loss by Armies in the American War of Independence (Highest to Lowest):
Americans and their allies: 16.80%
British and their allies: 12.09%



Notable Battles: 
Rossbach: Prussians 2.4% Franco-Imperials 24.1% : Average 13.3%
Zorndorf: Prussians 35.5% Russians 42.7% (highest  loss percentage of the SYW): Average 39.1%
Oriskany: Americans 55.4% (highest loss percentage in 18th century) British 18.6%: Average 37.0%
Eutaw Springs: Americans 26.3% British 44.1% : Average 35.2%

A Few Thoughts: 

The above data certainly surprised me in several areas. First of all, engagements like Zorndorf or Oriskany (which was much smaller but with a comparable percentage lost) did occur, but they were the exception, rather than the rule. On average, about 14.5% of men became casualties, and includes killed, wounded, missing, and captured on the battlefield. I was shocked by the relatively low casualties on the western front of the Seven Years' War in Europe and by the relatively high casualties suffered by the Americans in contrast to the British during the American War of Independence. I should say, the largest British losses in terms of percentage come near the end of the war, at places like Cowpens, Guilford Court House, Hobkirk's Hill, and Eutaw Springs. Finally, looking at the data for the Seven Years' War and American War of Independence, it does not appear as though a percentage of soldiers lost has any direct bearing on the outcome of the war. 

So, losing 40 men in a reenactment of 100 is possible, but not encouraged. Often, these losses were concentrated in a small number of units, such as the Royal Highland Regiment at Carillon, Regiment von Itzenplitz at Hochkirch, or the 1st Maryland Regiment at Long Island. So, while having a unit be destroyed or beaten up rather badly is accurate, taking above 40% losses for an army should not be. Likewise, wargamers should be able to quickly play battles in which armies are broken as a result of losses, but not destroyed by enemy fire.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:


Thanks for Reading,




Alex Burns 

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[1]Hans Bleckwenn, eds. Preussiche Soldatenbriefe Mit Einer Einführung Von Hans Bleckwenn, (Onsnabruck, 1982) 29.



Wednesday, June 7, 2017

How Long did Battles Last in the Mid-Eighteenth Century?

A group of reenactors led by David Moore, portraying a King's Royal Regiment of New York officer
Dear Reader,

Again, today we are going to examine an issue which sprang the to the forefront of my mind as a result of conversations which occurred (at the above reenactment) over the weekend. Namely: how long did eighteenth-century battles last? As we were standing in formation after the end of the Saturday battle at Fort Niagara, David Moore pulled out his pocket-watch and announced that from exiting the fort, to returning behind the curtain wall,  the battle lasted almost exactly 15 minutes. The other reenactors around me were somewhat astounded, as it felt as though we had been firing for much longer, and had shot through almost thirty cartridges in that time. How long did battles last in the mid-eighteenth century? Through examining the length of battles in Europe and North America between 1740 and 1789, I hope to come to some sort of conclusion regarding this matter.

In addition to writing something of historical interest for scholars and the public, I hope that this post could be useful for reenactors planning the length of their mock battles, and wargame designers who are attempting to fit the appropriate amount of action into a wargame turn. Wherever possible, I counted from when the two armies began to exchange small arms fire to the end of the combat.

Before presenting the data, I hope to closely define what is meant by "battles" "combats" and "engagements." By battle, I am referring to fighting which included more than 15,000 men engaged. By combat, I mean anything smaller than 15,000 total men engaged. By engagement, I mean a distinct fight within a battle between two opposing units, not protracted skirmishing. In example, Lobositz was a battle, with 60,000+ men engaged. White Plains was a combat with around 10,000 men engaged. The fight between Ephraim William's detachment and Baron de Dieskau's men before the Combat of Lake George was an engagement.

Finck Negotiates at Maxen


Results divided by the number of men engaged: 

Battles: (armies ranging from c. 150,000 to 16,000 men engaged, sample size: 34)
Average: 4.5 hours

Combats: (armies ranging from 15,000 to 1,300 men engaged, sample size: 18)
Average: 2 hours 45 minutes

Engagements: (individual unit combats ranging from 5,000 to 300 men engaged, sample size 10)
Average: 15-20 minutes

Germantown by Xavier della Gatta, 1782


Results Divided by War/Theatre (engagements excluded): 

Seven Years' War in Europe (sample size 30): 
Average: 4 hours and 15 minutes

Seven Years' War in North America (sample size 5): 
Average: 3 hours, 30 minutes

American War of Independence (sample size 16): 
Average: 3 hours, 20 minutes

Reenactors from the King's Regiment at Fort Niagara


Results Divided by Terrain in which Battle was Fought (engagements excluded):

Fought predominantly in Rough Terrain (woods, marsh, developed areas) (sample size 11):
Average: 5 hours 45 minutes

Fought predominantly in Open Terrain (sample size 40):
Average: 3 hours and 25 minutes

Notable Outliers: 

Rossbach (1757): 63,000~ men engaged, around 1 hour of combat.
Plains of Abraham (1759): 7,800~ men engaged, 30 minutes to an hour.
Torgau (1760) 105,000~ men engaged, around 7 hours of combat.
Oriskany (1777): 1,300~ men engaged, around 6 hours of combat.


A couple of thoughts:

The most pertinent factor to the length of battles in the mid-eighteenth century seems to be the terrain in which the battle was fought, rather than the continent or number of men engaged. Battles occurring in rough terrain, or slow attacks on developed areas seem to have bogged down, slowing the resolution of combat.

Combats between individual groups of infantry seem to last about 15-20 minutes in this era. For example, in the Battle of Liegnitz, there were 6 distinct engagements between groups of Austrian and Prussian infantry, in a battle lasting around two hours.[1] Considering the nature of the tactics Matthew Spring describes, it is possible that combat in the American War of Independence was resolved in an even shorter timetable.  Thus, we are left with battles that could last 5 hours or more, but relatively short combats of infantry occurring within those battles.


Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


P.S. I would be happy to share the collated datasets from which I drew the above information.


[1] Großer Generalstab, Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges, Vol 4, 92-108.