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Wednesday, February 28, 2018

How Often did Regular Troops Fight as "Skirmishers" in the Mid-Eighteenth Century?


Hessian Flanquers in North America
Dear Reader,


When thinking about skirmishers, those alive to a sense of the past often locate their development in the Napoleonic era, with the French tirailleurs, and their quick emulation by all of the states of Europe. In fact, it appears that a form of skirmisher, often called "flanquers", "flanqueur," or sometimes "Blänkerer" by French and German speakers, or Flankers, by the English speakers, developed during the eighteenth century. This is often controversial, as many military history enthusiasts believe that eighteenth-century soldiers were not trustworthy enough to fight in this fashion and that they would desert if fighting in this style. It is important to note: when using the term, "skirmishers" in this post, I am not referring to dedicated light infantry or ranger units, but the use of integrated skirmishers by regiments of infantry and cavalry. While these soldiers were not universally employed, it is possible to locate them before the French Revolution.

Very few historians have discussed this phenomenon previously. Notably, Jonathan Abel discusses it in his excellent book, Guibert: Father of Napoleon's Grand Army.  I published an article on the subject in the Spring 2014 issue Journal of the Seven Years' War Association. [1] Other authors have discussed light infantry troops in the eighteenth century in some detail, such as Brent Nosworhty, Matthew Spring, Christopher Duffy, and Hugh Boscawen. Most of these authors focus on dedicated light infantry, such as the light infantry battalions of the American War of Independence, Jägers or Frei-Infanterie in the service of Frederick the Great, or French Chasseurs such as the Chasseurs de Fischer.

We will not be focusing on dedicated light infantry, which is a separate topic

We need to carefully interrogate the usage of the term "flankers" as at times, this term is used to refer to bodies of cavalry or infantry drawn off to guard the flanks of a marching army, not necessarily integrated skirmishers. In his Principles of Military Movement, David Dundas mentions the idea of "skirmishing with the flankers" as a part of the normal process of engaging "for a small Corps."[2] Discussing European innovations, he indicates, "[European Armies] form separate corps, but still preserve the greatest order. Their skirmishers and dispersed men are loose, detached, and numerous... but a firm reserve always remains to rally upon."[3] Considering that Dundas wrote his book in 1788, we cannot attribute his observations to the French Revolutionary era, but rather the 1780s and earlier.

 We may be able to see the first inklings of the use of skirmishers in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century. A Hungarian officer reported that at the Battle of Mollwitz, "Our infantry had advanced a platoon of men in front of each battalion, to attack the enemy first, and be supported by us, yet this was not observed, and robbed us of the only means of striking such as well-trained enemy."[4] There are other examples of such detached platoons, but it is not clear if these men were operating in loose order.[5]

Cavalry, in particular units like Hussars, took on an important role in the eighteenth-century skirmishing. These units could fight alongside other cavalry in the line of battle, but would often detach small numbers of men (again, usually called Flanquer or Blänkerer), to skirmish. At the Battle of Rocoux during the War of Austrian Succession, Sampson Staniforth recalled that, "the Queen of Hungary's light-horse and theirs skirmished between us [and the French.]"[6]

A Member of Luckner's Hussars

In a letter describing the battle of Bergen, fought on April 13th, 1759, Ferdinand of Brunswick described the early stages of the action. Ferdinand states that, "I ordered our Grenadiers and Jägers to amuse the enemy by detached platoons, so that our columns would have time to arrive."[7] In describing the opening of the Battle of Minden, he reported, "infantry platoons drove in the enemy pickets."[8] The French also used this tactic: " Mr. [Duc] de Broglie pushed forward infantry platoons in front of his first line and drove the grand picquets of the enemy."[9] Brent Nosworthy describes the French practice of using skirmishers briefly in Anatomy of Victory.[10] By pointing to French skirmishers in the 1720s and 1730s, Nosworthy does an excellent job of showing that skirmishers never fell into disuse, they were simply less common.[11]

A French Officer Takes Aim 

The idea that the French employed skirmishers in the Seven Years' War is confirmed by a letter from  Victor-Francois, Duc de Broglie. In this letter, Broglie confirms that in the winter of 1759-1760 French infantry regiments trained 50 men per battalion to operate as skirmishers.[12] The 1764 Ordonnance du Roi, which was likely written by de Broglie, the French Infantry are instructed to use skirmishers:
"Nothing should prevent you, when on the advance or retreat, from detaching a half-section, and scattering these volonteers in front of the battlion, to make a feu de billebaude, and then retreat through the intervals behind the battalion when the enemy is very close."[13]
In addition to this adoption after the war, there is evidence to suggest that the French may have begun using integrated line skirmishers, particularly towards the end of the Seven Years' War, in small encounters. At the attempt on Lippstadt, on July 1st, 1759, the Comte de Melfort described his use of skirmishers in a small confrontation with Hanoverian troops.

The Comte de Melfort's map of Lippstadt

Melfort also drew a map of the action, shown in above. In the battle, the French used skirmishers in an attempt to clear the way for an attack. In his letter, Melfort uses the term, Tirailleurs: the traditional French term for skirmishers which we commonly associate with the French Revolutionary Wars. A French dictionary from 1752 defines a "Tirailleur" as, "one who skirmishes."[14] Melfort's choice of this term, and the forces present at the battle possibly indicates that he is referring to line infantry skirmishers, not Chasseurs or Volontaires Thus, according to the letter and map of the Comte de Melfort, both the French and the Hanoverians used skirmishers in this conflict.[15] It seems that in the case of the western front of the Seven Years' War, skirmishers were at the very least employed by the French, and that the Hessians encountered and emulated this practice in the American War of Independence.

It is unclear whether Prussian line infantry regiments utilized flanquers in the Seven Years' War. Rather, it seems that the Prussian Infantry may have used Heckenfeuer, what Christopher Duffy has called a type of "controlled skirmishing". In this process, two files advanced ahead of the regimental body, formed in two ranks, fired, and then retired to the main body while reloading. This process enabled the battalion to keep up a small but consistent rate of fire, while retaining a reserve of loaded muskets.[16] The reenactors of Infanterie Regiment von Kalnein (IR4) displayed this tactic in a video a few years ago. On March 3rd 1777 (or 1778, the source is unclear), the Prussian Cabinet ordered 10 men per infantry company to be drilled as skirmishers in order to serve in patrols and detachments.[17]

The Prussians may have employed skirmishers, as Frederick II of Prussia gave detailed instructions for that "officer who is... to cover an army or regiment whilst they are deploying... must send out flankers towards the enemy, who, by keeping up a constant firing, will endeavor to disperse them[.]"[18] Based on the context, it is very likely that this instruction is meant specifically for cavalry officers.  Prussian cavalry flanquers were noted both by contemporary authors and subsequent historians.[19] It seems at that times, cavalry flanquers were used to screen attacking infantry.[20]



In the western hemisphere, there is some evidence to suggest that the British used skirmishers to prepare the way for an assault on the Castillo de Immaculate Concepcion in Nicaragua, on July 26th 1762.[21] A soldier of the Reichsarmee recalled that in 1762, "Our flanqueurs engaged the enemy in disorder, and were driven past their positions.[22] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, a Prussian Hussar officer, noted that one of the principal duties of the Prussian Jägers was to, "keep enemy flankers at a distance."[23] In September of 1778, Prussian observers reported encountering enemy "flanqueurs" on their way to a hilltop position.[24] In his Geschichte des Kriegskunst, published in 1800, Johann Gottfried von Hoyer asserted that the German "flanqueur", like the Volontair and the Jäger, had preceded the Tirailleur of the French Revolution.[25] After the Seven Years' War in Europe, another European army, the Hessians, brought flanquers to North America.

The Battle of Long Island in August of 1776 provides one of the clearest examples of the use of skirmishers in the eighteenth century. A number of reports from junior officers describe this practice, as does General Heister, the overall commander of the Hessian troops on Long Island:
"[T]he rest of the infantry perform honorable service, which is evident from the reports of more than a few regiments. The platoons of skirmishers peel out, at all times gives the best service; but the main battalions are always closed up arm in arm, following the skirmishers at a musket shot distance, unless the rough terrain forces them, at some times, to break ranks, which the reports show is happening rather often."[26]
Hessian Flanquers in the New York Campaign

This practice also occurred at the Battle of White Plains, and the Hessians even tried to deploy their skirmishers at the Battle of Trenton. At a later stage of the battle, the Regiment von Knyphausen was desperately attempting to ford a creek and escape from the Americans. 2nd Lt. Sobbe recalled that in order to by time, "Captain von Biesenrodt had thereupon called out, 'skirmishers to the fore.'"[27] It was then Sobbe's responsibility to: "run around the battalion in order to call out the skirmishers required, and to form them up."[28] Junoir officers such as Lieutenants also led these skirmishers forward. Another such officer present at Trenton, Second Lt. Werner von Ferry recalled that after Captain von Biesenrodt's order, he, ""Marched forward with the skirmishers up the hill."[29] He continues:
"The skirmishers were fired on from the woods by the militia, and immediately... Lord Sterling and his brigade,... had marched up on this same hill...because the enemy were pressing... in such great strength [he and the skirmishers] had been forced to retire to the regiment."[30]
In this anecdote, Von Ferry gives a deployment of skirmishers from beginning to end. These troops advanced forward, attempted to screen the regiment, and when the enemy strength became too great, they retired on their main body. Not content to let his junior officers tell the story, Captain von Biesenrodt also described his role in sending skirmishers forward at Trenton. Biesenrodt stated that, "The skirmishers that I sent forward had begun to fire, but very few of the muskets would go off, owing to the heavy snow and rain." A little further on, Biesenrodt indicated, "The enemy had pressed on in such great numbers," that the skirmishers had been forced to retire. [31]

Hessian Flanquers on the Move

In this second testimony, Biesenrodt gives insight into the thinking which led him to deploy skirmishers, and what his goal in doing so had been. As the von Knyphausen regiment was caught between the Americans and a marshy creek, he had been attempting to find a ford, by which the men of the regiment could escape. Thus, in his words, his, "intention had been cover the regiments crossing through the water with the skirmishers, and... to make with them also the rear guard." Sadly, Biesenrodt noted that his had been made, "impossible by the rapid approach of the overpowering enemy." From this testimony, it is apparent that the deployment of skirmishers could not only be used to cover the regiment during an attack, but also to cover a regiment during withdrawal.[32] So, having established that the Hessians did indeed use skirmishers as they might be understood in the Napoleonic era, we need to examine evidence from other armies in the American War of Independence.

In the American War of Independence,  the British used "skirmishers" in specific instances. Many authorities, such as Matthew H. Spring, assert that they did not, and we must grapple with this view. [33] Although the British army adapted to North America in other ways, there is some evidence to suggest that on a local level, the British Army used skirmishers. The 71st Regiment of Foot was issued standing orders which indicated:

If the Battalion is commanded to engage in a woods, thicket or country, one or more Sections will be detached in front of each Company with an Officer at the head of each who are immediately to occupy every Tree, Stump, Log, Bush, Rock, Cleft, Hedge, Wall, or in short, any kind of covering which can afford them tolerable shelter from the enemy...When the Signal for Action is given, the firings are immediately to commence on which Occasion every man shall take the most direct aim possible at the most Favourable Object in his front and without waiting for an Officer’s orders with respect to times continue to load, present, and fire with the utmost alacrity, deliberation and accuracy ‘til the firings are ordered to cease.[34]
 Officers commanding these sections of what we might call skirmishers were ordered to:

Officers commanding Sections to observe the same attention with regard to their particular place of their Sections in front of each Company and that their respective diversions shall not only be judiciously dispersed but that every Soldier shall hug their coverts in the most compleat manner possible for giving annoyance to the enemy and perfect security to themselves— If the troops are ordered to move in any direction they are to spring from tree to tree, Stump, Log, & etc with the utmost Agility & continue to fire, load and spring as they advance upon or retreat from the enemy. If the Point of War is beat, they are to rush upon the enemy with Charged Bayonets.[35]
In describing the Saratoga campaign, General John Burgoyne reported that a British column at Saratoga was preceded by, "scouts and flankers," but this could simply mean troops guarding the flankers of the column. Interestingly, he also states that, "the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained."[36] This language appears to share some similarities with the descriptions above.

In the orders to the Irish Establishment issued by General Townsend in 1772, light infantrymen are to, "advance a guard and detach flanking parties," when moving through rough terrain. This may simply be instructions for guarding the flanks of a column while on the march, but Townshend also instructs: "the flanking parties to march in front and the files to move at a distance of ten yards from each other, when either of these parties shall discover an enemy, they are not to run into the main body."[37]


An image of the Battle of Brandywine, which may picture skirmishers, drawn by a contemporary

The Continental Army also employed screening bodies of men, with orders to engage the enemy until forced to fall back on the main battle line. Captain Henry Lee reported that at the Battle of Brandywine:
"Three small detachments, commanded by lietenant colonels Parker, Heth, and Simms, of the Virginia line, were, early in the morning, spearately and advantageously posted by the brigadier... and captain Porterfield, with a company of infantry, preceded these parties with orders to deliver his fire as soon as he should meet the van of the enemy, and then to fall back."[38]
Thomas J. McGuire argues that skirmishers are represented in a rare contemporary battle image: A Battery of the Rebels opened on Brandywine Heights.This image, above,  shows groups of Americans firing on British positions in front of the main American battle line. [39]

I think it is clear from the evidence above, that the Hessians, in the American War of Independence, and the French army of the Seven Years' War utilized regular infantrymen as skirmishers in the eighteenth-century. Other European armies fighting in the Seven Years' War, may have adopted skirmishers which operated by detachment from formed bodies of infantry or cavalry. This development is not something only located for the first time in the Napoleonic era, but used throughout most eras of history.

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Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


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[1]"Flanquers und Pelotons: Hessian Links between the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence" Journal of the Seven Years' War Association, Spring 2014: (4-16)
[2] David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, Appendix page 82.
[3] Ibid, 13.
[4] Anon. Sammlung ungeduckter Nachrichten, Vol. 1, 35.
[5] Ibid, Vol. 4, 568.
[6] Thomas Jackson, Early Lives of the Methodist Preachers, 135-136.
[7] Westphalen, Geschichte Der Feldzüge Des Herzogs Ferdinand  Vol. 3  242.
[8] Ibid, 468.
[9] Ibid, 544.
[10] Brent Nosworthy, Anatomy of Victory, 338-340.
[11] Brent Nosworthy, With Musket, Cannon and Sword, 247.
[12] Jean Lambert Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siecle, 75-79.
[13] [Broglie], Ordonnance du roi, pour régler l'exercice de l'infanterie . Du 20 mars 1764, 106-107.
[14] Services historiques de l'armée de terre, A1 3518, pièce 40.
[15] Annibale Antonini, Dictionnaire françois, latin & italien, 520.
[16] Christopher Duffy, Army of Frederick the Great, 127.
[17] Pascal Bressonet, Études tactiques sur la campagne de 1806, 371.
[18] Frederick II, Translated by T. Foster, Military Instruction from the Late King of Prussia, 62.
[19] Von Gauid, Journal vom Siebenjährigen Krieg, Vol 7, 220.; Achim Kloppert, Der Schlesische Feldzug von 1762, 404.
[20]Publicationen aus den Preussischen staatsarchiven, Vol 22, 359.
[21]Roberto T. Bada, "Defensas Estratégicas De La Capitanía General De Guatemala Castillos De La Inmaculada Concepción Y De San Carlos," Revista De Temas Nicaragüenses, February 2011, 178.
[22] Anonymous, Beyträge zur neuern Staats-Und Krieges-Geschichte, 335.
[23] Charles Immanuel de Warnery, Remarks on Cavalry, 106.
[24] Comte de Schmettau, Mémoires raisonnés sur la campagne de 1778 en Bohéme, 186-187
[25]Johann Gottfried von Hoyer, Geschichte des Kriegskunst, 941.
[26] StaMarburg 4h.410 nr. 1 507, Heister zu Landgraf, 21 March, 1777. For other accounts of this practice, see: Jakob Piel, Defeat, Disaster and Dedication: The Diaries of the Hessian Officers Jakob Piel and Andreas Wiederhold, 17. Karl Friedrich. Rüffer, The Hesse-Cassel Mirbach Regiment in the American Revolution , 54.; Johann Heinrich Von Bardeleben, The Diary of Lieutenant Von Bardeleben and Other Von Donop Regiment Documents, 56.
[27] "The Affair at Trenton," in Hessian Documents of the American Revolution(Boston: G.K. Hall, 1989), M.L.375, microform.
[28] Ibid.
[29] "The Affair at Trenton," M.L. 444.
[30] Ibid,
[31] Ibid, 456
[32] Ibid, 481.
[33] Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 252.
[34] Order Book, Standing Orders of the 71st Regiment, Huntington Library, NRAS28/19, 8-9.
[35] Ibid.
[36] John Burgoyne, A Brief Examination of the Plan and Conduct.. 33.
[37] Townshend, Orders for the Irish Establishment, July 17th, 1772.
[38] Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, 15.
[39] Thomas McGuire, The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol 1. 225.

3 comments:

  1. Military historians have perhaps focused too narrowly on the Army of Frederick the Great, arguably the most rigidly disciplined in Europe. The War of the Austrian Succession did introduce an important change into European Warfare, though. By loosing the dreaded Pandurs on central European battlefields, Maria Theresa schooled everyone on the importance of light and irregular units. This change may have encouraged increased use of skirmishers. The general thinking has been that officers were afraid of letting their men out of line to skirmish for fear they would dissert. Your excellent article challenges that thinking. Nonetheless, skirmishing seems to have increased in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, presumably because patriotic soldiers could be trusted not to run away. Your thoughts?

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    Replies
    1. Hey Tom! Thanks for the comment! Patriotism (and other sustaining motivations) seems to have played a larger role in eighteenth-century armies than we previously thought, according to the recent book by Ilya Berkovich. Dedicated "light troops" such as Croats, Jaeger, and Pandurs played an important role, as did American Riflemen. In combating these troops, these eighteenth-century flanquers played an important role, protecting formed bodies of troops.

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