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Friday, March 30, 2018

Reenactment Report: Kaintuck Immersion 2018


Photos from Kaintuck Immersion 2018
Dear Reader,

Today, we wanted to try something a little bit different. We have another guest author, David Ervin, who is a reenactor and author himself. He and I both attended an immersion reenactment event in eastern Kentucky this past weekend. This event was designed to replicate backcountry warfare during the American Revolution, possibly during a British-led incursion into what is now Kentucky late in the war. Alex Burns will provide the British perspective, and David Ervin will provide the American, or Congressional perspective.

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Our Sargeant and I arrived at the site of the reenactment on Friday afternoon, and hiked up into the hills in order to find a campsite for the night. Upon locating a suitable site, we began the process of cutting firewood and collecting water for the rest of the unit. As a result of the weather and various other factors, our unit made a rather small showing at this event. Most of the unit arrived by 11pm, and we spent the rest of the night trying to stay warm. The temperature dropped to below freezing, and by morning, most of the unit was huddled around a fire attempting to stay warm. Our unit began to move out around 7:45am on Saturday morning when a heavy snowfall began. All in all, around 4-5 inches of snow accumulated by the afternoon.



Moving through wooded, snowy, and elevated terrain in period clothing while expecting to fight Whigs (slang for American rebels) was somewhat challenging. Our unit moved between three and four miles, and dropped out of the hills into the bottoms of a creek. At this moment, the lead man in our formation saw what he assumed were Whigs, and our unit took cover. This suspicion was confirmed when the enemy opened fire, and we began to reply. Our sergeant gave the order, "to the front, form!" My file partner and I scrambled through the snowy undergrowth, taking a position alongside the other files. Upon the order, "Commence firing," Dakota and I began to load and fire as fast as we could. Because of the heavy snowfall, both sides had difficulty with their firelocks. After a flash in the pan,  I fired my musket fired twice and others had less luck. On the Whig side, I counted two shots. In the course of the fight, I splashed through a creek, soaking my right foot in below freezing weather. Fun.



At this point, both sides began moving back to their start positions, since neither had gained a clear advantage. Moving back into the mountainous terrain, our unit slowly marched the 3-4 miles back to camp, where we assessed the situation, decided to head out for the weekend. All in all, it was an amazing time. The snow combined with the elevated terrain made for tiring marches, and the sergeant and I moved about 14 miles by the time the weekend was all said and done. (Still just about one average day of marching for an eighteenth-century army.) I rolled my ankle several times in the course of the weekend and was quite sore overall. Despite this, the weekend was absolutely an incredible experience, one which I highly recommend to others. The weather, terrain, distance covered, and short and confusing fight made this experience seem a bit like some of the primary sources I spend time reading. I never felt as though, "I was there", but still valued the immersive experience.

A cocked hat after 4 hours of snowfall

Considering joining our unit (Lt. Colonel's Company, King's Regiment) next time for Kaintuck Immersion! You can find us on facebook here.
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The weekend of March 23-25, 2018, a dozen members of the Augusta County Militia (ACM) and the Shirttail Mess gathered at Pioneer Weapons’ Wildlife Management Area near Salt Lick, Kentucky. We were to portray a cobbled-together Kentucky militia detachment dispatched to recover the dead and wounded of a party that’d been ambushed near the banks of Cave Run Lake and to pursue any Native or British enemies that lingered in the area. On Friday we established a basecamp in an easily defensible hollow a few miles west of the objective. The weather forecast threatened wet snow and rain for Saturday, so we constructed a shelter of poles and tent linen and laid on a supply of firewood. Over supper, Captain Kraus of the ACM formulated a plan for the next day’s march. We’d advance along Buck Creek until we reached the objective in the hopes of reaching it quickly, recovering the victims, and returning to camp.



At first light, we roused and packed enough equipment to spend the night outside of basecamp. We pushed out a picquet near Buck’s Creek while the company formed, and then took up our march shortly after dawn. Three men in an advance party marched a hundred yards to our front and a flanker took up positions on each of the flanks. The middle of the formation was composed of a single Indian file, and our rear guard of three men. We were to form a large square upon enemy contact, with the file in the middle splitting off to the left and right and the advance party and rear guard making closing in if they could. Thereafter we would maneuver accordingly. It was overcast and cold, but still dry. We moved carefully. Men scouted a hundred yards up each hollow before we passed it, and we hurried past open ground.

We halted at the first crossing of Buck Creek and formed a line while the captain and a scout pushed on beyond the creek to reconnoiter. In the meantime, the weather had deteriorated. In our advance of a couple of kilometers, a downpour of heavy, wet snow had begun and showed no signs of letting up. Everything was quickly covered, and near half the men were ordered back to camp to attempt to get warm and dry. The scouts continued up the creek while a few of us held the line at the crossing. Those scouts fell in with a party of the enemy and surprised them. They treed and the captain managed to get a shot off. The enemy, too, managed to fire once, but the weather had rendered arms inoperable. As such, the scouts retreated to the crossing.



With the weather turning serious and several men’s feet wet, Captain Kraus decided that we would maintain a picquet of two men at the crossing and relieve them at short intervals. The snow turned to rain, then back to snow, and all the while we got drenched. When the picquet was relieved, we pulled back closer to the basecamp, which, at this point, offered little respite. The shelter leaked in torrents, weighed down by heavy snow. The company held a council.

The situation had changed from a tactical exercise to a real-world survival situation. Each man was asked to consider his own situation and decide for himself whether he would stay or go. A few chose to leave, but most stayed on. After a few more hours in a losing battle against the elements, however, we opted to abandon the event for safety’s sake and hoped our adversaries decided the same. We marched out to the sound of tree branches snapping under the weight of wet snow. The event was far from a bust, course. We learned valuable lessons with which we can improve our woodcraft skills and, most importantly, came out of a potentially dangerous situation unscathed – even if not very dry.



If you are interested in attending future events like this as a militiamen, check out these websites: Shirttailmess.blogspot.com and augustamilitia.com

Dave Ervin

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If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

Thursday, March 22, 2018

"My Dearest Willy": A Scottish Noblewoman Loses Her Son


Dear Reader,

Today, we have a primary source account from the mother of a British officer. The Hon. William Leslie, an officer of the 17th Regiment of Infantry, died in the Battle of Princeton. His mother, Scottish noblewoman, Wilhemina Nisbet, recorded her worries and loss in her diary. These entries show how war could affect the lives of women (and men) thousands of miles away from the battlefield. This diary can be found in the Society of the Cincinnati Library, in Washington, D.C.

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Thursd 24.

This day (by a ship arrived at Glasgow), there is an alarming account come to town concerning the 17th Regiment... that a body of provincials had attacked that regiment, (which was upon its march) from behind a hedge, and that the 17th Regiment broke upon them in a furious manner, and had killed about 300, taking their commander... that the loss sustained by the 17th was inconsiderable,----- this is very trying news. May the Lord prepare me to receive the loving perfection of his unerring Providence with becoming meekness and submission. Faith in the overwhelming power and providence of God is the only relief of the mind, believing that nothing can happen without divine permission when very uneasy. Vexing thoughts only in my heart, Lord! Enable me to hope in thee continuously! I am but ill-prepared to receive bad news, but this I know, that whatever happens to my dearest Willy, it will be the Lord's doing, and not a hair of his head will fall to the ground without divine permission...

Sat. 27th February (the day after I received the account of my dear Willy's death.)

This is the day that hurt made wherein I should feel anguish and sorrow. O that it may be after a Godly manner, and that sin, which is the cause of sorrow may not mingle with my tears... about 7 oclock last night I received of my lovely Willy's death.

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If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns

Monday, March 19, 2018

1770s Prussian Army Uniform Plates


Prussian Hussars circa 1776


Dear Reader,

Over "spring break," I had the distinct pleasure to be able to research for my dissertation in Washington D.C. and New York City. I looked at numerous document collections relating to my dissertation on the cultural views of British and Prussian soldiers, but also took a few moments to photograph this collection.

The official title of this collection in German is: Plan von der Koeniglichen Preussischen Armee worinnen ein Officer und Gemeiner von Jeden Regiment zu Sehen.  Roughly, this means, "plan of the Royal Prussian Army with a officer and private from each regiment pictured." Drawn in 1776, this collection displays an officer and soldier from each regiment of the Prussian Army as it appeared in the 1770s. I had the opportunity to photograph it at the Society of the Cincinnati Library, in the Anderson House Museum.

This image collection is not necessarily a great resource for the Seven Years' War era, some of the regiments post-date that conflict. However, it is a source drawn in Berlin within 15 years of the end of the war. Certainly, for any wargamers interested in the Prussian army in the 2nd half of the eighteenth-century, these images are worth a look.










































If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns



















Wednesday, March 14, 2018

Swedish Gå På Tactics During The Great Northern War

Swedish Reenactors 


Dear Reader,

Today we have another excellent guest post focusing on the Karoliner, by historian Mike Glaeser.[1]

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"Never have I seen such a combination of uncontrollable dash and perfectly controlled discipline, such soldiers and such subjects are not to be found the wide world over except in Sweden"[2]
- General Magnus Stenbock after the Battle of Gadebusch, 1712

If students of early modern warfare know one thing about the Swedish Karoliner, it is that they preferred aggressive tactics often executed in the face of overwhelming odds. Their successes in the first half of the Great Northern War bewildered their enemies and endeared the Karoliner to many a historian and wargamer since. Known as Gå På, translated as “go on”, the Swedish tactics emphasized speed over firepower and closing with cold steel.[3] At a time when much of Western European warfare devolved into long and grueling sieges, Gå På allowed the Swedes to play an attacking role and quickly move against a numerically superior foe before excessive firepower could be brought to bear. In this way the Swedes were victorious at Narva (outnumbered 3:1), Klissow (2:1), and Fraustadt (2:1), to name a few. What follows is a brief look at the mindset of the Swedish army, their weapons, and how this combination allowed them to execute Gå På with élan.

Swedish Infantry Formation, Alf Aberg, Karoliner, 156.

Voltaire described the Swedes as “well made, robust, agile and capable of enduring the greatest hardships, hunger and poverty. They are born warriors, full of pride and more brave than industrious” .[4] It is from this stock that the army drew its manpower. Military reforms undertaken by King Charles XI in the 1680s and 90s helped create a strong, unified force that could be sustained in times of peace and quickly mustered for war.[5] The men in each provincial regiment came from the same geographic area which fostered an esprit de corps. Continuous training was a high priority and companies would gather once a month while the full regiment assembled annually for drills under the supervision of the king. They were expected to follow orders without question: “Commands will be carried out soberly and silently without any observation on the part of those whose business it is to obey”.[6] While the men honored their king, they also feared God. Each regiment had an attachment of chaplains who preached the Lutheran creed. Ultimately, God alone decided when and where each soldier would die so it was a moot point to fear death. This religious fatalism allowed the Swedes to march and ride undaunted into enemy fire. Rigorous training, strict discipline, and a shared faith provided the foundations for effective Gå På.

Gå På tactics affected the selection and use of certain weapons. The most notable armament difference between Swedish armies and those of Western Europe was the deployment of the pike. Starting with the Spanish Tercios and Swiss mercenaries of the 1500s, the pike became the queen of the battlefield for much of the following century. It was primarily used as a defensive weapon to help protect matchlock musketeers from cavalry attacks. True to form, the Swedish pike held off a charge of the Polish Crown army at Klissow and then shattered them with two volleys of musket fire. However, the “push of pike” was also a devastating offensive maneuver but one that relied on momentum to see the attack through. With the advent of effective bayonets towards the end of the 17th century, as well as the improvements in gun technology, the pike began to fall out of favor.[7] Nevertheless, the Swedes and Russians tended to make use of the pike throughout the Great Northern War.[8] For the Swedes, the pike suited Gå På tactics perfectly as an offensive shock weapon. Up to one third of each battalion was equipped with the 12-18 foot long weapon with the pikemen taking up the center of the formation. With a typical musket and bayonet amounting to ~6.5 feet, the pike enjoyed a distinct reach advantage. Following the one or two volleys from the musketeers, the entire battalion would charge with pikes leveled.

The Swedes put their faith in the effectiveness of cold steel. While Charles respected firepower, the prevailing belief was that the sword could be more accurate and devastating. At Holowczyn in 1708, “…the king himself went from one battalion to another ordering them above all things, instead of firing, to use their pikes, bayonets and their swords”.[9] All infantry, musketeers and pikemen alike, were equipped with a sword that the king himself had a hand in designing. Once the initial volley was delivered, bayonets would be fixed and swords drawn. The musket with fixed bayonet would be tucked under one arm and the sword leveled in the other. The horse and dragoons had a similar blade and it was used to the same effect. It is worth noting that the blade was straight rather than curved, reinforcing the emphasis on stabbing rather than slashing.

Tent of Augustus the Strong, captured in 1702 by Swedish Karoliner

There is a common perception that Charles had no use for the artillery as it was rarely fielded en masse in his armies. Even the head of the artillery, General Carl Cronstedt, had a similar observation: “At the beginning of the war His Majesty had a sort of contempt for the artillery; but later bitter experience taught him how valuable a weapon it could be”.[10] For Charles and the spirit of Gå På, it was a matter of deployment and speed. Many of Sweden’s victories saw them start the battle as the outnumbered attacker which meant a traditional artillery duel was unsustainable. Deploying cannons could be a time-consuming process and in most cases the Swedes had a tactical disadvantage in terms of terrain. To maintain the initiative, the larger pieces simply had to be kept out.

With morale and discipline established and the appropriate weaponry in place, the Gå På tactic was ready to be unleashed. A provincial infantry regiment consisted of about 1200 Swedes. This was broken down into two battalions and these served as the primary tactical unit. During battle, a battalion would line up four ranks deep with pikes in the center, musketeers on either side, and grenadiers on the flanks. The order to advance would be given by the sound of drums and there are examples of Swedes marching in total silence. At about 40 paces from the enemy, the two front ranks would kneel and the two rear ranks would give fire. The advance would then continue through the cover of the blackpowder smoke to about 20 paces where the two front ranks would fire.[11] General Stenbock’s Instructions stressed holding fire until the foe was within bayonet range.The order was then given to charge and if the enemy unit was not already wavering from being shot at point-blank range, they were now assaulted with sword, bayonet, and pike. At Fraustadt in 1706, some battalions attacked the Saxon lines without firing a single volley. More often than not, the first volley or charge was enough to break a unit and the momentum then carried the Swedes through enemy lines. At the first battle of Narva, the rapidity of the assault allowed the Swedes to close on their opponents with minor casualties and despite being outnumbered three to one, the majority of fighting was over within three hours. The Gå På tactic was devastating against low discipline/ ill-trained units but occasionally proved more problematic against a disciplined foe, especially one that was entrenched like the Russians at Poltava.

Reconstructed Karoliner (Svenska Armeemuseum)

The Swedish cavalry tended to make up around fifty percent of the fighting force. The cavalry was divided between the horse and dragoons although they acted and fought the same way.[12] The tactical unit was the squadron of about 250 men. Deployed on the flanks, the Swedish cavalry tended to move quicker than their enemy counterparts and would charge home at the gallop rather than the trot. The squadron would advance “knee behind knee” with the cornet at the front and each man slightly behind the next to form an arrow. This wedge shape helped punch holes through infantry and cavalry alike. While the horse had pistols and the dragoons their carbines, doctrine decreed that guns should not be fired (unless the attack wasn’t slowed as a result) and the unit should charge home with cold steel.[13] At Klissow in 1702, the Saxon horse surprised the Swedes with a quick deployment through swampy terrain. However, any impetus was lost when the Saxons slowed down and began to caracole .[14] The Swedish cavalry recovered, formed up, and charged with swords. They managed to break the Saxons before turning in on the flank. Here then is a clear example of cold steel having a greater effect than black powder.

If you enjoyed this post, or any of our other posts, please consider liking us on facebook,  or following us on twitter. Finally, we are dedicated to keeping Kabinettskriege ad-free. In order to assist with this, please consider supporting us via the donate button in the upper right-hand corner of the page. As always:

Thanks for Reading,


Mike Glaeser

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[1] Michael Glaeser is an early modern historian specializing in the Great Northern War and the reign of Charles XII of Sweden. He is published in The Great Northern War Compendium and taught history at the University of New Hampshire. He is also an avid reenactor and wargamer. He completed his graduate work at the University of Sheffield, England.
[2]Robert Nisbet Bain, Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, 243.
[3]The “a” has a ring diacritic which gives it a similar pronunciation as “o”. Gå På is therefore pronounced as “go-po”
[4]Voltaire, The History of Charles XII of Sweden, 31.
[5]This was known as the indelningsverk, or allotment system
[6]Charles XI quoted by Alf Aberg, Sweden’s Age of Greatness 1632-1718, 272.
[7]Despite being outdated, Maurice de Saxe still supported use of the pike later in the century.
[8]The Danes, having seen the effectiveness of the pike earlier in the conflict, fielded them when they re-entered the war in 1710.
[9]Robert Frost, The Northern Wars 1558-1721, 274.
[10]Aberg, 284.
[11]David Chandler suggests 40-20 paces whereas Einar Lynth and Lars-Eric Hoglund suggest 70-30.
[12]Dragoons were cheaper to raise and equip but they behaved like cavalry on the battlefield. Their carbines tended to be employed more during foraging missions.
[13]Stenbock, Instructions, Waxjo 1710.
[14]The caracole (Spanish for snail) was a tactic that saw cavalry advance on the enemy at a trot, fire their pistols, and then retreat to the rear to reload while the next rank repeated the same steps.

Wednesday, March 7, 2018

Reenactors and Wargamers: Representing Fear and Flight on Eighteenth-Century Battlefields

These men are not fleeing, nor is there concrete proof they are afraid
Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to examine a vital part of battlefield experience in the eighteenth century: fear and flight. Soldiers ran from eighteenth-century battles. Fear and intimidation, rather than powder or cold steel, were the greatest threats to the battle-plans of eighteenth-century commanders. Despite this, eighteenth-century reenactors rarely portray troops fleeing from the field of battle. At most events, reenactors maintain their geometric formations during the heat of battle, until one side calmly marches away from the battle. This is so ingrained in reenactor imagination that doing anything else provokes shock. I fled from a reenacted battle outside Fredonia, Wisconsin in 2014, and the chief officer looked up with surprise and asked, "what are you doing?" Over my shoulder, I replied, "I'm running away, it was a thing."


Do you have any idea how hard it is to find a picture of reenactors running away?
These guys aren't even running away, that is how hard it is.
Was it, though? Did troops frequently experience fear and flight on eighteenth-century battlefields? Once again, I stand on the shoulders of giants as I write this post. Christopher Duffy, Ilya Berkovich, Matthew Spring, David Blackmore, and many other historians have addressed this topic. Particularly, the essays by Andreas Bähr, Ilya Berkovich, and Marian Füssel in the edited volume Battlefield Emotions, 1500-1800 are worth a read.[1] What do primary sources tell us regarding fear on the battlefield? Did soldiers often speak about their fear? Did they admit to fleeing in the face of the enemy? How should reenactors and wargamers represent these emotions and actions?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, very few soldiers emphasized fleeing in the face of the enemy, particularly during combat. Garrett Watts, a North Carolina Militiamen, stands out as admitting that he was one of the first to flee at the Battle of Camden:
I can state on oath that I believe my gun was the first gun fired not withstanding the orders: for we were close to the (enemy) army, who appeared to maneuver in contempt of us, and I fired without thinking except that I might prevent the man opposite from killing me. The discharge and loud roar soon became general from one end of the lines to the other. Amongst other things, I confess I was amongst the first that fled. The cause of that I cannot tell, except that everyone I saw was about to do the same. It was instantaneous. There was no effect....encouragement to fight... I threw away my gun, and reflecting, I might be punished for being found without arms. I picked up a drum, which gave forth such sounds when touched by the twigs I cast it away...[2]
Carl Roechling's depiction of the Saxon flight in the Battle of Hohenfriedberg
Veterans and military theorists often asserted that everyone in combat felt the effects of fear. French military author Comte Lancelot Turpin de Crissé attempted to describe the nature of fear on the battlefield:
The general must understand his soldiers and go further: the best countenance does not always contain the strongest heart. The coward often feigns courage, but in the moment of combat the veil falls, and the quiet man proves himself a hero. It is not that healthy fear at this moment is reprehensible, men must be allowed a natural shudder in the face of uncertain destruction. The coward gives himself up to his fear, the false hero tried in vain to conceal fear, the hothead, who sees nothing, cannot feel them, and the true soldier represses fear: a good general uses them all to advantage.[3] 
If all soldiers felt fear, how did some of these men processes this experience? It seems that soldiers often felt great fear at the start of a battle, particularly if they were under an artillery bombardment. Once infantrymen began to shoot, or cavalry troops were engaged in combat, was often temporarily replaced by a sense of excitement or detachment. Once the battle developed, fear returned, and men on both sides began to melt away, until a crisis developed, which led to a mass break. Troops on the fleeing side would stream back in the direction that had initially marched from, often will little order.  

How do our sources describe this model of fear and flight in combat? Veterans such as Ulrich Bräker asserted that the greatest moments of fear were before the battle: 
"the powerful shots from Imperial batteries slammed through our regiment, which stood in the middle line. Up to this point, I had hoped to avoid a battle. Now though, I saw no prospect of flight behind me, or to the right or left... my courage had completely vanished, and I would like to have crawled into the earth. I saw a similar fear, noticeable by a sort of deathly paleness, on all faces, even those who had previously bragged of their courage.[4]
Artillery bombardment, particularly when soldiers had no means of replying, was especially terrifying, as Bräker seems to indicate above. Troops frequently attempted to dodge out of the way of artillery fire, and generals who did not make an effort to shelter their waiting troops from artillery faced criticism.[5] 
Prussian soldiers flee 
 Bräker also noted that some soldiers began to drink their small stores of alcohol in order to deal with the stress of the artillery bombardment. Sometimes, soldiers would turn to other substances, or engage in bluster, in order to deal with the stress of combat. Ernst von Barsewisch, a young officer in the Regiment of Meyerinck, or IR 26, recalled of the Battle of Hochkirch,
I had the priviledge that early in the engagement a musket ball penetrated the peak of my hat near my head, and just a moment afterwards, a second ball hit the rear brim of the hat, knocking it from my head. I turned to the Von Hertzbergs [brothers, who were officers in IR 26] and said, "Gentlemen, should I put this hat on, if the Imperials want it? "Yes, indeed," they said, "that hat does you honor." The older von Hertzberg took his snuff tobacco tin in his hand and said, "Gentlemen, take a pinch of courage!" I stepped up to him, took a pinch, and said, "yes, here, we need courage." Von Unruh followed and the younger von Hertzberg brother took the final pinch. At this moment, the older von Hertzberg raised his pinch to his nose, and a musket ball slammed into his forehead. I was at his side, and he cried out, "Lord Jesus!" and turning, fell dead to the ground.[6] 

Revolutionary Troops engaged in combat
  Once the shooting began soldiers often experienced an odd sense of calm, or great excitement, but fear is not often recorded. Soldiers sometimes indicated that they had no fear of death, even in the heat of combat. Sgt. Roger Lamb recalled at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse:
I observed several bodies of Americans drawn up within the distance of a few yards. Whoever has been in an engagement well knows that, in such moments all fears of death are over. Seeing one of the guards among the slain, where I stood, I stopped and replenished my own pouch with the cartridges that remained in his; during the time I was thus employed, several shots were fired at me; but not one took effect. [7]
Urlich Bräker noted that his thoughts were, "in a state of excitement and heat" and that, "our native Prussians and Brandenburgers sprang upon the enemy like furies."[8] This description matches well with Lamb's account, above. Again, we see that during combat, if events were still in the balance, soldiers recalled that the activities of combat itself, not fear, dominated their minds. Once the battle was joined, then, soldiers appear to have felt slightly less fear, which would return at a crisis point in the battle.

Prussian Cuirassier pursuing fleeing French at Rossbach
Crisis points could begin in a relatively isolated way, and travel like lightning across an army.  The Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757, Russian officers observed that once the Prussians, "saw their comrades were running away, they believed it was high time for them to do the same. What an agreeable and entrancing spectacle it was!"[9] Another Russian at the same battle recalled a shout that a local victory had been achieved and that this restored life to troops who had been retreating: "Wherever this shout came from, it produced some undoubtedly good effects. The Second Grenadier Regiment found new stores of courage and went out to attack the enemy once again."[10]

In the later stages of the battle, fear seemed to affect more and more soldiers. Feldprediger [chaplain] Karl Daniel Küster, discussed the phenomenon of "freezing" and fear with the Prussian army in the Seven Years' War.
I have often spoken with both high and low ranking officers, as well as the brave enlisted men, regarding this so-called, "cannon-fever." They are all in one accord that only boastful liars have never felt horror in battle at the prospect of death. They also commented, and I have also noted, that this sense (of cannon-fever) spreads during the early, middle, and last stages of a battle. During the early stages, the strong men support the weak, and a general flight only cccurs when this disabling fear affects the morale of the majority of the army, and both the strong and weak flee together.[11]

Xavier della Gatta's depiction of the Battle of Germantown
Of course, this model does not fit all situations. Some soldiers, even at the opening and middle stages of the battle, felt fear, and wisely took steps to escape the danger they found themselves in. The 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry retreated precipitously from the American forces during the beginning of Battle of Germantown. Martin Hunter recalled, "This was the first time we had ever retreated from the Americans, and it was with the greatest difficulty that we could prevail upon our men to obey orders."[12] Bill Sartain of Butler's Brigade of North Carolina Militia, recalled at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse: "the British were so close that there was no chance for him to escape... [so] he lay there flat on the ground, pretending to be dead, in which he acted his part so well that the enemy did not think worth while even to give him a push with the bayonet..."[13] 

Having discussed fear on the battlefield, let us turn to the experience of flight. Sometimes, fear confronted men after the danger of combat had passed. Karl Daniel Küster, the chaplain encountered earlier, noted that at Hochkirch,
"the so-called cannon-fever or battle-shiver came over me in all of its power. But God graciously granted that this happened later, on the other side of the village of Kitlitz when the danger was almost over. I stood alone, near the regiment, and quickly, a dizzying fear overtook me, fright with trembling limbs, such that I could have been knocked over by a weak child."[14]
 When troops were already moving towards the rear, the appearance of cavalry could produce mass-panic. At Kunersdorf, Johann Jacob Dominicus, a Prussian veteran of IR9, recalled fleeing pell-mell, not during the battle, but when a party of Cossacks appeared during the retreat. In the course of this scene, he recalled, "everyone ran for himself."[15]  Soldiers sometimes recalled hunger and exhaustion as the most pressing thought during flight. Joseph Plumb Martin recalled after the, "rout" at Germantown, "I had now to travel the rest of the day, after marching all day and night before and fighting all morning. I had eaten nothing since noon the preceding day, nor did I eat a morsel till forenoon the next day, and I needed rest as much as victuals."[16] Clearly, being defeated was exhausting work.  Sampson Staniforth gives us a further window into this disappointment. After retreating from the Battle of Rocoux:
Night came on, but, the French still pressing upon us, we retreated all night, till we came near Maestricht. It rained very hard, being the 30th of September, and was exceedingly cold. Toward morning, being out of the reach of the French, we had orders to halt. We had no tents, and it continued raining: however, being well tired, I lay down on the wet ground, put my knapsack under my head, and soon fell fast asleep. In the morning we had orders to march and join the grand army... [we] did so without delay.[17]
Reenactors engaged in a mock fire-fight

 So: How might reenactors and wargamers do a better job representing fear and flight on eighteenth-century battlefields? Let us begin with reenactors. If you are an 18th-century reenactor, and you are standing stationary with no orders while under an artillery bombardment, display a considerable amount of agitation, rather than just standing there. If you are representing an infantryman, and you are being shot at, (safely) feel free to load and fire as fast as you can, until someone in authority convinces you to stop. If your unit has been under fire for a significant amount of time or flanked by enemy soldiers, (safely, with your musket unloaded) run away from the battleline. Go on. Do it. You know you want to.  With any luck, this will create a general spontaneous rout to the rear, disrupting whatever farbery the event organizers and officers had planned.

If, of course, your NCO is a buff, terrifying man, capable of outrunning you, just do whatever he says. In my view, eighteenth-century reenacting is currently at the place envisioned by eighteenth-century officers: that is to say, troops on the battlefield rarely do anything but what officers command. By sometimes (safely) firing spontaneously and if the situation warrants it, (especially if you are losing the battle, or a non-regular) fleeing from combat, you may cause your officers a bit of a headache, but you will be portraying a more realistic past to the public.

It seems these Austrians might be wise to flee from this wargame battle.


Now, on to wargamers. Many rulesets, such as Age of Reason, and Final Argument of Kings,  do an excellent job portraying morale breakdown. I would encourage all gamers to test for morale the first time troops are hit by artillery, particularly if they are otherwise unengaged. I would also suggest that the longer troops remain stationary under this artillery bombardment, the more difficult the test should become. Many rulesets also have tests for seeing friendly troops fleeing the field. This is an excellent rule, one which accurately reflects the realities of battlefield combat. Many of these tests are quite easy to pass, and should be before combat is joined, but once troops are in heavy combat, once one regiment begins to flee, there should be strong incentives for others to do the same. I would also like to suggest that each player, once per round, test for spontaneous good or bad news sweeping the ranks like lightning. Both of these results should be exceedingly rare (double ones or double sixes, perhaps?), but should carry a significant penalty or bonus, perhaps increasing or lowering the morale grade of troops by a quarter or a third.

How else might reenactors or wargames represent fear and flight?

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Thanks for Reading,



Alex Burns


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[1] Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven, Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experience and Imagination.
[2] Garrett Watts, Revolutionary Pension Roll, in Vol. xiv, Sen. Doc. 514, 23rd Cong., 1st sess., 1833-34.
[3] Turpin de Crissé, Essai sur l'art de la guerre, Vol 1, 391.
[4] Ulrich Bräker, Der Arme Mann, 147.
[5] Christopher Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 218-219.
[6] Ernst von Barsewisch, Meine Kriegs-Erlebnisse, 75.
[7] Roger Lamb, Journal,  362.
[8] Ulrich Bräker, Der Arme Mann, 150.
[9] Andrei Bolotov, Zhizn, Vol 1, 539.
[10] Weymarn, "Ueber den ersten Feldzug," Neue Nordische Miscellaneen, 200-1.
[11] Karl Daniel Küster, Bruchstück seines Campagnelebens, 62.
[12] Martin Hunter, Journal of General Martin Hunter, 34.
[13] Eli Caruthers, Interesting Revolutionary Incidents, Vol 2 (Second Series), 161.
[14] Karl Daniel Küster, Bruchstück seines Campagnelebens, 60.
[15] Johann Jacob Dominicus, Tagebuch, 60.
[16] Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, 73-74.
[17] Thomas Jackson, Early Lives of the Methodist Preachers, Vol 4, 137.