Monday, January 31, 2022

Spain and American Independence: How Important Was Spain's Contribution?

 



Dear Readers,

Spain's role in the American War of Independence is currently one of the most active, loud and heated discussions in the online revolutionary war community. To a large degree, this is because the narrative regarding these claims has shifted drastically since 2002, when Thomas Chávez asserted that, "the role of Spain has not been genuinely recognized."[1] Paired with Chávez's own excellent book on the subject, which all students of the American Revolution should own, other books, such as Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia's biography of Bernardo de Gálvez, have corrected this flawed understanding. In 2014, Congress awarded Gálvez with Honorary U.S. Citzenship, an award which has only been granted to seven other individuals in United States History. If Gálvez is in an elite group with Winston Churchill and Mother Teresa in American memory, we cannot claim that he has been fully forgotten. 

Instead, in heated online salvos, the debate has transformed into another question altogether. Rather than asserting that the ungrateful gringos have forgotten Spanish assistance (which was broad, varied, and important), the debate has become whether or not Spain was the sole decisive military force in the American War of Independence, overshadowing Washington, France (obviously the Dutch) and anyone else audacious enough to come to the front of the line. Much like William Pitt's famous formulation of "winning America in Germany" during the French and Indian War, the debate now seems to rage on whether Spain achieved American Independence primarily by fighting in the Caribbean, Gulf Coast, and Gibraltar. Likewise, the debate has transformed into whether or not Bernardo de Gálvez was supreme commander of French, Spanish, and American forces in North America.  Spain also seems to have been promoted to the senior Bourbon partner in the Franco-Spanish alliance of 1779 at the Treaty of Aranjuez. The evidence supporting each of these claims comes from overly generous interpretations of strongly-stated scholarly argument. As a historian specializing in eighteenth-century military history, I will attempt to give my views on this debate. 

Was Spain the Sole Decisive Military Force in the American War of Independence? 

No. The Spanish forces played a vital role after 1779. Although never supporting the Continental Army with combat troops in the thirteen colonies, Spain vitally aided American troops with supplies, money, and weapons. American, French, Spanish, and Dutch military forces conducted a global war, where they jointly defeated British forces. Like their French, Dutch, and American allies, the Spanish military had its share of successes and defeats in this wider conflict. 

Did Spain Win American Independence in the Caribbean, Gulf Coast, and Gibraltar? 

There is no doubt that Spain's decision to enter the war further subdivided British military resources, which were already strained by French involvement. France joined the colonists in June of 1778, the Spanish, concerned over a number of issues, delayed their involvement until 1779. Spain focused their resources on the Caribbean, Gulf Coast, and Gibraltar as a result of their lack of recognition of the rebellious colonists. As a powerful empire with global colonies, the Spanish government was more wary of a breakaway colonial movement than their French counterparts, whose colonial holdings had been largely taken in the Seven Years War. The addition of Spain's powerful fleet was vital, as was the widening of the war. The French, in the words of Saravia, were taken "hostage to Spain's war aims."[2] 

This hostage taking had the effect of drawing out the war beyond when it would have naturally ended in America. Although Britain was ready to make peace in North America after Yorktown, and France was ready to negotiate after the disastrous Battle of the Saintes in April 1782, the Spanish held out hope that Gibraltar would fall, until the failure of the great assault on September 13th, 1782. This confirmed for the Spanish that Gibraltar would not fall, and all sides then prepared for negotiation. [3] As a result, although the Spanish deserve credit for dividing British resources, American Independence was achieved regardless of the outcome of the siege of Gibraltar. Naval resources were more important, and Spain did prove effective in this regard. 



Was Gálvez Supreme Commander of Forces in North America?

As a result of negotiations, Gálvez was had directional authority over French and Spanish forces. In practice, he had limitations. Gálvez also possessed authority over the continuing wars with the Comanche and Tupac Amuru's rebellion in Peru, but exerted little authority over these theatres. Attempting to make Spain seem more relevant to the victory at Yorktown, Thomas Chávez asserts that Bernardo de Gálvez gave Admiral de Grasse permission to sail north assist the American-French ground forces at Yorktown. In reality, this was a joint decision made de Grasse and his Spanish counterpart, Saavedra de Sangronis, made the decision together, and de Grasse departed. The Spanish were hesitant to allow their own ships to accompany de Grasse to Yorktown, as they had not formally recognized American Independence. As a result, de Grasse sailed with only the French portions of the fleet.[4] Gálvez arrived later, and retroactively approved the decision.[5] 

This fallacy comes from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of authority in eighteenth-century armies. Commanders frequently reported to officers or even councils of officers far from their commands. However, in a world before instant communications, commanders were responsible for the troops under their direct care. This was even more true in allied command structures. In the European Seven Years War, commanders treated the needs of their allies in-theatre as secondary to their own decision-making and the goals of their government. Frederick II was able to convince a Russian allied commander to stay alongside him for a couple of days through extreme measures such as personal bribery.[6] Regardless of their rank and authority, the idea of a supreme allied commander was simply not binding in eighteenth-century allied military command structures. Gálvez was an important figure who skillfully managed hemispheric eighteenth-century wars. His authority had limitations imposed by the dictates of his culture and century. 

Final Thoughts: 

It is difficult to rank "credit" for the outcome of a conflict. Was the Chinese and Soviet aid to Vietnam more important than the lives of North Vietnamese soldiers in fighting the United States? These questions are subjective. In the end, Spain must be equated with France in terms of impact on the outcome of the war. Very few professional historians would disagree with this assessment. What is strange, or even idiotic, is to suggest that Spain fought and defeated Britain as the sole power in the war of 1779-1783. This should not be difficult to understand. America did not defeat Imperial or Nazi Germany without outside help, but its impact was vital to the success of an allied war effort. This is the same type of serious consideration Spain's efforts should receive in the wider war between 1775 and 1783. Spain fought a skillful war between 1779-1783, not free the United States (which they did not recognize as an independent  power until 1783) but to regain honor after 1762 and restore important territories to the Spanish crown. 

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Thanks for Reading, 



Alex Burns

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[1] Thomas Chávez, Spain and the Independence of the United States, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002) 213.   

[2]Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia, Bernardo de Gálvez: Spanish Hero of the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018) 146. 

[3] David Allison and Larrie D. Ferrerio, The American Revolution: A World War, (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2018), 220;  Lawrence Kaplan, "The Treaty of Paris, 1783: A Historiographical Challenge" International History Review, Vol. 5 No. 3 (1983) 431-442. 

[4] Chávez, Spain and the Independence of the United States, 201.  

[5] Chávez, Spain and the Independence of the United States, 203. 

[6] Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life, (New York: Routledge, 1986), 236. 

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