Parade Expectations and Campaign Realities: The Paradox of Kabinettskriege Warfare

Modern Reenactors portray soldiers moving on parade (left) and on campaign (right)

Dear Reader,

This post springs up out of a series of thoughts and conversations (both online and in person) that I have had over the last few days. What did eighteenth-century warfare look like? Did large regiments of men in restrictive clothing, locked arm in arm, advance to the beat of drums under the terrible gaze of their officers? Or did soldiers' fight in a manner which was logical at the time?  At first glance, it may seem as though two different strains of soldier existed in the eighteenth-century. Reenactors, Television, and even historians seem to display two distinct types of soldier: the 'clockwork' soldier and the 'effective' soldier. 

With the reintroduction of cadenced marching and the slow geometrical maneuvers of linear warfare, it may seem as though soldiers in the eighteenth-century were plodding automata, or what some historians, including John Lynn, have called, "the clockwork soldier." In this view, the soldier marches with no great haste towards the enemy, and on the orders of his feared officers, performs the route motions of drill on the battlefield. Indeed, John Houlding has criticized the eighteenth-century British army for its relative lack of realistic training. According to popular belief, these soldiers were hampered by cumbersome uniforms, parts of which even made it more difficult for soldiers to breathe and fight. By the logic of this school of thought, eighteenth-century warfare seems to have unfolded much like drills on the parade ground. In the video below, you can see soldiers demonstrating the more formal aspects of the Prussian drill manual. The German transcriptions are not entirely accurate.

  On the other hand, historians such as Matthew Spring point to a different set of realities of warfare in the eighteenth century: that soldiers were capable moving swiftly, adapting to tactical realities, and that junior officers both exercised sound judgment and developed a positive working relationship with their men. Iyla Berkovich has suggested that many eighteenth-century fighting men were highly motivated. Reenactors and historians in this school often point to the numerous adaptations and modifications to uniforms and tactics made by soldiers in the era. In this model, men on the march and in combat made rational and effective decisions based on the realities of their wartime service. In the video below, you can see Prussian reenactors demonstrating a maneuver meant to be used in the midst of battle.

Infuriatingly, both of these schools have evidence and rationale to back up their opinions. However, this is where historians must look carefully at the type of evidence utilized. By and large, the clockwork soldier school uses prescriptive evidence: drill manuals, regulations, and military treatises. On the other hand, the effective soldier school uses descriptive evidence: orderly books, diaries, and letters. In other words, the clockwork soldier school often uses advice given out before and during wartime, while the effective soldier school often employs descriptions of events written during and after conflicts.  It swiftly becomes clear that with such evidence, both schools must have some ring of truth, even if as a historian, I find the descriptive evidence more convincing. 

Let us take a case from the army often cited as having the most "clockwork" tendencies in the eighteenth century: the Prussian army. If you examine the Prussian drill manual of 1750, there are a myriad of examples describing the clockwork soldier. Prussians are to load in their muskets in a multitude of tiny steps, they are never permitted to fire as individuals, only as platoon-sized elements, and the maneuvers are carried out with geometric precision. Soldiers are to be punished for minor infractions of military dress, and large appendices cover the complicated and formal clothing of soldiers. However, the effective soldier school replies: what actually happened? 

Descriptive sources from Prussian soldiers talk about firing as individuals in the confusion of battle, and even describe daily orders in which soldiers wear reduced clothing in violation of the drill manual.[1] Violence on the battlefield, then, looked different for Prussian soldiers than marching on the drill square. It is hard to imagine the 8th Regiment moving fifty miles a day in the rural midwest while maintaining parade level discipline. How can we account for these differences? 

Some historians have attempted to answer the question via the North American/European divide, arguing that for various reasons (terrain, lack of cavalry, individualism, 'national character', etc) soldiers in North America were effective soldiers, while those in Europe remained clockwork soldiers.  This alone cannot explain the difference, because, as I suggested last month, the Prussian army developed quick battlefield maneuvers. Christopher Duffy describes European soldiers moving "almost at a run" during the battles of the War of Polish Succession in the 1730s, and Peter Paret, Jim McIntyre, and others have suggested that light infantry doctrine emerged in Europe, not North America.[2]

The obvious answer to this problem is that context matters a great deal. Parade ground maneuvers took on a decidedly clockwork feel, as some of the same soldiers who examine the effective choices made in the field described.[3] Officers and men who experienced frontline combat and then observed peacetime reviews often criticized such maneuvers as ridiculous.[4] Much like the army today, the importance of close order drill, traditional uniforms, and military discipline mattered a great deal, because they taught important skills to eighteenth-century soldiers. However, once in a combat or campaign environment, those clockwork ideas were quickly replaced by a need for military effectiveness. Obviously, there was never a perfect split between these two realms. But, as soldiers moved further away from garrison life and into the maelstrom of combat, some of the formality of eighteenth-century warfare seems to have fallen behind. 

As historians write about the wars of the eighteenth century, and reenactors portray it to the public, great care must be given to the exact context of what is being described and portrayed. Confusing battlefield practices and parade ground maneuvers is a fatal mistake. 

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

[1] Braeker, Der Arme Mann im Tockenburg, 164; Hoppe, "A Truthful Description", 7.
[2] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 203, McIntrye, British Light Infantry Tactics,1-5

[3] Braeker, Der Arme Mann im Tockenburg, 140-5. 

[4] Cornwallis, Correspondence, Vol I, 212.