How Often did Regular Troops Fight as "Skirmishers" in the Mid-Eighteenth Century?

Hessian Flanquers in North America

Dear Reader,


When thinking about skirmishers, those alive to a sense of the past often locate their development in the Napoleonic era, with the French tirailleurs, and their quick emulation by all of the states of Europe. In fact, it appears that a form of skirmisher, often called "flanquers", "flanqueur," or sometimes "Blänkerer" by French and German speakers, or Flankers, by the English speakers, developed during the eighteenth century. This is often controversial, as many military history enthusiasts believe that eighteenth-century soldiers were not trustworthy enough to fight in this fashion and that they would desert if fighting in this style. It is important to note: when using the term, "skirmishers" in this post, I am not referring to dedicated light infantry or ranger units, but the use of integrated skirmishers by regiments of infantry and cavalry. While these soldiers were not universally employed, it is possible to locate them before the French Revolution.

Very few historians have discussed this phenomenon previously. Notably, Jonathan Abel discusses it in his excellent book, Guibert: Father of Napoleon's Grand Army.  I published an article on the subject in the Spring 2014 issue Journal of the Seven Years' War Association. [1] Other authors have discussed light infantry troops in the eighteenth century in some detail, such as Brent Nosworhty, Matthew Spring, Christopher Duffy, and Hugh Boscawen. Most of these authors focus on dedicated light infantry, such as the light infantry battalions of the American War of Independence, Jägers or Frei-Infanterie in the service of Frederick the Great, or French Chasseurs such as the Chasseurs de Fischer.

We will not be focusing on dedicated light infantry, which is a separate topic

We need to carefully interrogate the usage of the term "flankers" as at times, this term is used to refer to bodies of cavalry or infantry drawn off to guard the flanks of a marching army, not necessarily integrated skirmishers. In his Principles of Military Movement, David Dundas mentions the idea of "skirmishing with the flankers" as a part of the normal process of engaging "for a small Corps."[2] Discussing European innovations, he indicates, "[European Armies] form separate corps, but still preserve the greatest order. Their skirmishers and dispersed men are loose, detached, and numerous... but a firm reserve always remains to rally upon."[3] Considering that Dundas wrote his book in 1788, we cannot attribute his observations to the French Revolutionary era, but rather the 1780s and earlier.

 We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century. A Hungarian officer reported that at the Battle of Mollwitz, "Our infantry had advanced a platoon of men in front of each battalion, to attack the enemy first, and be supported by us, yet this was not observed, and robbed us of the only means of striking such as well-trained enemy."[4] There are other examples of such detached platoons, but it is not clear if these men were operating in loose order.[5]

Cavalry, in particular units like Hussars, took on an important role in the eighteenth-century skirmishing. These units could fight alongside other cavalry in the line of battle, but would often detach small numbers of men (again, usually called Flanquer or Blänkerer), to skirmish. At the Battle of Rocoux during the War of Austrian Succession, Sampson Staniforth recalled that, "the Queen of Hungary's light-horse and theirs skirmished between us [and the French.]"[6]

A Member of Luckner's Hussars

In a letter describing the battle of Bergen, fought on April 13th, 1759, Ferdinand of Brunswick described the early stages of the action. Ferdinand states that, "I ordered our Grenadiers and Jägers to amuse the enemy by detached platoons, so that our columns would have time to arrive."[7] In describing the opening of the Battle of Minden, he reported, "infantry platoons drove in the enemy pickets."[8] The French also used this tactic: " Mr. [Duc] de Broglie pushed forward infantry platoons in front of his first line and drove the grand picquets of the enemy."[9] Brent Nosworthy describes the French practice of using skirmishers briefly in Anatomy of Victory.[10] By pointing to French skirmishers in the 1720s and 1730s, Nosworthy does an excellent job of showing that skirmishers never fell into disuse, they were simply less common.[11]

A French Officer Takes Aim 

The idea that the French employed skirmishers in the Seven Years' War is confirmed by a letter from  Victor-Francois, Duc de Broglie. In this letter, Broglie confirms that in the winter of 1759-1760 French infantry regiments trained 50 men per battalion to operate as skirmishers.[12] The 1764 Ordonnance du Roi, which was likely written by de Broglie, the French Infantry are instructed to use skirmishers:

"Nothing should prevent you, when on the advance or retreat, from detaching a half-section, and scattering these volonteers in front of the battlion, to make a feu de billebaude, and then retreat through the intervals behind the battalion when the enemy is very close."[13]

In addition to this adoption after the war, there is evidence to suggest that the French may have begun using integrated line skirmishers, particularly towards the end of the Seven Years' War, in small encounters. At the attempt on Lippstadt, on July 1st, 1759, the Comte de Melfort described his use of skirmishers in a small confrontation with Hanoverian troops.

The Comte de Melfort's map of Lippstadt

Melfort also drew a map of the action, shown in above. In the battle, the French used skirmishers in an attempt to clear the way for an attack. In his letter, Melfort uses the term, Tirailleurs: the traditional French term for skirmishers which we commonly associate with the French Revolutionary Wars. A French dictionary from 1752 defines a "Tirailleur" as, "one who skirmishes."[14] Melfort's choice of this term, and the forces present at the battle possibly indicates that he is referring to line infantry skirmishers, not Chasseurs or Volontaires Thus, according to the letter and map of the Comte de Melfort, both the French and the Hanoverians used skirmishers in this conflict.[15] It seems that in the case of the western front of the Seven Years' War, skirmishers were at the very least employed by the French, and that the Hessians encountered and emulated this practice in the American War of Independence.

It is unclear whether Prussian line infantry regiments utilized flanquers in the Seven Years' War. Rather, it seems that the Prussian Infantry may have used Heckenfeuer, what Christopher Duffy has called a type of "controlled skirmishing". In this process, two files advanced ahead of the regimental body, formed in two ranks, fired, and then retired to the main body while reloading. This process enabled the battalion to keep up a small but consistent rate of fire, while retaining a reserve of loaded muskets.[16] The reenactors of Infanterie Regiment von Kalnein (IR4) displayed this tactic in a video a few years ago. On March 3rd 1777 (or 1778, the source is unclear), the Prussian Cabinet ordered 10 men per infantry company to be drilled as skirmishers in order to serve in patrols and detachments.[17]

The Prussians may have employed skirmishers, as Frederick II of Prussia gave detailed instructions for that "officer who is... to cover an army or regiment whilst they are deploying... must send out flankers towards the enemy, who, by keeping up a constant firing, will endeavor to disperse them[.]"[18] Based on the context, it is very likely that this instruction is meant specifically for cavalry officers.  Prussian cavalry flanquers were noted both by contemporary authors and subsequent historians.[19] It seems at that times, cavalry flanquers were used to screen attacking infantry.[20]

In the western hemisphere, there is some evidence to suggest that the British used skirmishers to prepare the way for an assault on the Castillo de Immaculate Concepcion in Nicaragua, on July 26th 1762.[21] A soldier of the Reichsarmee recalled that in 1762, "Our flanqueurs engaged the enemy in disorder, and were driven past their positions.[22] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, a Prussian Hussar officer, noted that one of the principal duties of the Prussian Jägers was to, "keep enemy flankers at a distance."[23] In September of 1778, Prussian observers reported encountering enemy "flanqueurs" on their way to a hilltop position.[24] In his Geschichte des Kriegskunst, published in 1800, Johann Gottfried von Hoyer asserted that the German "flanqueur", like the Volontair and the Jäger, had preceded the Tirailleur of the French Revolution.[25] After the Seven Years' War in Europe, another European army, the Hessians, brought flanquers to North America.

The Battle of Long Island in August of 1776 provides one of the clearest examples of the use of skirmishers in the eighteenth century. A number of reports from junior officers describe this practice, as does General Heister, the overall commander of the Hessian troops on Long Island:

"[T]he rest of the infantry perform honorable service, which is evident from the reports of more than a few regiments. The platoons of skirmishers peel out, at all times gives the best service; but the main battalions are always closed up arm in arm, following the skirmishers at a musket shot distance, unless the rough terrain forces them, at some times, to break ranks, which the reports show is happening rather often."[26]

Hessian Flanquers in the New York Campaign

This practice also occurred at the Battle of White Plains, and the Hessians even tried to deploy their skirmishers at the Battle of Trenton. At a later stage of the battle, the Regiment von Knyphausen was desperately attempting to ford a creek and escape from the Americans. 2nd Lt. Sobbe recalled that in order to by time, "Captain von Biesenrodt had thereupon called out, 'skirmishers to the fore.'"[27] It was then Sobbe's responsibility to: "run around the battalion in order to call out the skirmishers required, and to form them up."[28] Junoir officers such as Lieutenants also led these skirmishers forward. Another such officer present at Trenton, Second Lt. Werner von Ferry recalled that after Captain von Biesenrodt's order, he, ""Marched forward with the skirmishers up the hill."[29] He continues:

"The skirmishers were fired on from the woods by the militia, and immediately... Lord Sterling and his brigade,... had marched up on this same hill...because the enemy were pressing... in such great strength [he and the skirmishers] had been forced to retire to the regiment."[30]

In this anecdote, Von Ferry gives a deployment of skirmishers from beginning to end. These troops advanced forward, attempted to screen the regiment, and when the enemy strength became too great, they retired on their main body. Not content to let his junior officers tell the story, Captain von Biesenrodt also described his role in sending skirmishers forward at Trenton. Biesenrodt stated that, "The skirmishers that I sent forward had begun to fire, but very few of the muskets would go off, owing to the heavy snow and rain." A little further on, Biesenrodt indicated, "The enemy had pressed on in such great numbers," that the skirmishers had been forced to retire. [31]

Hessian Flanquers on the Move

In this second testimony, Biesenrodt gives insight into the thinking which led him to deploy skirmishers, and what his goal in doing so had been. As the von Knyphausen regiment was caught between the Americans and a marshy creek, he had been attempting to find a ford, by which the men of the regiment could escape. Thus, in his words, his, "intention had been cover the regiments crossing through the water with the skirmishers, and... to make with them also the rear guard." Sadly, Biesenrodt noted that his had been made, "impossible by the rapid approach of the overpowering enemy." From this testimony, it is apparent that the deployment of skirmishers could not only be used to cover the regiment during an attack, but also to cover a regiment during withdrawal.[32] So, having established that the Hessians did indeed use skirmishers as they might be understood in the Napoleonic era, we need to examine evidence from other armies in the American War of Independence.

In the American War of Independence,  the British used "skirmishers" in specific instances. Many authorities, such as Matthew H. Spring, assert that they did not, and we must grapple with this view. [33] Although the British army adapted to North America in other ways, there is some evidence to suggest that on a local level, the British Army used skirmishers. The 71st Regiment of Foot was issued standing orders which indicated:

If the Battalion is commanded to engage in a woods, thicket or country, one or more Sections will be detached in front of each Company with an Officer at the head of each who are immediately to occupy every Tree, Stump, Log, Bush, Rock, Cleft, Hedge, Wall, or in short, any kind of covering which can afford them tolerable shelter from the enemy...When the Signal for Action is given, the firings are immediately to commence on which Occasion every man shall take the most direct aim possible at the most Favourable Object in his front and without waiting for an Officer’s orders with respect to times continue to load, present, and fire with the utmost alacrity, deliberation and accuracy ‘til the firings are ordered to cease.[34]

 Officers commanding these sections of what we might call skirmishers were ordered to:

Officers commanding Sections to observe the same attention with regard to their particular place of their Sections in front of each Company and that their respective diversions shall not only be judiciously dispersed but that every Soldier shall hug their coverts in the most compleat manner possible for giving annoyance to the enemy and perfect security to themselves— If the troops are ordered to move in any direction they are to spring from tree to tree, Stump, Log, & etc with the utmost Agility & continue to fire, load and spring as they advance upon or retreat from the enemy. If the Point of War is beat, they are to rush upon the enemy with Charged Bayonets.[35]

In describing the Saratoga campaign, General John Burgoyne reported that a British column at Saratoga was preceded by, "scouts and flankers," but this could simply mean troops guarding the flankers of the column. Interestingly, he also states that, "the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained."[36] This language appears to share some similarities with the descriptions above.

In the orders to the Irish Establishment issued by General Townsend in 1772, light infantrymen are to, "advance a guard and detach flanking parties," when moving through rough terrain. This may simply be instructions for guarding the flanks of a column while on the march, but Townshend also instructs: "the flanking parties to march in front and the files to move at a distance of ten yards from each other, when either of these parties shall discover an enemy, they are not to run into the main body."[37]

An image of the Battle of Brandywine, which may picture skirmishers, drawn by a contemporary

The Continental Army also employed screening bodies of men, with orders to engage the enemy until forced to fall back on the main battle line. Captain Henry Lee reported that at the Battle of Brandywine:

"Three small detachments, commanded by lietenant colonels Parker, Heth, and Simms, of the Virginia line, were, early in the morning, spearately and advantageously posted by the brigadier... and captain Porterfield, with a company of infantry, preceded these parties with orders to deliver his fire as soon as he should meet the van of the enemy, and then to fall back."[38]

Thomas J. McGuire argues that skirmishers are represented in a rare contemporary battle image: A Battery of the Rebels opened on Brandywine Heights.This image, above,  shows groups of Americans firing on British positions in front of the main American battle line. [39]

I think it is clear from the evidence above, that the Hessians, in the American War of Independence, and the French army of the Seven Years' War utilized regular infantrymen as skirmishers in the eighteenth-century. Other European armies fighting in the Seven Years' War, may have adopted skirmishers which operated by detachment from formed bodies of infantry or cavalry. This development is not something only located for the first time in the Napoleonic era, but used throughout most eras of history.

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Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


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[1]"Flanquers und Pelotons: Hessian Links between the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence" Journal of the Seven Years' War Association, Spring 2014: (4-16)
[2] David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, Appendix page 82.
[3] Ibid, 13.
[4] Anon. Sammlung ungeduckter Nachrichten, Vol. 1, 35.
[5] Ibid, Vol. 4, 568.
[6] Thomas Jackson, Early Lives of the Methodist Preachers, 135-136.
[7] Westphalen, Geschichte Der Feldzüge Des Herzogs Ferdinand  Vol. 3  242.
[8] Ibid, 468.
[9] Ibid, 544.
[10] Brent Nosworthy, Anatomy of Victory, 338-340.
[11] Brent Nosworthy, With Musket, Cannon and Sword, 247.
[12] Jean Lambert Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siecle, 75-79.
[13] [Broglie], Ordonnance du roi, pour régler l'exercice de l'infanterie . Du 20 mars 1764, 106-107.
[14] Services historiques de l'armée de terre, A1 3518, pièce 40.
[15] Annibale Antonini, Dictionnaire françois, latin & italien, 520.
[16] Christopher Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 127.
[17] Pascal Bressonet, Études tactiques sur la campagne de 1806, 371.
[18] Frederick II, Translated by T. Foster, Military Instruction from the Late King of Prussia, 62.
[19] Von Gauid, Journal vom Siebenjährigen Krieg, Vol 7, 220.; Achim Kloppert, Der Schlesische Feldzug von 1762, 404.
[20]Publicationen aus den Preussischen staatsarchiven, Vol 22, 359.
[21]Roberto T. Bada, "Defensas Estratégicas De La Capitanía General De Guatemala Castillos De La Inmaculada Concepción Y De San Carlos," Revista De Temas Nicaragüenses, February 2011, 178.
[22] Anonymous, Beyträge zur neuern Staats-Und Krieges-Geschichte, 335.
[23] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Remarks on Cavalry, 106.
[24] Comte de Schmettau, Mémoires raisonnés sur la campagne de 1778 en Bohéme, 186-187
[25]Johann Gottfried von Hoyer, Geschichte des Kriegskunst, 941.
[26] StaMarburg 4h.410 nr. 1 507, Heister zu Landgraf, 21 March, 1777. For other accounts of this practice, see: Jakob Piel, Defeat, Disaster and Dedication: The Diaries of the Hessian Officers Jakob Piel and Andreas Wiederhold, 17. Karl Friedrich. Rüffer, The Hesse-Cassel Mirbach Regiment in the American Revolution , 54.; Johann Heinrich Von Bardeleben, The Diary of Lieutenant Von Bardeleben and Other Von Donop Regiment Documents, 56.
[27] "The Affair at Trenton," in Hessian Documents of the American Revolution(Boston: G.K. Hall, 1989), M.L.375, microform.
[28] Ibid.
[29] "The Affair at Trenton," M.L. 444.
[30] Ibid,
[31] Ibid, 456
[32] Ibid, 481.
[33] Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 252.
[34] Order Book, Standing Orders of the 71st Regiment, Huntington Library, NRAS28/19, 8-9.
[35] Ibid.
[36] John Burgoyne, A Brief Examination of the Plan and Conduct.. 33.
[37] Townshend, Orders for the Irish Establishment, July 17th, 1772.
[38] Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, 15.
[39] Thomas McGuire, The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol 1. 225.

Did Melee Combat Frequently Occur on Eighteenth-Century Battlefields?

British Troops prepare to charge at Guilford Courthouse

Dear Reader,

We have charted some interesting territory over the past couple of weeks. It seems that mid-eighteenth-century soldiers frequently fired away their entire ammunition load, engaged in firefights at a much greater distance than is usually assumed, and sometimes fired at will, rather than fire by platoon or division. What does all this mean for eighteenth-century combat? If troops fired quickly, it can help to explain the ammunition usage, and the range of combat can help historians make sense of the large numbers of rounds expended vs. small number of casualties.

What does all this mean for melee (hand to hand, close) combat? Did eighteenth-century soldiers engage in melee combat frequently? If the Swedish Army during the Great Northern War and the British Army during the American War of Independence preferred bayonet attacks, surely there was a good deal of hand-to-hand combat?

Melee combat occurred, but it was perhaps less frequent than might be initially imagined. I am sure we can all think of famous examples: Culloden, Bunker Hill, and Guilford Courthouse all seem like important examples. When fighting against the Ottoman Empire, both Russian and Austrian soldiers reported fierce hand-to-hand struggles. Many military commanders, at some point in their careers, seemed to prefer an armes blanche or cold steel attack. Frederick the Great advocated this idea in the early Seven Years' War, Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov famously stated that, "the bullet is a mad thing, put your trust in the bayonet." With these ideas spreading, surely hand to hand combat was frequent?

An artist's reimagining of Prussian Troops at the Battle of Leuthen

In reality, hand-to-hand, or melee combat was often limited to a select number of places on the battlefield. When enemy troops appeared to make a serious advance into close range with bayonets, defending troops often melted away. That is why the Swedish Karoliner and British redcoats proved so effective on their respective battlefields. It also helps to explain why, when things went wrong for troops making a charge with cold steel, they went very wrong (such as at Poltava in 1709 and Cowpens in 1781.)Troops did experience hand-to-hand combat, but firepower (at range) was the order of the day. In William Dalrymple's 1782 essay on tactics, he asserted (in the case of infantry):

"There is probably not an instance of modern troops being engaged in close combat... the bayonet can be of little utility by way of impulsion in the field... these defects in modern infantry prove the impracticability of two battalions, opposed to each other, being brough in the open field to close encounter: one body must give way before they get into action."[1]

Though Dalrymple is exaggerating for effect, we would be wise to take his point. In the open field, when flight was a possibility, it was rare for two battalions of infantry to cross bayonets. Nonetheless, other types of melee combat did occur, and are worth discussing. Even in nations where military theorists preferred bayonets, such as the French, soldiers realized that actual bayonet fighting was rare in this era. French military authority Jacques Antoine de Guibert understood the issue in this way:

"Finally, it seems that the entire exercise of the bayonet consists of fixing bayonets, presenting, and unfixing. I do not wish, as is currently the case, that troops should only use bayonets at parades and reviews. I would like them to be placed, as in combat, or rather in simulated motions which represent it. Soldiers have become familiar with bayonets, and view them as an unnecessary arm. They consider it to be a weapon without a use. Soldiers, and French soldiers above all, believed, "Well, I am out of ammunition, so only bayonets are left."... According to the method of the German infantry, our troops always march with fixed bayonets, in a unique way, a weapon that is always ready but never used."[2]

In short, during cavalry action, attacks on defensive works, and surprise attacks, troops often engaged in melee combat. These were the places for bayonets, not in the open field against other infantry.

Prussian Cavalry on the Charge

When cavalry troops were involved, melee combat was quite frequent. At Guilford Courthouse, William Washington's light dragoons savaged the British 2nd Guards.[3] One of these light dragoons, Peter Francisco gave us a window in the visceral intensity of this type of combat:

“Colonel Washington, observing their maneuvering, made a charge upon them, in which charge he (Francisco) was wounded in the thigh by a bayonet, from the knee to the socket of the hip, and in the presence of many, he was seen to kill two men, besides making many other panes which were doubtless fatal to others.”[4]

At the Battle of Hohenfriedberg. the Bayreuth Dragooner swept away a large portion of the Austrian army.[5] Lt. Francois de Chasot, a friend of Frederick "the Great" of Prussia, gave his recollection of the attack:

At the start we moved at a walk. We crossed several ditches one rank at a time, and on each occasion I made the leading rank halt of the far side so as to give the reward two ranks time to catch up. Then we broke into a trot, and finally into a full gallop, putting our heads down and running into the Austrian grenadiers. At first they stood bravely, and fired a salvo at twenty paces. After that, they were overthrown and cut down.[6] 

Unlike dragoons and cuirassiers, Prussian Hussars had curved swords 

When fighting other cavalry, it appears that the horses would seek intervals through the enemy formation, leading to brief moments of intense combat followed by maneuvering. In moments of true melee combat, all order was lost, and horses and men swirled around in an individual combat. Even here, however, cavalry melee was perhaps less effective than frequently believed. In the 1780s, military theorists studying the Prussian army recorded, "We heard from some cavalry officers that when troops undertake a charge, almost always, one troop flees before melee is joined, and the other gives pursuit."[7] Georg Tempelhof, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, reported,

"The strength of cavalry consists in its movement: it must have the ability to maneuver with speed. The shock or charge has no effect unless it happens in this way. Forgive me if I do not consider the cavalry's shock to be so decisive as it seems. In 1762 I observed Prussian cavalry charging superior Austrian horsemen. The result was that on both sides there were a few hundred wounded and prisoners. Not a single death was recorded."[8]

It is possible that Tempelhof, as an artillerist, underestimated the potency of cavalry. Horsemen, then, particularly in Europe, preferred to engage in hand to hand combat. Cavalry officers endlessly debated whether or not it was more effective to cut or thrust against the enemy, or whether straight or curved swords were more effective. Frederick II of Prussia was once pressed on this issue:

Speaking one day with his Majesty the King of Prussia, of this diversity of opinions, with regard to the edge or the point, he answered, " Kill your enemy with the one or the other, I will never bring you to an account with which you did it."[9]

Having addressed cavalry, we will now turn to another example of troops in melee combat: combat over defended positions.

Reenactors in the processes of assaulting a Redoubt

When defending soldiers held fortified or prepared positions, melee combat could be fierce. Soldiers attached great pyschological important to their defensive works, and often tangled with enemy troops in melee combat in order to defend them. In discussing this issue, Christopher Duffy presents evidence that soldiers actually had difficulty understanding that they needed to use their bayonets in these type of assaults.[10] Even insignificant defensive positions could motivate defending troops to stand, such as the rail fence which the North Carolina troops sheltered behind at Guilford Courthouse in 1781. An advancing Hessian soldier, recalling the fighting over this obsticale, only commented, "Colonel Du Buy at once ordered, "Fix bayonets! March! Before the enemy could reload, we changed against them with our bayonets. Everyone was bayoneted."[11]

Obviously, this type of melee action includes siege warfare. During the Siege of Schweidnitz in 1762, Austrian 1st Lt. Waldhütter and thirty men of the Erzherzog Carl regiment spearheaded a successful sortie against the besieging Prussian forces. Franz Guasco, the fortress commandant, left this description of the sortie:

"Waldhütter and his troops jumped inside without hesitation and found the Prussians on their guard.Some of the opened fire, while some knelt on the floor and raised their muskets, the bayonets fixed to the muzzles. Our men flung themselves blindly among them, sabre in hand; some of them were skewered on the bayonets, but the rest set about the enemy and hacked them to pieces."[12]

Alexander Hamilton was briefly involved in bayonet fighting during the storming of redoubts 9 and 10 at the siege of Yorktown. Joseph Plumb Martin is silent on the exact nature of the fighting inside the redoubts.[13]  Hamilton reported that men under his command suffered a number of "bayonet wounds," in the course of the fighting.[14]

Xavier della Gatta's impression of the Battle of Paoli

Troops often fought with bayonets during surprise attacks or "massacres." 
The American War of Independence produced a number of famous night-attacks which led to bayonet fighting, both of these, at Paoli in 1777 and Tappan in 1778 were extremely violent affairs, with many soldiers being killed both in and out of combat. At both Paoli and Tappan, British troops bayoneted Americans, and there is indeed evidence that Americans fought back with bayonets. This type of fighting was quite intense from a psychological perspective, and you often find descriptions of men, who like Captain Sir James Baird, killed large numbers of enemy troops singlehandedly. In addition to fighting with bayonets, troops at Paoli and Tappan burned to death, and were killed by firepower. Lt. Martin Hunter described the scene: "the camp was immediately set on fire; the Light Infantry bayonetted every man they came up with... this, with the cries of the wounded, formed altogether the most dreadful scene I ever beheld. Every man that fired was immediately put to death."[15]

The Attack at Hochkirch by Hyacinthe de La Pegna

During the Seven Years' War, the Austrians managed to inflict similar damage on the Prussian army. At the Battle of Hochkirch in 1758, Austrian columns overran the Prussian camp before some Prussians were even awake. Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, a Prussian veteran, described what it was like the be on the receiving end of such a swift-moving attack:

"It was dark, and confusion reigned supreme. What a sight for these warriors, almost like a night terror. The Austrians seemed to emerge from the earth, in the midst of the Prussian flags at the center of camp! Several hundred men were killed before they could open their eyes, and others ran half-naked to their weapons. Only a few could reach them. Others laid ahold of whatever was closest to hand, and began to fight."[16]

Here we have an example of true melee, with thousands of soldiers fighting and dying in close combat. However, even here, it is important to note the ways in which this melee is unique. The Prussian army was surprised in camp, and fought a battle of desperation because of the impossibility of escape. In the open, troops would have fled long before this point.

British Troops with charged bayonets

So, did troops in the open really not cross bayonets? Outside of the above-mentioned categories, infantry forces actually crossing bayonets when one force had the option to flee seems to have been quite rare. Again, there are instances such as Culloden and Guilford Courthouse, but those remained more the exception than the rule.  According to one French report, 68.8% percent of troops were wounded by small arms fire, 14.7% were wounded by artillery fire, and approximately 15% were wounded by swords and bayonets.[17] When we consider that swords were the cavalry's main form of engaging the enemy, these figures are impressive. J. F. Puysegur argued that,

"firearms are the most desctructive category of weapon, and now more than ever. If you need convinving, just go to the hospital and you will see how few men have been wounded by cold steel as opposed to firearms. My argument is not advanced lightly. It is founded on knowledge.[18]

Because Puysegur was writing in the 1740s, before the Seven Years' War, his experience is even more telling. Other military theorists, such as David Dundas, recalled,  "... infantry seldom mix with bayonets."[19] These eighteenth-century military observations match well with those from the twentieth century:

"The vast majority of soldiers who do approach bayonet range with the enemy use the butt of the weapon or any other available means to incapacitate the enemy rather than skewer him... when the bayonet is used, the close range results in a situation with enormous potential for psychological trauma... The resistance to killing with the bayonet is equal only to the enemy's horro at having this done to him. Thus in bayonet charges one side or the other inveriably flees before the actual crossing of bayonets occurs."[20] 

Reenactors at Guilford Courthouse

 Thus even in desperate circumstances, such as the battle of the third line at Guilford Courthouse, we see infantry attempting to load and fire while in melee combat. Captain John Smith of the 1st Maryland Regiment found himself in heavy melee combat against the British guards, but was shot in the head at extremely close range (non-fatally by buckshot, as it turns out) by a soldier who had just loaded.[21] Therefore, there may be some truth psychological prejudice against using bayonets, even in the eighteenth-century. Lt. Colonel John Graves Simcoe described realistic small unit training which kept this principle in mind:

"they were, particularly, trained to attack a supposed enemy, posted behind railing, the common position of the rebels; they were instructed not to fire, but to charge their bayonets with their muskets loaded, and, upon their arrival at the fence, each soldier to take his aim at their opponents, who were then supposed to have been driven from it; they were taught that, in the position of running, their bodies afforded a less and more uncertain mark to their antagonists, whose minds also must be perturbed by the rapidity of their approach..."[22]

Here, we can see that when driving enemy from a position, infantry were trained to fire at fleeing men, rather than attempt to chase them down with bayonets. Obviously, melee occurred in the eighteenth century. However, it was not a common occurence, and seems to have become less prevelant over the course of the era.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for reading,


Alex Burns

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] William Dalrymple, Tacticks, 113.
[2] Guibert, Essai général de tactique, 81.
[3] Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard, Long Obstinate and Bloody, 160.
[4]Letter of Peter Francisco, William and Mary College Quarterly, (1905) Vol 10, 219.
[5] Christopher Duffy, Military Life of Frederick the Great, 64.
[6] Matthias Kröger, Friedrich der Große und General Chasot, 38.
[7] Mirabeau and Mauvillon, Systeme militaire de Prusse, 104.
[8] Georg F. Tempelhof, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland, 68.
[9] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Remarks on Cavalry, 17.
[10] Christopher Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 204-5.
[11] Bertold Koch, The Battle of Guilford Courthouse, 7.
[12] Kriegs Archiv, Vienna, HKR Memoires 1762  880/12, Guasco, Relation du Siege de Schweidnitz, 31 October, 1762.
[13] Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, 237.
[14] Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Vol 8, 47.
[15] Martin Hunter, Journal, 31.
[16] Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges, Vol 2, 279.
[17] Andre Corvisier, L'Armee Francaise, 64.
[18] Puysegur, Art de guerre par pricipes et par regles, Vol 1, 227. (Translation is Christopher Duffy's.)
[19] David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, 51.
[20] David Grossman, On Killing, 120.
[21] Babits and Howard, Long Obstinate and Bloody, 159.
[22] John Simcoe, Simcoe's Military Journal, 98.

Eighteenth-Century Combat Podcast

British Troops Maneuvering in Close Order

Dear Reader,

I had the great privilege of being a guest on Rob Rhodes' History to Wargames podcast. In this episode, we discussed the nature combat in the mid-eighteenth century. By its very nature, a podcast is perhaps less "scientific" or footnoted than the written word, but Rob and I had a lively discussion, and I thoroughly enjoyed being a guest on his excellent podcast.


You can find the podcast here.

We discuss a number of articles published on Kabinettskriege in recent months, troops firing without orders,  the frequency of melee combat, and troops moving at speed.

Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns

How Often did Eighteenth-Century Soldiers Fire Independently?

Members of HM 17th Regiment of Infantry engaged in a firefight

Dear Reader,

In the eighteenth century, commanders prized orderly and disciplined fire. The British and Prussian armies were famous for their level of discipline and firepower. These armies particularly valued soldiers who fired by platoons (perhaps 1/8 of the formation firing at a time.) Soldiers and junior officers regularly noted when troops were able to achieve this level of discipline and control on the battlefield. At battlefield as diverse as Mollwitz, Dettingen, Prague, the Sullivan Campaign, and Reichenbach soldiers maintained complicated firings by platoons, divisions, and battalions. [1] We should take these reports seriously: these armies were sometimes able to achieve fire-discipline.

However, it appears from the sources that troops involuntarily used another type of fire: something that in modern English we might call, "firing at will." In the eighteenth century, the English sometimes called this an "irregular," "straggling," or "running fire," the French a, "feu de billebaude" and German sources often refer to it as, "Plackerfeuer" or sometimes "Batalillenfeuer." In practice, this simply meant that troops loaded and fired as quickly as they could, often without orders from officers. It is important to carefully interrogate sources referring to "running fire," as at times this can mean a quick but orderly fire by divisions.  A number of historians have written on this topic, such as Christopher Duffy, David Blackmore, John Houlding, and Matthew Spring.

British Troops firing

I should make it clear: eighteenth-century military theorists often frowned on this type of firing, as it was perhaps less effective than controlled firing by platoons or ranks.  Despite the censure of military theorists, we can observe this type of firing in a number of sources. It was used on eighteenth-century battlefields, across most armies. The British and Prussian armies took steps to mitigate firing at will and it may have occurred less frequently, but sources still report its use in those armies. Perhaps the most famous (and controversial) description of this type of firing comes from Lt. Colonel Russell of the British Guards at the Battle of Dettingen in 1743:

"That the Austrians behaved well also is true; that except one of their battalions which fired only once by platoons, they all fired as irregular as we did; that the English infantry behaved like heroes, and as they were the major part in the action to them the honor of the day is due; that they were under no command by way of Hide Park firing, but that the whole three ranks made a running fire of their own accord, and at the same time with great judgement and skill, stooping all as low as they could, making almost every ball take palce, is true, that the enemy, when expecting our fire, dropped down, which our men perceiving, waited till they got up before they would fire as a confirmation of their coolness as well as bravery, is very certain; that the French fired in the same manner, I mean like running fires, without waiting for words of command, and that Lord Stair did often say he had seen many a battle and never saw the infantry engage in any other manner is as true.[2]

As you might expect, this statement has generated some controversy. David Blackmore has called the eyewitnesses credibility into account and has suggested that Lord Stair's comment may only apply to the French Infantry.[3] The author was two miles away from the battle, but wrote this letter two months after the battle, and would have been able to discuss the events with officers closer to the scene. The statement "Lord Stair did often say," implies that this topic was a matter of conversation, at least among officers, after Dettingen. Even if we assume that Stair's statement only applies to the French, what a statement! Another officer reported on the same battle reported that "the British infantry fired not by platoons but with perpetual volleys from right to left, loading almost as fast as they fired without ceasing so that the French were forced to retreat."[4]

Interpretive Staff representing French Troops at Fort Ticonderoga in 1758

If this practice happened at Dettingen, where else can we observe it in the eighteenth-century? Certainly, this practice was embraced by the French. In the 1750s, the Comte de Chabot argued that allowing soldiers to fire at will was superior to other systems of fire. "The French leave each man the will and power to direct his fire, and all this fire takes good effect... this is the great advantage of French fire."[5] Chabot put forth a number reasons why this type of firing might be effective, including less pressure on officers, less chance of rookie soldiers interfering and disordering the battalion, and many other reasons.[6] Sometimes, the troops would augment firing at will by laying on the ground or on their knees. It seems that the battles of Parma and Guastalla in 1734,  the French and Austrian fought mainly on their knees.[7]   Charles Immanuel de Warnery reports that on this occasion, "the infantry laid on all fours, and fired after the manner of Croats."[8]  Comte Turpin de Crisse, writing in 1770, called the feu de billebaude, "the best of all fires," and advocated that officers facilitate the fire by having men in the rear ranks load, while the men in the front ranks fired.[9] Austrian Veteran Jacob de Cogniazzo discussed the use and disadvantages of an "unregulated fire."[10] Tobias Smollet's military history, published in 1786, refers to straggling and irregular fire in reference to the British and French Infantry in 1758, but since he was not an eyewitness, we should treat these accounts with care.[11] John Knox reports that the French used, "a galling though irregular fire" at Quebec in 1759.[12]

French military author, Jacques, Comte de Guibert, discussed the varieties of infantry fire in his 1772 essay on tactics. He concluded,

Finally, the running fire, [feu de billebaude] is the only one that should take place during a musketry firefight. After two orderly discharges, there is no effort of discipline that can prevent a complicated and regular fire from degenerating into firing at will. This fire is the liveliest and most deadly of all... it is particularly suited to the French way of war. The only thing that is necessary is a signal to cease firing. Formerly, it was thought impossible that this could succeed. During a battle in the last war [the Seven Years' War] I witnessed a regiment execute this fire in a fight with the enemy, by beginning and ending with a drum beat.  This regiment fought everywhere with the same discipline and value.[13]

As I believe the next few sources will show, the Prussians fretted endlessly about their inability to perfect platoon fire, even though they were more successful in achieving this end than other armies. Charles Immanuel de Warnery, writing in 1782, summarizes some of the difficulties in firing with platoons.

"The whole world seems to cry out against our platoon fire, since on the battlefield, we can only seem to do it twice. I agree in part, as I have written elsewhere, and I believe that we could perfect this system with better principles than we have now. The first vice is the size of our platoons: they are much too big, their frontage is too wide. How can we pretend that the officer who commands the platoon, standing on the right can see his command, much less be heard when the [more senior] two officers 50 paces to the rear can barely hear themselves? The noise of the artillery, musketry, and shouts of other platoons officers, the cries of the wounded, blinding and suffocating smoke, the distance from where the [platoon] commander stands to the left of the platoon, all conspires to hide the officer from the platoon. He could not command them even if he had a voice of thunder. These are the primary obstacles which prevent us from firing by platoons, as the system currently exists. It is amazing that noone has tried to fix this. We should also carefully examine initial cause of the disorder which gets into the infantry as soon as it has started to fire. Officers agree that this is quite normal, [once the shooting starts,] they are almost no longer masters of their soldiers."[14]

An image of Scharnhorst later in life, during the Napoleonic Era

 In his 1790 handbook for officers, Prussian General Johann von Scharnhorst, entitles one of his chapter headings: "The Plackerfeuer which must be Avoided."[15] He complains about firing at will for some time, giving detailed descriptions of why it is disadvantageous. "The worst of all these is that a certain order in the battalion has been generally lost during this fire, and that the officers who have lost control of their command can only restore their attention with great difficulty, and often not at all."[16] The extensiveness of his complaints indicate that he was not merely talking from a theoretical standpoint but from first-hand experience. Other Prussian military authorities also addressed the problem of troops involuntarily firing at will.

Berenhorst in 1756

In 1798, Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst reflected on the art of war. He had served on Frederick II of Prussia's staff during the Seven Years' War, and would become an important military figure in the history of the Napoleonic era. When describing infantry firing in battle, he noted,

You begin firing by a salvo, or perhaps firing by platoons for two or three shots. Then a general blazing away follows: the usual rolling fire where everyone fires as quickly as they are loaded. Ranks and files become mixed, those in the first rank could not kneel even if they desired it, and the officers, from the lower ranks to the generals can do nothing more with this mass, until it finally begins moving forwards or backwards.[17] 

This type of firefight is perhaps the kind of combat Ulrich Bräker was referring to when he recalled of the Battle of Lobositz in 1756. A soldier with the Itzenplitz regiment, Bräker recalled that"in great heat and excitement I, I fired away nearly all my sixty rounds. My musket became so warm that I had to carry it by the sling."[18] A Prussian report from the Battle at Soor in 1745 indicates, "In the meantime, our infantry had to endure a strong fire from the small arms [of the enemy.] Our battalions began to fire without orders, the enemy withstood this and continued his fire, which brought disorder into our lines."[19]  Johan Gottfried Hoyer, who would rise to prominence as a Prussian Major-General of the Napoleonic Era, set out to describe military history between 1750 and 1799. In describing infantry fire-tactics, he describes firing by platoons and other various forms of complex firing in the eighteenth-century. Near the end of his description, he comments:

"In fact, all these types of firing were practiced in peacetime on the drill-square, but soldiers hardly used them in serious combat. Once there, everything was abandoned for running fire [plackerfeuer], that is, everyone loaded and shot for himself as fast as he could. This is highly embarrassing, as after one hundred years of practice, we can not bring common soldiers under control, and build an unfeeling shooting-machine. In the heat and confusion of battle, the instrument is only set in motion by the artist's finger. Some exceptions [to the general rule of running fire], which may be found among the Prussian troops, and only with them alone, have been made possible through their ceaseless practice. They can prove nothing against the universality of the idea shared here."[20]

Hessian Troops open fire at Guilford Courthouse

 In North America, there are examples of this type of firefight as well, though during the American War of Independence, the British used bayonet attacks and volley fire. This swift-moving sort of attack sometimes prevented a general breakdown of control. On the other hand, the forces of the young United States appear to have used this tactic frequently.[21] It occasionally happened to the British as well, as British officer Thomas Anburey describes it in his letters from Burgoyne's campaign:

"In this action, I found that all manual exercise is but an ornament, and the only object of importance it can boast of was that of loading, firing, and charging with bayonets: as to the form, the soldiers should be instructed in the best and most expeditious method. Here I cannot help observing to you, whether it proceeded from an idea of self-preservation, or natural instinct, but the soldiers greatly improved the mode they were taught in, as to expedition, for as soon as they primed their pieces, and put the cartridge into the barrel, instead of ramming it down with their rods, they struck the butt end of their piece upon the ground, and bringing it to the present, fired it off. The confusion of a man's ideas during the time of action, brave as he may be, is undoubtedly great..."[22]

This phenomenon, often called, "tap-loading" quickened the rate of fire, but had the potential to
greatly reduced muzzle-velocity. It is possible that the Austrians engaged in this practice at the Battle of Mollwitz in 1741.[23]

2nd Battalion of Light Infantry at Germantown

What does all this mean for wargamers and reenactors? The nature of many wargame rules already simulates this idea, as many rulesets give a bonus for initial firing, and have factors which slowly curtail the effectiveness of extended fire. I would argue that it should be possible for troops who stay stationary and away from the enemy (doing nothing) for a 15 minute period to reclaim this "first fire" bonus, as troops often carried extra flints, and cleaning supplies such as barrel worms, with them on the battlefield. In addition, this represents officers bring the regiment back into a state of order, which was a key part of maintaining fire discipline. In terms of effectiveness, troops who engaged in a running fire should be perhaps marginally more effective in a firefight, but at a severe disadvantage if charged by a swift-moving enemy.

For reenactors, if in a firefight lasting more than 3 volleys, (preferably at longer range) I would suggest that it is perfectly permissible to represent troops engaging in an uncontrolled firing. The unit as a whole should fire as fast as possible until the enemy moves away, or officers manage to restore order. Again, this is perhaps less likely for Prussian and British troops (although still a feature of their experience) and more common for French troops.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook, or following us on twitter. Consider checking out our exclusive content on Patreon. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] For examples of these types of reports see: Christopher Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 212-213.;  Cook, Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan,  232.; Anonymous, Schreiben eines Hollaendischen Volontairs, 5,; Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Campagnes de Frédéric II, roi de Prusse, de 1756 à 1762, 48.; David Blackmore, Descructive and Formidable, 107.; C. F. Hempel and J. F. Seyfart, Helden- Staats- und Lebens-Geschichte Des Allerdurchlauchtigsten und Grosmächtigsten Fürsten, 260.; Anonymous, Das Treffen bei Reichenbach in Schlesien Zwischen Einem Korps Preussen Unter Den Befehlen Des Herzogs Von Braunschweig-Bevern, 12-13.
[2]Historical Manuscripts Commission,  Report on the manuscripts of Mrs. Franklin-Russell-Astley, of Chequers Court, 278.
[3]Blackmore, Destructive and Formidable, 107.
[4]Lt. Colonel E. A. H. Webb, History of the 12th (The Suffolk) Regiment, 63,
[5] Chabot, Réflexions critiques sur les differens systêmes de tactique de Folard, 9-11.
[6]Ibid, 5-20.
[7] Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 213.
[8] Warnery, Des Herrn Generalmajor von Warnery sämtliche Schriften, Vol 2, 211.
[9] Turpin de Crisse, Commentaires sur les memoires de Montecuculi, 179-180
[10] Jacob de Cogniazzo, Geständnisse eines Oesterreichischen Veterans, Vol 1, 169
[11] Tobias Smollet, The History of England from the Revolution to the Death of George the Second, 189, 260.
[12] John Knox, An Historical Journal, vol 2, 128.
[13] Comte de Guibert, Essai général de tactique, 107-108. (He was describing the Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment at Vellinghausen.)
[14] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Remarques sur plusieurs auteurs militaires et autres, 69-70.
[15] Scharnhorst, Handbook für Officiere, 276.
[16] Ibid, 277.
[17] Georg Berenhorst, Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst, Vol 1, 255.
[18]Ulrich Bräker, Arme Mann, 150.
[19] Sammlung ungedruckter Nachrichten, Vol 1, 359.
[20] Johann Gottfried Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 102-103
[21] John Simcoe, Simcoe's Military Journal, 45, 146.;  Cook, Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan,  92, 95.
[22] Thomas Anbury, Travels through the Interior Parts of America, 333.
[23] Anonymous, Denckwüdiges Leben und Thaten Beruehmeten Herren Johaan Daniels von Menzel, 80.