 |
Russians troops, 1770s
image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич |
Dear Reader,
Today, we are going to examine a subject which may be familiar to some of you, but I hope to explore the topic with a source base that will be new for many of you. The apocalyptic vision of Russian troops invading the United States became increasingly common during the Cold War, and has carried on into the post-Cold War era through the medium of video games like
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. The most famous example of this trend is perhaps the 1984 film,
Red Dawn.
The American fear of invasion by Russian troops existed long before the twentieth century, however. During the American War of Independence, many Americans feared that the Tsarina of Russia, Catherine II "the Great", would send troops to support the British during the War of Independence.
This possibility, both eagerly anticipated by British officers, and feared by the American people, has been addressed by a number of diplomatic historians, going all the way back to Frank A. Golder's 1915 treatment of the subject, "Catherine the Great and the American Revolution" in the
American Historical Review. The best book in English on this subject is doubtlessly still Normal Saul's
Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867. More recently,
Norman Desmarais has covered the topic via published writings by British officers, as well as tracking down newspaper reports of Russian involvement throughout the war. This is a post about an agreement between two countries that was never reached: in the words of Norman Saul, "Russians would not be Hessians." For first making me aware of this incident, and all of his incredible assistance during my MA studies, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sergei Zhuk, of Ball State University, who was gracious enough to work with a student who was interested in the Hessians.
 |
| A Court Portrait of Sir Robert Gunning |
On the 7th of August, 1775, the British Ambassador at the Russian Court, Sir Robert Gunning, received a letter from Henry Howard, the 12th Earl of Suffolk. Suffolk, a highly placed minister in Lord North's government, who eventually secured the use of Hessian and Hanoverian forces for the British Crown, wrote to Gunning, the Ambassador in Russian, confidentially asking him to put out feelers regarding obtaining Russian troops for British use in North America. In his cyphered reply to Suffolk, on the 8th of August, 1775, Gunning spoke of the "delicate and difficult commission" which the government had charged him, namely, obtaining, "a Body of Her Imperial Majesty's Infantry[.]"[1]
 |
| Henry Howard, 12th Earl of Suffolk |
Almost immediately in this process, Gunning appeared to hedge his bets in his letters back to his handler in London: he carefully explained that he needed to bring this topic of conversation up organically with the Empress herself, or with her minister Nikita Ivanonvich Panin. He planned to wait for the Empress to make one of her "numberless assurances [that] she has formerly given me of Her wishes to have any opportunity of serving the King (George III)."[2] This type of assurance was normally given in the course of diplomatic niceties at court, and can be understood as the equivalent of the modern English nicety, 'let us know if you need anything.' In a difficult situation, Gunning planned to follow-up this nicety with, 'actually, your Imperial Majesty, we need about 20,000 troops for service in North America.'
 |
| Nikita Ivanonvich Panin |
By the 8th of September, Suffolk had replied to Gunning, indicating that he should be prepared to offer the Russian Empress a subsidy treaty in exchange for use of this "body of troops", but that "it is more profitable," for Gunning to pursue, "the same line of sentiment on which she [Empress Catherine] has thus far proceeded; she may think a treaty unncessary and lend the assistance required without any formal obligation whatever."[3] Acknowledging that this level of generosity seemed unlikely, Suffolk continued, "That you however may be prepared for every possible contingency, His Majesty commands me to inform you that the proposal of a Subsidy is not to frustrate the negotiations."[4]
Helpfully, Suffolk drew up a draft of a subsidy treaty, leaving key areas, such as numbers of troops committed, blank, so that Gunning would have something tangible to present the Russian Empress. This treaty, written in French, contained the following points:
1. George III would secure a body of troops for service, the exact number of troops left blank, they would be officered by Russians.
2. The troops would be picked up by British transports from various seaports on the 25th of March, 1776.
3. The troops would be reviewed before embarkation by an English commissioner, who would administer an oath of loyalty to George III, which the treaty was careful to note, "of course, this will not supersede their oath of Loyalty taken to the Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russians."[5]
4.The British crown would provide two battalion guns (light cannon) to each battalion serving in this manner, and also provide the necessary men for crewing these pieces.
5. Having taken the oath of Loyalty on March 25th, they would for all intents and purposes be British National Troops, receiving pay at the same rate as their British counterparts.
6. Should these battalions be damaged or destroyed while in British service, the British crown would pay for the cost of re-raising the troops, and return them into Russian service in the same condition that they were received.
7. The troops will serve for the duration of the treaty, the British crown would give a three-month warning when the treaty was to be dissolved, and send the troops back to Russian with two months pay for their travel costs.
8. Should hostilities break out in Russia, the troops would be returned immediately with the same arrangement for back pay, and in addition the British government would transport them free of charge.
9. The treaty would last for two years with the possibility of renewal.
10. The Russians have ten weeks from the British signature to ratify the treaty.[6]
Having drafted the treaty, Suffolk felt the need to clarify points in his following letters to Gunning, instructing him, "have it fully understood that the supreme command is to be with General Carlton, or Genl. Howe, or whoever may be the British commander in chief in the District where the Russians are to act[.]"[7] Suffolk continued, "I must again remind you of the great importance of bringing this matter to an immediate Decision so as the Account of it may arrive on or before the 24th of October."[8]
On the September 11th, 1775, Gunning reported to Suffolk a conversation with Catherine II, where she had asked the British Ambassador "whether any progress had been made in settling disputes in America."[9] Before Gunning could reply, the Empress continued, "for God's sake, put an End to it as soon as possible, and do not confine yourself to one Method of accomplishing this desirable End there are various means of doing it, and they ought all to be tried."[10]
Tragically for the British, Gunning was at this particular moment unaware of the drafted subsidy treaty, which had just been written three days earlier by Suffolk, and was still enroute to him. Only on October 1st did Gunning report back that the message had arrived to late, and the empress had departed for another country seat when the subsidy treaty arrived. Notwithstanding this setback, Gunning immediately approached Panin, "the next morning, and on account of the extreme Readiness and good Will which he had shewn in the Business hitherto, I was resolved to treat with him with all possible Openness."[11] Panin initially treated Gunning's request with favor: "Neither the number of troops nor the place of their destination seemed to strike him as exceptionable: he repeated to me that he saw it perfectly in the light I did, as a matter of Friendship between sovereign and sovereign."[12] Panin seemed to wholeheartedly support the plan, but Gunning related that his, "impatience to have the business communicated to the Empress was checked by my knowledge of the persons by whom she was then surrounded, Mons. Potemkin and the Tchernychevs."[13] Panin confirmed Gunning's suspicions that the idea might be shot down in the presence of this hostile party, and "was of the opinion that he ought himself to be the Bearer of His Majesty's Letter to the Empress."[14]
 |
| Count Osterman |
Gunning next approached Count Ivan Andreyevich Osterman, and received a cooler response. Osterman, "asked me whether such an assistance would not alarm the other powers."[15] Gunning was unable to convince Osterman of the feasibility of the scheme. When Gunning had the opportunity to speak to Panin once again, "the less positive manner in which he expressed his hopes of the success of my application made me very much apprehensive that Count Osterman's ideas of the difficulty of the business had infected him."[16] That was Wednesday. By Friday, at 5pm, Panin relayed to Gunning that the Empress,
"shewed much repugnance to the [idea of] having her troops employed in America, where they could have no communication with this country; and that the number requested was so great that she did not think it was possible to grant them in the present state of her forces, wasted as they were by the length of hte late war; as well as on account of the unsettled state of Poland and the uncertainty of that of Sweden[.]... She had asked whether it was not possible for Her to assisted Us in any other Manner than by sending Her troops out of Europe?"[17]
Panin, in passing, added to Gunning, "could not His Majesty make use of Hanoverians?"[18] At this point, Gunning resorted to begging, pleading, and that most unhelpful of suggestions, 'we could have assisted the Turks in the late war.' Gunning then attempted to negotiate for a smaller body of troops, reducing his request to 15,000 men. Panin was noncommittal, and Gunning concluded, "I can scarcely entertain any Hopes at present that Her Imperial Majesty will be prevailed upon to send Troops to America[.]"[19]
Finally, Catherine II sent a lengthy letter to George III via Gunning. Despite a warm and effusive opening, Catherine indicated that, "your minister explains and desires a body of twenty thousand men from my troops be transported to Canada next spring, I cannot hide from your Majesty that such aid with such a destination not only sits ill with me, but also exceeds the limits of my powers to oblige."[] She continued, "Nor can I stop thinking about what should have resulted for Our own dignity, if two monarchies and two nations had thus joined of our forces simply to calm a rebellion."[20]
In summary, though Gunning and Suffolk worked at some length to obtain a body of Russian subsidy troops, the opinions of Count Osterman and other prominent members of the Russian Court intervened to prevent Russian soldiers from intervening on the British side of the American War of Independence.
Now, we turn to that most dangerous of historical enterprises: the counterfactual hypothesis. What would have occurred if Tsarina and her ministers had been disposed to accept the subsidy treaty with the government of George III? Obviously, take what follows with a giant helping of salt.
 |
Period drawing of Russian Troops, 18th Century
Unknown artist, oil on canvas, image graciously provided by Артур Юшкевич
|
Assuming all went well with the inspection and embarkation of troops on March 25th, the Russian force of 20,000 men would have been available for the New York offensive, and could have arrived off Long Island with the rest of Howe's forces by the end of June. Uniformed in their red summer jackets the Russians would have fit in quite well with the British forces. There is little doubt that they would have performed as effectively as the Hessians did in the late summer and fall campaign across New York in 1776. As the year drew to a close, gaining a similar amount of ground, Howe would likely have dispersed his men into garrisons, and placed 1,500 men under the command of Major General Alexander Suvorov in the area around Trenton. Following established Russian doctrine, Suvorov followed his subordinates' suggestion to place redoubts around key positions at Trenton. When the American attack came on December 26th, 1776, the Russians where still operationally surprised, but doggedly held out in their defensive positions, suffering numerous casualties, but rebuffing Washington's surprise counterattack. With the final failure of this gamble, American resistance continued, but the war ended in a negotiated settlement with most of the thirteenth colonies returning to British rule. Perhaps a bit too, "on the nose," but you get the point.
Thanks for Reading,
Alex Burns
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Robert Gunning to Earl of Suffolk, August 8th 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 44,46.
[2] Ibid, 45.
[3]Suffolk to Gunning, 8th September 1775, TNA UK, SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 59-60.
[4] Ibid
[5] Draft of Subsidy Treaty, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 63.
[6] Ibid, 62-65.
[7] Suffolk to Gunning, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 72.
[8] Ibid
[9]Gunning to Suffolk, 11th September 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 99-100.
[10]Ibid.
[11] Gunning to Suffolk, 1st October, 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 109.
[12] Ibid, 110.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 111.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, 112.
[17] Ibid, 113.
[18] Ibid, 114.
[19] Catherine II to George III, 7th October 1775, TNA UK SP 91 Russia, Vol 99, 128.
[20] Ibid, 129.
