Primary Source: Hessian Description of the Battle of Long Island

Hessian Flanquers 

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to continue examining primary sources related to the Hessians in the American War of Independence. This source is from an anonymous Hessian soldier, likely a staff officer, who accompanied the Hessian troops to Long Island in 1776. I have taken excerpts of this account, which address the Hessian role in the Battle of Long Island, on August 27th, 1776. This source, like the previous one, comes from the large microfilm collection, Hessian Documents of the American Revolution. 

August 22nd...

...the signal for landing was given, and as not a single one of the enemy appeared, it was safely carried out without firing a shot. As soon as the boats had landed their men, they returned to the big ships and fetched away the others, who were thus landed in four journeys. Our Commander-in-Chief, General Howe, immediately led the first English troops which were landed inland in the direction of Gravesend, which he found to be quite deserted by the inhabitants, meeting none of the enemy. The other battalions, as soon as they had formed up, followed, and remained before the said village till towards midday. General Clinton, with a part of the English troops, including their Grenadiers, struck off to the left of the landing-place, occupied the heights of a wooded range of hills running down the whole length of the islands in the middle, and thus covered our left flank in the position assigned to it. General Howe made Gravesend his headquarters and retained the English Guards for its protection. General Cornwallis with the Scotch Highlanders and their light infantry, together with Colonel Donop and his Brigade of Hessian Jaegers and Grenadiers marched three English miles further on to a village named Flatbush at the foot of the above-named hills and occupied the avenue there. Another English corps, I do not know under whose orders, marched somewhat further forward, occupied the road to the ferry through the mountains and thereby covered our left flank. All this took place in the greatest stillness and without hearing a shot. But the next day the little war began; their riflemen and militia, (I have not seen anything yet of the regulars) began to harass our outposts without ceasing day and night; their mode of action is like the Pandours, they shoot from an unusual distance, for which reason our few wounded are only slightly so. For all that, the Hessian Jaegers, who have turned out right well, gave a good account of themselves; it was reckoned that they had caused a loss of 50 men, partly killed and partly wounded, to the enemy, and they had only one man killed a few slightly wounded. This harassing continued till the 26th.

August 26th...

We were much vexed that we could do nothing in retaliation for all these insults from such a despicable people, till at last the whole army, with the exemption of Colonel v. Lossberg, who commanded General Stirn's above-mentioned Brigade consisting of the four Regiments, which had remained on Staten Island, had been brought over here during the days spent here. Then on the evening of the 26th General Cornwallis marched with all the English Grenadiers and Light Infantry to the right and made the attack next day on the right had side: the Scotch Highlanders who were with us, marched to the left to General Clinton's and commenced the attack even before day-break. Towards six o'clock on the morning of

August 27th

the Hessian Grenadiers received orders to set out and advance upon Flatbush; Linsing took up its position on the right hand side of the village, Slock the left-hand side, and Minnigerode in the village street, in order to attack from that position. But as the attacks from the right and left-wings were already very furious and the Hessian Jaegers together with the Grenadiers, skirmishers, and scouts covered the battalions,  they [the battalions] had nothing to do, but found everything forsaken. Had the rebels wished to fight as honest soldiers, they would have given us a great deal of trouble, for now we discovered their position and retrenchments, which we could not reconnoiter before, because everything had been concealed in the wood. The Minnigerode Battalion came across a battery protected by three double barriers of felled trees, which would have cost a frightful amount of bloodshed to have taken, but which was deserted, so they had nothing further to do than clear away the barriers in order to bring the guns through. We then gained the heights behind the wood without any difficulty. The rebels, being an irregular horde, were now like a scattered herd of cattle, singly and in troops, but with no closed battalions; we now began to attack them in the rear and drove them towards our regiments in camp, who consequently took more of them prisoners than we did. Their whole loss is computed to amount to 2,500 men, including as prisoner, Lord Sterling, one of their most distinguished Generals. The loss on our side was 250 men, including one Hessian killed and 30 wounded, most slightly so. If they trophies take I know nothing further than that one was a flag, red in colour and bearing the device "Liberty"; this was captured by the Rall Regiment in camp, two guns and one howitzer all taken by English. The rebels, computed to number 14,000 men on the island on this day, withdrew after battle into a very finely fortified camp on the northern coast of the island opposite New York, and we pitched ours on the aforementioned heights in front of the wood.


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Alex Burns

How Often did Regular Troops Fight as "Skirmishers" in the Mid-Eighteenth Century?

Hessian Flanquers in North America

Dear Reader,


When thinking about skirmishers, those alive to a sense of the past often locate their development in the Napoleonic era, with the French tirailleurs, and their quick emulation by all of the states of Europe. In fact, it appears that a form of skirmisher, often called "flanquers", "flanqueur," or sometimes "Blänkerer" by French and German speakers, or Flankers, by the English speakers, developed during the eighteenth century. This is often controversial, as many military history enthusiasts believe that eighteenth-century soldiers were not trustworthy enough to fight in this fashion and that they would desert if fighting in this style. It is important to note: when using the term, "skirmishers" in this post, I am not referring to dedicated light infantry or ranger units, but the use of integrated skirmishers by regiments of infantry and cavalry. While these soldiers were not universally employed, it is possible to locate them before the French Revolution.

Very few historians have discussed this phenomenon previously. Notably, Jonathan Abel discusses it in his excellent book, Guibert: Father of Napoleon's Grand Army.  I published an article on the subject in the Spring 2014 issue Journal of the Seven Years' War Association. [1] Other authors have discussed light infantry troops in the eighteenth century in some detail, such as Brent Nosworhty, Matthew Spring, Christopher Duffy, and Hugh Boscawen. Most of these authors focus on dedicated light infantry, such as the light infantry battalions of the American War of Independence, Jägers or Frei-Infanterie in the service of Frederick the Great, or French Chasseurs such as the Chasseurs de Fischer.

We will not be focusing on dedicated light infantry, which is a separate topic

We need to carefully interrogate the usage of the term "flankers" as at times, this term is used to refer to bodies of cavalry or infantry drawn off to guard the flanks of a marching army, not necessarily integrated skirmishers. In his Principles of Military Movement, David Dundas mentions the idea of "skirmishing with the flankers" as a part of the normal process of engaging "for a small Corps."[2] Discussing European innovations, he indicates, "[European Armies] form separate corps, but still preserve the greatest order. Their skirmishers and dispersed men are loose, detached, and numerous... but a firm reserve always remains to rally upon."[3] Considering that Dundas wrote his book in 1788, we cannot attribute his observations to the French Revolutionary era, but rather the 1780s and earlier.

 We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century. A Hungarian officer reported that at the Battle of Mollwitz, "Our infantry had advanced a platoon of men in front of each battalion, to attack the enemy first, and be supported by us, yet this was not observed, and robbed us of the only means of striking such as well-trained enemy."[4] There are other examples of such detached platoons, but it is not clear if these men were operating in loose order.[5]

Cavalry, in particular units like Hussars, took on an important role in the eighteenth-century skirmishing. These units could fight alongside other cavalry in the line of battle, but would often detach small numbers of men (again, usually called Flanquer or Blänkerer), to skirmish. At the Battle of Rocoux during the War of Austrian Succession, Sampson Staniforth recalled that, "the Queen of Hungary's light-horse and theirs skirmished between us [and the French.]"[6]

A Member of Luckner's Hussars

In a letter describing the battle of Bergen, fought on April 13th, 1759, Ferdinand of Brunswick described the early stages of the action. Ferdinand states that, "I ordered our Grenadiers and Jägers to amuse the enemy by detached platoons, so that our columns would have time to arrive."[7] In describing the opening of the Battle of Minden, he reported, "infantry platoons drove in the enemy pickets."[8] The French also used this tactic: " Mr. [Duc] de Broglie pushed forward infantry platoons in front of his first line and drove the grand picquets of the enemy."[9] Brent Nosworthy describes the French practice of using skirmishers briefly in Anatomy of Victory.[10] By pointing to French skirmishers in the 1720s and 1730s, Nosworthy does an excellent job of showing that skirmishers never fell into disuse, they were simply less common.[11]

A French Officer Takes Aim 

The idea that the French employed skirmishers in the Seven Years' War is confirmed by a letter from  Victor-Francois, Duc de Broglie. In this letter, Broglie confirms that in the winter of 1759-1760 French infantry regiments trained 50 men per battalion to operate as skirmishers.[12] The 1764 Ordonnance du Roi, which was likely written by de Broglie, the French Infantry are instructed to use skirmishers:

"Nothing should prevent you, when on the advance or retreat, from detaching a half-section, and scattering these volonteers in front of the battlion, to make a feu de billebaude, and then retreat through the intervals behind the battalion when the enemy is very close."[13]

In addition to this adoption after the war, there is evidence to suggest that the French may have begun using integrated line skirmishers, particularly towards the end of the Seven Years' War, in small encounters. At the attempt on Lippstadt, on July 1st, 1759, the Comte de Melfort described his use of skirmishers in a small confrontation with Hanoverian troops.

The Comte de Melfort's map of Lippstadt

Melfort also drew a map of the action, shown in above. In the battle, the French used skirmishers in an attempt to clear the way for an attack. In his letter, Melfort uses the term, Tirailleurs: the traditional French term for skirmishers which we commonly associate with the French Revolutionary Wars. A French dictionary from 1752 defines a "Tirailleur" as, "one who skirmishes."[14] Melfort's choice of this term, and the forces present at the battle possibly indicates that he is referring to line infantry skirmishers, not Chasseurs or Volontaires Thus, according to the letter and map of the Comte de Melfort, both the French and the Hanoverians used skirmishers in this conflict.[15] It seems that in the case of the western front of the Seven Years' War, skirmishers were at the very least employed by the French, and that the Hessians encountered and emulated this practice in the American War of Independence.

It is unclear whether Prussian line infantry regiments utilized flanquers in the Seven Years' War. Rather, it seems that the Prussian Infantry may have used Heckenfeuer, what Christopher Duffy has called a type of "controlled skirmishing". In this process, two files advanced ahead of the regimental body, formed in two ranks, fired, and then retired to the main body while reloading. This process enabled the battalion to keep up a small but consistent rate of fire, while retaining a reserve of loaded muskets.[16] The reenactors of Infanterie Regiment von Kalnein (IR4) displayed this tactic in a video a few years ago. On March 3rd 1777 (or 1778, the source is unclear), the Prussian Cabinet ordered 10 men per infantry company to be drilled as skirmishers in order to serve in patrols and detachments.[17]

The Prussians may have employed skirmishers, as Frederick II of Prussia gave detailed instructions for that "officer who is... to cover an army or regiment whilst they are deploying... must send out flankers towards the enemy, who, by keeping up a constant firing, will endeavor to disperse them[.]"[18] Based on the context, it is very likely that this instruction is meant specifically for cavalry officers.  Prussian cavalry flanquers were noted both by contemporary authors and subsequent historians.[19] It seems at that times, cavalry flanquers were used to screen attacking infantry.[20]

In the western hemisphere, there is some evidence to suggest that the British used skirmishers to prepare the way for an assault on the Castillo de Immaculate Concepcion in Nicaragua, on July 26th 1762.[21] A soldier of the Reichsarmee recalled that in 1762, "Our flanqueurs engaged the enemy in disorder, and were driven past their positions.[22] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, a Prussian Hussar officer, noted that one of the principal duties of the Prussian Jägers was to, "keep enemy flankers at a distance."[23] In September of 1778, Prussian observers reported encountering enemy "flanqueurs" on their way to a hilltop position.[24] In his Geschichte des Kriegskunst, published in 1800, Johann Gottfried von Hoyer asserted that the German "flanqueur", like the Volontair and the Jäger, had preceded the Tirailleur of the French Revolution.[25] After the Seven Years' War in Europe, another European army, the Hessians, brought flanquers to North America.

The Battle of Long Island in August of 1776 provides one of the clearest examples of the use of skirmishers in the eighteenth century. A number of reports from junior officers describe this practice, as does General Heister, the overall commander of the Hessian troops on Long Island:

"[T]he rest of the infantry perform honorable service, which is evident from the reports of more than a few regiments. The platoons of skirmishers peel out, at all times gives the best service; but the main battalions are always closed up arm in arm, following the skirmishers at a musket shot distance, unless the rough terrain forces them, at some times, to break ranks, which the reports show is happening rather often."[26]

Hessian Flanquers in the New York Campaign

This practice also occurred at the Battle of White Plains, and the Hessians even tried to deploy their skirmishers at the Battle of Trenton. At a later stage of the battle, the Regiment von Knyphausen was desperately attempting to ford a creek and escape from the Americans. 2nd Lt. Sobbe recalled that in order to by time, "Captain von Biesenrodt had thereupon called out, 'skirmishers to the fore.'"[27] It was then Sobbe's responsibility to: "run around the battalion in order to call out the skirmishers required, and to form them up."[28] Junoir officers such as Lieutenants also led these skirmishers forward. Another such officer present at Trenton, Second Lt. Werner von Ferry recalled that after Captain von Biesenrodt's order, he, ""Marched forward with the skirmishers up the hill."[29] He continues:

"The skirmishers were fired on from the woods by the militia, and immediately... Lord Sterling and his brigade,... had marched up on this same hill...because the enemy were pressing... in such great strength [he and the skirmishers] had been forced to retire to the regiment."[30]

In this anecdote, Von Ferry gives a deployment of skirmishers from beginning to end. These troops advanced forward, attempted to screen the regiment, and when the enemy strength became too great, they retired on their main body. Not content to let his junior officers tell the story, Captain von Biesenrodt also described his role in sending skirmishers forward at Trenton. Biesenrodt stated that, "The skirmishers that I sent forward had begun to fire, but very few of the muskets would go off, owing to the heavy snow and rain." A little further on, Biesenrodt indicated, "The enemy had pressed on in such great numbers," that the skirmishers had been forced to retire. [31]

Hessian Flanquers on the Move

In this second testimony, Biesenrodt gives insight into the thinking which led him to deploy skirmishers, and what his goal in doing so had been. As the von Knyphausen regiment was caught between the Americans and a marshy creek, he had been attempting to find a ford, by which the men of the regiment could escape. Thus, in his words, his, "intention had been cover the regiments crossing through the water with the skirmishers, and... to make with them also the rear guard." Sadly, Biesenrodt noted that his had been made, "impossible by the rapid approach of the overpowering enemy." From this testimony, it is apparent that the deployment of skirmishers could not only be used to cover the regiment during an attack, but also to cover a regiment during withdrawal.[32] So, having established that the Hessians did indeed use skirmishers as they might be understood in the Napoleonic era, we need to examine evidence from other armies in the American War of Independence.

In the American War of Independence,  the British used "skirmishers" in specific instances. Many authorities, such as Matthew H. Spring, assert that they did not, and we must grapple with this view. [33] Although the British army adapted to North America in other ways, there is some evidence to suggest that on a local level, the British Army used skirmishers. The 71st Regiment of Foot was issued standing orders which indicated:

If the Battalion is commanded to engage in a woods, thicket or country, one or more Sections will be detached in front of each Company with an Officer at the head of each who are immediately to occupy every Tree, Stump, Log, Bush, Rock, Cleft, Hedge, Wall, or in short, any kind of covering which can afford them tolerable shelter from the enemy...When the Signal for Action is given, the firings are immediately to commence on which Occasion every man shall take the most direct aim possible at the most Favourable Object in his front and without waiting for an Officer’s orders with respect to times continue to load, present, and fire with the utmost alacrity, deliberation and accuracy ‘til the firings are ordered to cease.[34]

 Officers commanding these sections of what we might call skirmishers were ordered to:

Officers commanding Sections to observe the same attention with regard to their particular place of their Sections in front of each Company and that their respective diversions shall not only be judiciously dispersed but that every Soldier shall hug their coverts in the most compleat manner possible for giving annoyance to the enemy and perfect security to themselves— If the troops are ordered to move in any direction they are to spring from tree to tree, Stump, Log, & etc with the utmost Agility & continue to fire, load and spring as they advance upon or retreat from the enemy. If the Point of War is beat, they are to rush upon the enemy with Charged Bayonets.[35]

In describing the Saratoga campaign, General John Burgoyne reported that a British column at Saratoga was preceded by, "scouts and flankers," but this could simply mean troops guarding the flankers of the column. Interestingly, he also states that, "the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained."[36] This language appears to share some similarities with the descriptions above.

In the orders to the Irish Establishment issued by General Townsend in 1772, light infantrymen are to, "advance a guard and detach flanking parties," when moving through rough terrain. This may simply be instructions for guarding the flanks of a column while on the march, but Townshend also instructs: "the flanking parties to march in front and the files to move at a distance of ten yards from each other, when either of these parties shall discover an enemy, they are not to run into the main body."[37]

An image of the Battle of Brandywine, which may picture skirmishers, drawn by a contemporary

The Continental Army also employed screening bodies of men, with orders to engage the enemy until forced to fall back on the main battle line. Captain Henry Lee reported that at the Battle of Brandywine:

"Three small detachments, commanded by lietenant colonels Parker, Heth, and Simms, of the Virginia line, were, early in the morning, spearately and advantageously posted by the brigadier... and captain Porterfield, with a company of infantry, preceded these parties with orders to deliver his fire as soon as he should meet the van of the enemy, and then to fall back."[38]

Thomas J. McGuire argues that skirmishers are represented in a rare contemporary battle image: A Battery of the Rebels opened on Brandywine Heights.This image, above,  shows groups of Americans firing on British positions in front of the main American battle line. [39]

I think it is clear from the evidence above, that the Hessians, in the American War of Independence, and the French army of the Seven Years' War utilized regular infantrymen as skirmishers in the eighteenth-century. Other European armies fighting in the Seven Years' War, may have adopted skirmishers which operated by detachment from formed bodies of infantry or cavalry. This development is not something only located for the first time in the Napoleonic era, but used throughout most eras of history.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1]"Flanquers und Pelotons: Hessian Links between the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence" Journal of the Seven Years' War Association, Spring 2014: (4-16)
[2] David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, Appendix page 82.
[3] Ibid, 13.
[4] Anon. Sammlung ungeduckter Nachrichten, Vol. 1, 35.
[5] Ibid, Vol. 4, 568.
[6] Thomas Jackson, Early Lives of the Methodist Preachers, 135-136.
[7] Westphalen, Geschichte Der Feldzüge Des Herzogs Ferdinand  Vol. 3  242.
[8] Ibid, 468.
[9] Ibid, 544.
[10] Brent Nosworthy, Anatomy of Victory, 338-340.
[11] Brent Nosworthy, With Musket, Cannon and Sword, 247.
[12] Jean Lambert Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siecle, 75-79.
[13] [Broglie], Ordonnance du roi, pour régler l'exercice de l'infanterie . Du 20 mars 1764, 106-107.
[14] Services historiques de l'armée de terre, A1 3518, pièce 40.
[15] Annibale Antonini, Dictionnaire françois, latin & italien, 520.
[16] Christopher Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 127.
[17] Pascal Bressonet, Études tactiques sur la campagne de 1806, 371.
[18] Frederick II, Translated by T. Foster, Military Instruction from the Late King of Prussia, 62.
[19] Von Gauid, Journal vom Siebenjährigen Krieg, Vol 7, 220.; Achim Kloppert, Der Schlesische Feldzug von 1762, 404.
[20]Publicationen aus den Preussischen staatsarchiven, Vol 22, 359.
[21]Roberto T. Bada, "Defensas Estratégicas De La Capitanía General De Guatemala Castillos De La Inmaculada Concepción Y De San Carlos," Revista De Temas Nicaragüenses, February 2011, 178.
[22] Anonymous, Beyträge zur neuern Staats-Und Krieges-Geschichte, 335.
[23] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Remarks on Cavalry, 106.
[24] Comte de Schmettau, Mémoires raisonnés sur la campagne de 1778 en Bohéme, 186-187
[25]Johann Gottfried von Hoyer, Geschichte des Kriegskunst, 941.
[26] StaMarburg 4h.410 nr. 1 507, Heister zu Landgraf, 21 March, 1777. For other accounts of this practice, see: Jakob Piel, Defeat, Disaster and Dedication: The Diaries of the Hessian Officers Jakob Piel and Andreas Wiederhold, 17. Karl Friedrich. Rüffer, The Hesse-Cassel Mirbach Regiment in the American Revolution , 54.; Johann Heinrich Von Bardeleben, The Diary of Lieutenant Von Bardeleben and Other Von Donop Regiment Documents, 56.
[27] "The Affair at Trenton," in Hessian Documents of the American Revolution(Boston: G.K. Hall, 1989), M.L.375, microform.
[28] Ibid.
[29] "The Affair at Trenton," M.L. 444.
[30] Ibid,
[31] Ibid, 456
[32] Ibid, 481.
[33] Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 252.
[34] Order Book, Standing Orders of the 71st Regiment, Huntington Library, NRAS28/19, 8-9.
[35] Ibid.
[36] John Burgoyne, A Brief Examination of the Plan and Conduct.. 33.
[37] Townshend, Orders for the Irish Establishment, July 17th, 1772.
[38] Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, 15.
[39] Thomas McGuire, The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol 1. 225.

Hessian Jägers at the Siege of Charleston

A non-contemporary image, from the perspective of the siege lines

Dear Reader,

Today, we have an extract from the journal of Staff Captain Johann Hinrichs of the Hessen-Kassel Feld-Jäger Corps at the Siege of Charleston in 1780. Hinrichs gives an account of the entire siege, but it lasts for 50 pages, so I will only detain you will the final days here. Hinrichs' account is available in certain libraries via Microform, and is highly readable. He was a keen observer of siege tactics.

"May 5.

Today 1 Captain [Ewald] & company went towards no. 1 (a redoubt) by another road, that lay close to the Ashly and skirted the trench. Our batteries in the 3rd parallel were still all masked, and did not fire a shot. The enemy enfiladed them in the rear and partly on the flank, and they suffered a great deal. The mistake lay in the 2nd parallel, [His emphasis] As the enemy had got to know that the workmen were relieved at 3 o'clock in the morning by means of deserters from our side, and therefore kept up a steady cross ricochet fire along the road until daylight. I went there this afternoon and marked out another road to the right of the existing one, on which only 3 embrasures could play.  This night the battery in the 2nd parallel that had been commenced the preceding night was completed, and the batter en barbette on the highroad, 160 paces behind the 2nd parallel, was provided with 3 embrasures, repaired and strengthened.

Hessian Jägers, Don Troiani

May 6

This morning I marched along the new road with the detachment, and only one ball came near us. I went to the left and Lt. Schaeffer to the right. Our workers had been diligent, they had got a good deal done... We fired 3 6-pounders into the midst of the enemy's works. Our 3rd parallel ran towards the centre of the enemy's section in oblique lines. Not a single cannon in the enemy's advance redoubts on both wings had been silenced. Consequently their left wing enfiladed our left en revers, and their right our right. And our side had not attempted to rectify this mistake either by means of sufficient traverses or re-entering and salient angles. The rebels tried to avail themselves of every advantage and kept up a brisk fire. However, the Jägers always kept them in check, so that they dared not open their embrasures much during the day, and could only fire a shot now and then by one or other gun by stealth. But they fired all the more during the night, and razed our new batteries that were built of such light materials, so that there was enough to repair next morning.

A few bombs were thrown on our side, and the Jägers kept up a steady fire. I had 300 sandbags fetched during the day, and had proper embrasures made on the parapet for the rifles in a line with the rebels' embrasures. At 5 o'clock int  the afternoon, whilst we were constructing these embrasures, they enemy fired a salvo of 13 guns at us, that hit below the sandbags, threw them in to the air,a nd then into the ditch. Fortunately, none of the Jägers were wounded, although they were all occupied either in aiming at the enemy or arranging the sandbags. The blast and debris knocked us all down, and some rifles were smashed.  Almost all our batteries were completed during the night and supplied with ammunition. The enemy kept up a brisker fire than they had ever done before. At o'clock an alarm was sounded in the town. The noise never ceased, and it seemed to be seized with a panic.

[The entry for May 7th contains details for the surrender of outling forts]

May 8

As our breaching battery was now ready, the embrasures were opened last night, and another summons was sent to the town and garrison at daybreak. The whole of the opposite bank of the river was in our hands, from Cain Hoy to Fort Multrie, consequently, all the communications the enemy might have were cut off, their cavalry routed, no chance of succour, all their forces concentrated in the town, our works quite near their ditch, about 100 paces of this ditch was already dry and becoming drier every moment, and Fort Multrie and the whole of the harbour in our hands.  They were given two hours respite, which was prolonged from time to time, this went on until 6 o'clocl in the evening. Various points had already been settled, and then suddenly the negotiations were broken off.

At o'clock in the evening, the armistice was at an end, the enemy had all the bells in the town rung, and after 8 hurrahs had been given they kept up such a terrible fire the whole night as never before. It was a fire kept up by drunkards, for I believe the whole garrison was drunk...

Hessian Jäger, Don Troiani

May 9

In the Morning our batteries and bombs began to play, and kept up a galling fire. The enemy's front redoubt on the left wing demlished our one 24-pounder that had played on it straightway in the first salvo, but another was brought in in no time, which silenced all the 4 gun batteries of the front redoubt on the left wing, smashed 2 of the guns and destroyed all the 4 embrasures, so that nothing more was to be seen of them. The enemy had provided all their embrasures with mantelets, but some bar-shots cleared the embrasures and gave the Jägers a chance of shooting.

May 10t

The firing was kept up all day, and a number of bombs were thrown during the night. Th enemy had thrown very few for the  last fortnight. The 10-inch howitzer that had been captured at Fort Moultrie was brought up the river Ashley during the night, and taken into the 3rd parallel to the right.

May 11

The enemy bore up against the fire and returned it until noon, when another flag was sent out. The fire was so fierce that we did not see them come, and they had to retire again. At 2 o'clock they hoisted a large white flag on the horn-work and sent a second flag, and offered to surrender the town, etc, on the conditions we had already offered to them. An armistice was granted and a message dispatched to the admiral... and at 11 o'clock the same vening the main capitulation was in order.

[...]

As regards the rebel fortifications and their defence as well as our attack I will keep the account until I have finished the plan of the town, as it has been quite impossible for me to do it as yet. Their artillery was better than our, but they have confessed themselves that our rifles had cost them...killed and wounded since our 3rd parallel was commenced, and they could never open their embrasures without loss. The reason why they threw so few bombs during the latter part of the seige was because their best bombardier, a major in the artillery, had been shot on April 31, and they had nobody who could make good fuses, of which they stood in need."



Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns

"He was a Blue and Bloody Man!": The Von Bose Regiment (No. 8)

A reenactor portraying a soldier of Regiment von Bose
Photo Credit: Andrew Shook

Dear Reader,

Despite the harsh criticism of Regiment Prinz Friedrich by Riedesel, the "German" forces who served alongside the British in the American War of Independence were not inferior to their Anglo counterparts. Despite several notable defeats, Germanic Subsidientruppen were capable of fighting as well as their British allies and American foes. Today, we are going to examine one of the best regiments in the American War of Independence- the von Trümbach/von Bose Regiment.

The regimental name change indicates a change in the regimental Chef, or colonel-proprietor. Raised in 1701, the regiment had a long history of serving as British allies. In 1746, the regiment served alongside Hanoverian forces in Scotland, during the suppression of the Jacobite rebellion. Though not serving at Culloden, the regiment was involved in combat operations, and blocked the movement of the Jacobite army. Around this time there was a small confrontation between Jacobite forces and Hessians. This small action received a mention in Jacobite Dougal Graham's lyric history of the rebellion, in which the Jacobites beat a hasty retreat after the Hessian battalion guns opened fire:

"Their grenadiers had caps of brass,
Thus order'd were the men of Hesse
Who' camp'd for some time near Dunkel'
And kept that pass, till they heard tell...
How at Culloden all were broke
And they had never fought a stroke,
Except one cannonading 'bout.
The Clans afar came on a scout,
To view their camp from a hill-top
Who soon retir'd when they drew up;
Whene'er their cannon began to play,
They skilled [scattered] like rams and ran away:
Described the Hessians even as they can,
Said, 'He was a blue and bloody man!'"[1]

Later, on October 11th 1746, at the Battle of Rocoux, the regiment (at this point in the time, called the Mansbach Regiment) served with distinction. Christopher Duffy described the scene: "Frederick, [the future landgrave of Hessen-Kassel], with tears in his eyes, succeed in rallying his battered troops, and at the end of the battle the regiment of Mansbach... stood its ground to cover the allied retreat and was almost wiped out."[2] Likewise, The Gentleman's Magazine for 1746 reports that the Mansbach regiment, "stood their ground to the last, and refused quarter, so that few of them escaped."[3]

Hessian Troops at the Battle of Krefeld (Richard Knötel)

During the course of the Seven Years' War in Europe, the regiment served with Prinz Ferdinand of Brunswick in the western European theater. In the course of this war, the regiment served in a number battles, such as Krefeld, Minden, Bergen, Emsdorf,  Vellinghausen, and Wilhelmsthal. It served directly alongside Prussian troops at the combat of Langensalza. Although not performing poorly in any of these engagements, the regiment also failed to win great distinction and fame in the course of the Seven Years' War. Rather, they provided good, solid service.

For much of the American War of Independence, the Trümbach Regiment was not heavily engaged. The regiment took part in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776, but failed to accompany the main British army on campaign around Philadelphia in 1777.  Clinton utilized it in the abortive move to assist Burgoyne.  In 1780, the British transferred the newly renamed Von Bose Regiment to the Southern theater of war. Some authors claim that they fought in other battles of the Southern theater, such as Eutaw Springs. If so, it is likely that this means a company sized force or smaller, since the main regiment stayed with Cornwallis, or that the author is referring to the Von Rall/Von Trumbach regiment, rather than the Von Trümbach/Von Bose Regiment.

Two soldiers of varying ages in Regiment von Bose 

During the Southern Campaign in 1781, the average age in the regiment was 33, compared with the American age of 23, and the British age of 28.[5] As a result, experienced men such as Sargeant Berthold Koch were prevalent in the regiment. Koch was born in 1742, (not recruited into the army that year, as Rodney Atwood claims), and joined the (then) Mansbach Regiment at 15, at the onset of the Seven Years' War. During this time, he served in battles such as Bergen.[6] The commander of the regiment in the Southern campaign, Johann Christian du Buy, had joined the military at 14, and was now in his mid-forties. He was a veteran of 13 major battles in the European Seven Years' War.[7]

Von Bose at Guilford in miniature

However, the regiment fought its most famous action on March 15th, 1781, at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. In the course of this battle, the Von Bose Regiment, together with the 1st battalion of British Guards, broke through two lines of American defenders. Circumstantial evidence suggests that by this point, the regiment had adopted the British standard style of advance during the War of Independence. Sargeant Berthold Koch noted that the regiment moved with a high degree of speed in this engagement.[8]Johann Christian du Buy reported the following to Knyphausen:

"After quickly laying aside our tornisters and everything that could impede a soldier, the 71st and von Bose received orders to more forward and attack the enemy... We had not advanced more than 300 yards when we found a deep ditch in front of us, with tall banks and full of water. After crossing it with difficulty, we then came to a fenced wheat field; on the other side of this field 1500 continentals and militia were deployed in line... I formed the battalion into line with the greatest of speed and we ran to meet the enemy in tolerable order."[9] 

A Soldier of the Von Bose Regiment, reimagined by Don Troiani

It was then, together with the 1st Guards, drawn into a running firefight in the woods. Major du Buy, and Major von Scheer first fought the Regiment back-to-back, and then led the regiment in two parts against the colonial enemy.  Bertold Koch, a sergeant with Von Bose, recalled,

"before we knew it, the enemy attacked us again in the rear. The regiment, therefore, had to divide into two parts. The second, command by Major Scheer, had to attack toward the rear, against the enemy who were behind us, and forced them once again to take flight... during this time, Colonel du Buy advanced with the first part of the regiment, and Major Scheer returned with the second part of the regiment and rejoined the first..."[10]  

It may seem a bit odd that Koch refers to du Buy as a Lt. Colonel, most sources from the battle indicate his rank as major. It is likely that Koch is simply remembering things in the wrong order, du Buy's April 18th after-action report indicates that he was a Lt. Colonel at that time. Whatever the case, in his own after-action report, British General Cornwallis reported that, "the 1st Battalion of Guards and Regiment von Bose were warmly engaged, in front, flank, and rear."[11]

After this battle drew to a close, the regiment continued with Cornwallis to Wilmington, and then to Virginia and finally Yorktown. At the close of the siege, the Von Bose regiment went into captivity, alongside some of the best regiments in the British army, including the 23rd Regiment of Foot. So, with their eighteenth-century service briefly described, let us turn to the other criteria, aside from service on campaign, that were outlined in the series introduction.

A soldier of von Bose in the wilds of North America

The Von Bose Regiment won the praise of its army commander. In the aftermath of the Battle of Guilford Court House, Cornwallis praised Von Bose, and listed them directly behind the Guards in his dispatches. Cornwallis believed, "The Hessian Regiment von Bose deserves my warmest praises for its discipline, alacrity, and Courage, and does honour to Major Du Buy who commands it, and who is an Officer of superior merit."[12]

On that note, let us turn to evaluations of the regimental commander in the field: Major du Buy. Aside of the praise of Cornwallis, du Buy was praised as an astute soldier by his commanders and fellow officers. Reichsfreiherr Wilhelm von Knyphausen the commander of the Hessians in North America for much of the war, suggest that du Buy was a, "most capable, gallant, and meritorious man."[13] John Graves Simcoe, observed du Buy's conduct of the surprise attack on Paramus in 1780. According to Simcoe, du Buy directed the attack with great skill, "The plan of this expedition was well laid, and as well executed: Major Du Buy seemed to be the master of the country through which he had to pass... the major was particularly attentive..."[14]

Reenactors portraying Von Bose perform drill at the Guilford Court House 

Finally, a point of analysis might be helpful in understanding the adaptability of the regiment to conditions in North America. It seems possible, if not concretely proven, that Major du Buy had a knack for knowing when British or Hessian practice was superior. There was a problem with the two-rank open order system adopted by the British in the American War of Independence: it failed to produce the volume of fire that troops with closed ranks might. This is not new information, Stephen Brumwell clearly points to this as the cause of the British defeat at Sainte-Foy in 1760.[15] Likewise, Matthew Spring indicates that a reliance on open-order bayonet charges may have become detrimental to the British by the end of the war.[16]

By contrast, at the Battle of Guilford Court House, du Buy led the regiment at great speed, speed which matched the standard British style of advance. His statements that von Bose, "ran to meet the enemy" taken together with Koch's assertion that the regiment moved, "at the double," indicates a departure from normal Hessian practice.[17] Although it is possible that these commands came directly from Campbell or Cornwallis, the relative amount of independence (especially at Guilford Court House) displayed by regiment commanders indicates that these orders were du Buy's ideas, especially considering his astute attention to terrain.

An image of Von Bose circa 1785

At this juncture,  having rambled on a bit, it may be helpful to condense my points. I believe that the Hessian Regiment Mansbach/Trümbach/Von Bose deserves to be considered as one the best regiments in the American War of Independence (and perhaps the whole of the eighteenth century), for the following reasons:

1) The regiment possessed a tradition of admirable service, from Rocoux to Guilford.
2) The praise of its fellow/superior/army officers, even when serving with allied forces. 
3) The great depth of military experience present in the regiment by 1781.
4) The reputation and skill set of the man commanding it: Johann Christian du Buy. 
5) The tradition AND adaptability present in the regiment. 

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Thanks for Reading,

Alex Burns





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[1] Dougal Graham, An Impartial History, 64.
[2] Christopher Duffy, The Best of Enemies, 150.
[3] The Gentleman's Magazine, (1746), 541.
[4] Babits and Howard, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 89.
[5] Rodney Atwood, The Hessians, 41. The source Atwood cites makes a different claim: K. Rogge-Ludwig, Mitteilungen an die mitglierder des Vereins für Hessische Geschichte und Landeskunde, 1876, 1-2.
[6] Atwood, The Hessians, 138.
[7]Berthold Koch, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse and the Siege and Surrender at Yorktown, 8.
[8]Du Buy, Raports vom Oberst Lieut. du Buy Regts v. Bose zu der General Lieutenant v. Knyphausen, Staatsarchiv Marburg, Best. 4h Nr. 3101.
[9]Berthold Koch, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse and the Siege and Surrender at Yorktown, 9.
[10] British National Archives, CO 5/184 112.
[11] British National Archives, CO 5/184 114-5
[12]Staatsarchiv Marburg, quoted in Atwood, The Hessians, 138.
[13]John Simcoe, Simcoe's Military Journal, A History of the Operations..., 142, 140.
[14]Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats, 261
[15]Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 244.
[16] Koch, The Battle of Guilford Court House, 9, Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 146-149

Happy Halloween!

A Hessian

Dear Readers-Happy Halloween!

Did you know, one of the most enduring Halloween legends, the Legend of Sleepy Hollow, has its roots in the Kabinettskriege era?

In this tale, a school teacher is chased out of town by the a ghastly apparition of a cavalrymen with no head!
Legend has it, that the headless rider was actually a Hessian soldier! (See my post on Hessians here.) According to myth, this soldier was decapitated by a cannonball, during the American War of Independence, and now roams the countryside of North America!

This legend has been continued by the new TV series, Sleepy Hollow, but that is a tale for another time!

Have a Happy Halloween, and don't let the Hessians get you!

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Book Review: A Generous and Merciful Enemy

Cover Art

Dear Readers,

Until the advent of the "New Military History," most historians focused on the campaigns, battles, and great leaders of history. In the past fifty years, military historians have begun to examine previously unexplored aspects of military history, including prisoners of war.  Historian Daniel Krebs has recently covered the role of prisoners of war for the western German auxiliary soldiers during the American War of Independence. This book, an expansion of his dissertation, is entitled:  A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American Revolution. 

Confused who exactly these German soldiers in the American Revolution were? Click here for an explanation! 

In his book, Krebs discusses all portions of life for the German prisoners of war. He gives excellent coverage to all portions of prisoner experience. His writing style is easy to read and engaging, a spectacular feat for a non-native English writer. Krebs divides the book into three sections: German soldiers in British Service, Into Captivity, and Prisoners of War.

In practical terms, the first section discusses recruitment and social composition of the subsidy soldiers. The second section explains the rituals of surrender and the difference between capture and surrender. Finally, the third section discusses the experiences of the various groups of German prisoners in the American War of Independence, and their eventual return to their native states. 

Krebs indicates that his overall goal is to write- Geschichte aus den Perspektive des gemeiner Soldat, or, history from the from the bottom up. Krebs amply succeeds in this goal, through a use primary source accounts, extensive German secondary literature, and statistical data.

This is not a book covering the military actions of the western German soldiers in the Revolution. For coverage of the campaigns of the "Hessians," the best work is still Rodney Atwoods' The Hessians. However, Krebs provides historians and historical hobbyists with an essential reference work for understanding the life of the western Germans who traveled to fight in the American Revolution.

For any serious student of the western German auxiliaries, or even of the American Revolution as a whole, this book is a must read. You can buy it here.

Thanks for reading,


Alexander Burns

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Soldatenhandel oder Subsidientruppen?

Contemporary drawing of a Hessian by a British newspaper

Dear Reader,


In American society today, we tend to have a negative view of mercenaries. Many Americans who support the American military distrust or dislike the idea of mercenary soldiers. The United Nations Mercenary Convention prohibits the use of mercenaries, and has been signed by thirty two countries. Why do we have such a negative opinion about this line of work?

As you might have guessed, the answer can be found in the eighteenth century. Throughout the eighteenth century, western German states such as Hesse-Kassel and Brunswick rented out their armed forces. In the American Revolution, roughly 1/3rd of the total forces employed by the British were regiments of these German soldiers. Horace Walpole referred to these soldiers as Great Britain's Triarii: her last line of defense. In America, these soldiers have become known as, "Hessians," despite the fact that they came from six different German states, not just Hesse-Kassel.

Understandably, the Americans took a much less favorable view of German, "mercenary" involvement in their fight for independence. According to the American newspapers, the Germans were hideous monsters who fought for pay, and wanted to despoil the riches of Americans.  According to Hessian Lt. Jakob Piel, captured Germans attracted much attention from local Americans. Piel made a note of this in his diary:

•               "There was no gentlemen in the entire region who did not come riding to see the Hessians, about whom he had heard so many stories. But, in most faces, one could see that they regretted the effort. They had come to see strange animals, and to their disgust, we looked like human beings. It seemed comical, but it is true, that they had formed such an idea of Hessians, but in the beginning they would not believe our words, that we were really Hessians." 

Piel makes it clear that public opinion in America was firmly against the Hessians. Nineteenth century authors described this rental arrangement of soldiers in terms of a Soldatenhandel, or, "a trade in soldiers." According to nineteenth century German historians, the Hessian soldiers were sold into a form of slavery, and suffered greatly from this abuse.

Bennington by Don Troiani

 However, this is not true, strictly speaking. The western German states were connected to Britain via dynastic ties, as well as a recent alliance in the Seven Years' War. Most of the German soldiers who served in America despised the American rebels. They saw the relative prosperity of the average American, and claimed that poor Americans lived better than the nobles in Germany. These soldiers were subsidized allies. Modern German scholars like to use the word, Subsidientruppen. This is a false cognate for subsidy, the word actually means, "support troops." These soldiers fought as the allies of Great Britain, not as mercenaries, or slave soldiers.

Many of these soldiers had more sympathy for Native Americans than the British or Americans, showing a precursor to Karl May in the German imagination. Most of all, the Germans condemned African slavery. Some wrote with ideas about racial equality far ahead of their time. An example of this is Captain Andreas Wiederholdt, who claimed that, "if the blacks were taught...many would exceed whites in intelligence."

The Germans who served in the American War of Independence were far from the simple, greedy villains which have been portrayed in American popular culture. They were not mercenaries in a traditional sense, they were allies of the British, as a result of dynastic connections and a monetary subsidy. These soldiers impacted the American view of mercenaries, and even up to the time of the Civil War, calling someone a "Hessian" meant that they were only concerned about financial gain. These soldiers provide historians with an interesting view of Colonial America, which in many ways, is more progressive than that of revolutionary-era Americans.

Thanks for reading,

Alex Burns

Some modern day "Hessians" (actually from Brunswick) prepare for battle. How can you not love these guys?

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Book Review: The Best of Enemies

(cover art from the book)

Dear Reader,

(Sorry for the long absence, I've been in Washington DC doing research for my MA program!)

Book Review of:

Christopher Duffy, The Best of Enemies: Germans vs. Jacobites, 1746. Emperor's Press,
          Bitter Books, (Chicago and London) 2013.

Most Americans remember the Hessians from their time in grade school. These are the soldiers which American general George Washington crossed the the Delaware to surprise at the Battle of Trenton on the day after Christmas, 1776. In his latest book, Dr. Christopher Duffy examines these soldiers in a different context: the '45, the final major Jacobite uprising in Britain  Much like in the American War of Independence, the German state of Hesse-Kassel hired its soldiers as subsidized allies (subsidientruppen) to the British. These Hessians assisted the British (and their Hanoverian monarch, George II) in suppressing this rebellion in the eighteenth century.

In this small, though informative, book, Duffy manages to give a campaign history of the Germans in the '45 uprising, as well as examine the life of Hessian Prince Frederick II in a book which, at times, reads as a mini-biography. Duffy lends a sympathetic voice to Frederick II of Hesse-Kassel, and attempts to show that this monarch had admirable qualities. Duffy's work touches on the history of the Hessian military from the turn of the eighteenth century to the American War of Independence. However, in order to get the full story of the Hessians in the American War of Independence (which is outside the scope of Duffy's work), this book should be read in tandem with Rodney Atwood's The Hessians. 

 For readers familiar with the American War of Independence, many familiar names crop up in the text, as we see future Hessian leaders. Duffy's thesis is that the Germans were more humane than their British counterparts, and kept clear of the worst of the atrocities following the Battle of Culloden. He amply proves his thesis, and this provides an interesting counterpoint to the supposed atrocities of the German troops during the American War of Independence.

As usual, Duffy writes in an engaging and often humorous style. His prose is easy to understand, even for those who do not understand all of the technicalities of eighteenth century warfare. He provides a full bibliography, which is clearly laid out. Overall, the only major flaw in this book is it's length: it leaves the reader wishing for more! Dr. Duffy has once again proved that military history and serious scholarship go hand in hand.

 The book is being published and sold by John Brewster over at Bitter Books, with assistance by Emperor's Press. If you would like to purchase the book directly, here is a link to Bitter Books.  For British readers, the book is a fascinating examination of a pivotal event in the history of Britain. For American readers, the book gives an important comparison to the experiences of the American War of Independence. For any serious student of the Jacobite Rebellions or American War of Independence, this book is a must have.

Thanks for reading,

Alex Burns

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Games at the Seven Years' War Convention

The view from the hotel: Notre Dame! (Hesburgh Library to be precise.)

Dear Reader, 

I promised pictures of the games: here they are! The majority of the pictures come from Dean West's beautiful Sandershausen game, but I managed to take pictures of several other games as well.

The French prepare to attack at Sandershausen

 

The Hessians (or Prussian stand ins) prepare to receive them.

The Diesbach Regiment: The end of the French Line

 The above photo is of the Diesbach Regiment, one of the best units in the French army. This regiment was on of the few to come out of the disastrous battle of Rossbach with any honor. They formed a square and marched of the battlefield, leading Frederick of Prussia to quip, "What is this red brick wall, that all my artillery cannot manage to bring down?" 

Behind the Hessian lines (again, these are Prussian figures)

The overall scenario at Sandershausen.

The French (bottom) are attempting to drive off the Hessians (top). As you can see, the French have superior numbers on their side. 

Some light troops and Landmiliz

The Hessians commanders, and the game host (1st play through)

The Evil French! (1st play through)

Sadly for the forces of good everywhere, the French soundly beat the Hessians in record time during the first player through. Good Job to the French players though!

The table during the 2nd play through

The French commander leans over the table, menacingly (2nd Play through)

Against all odds, the Hessians managed to defeat the French on the second play through. They did so by emulating the actions of the historical Hessian commander, Johann Casmir von Isenberg-Birstien

Dean West assisting with Patrick Lebeau's game on Saturday. Dean is attempting to get a bird's eye view of the proceedings.

Pat Lebeau's beautiful Burkersdorf scenario

A confused naval action of the coast of India. Jeff Knudsen's beautiful 1/900 scale ships of the line help make this game a favorite of convention go-ers.

The British attempt to break the French line

Oddly enough, after a long day of gaming, there was a fireworks display for some other event outside our hotel room. A fitting end to the convention!