Did Soldiers Move Quickly on Eighteenth-Century Battlefields?

British Reenactors Move out at Speed

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to address one of the primary conceptions of eighteenth-century warfare: that on the battles were conducted at a slow-moving, geometrical pace to the sound of drums.  In 1987, Christopher Duffy, asserted that "the time has long since passed since it was fashionable to dismiss [warfare in] the eighteenth century as  decorative interval, suspended between the glooms and dooms of the Wars of Religion and the grinding industrialization of the nineteenth century."[1] Yet somehow, this is still the dominant image of warfare in the Kabinettskriege era. The eighteenth century, in the popular imagination, is still a time where English officers doff their hats and say to their chivalrous opponents, "gentlemen of France, fire first!"  According to this view, soldiers move to the beat of drums in perfect clockwork precision, and cannot imagine combat occurring outside of a geometric, mechanical framework. To holders of this viewpoint: this century is still a decorative interval, as the clip below indicates.

It goes without saying that some portions of this stereotype are correct. As a result of the principle weapons system of the time, the smoothbore musket, soldiers did usually fight in linear formations. In Europe, these linear formations were usually in close order. However, as I have suggested before, there was a difference in the eighteenth century, as there is today, between the parade ground and the battlefield. These officers and soldiers were not unthinking automata who were incapable of performing any tasks but those learned on the drill square. Rather, under the direction of junior officers, they frequently modified their actions to fit with local conditions. Soldiers often moved quickly on the battlefield as the situation demanded, often moving at a run in moments of crisis. 

To students of the British Army in the American War of Independence, this should not come as surprising news. Matthew H. Spring has recently shown that British soldiers fought unconventionally in North America. However: this trend goes beyond North America and the American War of Independence. Eighteenth-century soldiers were often rational actors, and made competent decisions based on the needs of the moment, and battlefield crises. This willingness to respond quickly to developing factors was not a feature of the British or Prussian armies, but common to almost all eighteenth-century militaries. In performing the research for this post, I have been careful to distinguish intentional quick movement on the battlefield from the speedy flight of retreating troops.

Jacques Mercoyrol de Beaulieu, a French veteran of the War of Polish Succession in the 1730s, recalled the types of battlefield movements possible in heat of the moment: "In these battles, (which were all victories) the Picardie Brigade... moved almost as in a race: the most nimble arrived first, their arrival awakened courage and new strength to those already engaged in combat."[2] Moving quickly, perhaps even at the run, was common enough on European battlefield when speed was required.

A nineteenth-century reimagining of the Battle at Leuthen

The Prussian army was famous for its attention drill and parade excellence. It may therefore surprise readers to learn that Prussian soldiers under Frederick the Great occasionally moved with great speed. The official war journal of the Prussian Fusilier Regiment of Jung-Brauschweig makes this clear. In describing the Battle of Prague in 1757, the journal describes two instances of quick movement: both the Prussian regiment and their Austrian opponents moved at speed.

In order to reach the position of advance, we had to pass a long dam, which delayed us. So, in order arrive at the correct time, we had to run past the village of Arhem: the regiment was not in perfect order. The (Austrian) enemy were already advancing on us at the quick step, and we engaged them.[3] 

Johann Jakob Dominicus, a musketeer in Frederick II's army, also remembers running at Prague. He wrote, "our left wing had its work cut out for it, and we had to run with energy, in order to get under the enemy guns."[4]

In Prussia, speed, and reaching the appointed position at the right time (so as not to leave a gap in the battle line) took precedence over moving in step and keeping good order.  Prussian veteran Georg von Berenhorst asserted that commanders who lost time by correcting minor irregularities in dress were punished, as maintaining a healthy and cohesive battle line was more important than keeping in parade appearances.[5]

General Ludwig Matthias von Lossow recalled that as soon as the firing began, "the orderly lines fell by the wayside, as they did whenever troops advanced through terrain, as it is rarely open enough to permit lines of this size. Units only needed to keep in contact with the other parts of the line, that was the main thing, as the experienced army of Frederick II knew well."[6] Keeping in contact with other units, and keeping up the advance, it seems, was more of a priority than keeping in perfect close order. A Dutch officer in Prussian service recalled a nighttime skirmish in 1757:

"Because of the darkness of night, we had difficulty distinguishing our troops from the enemy, so Lt. York received orders to reconnoiter the enemy with two platoons. They fired on him. Captain Rodig, who had been fired upon, rode out to these flanquers[7]... His pickets behaved bravely, and kept up and orderly fire in the manner of platoons. They then rushed forward on the command, "Marsch! Marsch!" The enemy took flight with haste. [8]

David Dundas, one of the principal English-language observers of the Prussian army in the later part of Frederick II's reign, recalled this after seeing the Prussian maneuvers in the 1780s: 

"Quick movements, which considerable columns or lines of infantry,[Frederick II] considers as impracticable and ruinous from the hurry and disorder that must thence ensue... but brigades, or smaller divisions of the line, [such as regiments or battalions] occasionally lengthen their step, and move on with rapidty at the moment of attack.[9]

British Soldiers Moving to Attack the Enemy

In delegating more responsibility to junior officers, the British facilitated quick movement even more in North America during the American War of Independence. Matthew H. Spring exhaustively shows that British troops moved at a kind of jog or trot:

"The King's troops, 'briskly marched up to' the enemy at Long Island, 'briskly ascended ' Chatterton's Hill, 'advanced fearlessly and very quickly' at Brandywine, came on at Bemis Heights at a, 'quick step' stormed for Clinton, 'with as much velocity as the ground would admit,' and 'after a very quick march moved up briskly' against the enemy at Monmouth. Likewise, in the South, the redcoats, 'marched forwards briskly, or rather rushed with great shouts,' at Savannah, were observed 'advancing rapidly' at Briar Creek, and 'rushed on with the greatest rapitity' (or 'as fast as the ploughed fields they had to cross would admit') at Spencer's Ordinary. Most expressively of all, one rebel militiman at the battle of Cowpens later recalled, 'the British line advanced at a sort of trot with a loud hallo. It was the most beautiful line I ever saw,' while another reported that the King's troops, 'advanced rapidly as if certain of victory."[10]

All of the quotes in the above paragraph come from observers present at the battles, and Spring provides a detailed footnote for those looking to track them down. Thus, in the American War of Independence, British soldiers moved quickly as part of usual practice, rather than speeding up when the circumstances demanded it. Roger Lamb recalls that the British moved forward at Guilford Courthouse, "in excellent order, at a smart run, with arms charged."[11] At the same battle, the normally slower Hessians in the Von Bose Regiment joined the British advance with speed:

"After quickly laying aside our tornisters and everything that could impede a soldier, the 71st and von Bose recieved orders to more forward and attack the enemy... We had not advanced more than 300 yards when we found a deep ditch in front of us, with tall banks and full of water. After crossing it with difficulty, we then came to a fenced wheat field; on the other side of this field 1500 continentals and militia were deployed in line... I formed the battalion into line with the greatest of speed and we ran to meet the enemy in tolerable order."[12] 

Don Troiani's Study of a Von Bose private

Other German allies of the British, the Brunswickers under Baron Riedesel, appear to have moved at speed during the culmination of a flank attack during the Battle of Freeman's Farm on September 19th, 1777. Hearing the English troops engaged with the rebel Americans, Riedesel moved out, "as quickly as possible," and launched his final attack, "at the quick-step."[13]

It is important that we do not overdraw these examples. In the eighteenth century, most European commanders valued ordered bodies of men, and preferred to attack in an orderly fashion. However, in moments of crisis, European junior officers frequently took it upon themselves to move bodies of men at speed, in order to contain crises or take advantage of conditions. The British took a decidedly different approach in the American War of Independence. In that conflict, speed was instiutionalized in the British Army. Whether in Europe or North America, these soldiers were not automata: they moved at the speed demanded by the situation.

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Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns






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[1] Christopher Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 3.
[2] Mercoyrol de Beaulieu, Campagnes, 184.
[3] Anonymous, Sammlung ungedruckter Nachrichten, Vol 4, 118.
[4] Dominicus, Tagebuch, 16.
[5] Berenhorst, Betrachtungen, Vol 1, 221.
[6] Ludwig von Lossow, Denkwürdigkeiten zu Charakteristik, 242.
[7]Possibly a type of skirmisher, see my publication in the 2014 issue of the Journal of the Seven Years' War Association.
[8] Anonymous, Schreiben eines Hollaendischen Volontairs, 5.
[9] David Dundas, Principles of Military Movement, 9.
[10] Matthew Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only, 146.
[11] Roger Lamb, Journal, 361
[12]Du Buy, Raports vom Oberst Lieut. du Buy Regts v. Bose zu der General Lieutenant v. Knyphausen, Staatsarchiv Marburg, Best. 4h Nr. 3101.
[13] Eelking, Leben und Wirken, Vol 2, 149-50.