Why, from a Historical Perspective, this isn't Good Art

Dear Reader,

I'm glad the clickbait title has drawn you in. Today, we are going to examine two pieces of historical art. Ambush!, by Dan Nance, shows a Native American warrior about to attack a senior British officer during the American War of Independence. The other, below, shows a specific incident from the Battle of Savannah during the American War of Independence. At the outset, I should say that both images are artistically appealing. Mr. Nance is a fine painter, who has painted many other historical pieces which I like.

So, why isn't the painting of the Native American warrior attacking a British officer, below, a helpful image from a historical perspective? First, this image trades on common stereotypes regarding both Native Americans and the British Army during the War of Independence. The Native Warrior is shown jumping (presumably from a tree?) with club raised and screaming. The British officer, presumably from the 7th (Royal Fuziliers) or 8th (King's) Regiment of Foot, given his uniform. His sword is drawn, and is he looking rather obliviously in the opposite direction. Even his horse has noticed the oncoming warrior.





















































Both of these ideas (that the Native Americans were masters of the ambush, and that the British were remarkably ill-suited for wilderness warfare) are stock images from American mythology, and give little information regarding the actual reality of the past. Native American warriors were impressive soldiers in certain conditions, but certainly fell prey to ambush by Euro-American warriors. A famous example of this is during the Siege of Fort Sackville by George Rogers Clark, when Clark's forces took a Native war party by surprise.[1] Likewise, British forces had learned much regarding wilderness warfare since the early days of the French and Indian War, and were capable of fighting in wilderness conditions.


Second, the above image deliberately obscures historical reality. Much more often than not, the specific regiment which is depicted above fought alongside native warriors. The King's Regiment fought alongside native Americans at engagements such as the Cedars, Fort Stanwix, Fort Laurens, Hannastown, Bird's Invasion of Kentucky, and perhaps most famously, at the Battle of Newtown in 1779.[2] By and large, for good or ill, the King's Regiment fought alongside Native Americans throughout the War of Independence, not against them. If the 7th Regiment was depicted, the image is also somewhat less egregious, but the 7th Regiment of Foot spent much of the war fighting in larger coastal armies, and to my knowledge, was never ambushed by the Catawba or any other Native group.

Third, there are liberties taken with the material culture of the image. The enlisted men and drummer wear gaitered trousers, which is possible for the 8th Regiment, but not confirmed by documentary evidence. Finally, it is perhaps unlikely that a drummer would have accompanied raids deep into the upper country, and certainly would not have been beating a march step during this type of movement. The British officer appears to be wearing a hat purchased from GG Godwin, Sutler. His uniform is immaculate, if a bit large for him. Speaking frankly, I am not qualified to evaluate the accuracy of the dress of the Native Warrior (it is possible that it is of a very high standard).

Fourth, and finally, the image does not depict a specific historical event. No senior officers of the Royal Fuziliers or King's Regiment were killed in ambush by Native American warriors during the years of the American War of Independence. Many of them died, often from illness or being drowned while on transport ships on the Great Lakes. A shipwreck on the Lakes, would be an incredibly interesting artistic project for the various excellent artists currently exploring the revolution.

So, in short, whatever the artistic value of the above image, it possesses a questionable historical value.

Artist Graham Turner's image of the Battle of Savannah, painted for Osprey

The above image, depicting Archibald Campbell at the capture of Savannah by artist Graham Turner, may not be equal artistic appeal, but possesses much more historical value than the ambush of the Native Warrior above. 

First of all, the image depicts a specific historical event, described by a primary source.[3] When preparing to attack the rebel held city of Savannah, Lt. Colonel Archibald Campbell climbed a tree in order to better observe the rebel defensive positions. He also spoke with an enslaved man regarding a flanking route for his army's march, which is perhaps a missed opportunity in the painting.

Second, in choosing a specific historical event, the image destroys mythology regarding the British Army in the War of Independence. The popular view of British officers in the United States is that they were hide-bound traditionalist fops with little real experience in the arena of war. By showing a British officer who was willing to think outside the box and get is hands dirty a bit, Graham Turner displays a class of generally competent senior officers such as Howe, Cornwallis, and Campbell who were not afraid to innovate in order to gain victory in America.

Third, the uniforms are generally accurate. Turner's artwork shows the 71st Regiment of Foot in short coats and linen gaiter trousers with highland bonnets, all fairly responsible choices for this era of war. Woolen donation-cloth trousers might have been a better choice for this time of year (although I am not familiar with the primary source documentation for this particular regiment, so I cannot say) but this is a relatively minor quibble. Likewise, the tree may not have been defoliated at this time of year in Savannah. It is difficult to tell whether Campbell is wearing his own hair or a wig, which pleased me greatly.

So, in closing, both images are very enjoyable and artistically sound. With that said, images which depict specific events from primary sources, coupled with a theme which explores the reality, rather than the mythology of historical eras, are an asset to historians, and to the public. Accurate, well-presented uniforms are icing on the cake.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading, 

Alex Burns

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[1] Journal of Joseph Bowman, February 24th, 1779 https://www.in.gov/history/2964.htm
[2] Journal of Thomas Blake, 1st NH Regiment, August 29th, 1779, http://www.usgwarchives.net/pa/1pa/1picts/sullivan/nhjournals.html#norris
[3] See Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 66 and Archibald Campbell, Journal of an Expedition, 25-26.

Parade Expectations and Campaign Realities: The Paradox of Kabinettskriege Warfare

Modern Reenactors portray soldiers moving on parade (left) and on campaign (right)

Dear Reader,

This post springs up out of a series of thoughts and conversations (both online and in person) that I have had over the last few days. What did eighteenth-century warfare look like? Did large regiments of men in restrictive clothing, locked arm in arm, advance to the beat of drums under the terrible gaze of their officers? Or did soldiers' fight in a manner which was logical at the time?  At first glance, it may seem as though two different strains of soldier existed in the eighteenth-century. Reenactors, Television, and even historians seem to display two distinct types of soldier: the 'clockwork' soldier and the 'effective' soldier. 

With the reintroduction of cadenced marching and the slow geometrical maneuvers of linear warfare, it may seem as though soldiers in the eighteenth-century were plodding automata, or what some historians, including John Lynn, have called, "the clockwork soldier." In this view, the soldier marches with no great haste towards the enemy, and on the orders of his feared officers, performs the route motions of drill on the battlefield. Indeed, John Houlding has criticized the eighteenth-century British army for its relative lack of realistic training. According to popular belief, these soldiers were hampered by cumbersome uniforms, parts of which even made it more difficult for soldiers to breathe and fight. By the logic of this school of thought, eighteenth-century warfare seems to have unfolded much like drills on the parade ground. In the video below, you can see soldiers demonstrating the more formal aspects of the Prussian drill manual. The German transcriptions are not entirely accurate.

  On the other hand, historians such as Matthew Spring point to a different set of realities of warfare in the eighteenth century: that soldiers were capable moving swiftly, adapting to tactical realities, and that junior officers both exercised sound judgment and developed a positive working relationship with their men. Iyla Berkovich has suggested that many eighteenth-century fighting men were highly motivated. Reenactors and historians in this school often point to the numerous adaptations and modifications to uniforms and tactics made by soldiers in the era. In this model, men on the march and in combat made rational and effective decisions based on the realities of their wartime service. In the video below, you can see Prussian reenactors demonstrating a maneuver meant to be used in the midst of battle.

Infuriatingly, both of these schools have evidence and rationale to back up their opinions. However, this is where historians must look carefully at the type of evidence utilized. By and large, the clockwork soldier school uses prescriptive evidence: drill manuals, regulations, and military treatises. On the other hand, the effective soldier school uses descriptive evidence: orderly books, diaries, and letters. In other words, the clockwork soldier school often uses advice given out before and during wartime, while the effective soldier school often employs descriptions of events written during and after conflicts.  It swiftly becomes clear that with such evidence, both schools must have some ring of truth, even if as a historian, I find the descriptive evidence more convincing. 

Let us take a case from the army often cited as having the most "clockwork" tendencies in the eighteenth century: the Prussian army. If you examine the Prussian drill manual of 1750, there are a myriad of examples describing the clockwork soldier. Prussians are to load in their muskets in a multitude of tiny steps, they are never permitted to fire as individuals, only as platoon-sized elements, and the maneuvers are carried out with geometric precision. Soldiers are to be punished for minor infractions of military dress, and large appendices cover the complicated and formal clothing of soldiers. However, the effective soldier school replies: what actually happened? 

Descriptive sources from Prussian soldiers talk about firing as individuals in the confusion of battle, and even describe daily orders in which soldiers wear reduced clothing in violation of the drill manual.[1] Violence on the battlefield, then, looked different for Prussian soldiers than marching on the drill square. It is hard to imagine the 8th Regiment moving fifty miles a day in the rural midwest while maintaining parade level discipline. How can we account for these differences? 

Some historians have attempted to answer the question via the North American/European divide, arguing that for various reasons (terrain, lack of cavalry, individualism, 'national character', etc) soldiers in North America were effective soldiers, while those in Europe remained clockwork soldiers.  This alone cannot explain the difference, because, as I suggested last month, the Prussian army developed quick battlefield maneuvers. Christopher Duffy describes European soldiers moving "almost at a run" during the battles of the War of Polish Succession in the 1730s, and Peter Paret, Jim McIntyre, and others have suggested that light infantry doctrine emerged in Europe, not North America.[2]

The obvious answer to this problem is that context matters a great deal. Parade ground maneuvers took on a decidedly clockwork feel, as some of the same soldiers who examine the effective choices made in the field described.[3] Officers and men who experienced frontline combat and then observed peacetime reviews often criticized such maneuvers as ridiculous.[4] Much like the army today, the importance of close order drill, traditional uniforms, and military discipline mattered a great deal, because they taught important skills to eighteenth-century soldiers. However, once in a combat or campaign environment, those clockwork ideas were quickly replaced by a need for military effectiveness. Obviously, there was never a perfect split between these two realms. But, as soldiers moved further away from garrison life and into the maelstrom of combat, some of the formality of eighteenth-century warfare seems to have fallen behind. 

As historians write about the wars of the eighteenth century, and reenactors portray it to the public, great care must be given to the exact context of what is being described and portrayed. Confusing battlefield practices and parade ground maneuvers is a fatal mistake. 

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

[1] Braeker, Der Arme Mann im Tockenburg, 164; Hoppe, "A Truthful Description", 7.
[2] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 203, McIntrye, British Light Infantry Tactics,1-5

[3] Braeker, Der Arme Mann im Tockenburg, 140-5. 

[4] Cornwallis, Correspondence, Vol I, 212.

British Soldiers in the Upper Country: The King's (8th) Regiment in the American War of Independence

Reenactors portraying British Soldiers of the 8th Regiment

(Photo Credit: Lee Charles Gugino)

Dear Reader,

A mix of American bias and scholarly emphasis is whittling away at the presence of the British empire in the upper country of Revolutionary North America. Books such as Daniel Ingram's British Outposts in Eighteenth-Century North America, and a host of scholars such as Kathleen DuVal, Daniel Richter, and Micheal Witgen are accurately showing that Native Americans controlled almost all activities on the ground in territory west of Pennsylvania. These scholars are pointing us towards statements such as the following, from Major Arent Schuyler Depeyster, an officer in the King's (8th) Regiment, in October  of 1782:

Two British Soldiers at Montmorency Falls in 1781

"You must be sensible that my soldiers are little acquanted with wood fighting and illequiped for it withall. I have therefore only ordered to take post where they can secure ammunition and provisions,"[1]

And who can blame these scholars? Demographically, Native Americans and white settlers far outnumbered any military contribution that the British Empire could project into the upper country. However, despite these challenges, this post argues the men and in particular the officers of the King's Regiment played a vital and successful role in the maintenance of British power in the upper country throughout the American War of Independence.

Background to Service: 

Before diving into the sources, a brief description of the service of the King's (8th) Regiment in North America may be useful. First of all, by the time of the American War of Independence, the regiment had already been on a long deployment. In 1768, the men of the King's Regiment were sent to garrison Canada, at that point recently acquired after the Seven Years' War. From June of 1768 to 1774, the regiment guarded fortified positions around Montreal and Quebec City. Although the soldiers had hoped to be deployed home after this tour, the British government, facing a rising tide of dissatisfaction in colonies on the eastern seaboard of North America, sent the King's Regiment into the Upper Country posts.

Black: Oswegatchie/Carleton Island (1 Company)  Red: Fort Niagara (4 Companies) Green: Detroit (3 Companies) Blue: Michilimackinac (2 Companies) 

The men of the King's Regiment would spend 11 years in these posts, for a total 17 year deployment to North America. Even when close to full strength, the regiment numbered less than 500 individuals. The largest garrison at Fort Niagara was composed of less than two hundred men from the 8th, although soldiers from other units also supplemented the defenses. At their lowest strength, in 1770, the regiment numbered 379 men. They reached their highest strength of 603 near the end of the war.[2] However, even more impressive than the spread out nature of the garrisons are the distances that King's Regiment soldiers traveled to fight the American enemy.

Actions involving King's Regiment soldiers stretch from the Battle of Cedars southeast of Montreal to St. Louis, a distance of around 1,000 miles. 

In almost every one of these actions, a small group of soldiers from the King's Regiment joined forces with larger groups of Native Americans and/or Anglo/French militia in order to attack the enemy. For a regiment that supposedly did not have experience or the ability to fight in a woodland environment, the King's Regiment certainly performed the task a great deal. They conducted numerous successful interception of rebel forces or raids on rebel towns and outposts throughout the upper country, including:

1776 The Battle of the Cedars (Near Montreal, Canada)
1778 Cherry Valley Raid (Upstate New York)
1779 Siege of Fort St. Joseph (Western Michigan)
1780 Martin's Station and Ruddle's Station Raid (Northeastern Kentucky)
1780-81 Mohawk Valley Raids (Upstate New York)
1782 Hannastown Raid (East of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

There were failures too, such as the abortive Siege of Fort Stanwix in 1777,  or the capture of thirty men of the King's Regiment by George Rogers Clark at Vincennes, Indiana, in 1779.

A reenactor portraying a King's Regiment soldier
during a New York Valley Raid, 2016

The King's Regiment in the Upper Country: 

Fortunately, we have somewhat detailed accounts regarding the actions of King's Regiment soldiers in the upper country, focusing around the expeditions of men such as Governor Henry Hamilton surrender at Vincennes in 1779 and Captain Henry Bird's invasion of Kentucky in July of 1780. Despite Depeyster's dour warning above, the men of the King's Regiment undertook many of the necessary preparations for wilderness warfare. In 1770, the regiment engaged in what Mark Odintz has called, "realistic wilderness training," including, "engaging in the woods, rowing in boats, landing and walking on snow shoes[.]" [3]

Even more importantly, the men of the King's Regiment practiced marksmenship while on campaign. As Lt. Govenor Henry Hamilton's forces traveled towards Vincennes in late 1778, his troops repeated practiced firing at marks, or targets. On November 12th, Hamilton recorded: "Exercised the cannon and small arms at Marks-- The arms in very good order-- the savages expressed great surpize to see a mark of a foot sqaure struck from the 6lbr . at about 300 yards distance." Again on November 19th, after an abortive meeting with Indian leaders, Hamilton took offense at the Indian suggestion that the French would reclaim the upper country. He wrote, "I broke off the meeting abruptly, and told them I was going to exercise my young men, and gave orders for the men to turn out and fire ball at a mark, which they did, and shewed great dexterity firing very quick and making excellent shots." Norman MacLeod, a militia officer accompanying the British on the campaign, also recorded this occurence on November 19th. He wrote, "the troops was ordered to fire three rounds, each man at Targets in the Presence of the Indians. And the Indians was Very will Pleasd at their Performance." [4]

The benefits of these firing at marks are two-fold. First, they kept the soldiers on Hamilton's expedition proficient in the use of their firearms. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, they demonstrated British military power to Native Americans, who might contribute additional soldiers and supplies. Thus, on Hamilton's expedition, firing at marks possessed both a military and a political objective.

In 1780, Captain Henry Bird and the King's Regiment launched an invasion of Kentucky, supported by around 900 Native Americans and Anglo/French militiamen. Henry Bird and the men of the King's Regiment operated effectively in the upper country, capturing two forts, and taking three hundred prisoners. Through use of waterways, Bird was able to cover 90 miles in four days, the last 50 of which he covered in one day alone. [5] By pushing his men to these extremes, Bird was able to avoid contact with larger American forces trying to run him down.

However, the most interesting aspect of the King's Regiment's expeditions is that they were conducted by volunteers. The letters and pay accounts of the King's Regiment make it clear that the soldiers who went on both Hamilton's march to Vincennes and Bird's invasion of Kentucky were volunteers.[6] Although he is probably also speaking rhetorically for Indian benefit, Hamilton may while be accurately describing the situation when he stated, "I told them I was going to exercise my young men."

A Seargent of the King's Regiment "exercises his young men," at Fort Niagara in 2016.

So, while Depeyster may have seriously thought that his men were ill-prepared for wilderness warfare, he may also have been exaggerating the situation. Indeed, in a subsequent letter to Lt. General Haldimand, he makes it clear that the lack of cold weather gear, not ill-preparedness, was the reason for his refusal to take part in the winter campaign of 1782.[7]

The King's Regiment served in an adverse environment, long after their expected deployment duration. Several authors, including Thomas Hughes, criticized the appearance of the regiment in 1785.[] The younger men were drafted into different regiments, and the old soldiers were transported back to Britain for discharge. However, the results of the 8th Regiment's deployment speaks for itself. They utilized realistic training in order to achieve battlefield success, they were able to move with a speed that confounded American forces, and they effectively utilized volunteers to get the most out of their limited resources. It is almost as if the borders of Canada correspond to where the posts of the King's Regiment stood.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns


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[1] Depeyster, Miscellanies, pg. xxxvi
[2] William Potter, Redcoats on the Frontier, MA Thesis, unpublished, pg 40.
[3] Mark Frederick Odintz, The British Officer Corps. University of Michigan, Dissertation, unpublished, pg 88. Gage Papers, Letter from Guy Carleton to Gage, July 4th, 1770.
[4] John D. Barnhart ed, Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark in the American Revolution with the Unpublished Journal of Lieut. Gov. Henry Hamilton. William Evans ed, From Detroit to Fort Sackville: The Journal of Norman MacLeod, pg 81. 
[5] Haldimand Papers, Henry Bird to Arent S. Depeyster, July 1st, 1780.
[6] Hamilton to Haldimand, October 7th, 1778. This letter indicates that all Kingsmen on the expedition were volunteers. Haldimand Papers,
[7] Haldimand Papers, Arent S. Depeyster to Haldimand, November 21st, 1782.
[8] Hughes, A Journal by Thomas Hughes, 141.

Fort Niagara 2014

Dear Readers,

After a long absence, I am posting some updates- here is a group of photos related to the Fort Niagara Event, "Soldiers of the Revolution," on August 2nd and 3rd 2014.

                                                                                   

Room where the treaty of 1764 was signed by Sir William Johnson

A barrel with the markings of the King's Regiment

The outwork: a Ravelin

 

One of the blockhouses built after the Seven Years' War

Model of Niagara showing the Fort in 1780

 The British line of battle at Fort Niagara

A group of reenactors portraying the King's 8th Regiment of Foot, the garrison of Fort Niagara during the American Revolution